CopyPublished | Florida 4th District Court of Appeal
...Planning
Council staff’s understanding that the proposed hotel and
marina uses are located within lands designated as a pari-
mutuel by the State of Florida. Based on that information and
in such context of Florida Statute 550.155(2), it would appear
that the proposed use would qualify as a “capital improvement
2
proposed by a permitholder licensed under this chapter to a
pari-mutuel facility existing on June 2...
...Please note that this finding is subject to review and agreement
by the City of Dania Beach. In addition, the proposed uses
must meet any other applicable requirements of Florida
Statutes Chapter 550.
(Emphasis added.) The statute referenced in the letter, section 550.155(2),
Florida Statutes (2011), provides in pertinent part as follows:
A capital improvement proposed by a permitholder licensed
under this chapter to a pari-mutuel facility existing on June
23, 1981, which capital imp...
...The 54 dwelling units and
the park were to be deleted from the plat. According to the supporting
material, the plat was subject to the “Dania Beach Regional Activity
Center” (“RAC”). However, the planning council in consultation with its
attorney and the county attorney determined that based on Chapter
550.155, Florida Statutes, 1 the pari-mutuel facility uses were exempt from
being allocated as part of the RAC....
...A public hearing was held on August 26, 2014, with advance
notice published in the newspaper, posted at City Hall, and mailed to over
6,000 surrounding landowners. Members of the public were allowed to
speak, including Simpson, who expressed concern about the traffic and
1 No changes to section 550.155, Florida Statutes (2011), were made in 2012 or
later....
...ess to determine
the expansion’s impact on the city and its residents. Plaintiffs further
alleged that the development was inconsistent with the city’s code. Finally,
they alleged that the city improperly gave “carte blanche” to DEC based on
section
550.155(2), Florida Statutes.
In the complaint, plaintiffs sought declaratory judgment that section
550.155 did not apply to the Dania Jai Alai expansion, and that the 2011
amended agreement was void as a result. Similarly, they sought a
declaratory judgment that the 2014 agreement also relied on section
550.155 and thus was void. In another count, they sought a declaration
that section
550.155 was void as an unconstitutional special law.
Plaintiffs sought injunctive relief in two other counts pursuant to
section
163.3243, Florida Statute, requesting the court to declare the
official act of approving the development agr...
...this opinion during the intervening years between 2011 and 2014.
5
Plaintiffs also joined the county as a defendant. Plaintiffs alleged the
county “dropped the ball too” because the county misinterpreted section
550.155, Florida Statutes, to exempt existing pari-mutuels from county
land use regulations and review processes. Plaintiffs further alleged that
the county did not investigate whether the Dania Jai Alai facility complied
with section 550.155.
Plaintiffs sought a declaratory judgment with respect to the 2011 and
2014 agreements that the county erroneously relied on section 550.155
because that section did not apply or the county failed to comply with that
section by not applying the county land use code or engaging in
developmental review in connection to the 2011 and 2014 development
agreements.
All defend...
...City of Miami,
393 So. 2d
1197 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981); Upper Keys Citizens,
341 So. 2d at 1064.
Plaintiffs also have standing under section
163.3243, Florida Statutes,
with respect to their claims against DEC and city, except for the
constitutional challenge to section
550.155(2)....
...redressable injury traceable to it because the county did not approve the
development agreements. However, the plaintiffs’ claim is that the county
failed to conduct the review process required by county ordinances for
development applications because it erroneously relied on section 550.155
to exempt review....
...MAY, J., dissents with opinion.
MAY, J., dissenting.
I approach this case from a different vantage point than the majority
and thereby reach a different conclusion. I therefore dissent.
The plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief arguing that: (1)
section 550.155, Florida Statutes (2011), did not apply to the Dania Jai
Alai expansion; (2) the 2011 and 2014 development agreements were void
as noncompliant with the City of Dania’s zoning ordinances and Broward
County’s land use code; and (3) section 550.155 was an unconstitutional
special law. They alleged the county did not investigate whether the Dania
Jai Alai expansion complied with section 550.155.
The Dania Entertainment Center, LLC (“DEC”) and the City of Dania
(“City”) responded that section 550.155 applied and exempted the Jai Alai
expansion and development agreements from the City’s relevant zoning
ordinances....
