CopyCited 6 times | Published | Florida 1st District Court of Appeal | 1990 Fla. App. LEXIS 3788, 1990 WL 71623
...Ordinarily, the claimant drove a police vehicle to and from work, but on the day of the accident, her assigned van was in the shop for repairs. The City controverted the claim, arguing that the accident did not arise out of and in the course and scope of claimant's employment as defined in section 440.091, Florida Statutes (1985)....
...ary responsibility, and (3) Was not engaged in services for which he was paid by a private employer ... the employee shall be deemed to have been acting in the course of employment. Without elaboration, the judge of compensation claims (judge) found section 440.091, Florida Statutes, inapplicable under the facts of this case....
...Nieves, supra , this court held, on the authority of Sweat and Warg, that an officer was eligible for workers' compensation for the injury he sustained when his car rolled over his foot as the officer was preparing to depart from home to work. The passage of section 440.091 in 1982 (Chapter 82-146, Laws of Florida (1982)) abrogated the rule of law first announced in Sweat, and we find no basis for concluding, as the judge did, that this section is inapplicable in this case....
...It is undisputed that the officer in this case was neither investigating a crime nor enforcing the law when she was injured; thus, the officer was not discharging her primary responsibility at time of the accident. Accordingly, the accident did not occur within the course of employment under section 440.091, and the injuries resulting from that accident are therefore not compensable....
CopyCited 3 times | Published | Florida 1st District Court of Appeal | 1990 Fla. App. LEXIS 7578, 1990 WL 146791
...law has established police officers as a special category to whom the "going and coming" rule, which might otherwise exclude coverage for injuries sustained while traveling to and from work, does not fully apply. But the judge erroneously construed section 440.091, Florida Statutes, as precluding coverage in the present case....
...ch officers sustain while traveling to and from work may be compensated under the Florida Workers' Compensation Law. See Warg v. City of Miami Springs,
249 So.2d 3 (Fla. 1971); Sweat v. Allen,
200 So. 348 (Fla. 1941). In 1982 the legislature adopted section
440.091, Florida Statutes, which specifies when law enforcement officers should be considered to be acting within the course of their employment....
...Abrams,
561 So.2d 1294 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990), this court determined that a forensic detective who was involved in an automobile accident while traveling to work was not discharging her "primary responsibility" and was thus not entitled to compensation since under section
440.091 her injury did not occur within the course of the employment....
...Claimant was discharging this primary responsibility while traveling to the police station, and it was not necessary to actually issue a citation or take any affirmative action in this regard for the officer to be within the course of his employment as delineated in section 440.091....
CopyCited 3 times | Published | Florida 1st District Court of Appeal | 1990 WL 188964
...Section
440.09, Florida Statutes, provides, in pertinent part, that "[c]ompensation shall be payable under this chapter in respect of disability or death of an employee if the disability or death results from an injury arising out of and in the course of employment." Section
440.091, Florida Statutes, specifically delineates the circumstances under which law enforcement officers act within the course of their employment for purposes of coverage by the workers' compensation law. That section provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
440.091 Law enforcement officer; when acting within the course of employment....
...(Emphasis added.) The fact that a law enforcement officer is on call for duty and has a police radio and other indicia of his authority in his possession is not dispositive in determining whether an off-duty officer is acting within the course of his employment. Rather, the issue, pursuant to the provisions of Section 440.091, is whether the officer is carrying out his primary responsibility, which is the "prevention or detection of crime or the enforcement of the penal, criminal, traffic, or highway laws of the state." Accordingly, in City of Ft....
...igation kit and police radio in her car. Since it was undisputed that the police officer was not discharging a "primary responsibility" at the time of the accident, we held that the accident had not occurred within the course of her employment under Section 440.091....
...n duty, but was not actually on duty when the accident occurred. Further, the claimant here, like the claimant in Abrams, but unlike the claimant in Hanstein, was not then in the process of carrying out any "primary responsibility," as delineated by Section 440.091, Florida Statutes....
CopyCited 3 times | Published | Florida 4th District Court of Appeal | 2007 WL 1610156
...n call for duty and has a police radio and other indicia of his authority in his possession is not dispositive in determining whether an off-duty officer is acting within the course of his employment. Rather, the issue, pursuant to the provisions of Section 440.091, is whether the officer is carrying out his primary responsibility, which is the "prevention or detection of crime or the enforcement of the penal, criminal, traffic, or highway laws of the state." Id. The court concluded that although the claimant was fully prepared to be called on duty, he was not actually on duty when the accident occurred. Id. at 1061. He was not in the process of carrying out any "primary responsibility" as delineated by Section 440.091, Florida Statutes....
CopyCited 3 times | Published | Florida 1st District Court of Appeal | 1988 WL 31730
...olice department at the time of his injury. The court indicated in that opinion that there might be circumstances in which an off-duty police officer would be considered the employee of the off-duty employer. Such a circumstance exists in this case. Section 440.091, Florida Statutes (1985), provides that an injured law enforcement officer "shall be deemed to have been acting within the course of employment" at the time of the injury if he was discharging his "primary responsibility" (prevention...
...In that case, the claimant was unequivocally performing a police function, responding to his duty as a police officer to investigate a crime in his presence, and was not performing a service for which he was hired by the private employer. Under those circumstances, section 440.091 provides that he should be deemed to have been acting within the course of his employment with the City of Hialeah at the time of his injury....
