Florida/Georgia Personal Injury & Workers Compensation

...tual basis for the denial and permanent bar. The law applicable to Mr. Kauk’s application had been amended in 2011 to permanently preclude the licensure of any applicant who commits a felony involving fraud. The Department cited this bar, found at section 626.207(3), Florida Statutes (2011), as one statutory ground for its decision. As an alternative to section 626.207(3), the Department cited section 626.207(4), Florida Statutes (2011), which provides an absolute fifteen-year disqualification period for a felony involving moral turpitude that is not covered by section 626.207(3)....

...y and health insurance agent in the State of Florida. In its final order, the Department accepted the hearing officer’s findings, in full, while rejecting his conclusions concerning Sandlin, G.W., and the per se bar. The Department maintained that section 626.207(3) must be applied to Mr. Kauk and construed as imposing a permanent bar against his licensure. In addition, despite having accepted the hearing officer’s findings, the Department concluded that even assuming that the Department cannot impose the per se bar of section 626.207(3), the facts underlying Mr. Kauk’s convictions, when considered along with the legislative policy expressed in section 626.207(3), still require denial of his license as an exercise of the Department’s discretion....

...e agency action when “[t]he agency has erroneously interpreted a provision of law and a correct interpretation compels a particular action.” § 120.68(7)(d). The Department’s first error in this case was its clearly erroneous interpretation of section 626.207(3) as requiring denial of Mr. Kauk’s application and imposition of a permanent bar as a matter of law. Section 626.207(3) provides that “[a]n applicant who commits a felony of the first degree; a capital felony; a felony involving money laundering, fraud, or embezzlement; or a felony directly related to the financial services business is permanently...

...t imposing a per se licensure bar against a restored felon, regardless of the lack of a full pardon. 556 So.2d at 465 . Both this Court and the Department are required to follow the precedent established by Sandlin and G.W. and, therefore, interpret section 626.207’s per se bar as not reaching restored felons. We also reject the Department’s claim that section 626.207 is different from the statute at issue in Sandlin because section 626.207 imposes a per se bar only where an applicant has been convicted of a particular type of felony rather than simply any felony. Because interpreting section 626.207 as precluding the licensure of those who have been pardoned of those particular felonies still would “diminish[] the effect of’ an extension of clemency, this distinction is misguided....

...Rather, as required by section 626.641(1), Florida Statutes, Appellant filed his application for reinstatement of his license on January 26, 2012. The Department notified Appellant that his application was denied due to his disqualification for reinstatement under sections 626.207 and 626.621, Florida Statutes (2011)....

...scretion. § 120.68(7)(d)-(e), Fla. Stat. Appellant argues that the Department was bound by its suspension order to reinstate his license after the expiration of the suspension period and upon his application. He further argues that the amendment to section 626.207 requiring the lengthy disqualification period was illegally retroactively applied to his case....

...The Department correctly applied the law to Appellant’s application for reinstatement. Section 626.641, Florida Statutes provides that an applicant for reinstatement “is subject to denial and subject to a waiting period prior to approval on the same grounds that apply to applications for licensure” pursuant to section 626.207, Florida Statutes, and other statutes. Section 626.207(4)(a), Florida Statutes, disqualifies an applicant who has pleaded nolo contendere to a felony involving moral tur *478 pitude and the disqualification period is 15 years from the date Appellant’s probation was terminated....

...reinstatement was not an erroneous interpretation of any provision of law or an exercise of agency discretion in violation of any agency policy, statute, or constitutional provision. § 120.68(7)(d)-(e), Fla. Stat. Likewise, the recent amendment to section 626.207 establishing the 15-year disqualification period (Ch. 2011-174, Laws of Fla.) was not retroactively applied to Appellant’s application. Section 18 of Chapter 2011-174, Laws of Florida, provides “the amendments to s. 626.207, Florida Statutes, made by this act do not apply retroactively and apply only to applicants whose applications are pending or submitted on or after the date that the amendments to s. 626.207, Florida Statutes, made by this act, become law.” The amending act became law in July, 2011. Appellant’s application for reinstatement was submitted on January 26, 2012. Because his application was submitted and pending after July of 2011, it was subject to the amendments to section 626.207....