...trial court addressed, the majority does not reach the other issues raised
by the defendants in their motions for summary judgment. And yet, the
defendants alternatively moved for summary judgment on the basis that
the development agreements were properly approved pursuant to section
550.155, obviating the need for compliance with the City’s zoning
ordinances....
...Because the Tipsy Coachman rule allows us to affirm a trial
court if its decision is supported by a different reason properly raised, I
think it important to address this alternative basis for an affirmance. Dade
Cnty. Sch. Bd. v. Radio Station WQBA,
731 So. 2d 638 (Fla. 1999).
I would begin with the simple premise that section
550.155(2), Florida
Statutes (2011), presupposes approval of a pari-mutuel facility’s capital
improvement with certain caveats....
...ets the following criteria:
(a) The improvement does not qualify as a development of
regional impact as defined in s.
380.06; and
(b) The improvement is contiguous to or within the existing
pari-mutuel facility site[.]
§
550.155(2), Fla....
...justifiable and immediate hazard to the health and safety of its residents.
It did not qualify as a development of regional impact, and it is contiguous
to or within the existing parimutuel facility site. The DEC’s capital
improvement was therefore subject to approval pursuant to section
550.155(2). Case closed.
The plaintiffs suggest however that section 550.155(2) is
unconstitutional because it is a special law that was impermissibly
enacted as a general law in violation of Florida’s Constitution....
...Such is not the
case for these plaintiffs.
Perhaps more importantly, any challenge to the section’s
constitutionality has long since been time-barred. There is a four-year
statute of limitations for such constitutional challenges. See Milan Inv.
Grp., Inc. v. City of Miami,
50 So. 3d 662, 664 (Fla. 3d DCA 2010). Section
550.155(2) was enacted over twenty years ago on July 1, 2000....
CopyPublished | Florida 4th District Court of Appeal
...His letter provided:
Based on the information provided by you, it is Planning
Council staff’s understanding that the proposed hotel and
marina uses are located within lands designated as a pari-
mutuel by the State of Florida. Based on that information and
in such context of Florida Statute 550.155(2), it would appear
that the proposed use would qualify as a “capital improvement
proposed by a permitholder licensed under this chapter to a
pari-mutuel facility existing on June 23, 1981.”
In consultation with t...
...by the City of Dania Beach. In addition, the proposed uses
must meet any other applicable requirements of Florida
Statutes Chapter 550.
2
(Emphasis added).
The statute referenced in the letter, section 550.155(2), Florida Statutes
(2011), provides in pertinent part as follows:
A capital improvement proposed by a permitholder licensed
under this chapter to a pari-mutuel facility existing on June
23, 1981, which capital imp...
...The DEC
intervened in the proceedings.
In 2011 and 2012, the County approved two plat note amendments to
the Dania Jai-Alai Plat. 1 The planning council, in consultation with its
attorney and the County attorney, determined the pari-mutuel facility uses
were exempt from being allocated as part of the RAC, pursuant to section
550.155....
...They alleged the City failed to comply with the review
requirements of its own code and development review process to determine
the expansion’s impact on the City and its residents. And finally, they
alleged the City improperly gave “carte blanche” to the DEC based on
section
550.155(2), Florida Statutes (2011).
The plaintiffs sought a declaration that section
550.155 did not apply
to the Dania Jai Alai expansion, and the 2011 amended agreement was
void as a result. Similarly, they sought a declaration that the 2014
development agreement was void. They also sought a declaration that
section
550.155 was void as an unconstitutional special law.
The plaintiffs sought injunctive relief in two other counts, pursuant to
section
163.3243....
...comply with the public notice and hearing requirements of section
163.3225. They sought to compel the City to comply with section
163.3225.
The plaintiffs added the County as a defendant. They alleged the
County “dropped the ball too” because it misinterpreted that section
550.155 exempted existing pari-mutuels from County land use regulations
and review processes. The plaintiffs alleged the County did not investigate
whether the Dania Jai Alai facility complied with section
550.155.
The plaintiffs also sought a declaration that the County erroneously
relied on section
550.155 because that section did not apply.
Alternatively, the County failed to apply its land use code or engage in
developmental review in connection to the 2011 and 2014 development
agreements.
All defendants answered, asserting multiple defenses, including the
plaintiffs lacked standing....
...and public hearing on the next, but the City did not follow either the
Florida Local Development Agreement Act, section
163.3221, et seq. or its
own land use code. 5 The commission voted to approve each agreement,
affirmatively refusing to apply its code, concluding that section
550.1555(2), Florida Statutes (2011) prohibited their application....
...The allegations are not challenges to the substantive zoning
decision, but challenges to the procedure for approving the development
agreements. Furthermore, appellants’ complaint alleged that the City
affirmatively failed to follow its code provisions by its application of section
550.155....
...counts based upon the tipsy coachman principle. 7
Finally, the City and County both argue that the trial court should be
affirmed on the tipsy coachman principle, because even if appellants have
standing, the City’s actions in approving the development agreement were
required by section 550.155. While the majority has not addressed this
issue because they affirm on the standing issue, I must address why I
would still reverse. I disagree that tipsy coachman should apply, because
there remain material issues of fact as to how section 550.155 should be
applied.
Appellants claim in the complaint that the City and County improperly
failed to apply their land use codes, because they erroneously found that
the pari-mutuel facility was exempt from their application pursuant to
section 550.155. There are several reasons to support their claim that the
governmental entities are not exempt from following their own ordinances
in development approval.
Section 550.155 provides:
A capital improvement proposed by a permitholder licensed
under this chapter to a pari-mutuel facility existing on June
23, 1981, which capital improvement requires, pursuant to
any municipal or coun...
...Radio Station WQBA,
731 So.2d 638, 644–45
(Fla.1999).
17
(a) The improvement does not qualify as a development of
regional impact as defined in s.
380.06; and
(b) The improvement is contiguous to or within the existing
pari-mutuel facility site[.]
§
550.155(2), Fla....
...that date, and thus the statute would not apply to any improvement of the
expanded facility.
Finally, there is a material issue of fact as to what property is
“contiguous to or within the existing pari-mutuel facility site.” See §
18
550.155(2)(b), Fla....
...Given the definition of pari-mutuel facility in the
statute, property across a street that was dedicated to the City would not
qualify, even if the development agreement provided that the City was to
vacate the street.
For those reasons, I do not think a tipsy coachman resolution is merited
based on section 550.155(2), Florida Statutes.
WARNER, J., dissenting.
I dissent, because I believe that the standing issue is governed by the
third category set forth in Renard v....
...and public hearing on the next, but the City did not follow either the
Florida Local Development Agreement Act, section
163.3221, et seq. or its
own land use code. 8 The commission voted to approve each agreement,
affirmatively refusing to apply its code, concluding that section
550.1555(2), Florida Statutes (2011) prohibited their application....
...The allegations are not challenges to the substantive zoning
decision, but challenges to the procedure for approving the development
agreements. Furthermore, appellants’ complaint alleged that the City
affirmatively failed to follow its code provisions by its application of section
550.155....
...counts based upon the tipsy coachman principle. 10
Finally, the City and County both argue that the trial court should be
affirmed on the tipsy coachman principle, because even if appellants have
standing, the City’s actions in approving the development agreement were
required by section
550.155. While the majority has not addressed this
issue because they affirm on the standing issue, I must address why I
would still reverse. I disagree that tipsy coachman should apply, because
there remain material issues of fact as to how section
550.155 should be
applied.
Appellants claim in the complaint that the City and County improperly
failed to apply their land use codes, because they erroneously found that
the pari-mutuel facility was exempt from their application pursuant to
10 Dade Cnty. Sch. Bd. v. Radio Station WQBA,
731 So.2d 638, 644–45
(Fla.1999).
24
section
550.155. There are several reasons to support their claim that the
governmental entities are not exempt from following their own ordinances
in development approval.
Section
550.155 provides:
A capital improvement proposed by a permitholder licensed
under this chapter to a pari-mutuel facility existing on June
23, 1981, which capital improvement requires, pursuant to
any municipal or coun...
...following criteria:
(c) The improvement does not qualify as a development of
regional impact as defined in s.
380.06; and
(d) The improvement is contiguous to or within the existing
pari-mutuel facility site[.]
§
550.155(2), Fla....
...existing on
that date, and thus the statute would not apply to any improvement of the
expanded facility.
Finally, there is a material issue of fact as to what property is
“contiguous to or within the existing pari-mutuel facility site.” See §
550.155(2)(b), Fla....
...Given the definition of pari-mutuel facility in the
statute, property across a street that was dedicated to the City would not
qualify, even if the development agreement provided that the City was to
vacate the street.
For those reasons, I do not think a tipsy coachman resolution is merited
based on section 550.155(2), Florida Statutes.
* * *
Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
26