...Hospital, checking the emergency room parking lot to see that the spaces reserved for ambulances were not being used by other vehicles, and testified that he was not performing a police function at the time he was injured. Under these circumstances, section 440.091 provides that he should not be deemed to have been acting within the course of his employment with the City of Miami Beach at the time of his injury....
CopyAgo (Fla. Att'y Gen. 1992).
Published | Florida Attorney General Reports
...Chapter 440 , F.S., is the Workers' Compensation Law. 1 The provision with which you are concerned is contained in s.
440.15 (11), F.S., and states, in part, that: Any law enforcement officer . . . who, while acting within the course of employment as provided by s.
440.091 , 2 is maliciously or intentionally injured and who thereby sustains a job-connected disability compensable under this chapter shall be carried in full-pay status rather than being required to use sick, annual, or other leave....
...volved. Thus, the phrase "maliciously or intentionally injured" as used in s.
440.15 (11), F.S., refers to an injury which is inflicted with the desire to harm a law enforcement officer or one which is done deliberately. 11 1 Section
440.01 , F.S. 2 Section
440.091 , F.S., provides that if an employee: (1) Is elected, appointed, or employed full time by a municipality, the state, or any political subdivision and is vested with authority to bear arms and make arrests and his primary responsibilit...
...his public employer had no agreement providing for workers' compensation coverage for that private employment; then the employee is deemed to have been acting within the course of his or her employment. Included within the term "employee" as used in s. 440.091 , F.S., are "all certified supervisory and command personnel whose duties include, in whole or in part, responsibilities for the supervision, training, guidance, and management of full-time law enforcement officers, part-time law enforceme...
CopyPublished | Florida 5th District Court of Appeal
...was not in the process of carrying out a ‘primary responsibility’ of his job as
a police officer” because he “was not engaged in the ‘prevention or detection
of crime or the enforcement of the penal, criminal, traffic, or highway laws of
the State.’” Id. at 7 (quoting section 440.091(1)(a), Florida Statutes, which
addresses when a law enforcement officer is acting within the scope of his
employment for workers’ compensation purposes)....
CopyPublished | Florida 1st District Court of Appeal | 2014 Fla. App. LEXIS 9970, 2014 WL 2925253
...He decided to take steps to protect other motorists from the hazard, but ran into the tractor-trailer before he could do so. The question we address is whether Deputy Allen’s injuries are compensable because he was “acting within the course of employment” under section
440.091(1), Florida Statutes, or non-compensable because he was “going to or coming from” work under
440.092(2), Florida Statutes....
...Fla. Stat. Noting that the section’s two exceptions did not apply (the injury did not occur “during the officer’s work period or while going to or coming from work in an official law enforcement vehicle”), the JCC turned to the provisions of section 440.091(1), which provides that an “employee is considered to have been acting within the course of employment” if the employee: (a) Is elected, appointed, or employed full time by a municipality, the state, or any political subdivision a...
...ests,” the JCC analyzed whether an off-duty police officer who is “suddenly thrust” into the “performance of an official duty” meets the statutory test. In reviewing the statute’s language and caselaw on the topic, the JCC concluded that section 440.091(1) applies where an “officer’s duty status” changes due to intervening events that require the performance of the “employee’s primary responsibility,” which statutorily must be “the prevention or de *1152 tection of crime or the enforcement of the penal, criminal, traffic, or highway laws of the state[.]” Id. § 440.091(l)(a)....
...guard the drivers on the road and resolve the hazard as required by the Levy County Sheriffs Office standards of conduct.” For these reasons, the JCC concluded that Deputy Allen established he was “acting within the course of employment” under section
440.091(1) because he was discharging his primary responsibility at the time of the accident. The employer/carrier argued that that section
440.092(2) applies because it is an exception to and more specific than
440.091(1), but the JCC determined that both sections contain “exceptions to the going and coming rule as it relates to law enforcement officers, and each provides criteria that must be met before an accident is deemed to have occurred in the cours...
...ployment.” The JCC thereby concluded that Deputy Allen’s accident was compensable, which the employer/carrier now appeals. II. The employer-carrier raises three issues, two of which are inter-related and involve the scope and purpose of sections
440.091(1) and
440.092(2); the third involves a claim that Deputy Allen was not a “full time” employee, but competent substantial evidence supports that he was. On the main issues, the employer-carrier asserts that because Deputy Allen was off-duty and on his way to work, section
440.092(2) applies to the exclusion of section
440.091(1)....
...to or coming from work in an official law enforcement vehicle,” neither of which apply in this case. Because neither of the exceptions apply, the employer-carrier’s view is that no accident can ever be compensable — even if the requirements of section
440.091(1) are otherwise met — if an officer is in the process of going to/coming from work, even if interrupted by an event that requires the officer to engage in action required of the officer as part of his official responsibilities. But section
440.092(2) cannot be read to extinguish the intended scope of section
440.091(1), which provides that officers (who otherwise fulfill the other statutory requirements) engaging in their “primary responsibility” are considered acting within the course of employment regardless of whether they happen to be going to/coming from work....
...for the official acts of an officer. Here, because Deputy Alen was driving his personal vehicle to work, an accident ordinarily would not be compensable. But extraordinary intervening events made the *1153 fact he was going to work irrelevant under section 440.091(1)....
...He was a full-time deputy with the “authority to bear arms and make arrests” who happened upon a situation that his employer deemed by written policy to require Deputy Allen to intervene. At that moment, Deputy Allen was no longer “going to work” but instead was — for purposes of section 440.091(1)— engaged in his “primary responsibility” which was “the prevention or detection of crime or the enforcement of the penal, criminal, traffic, or highway laws of the state” as the Levy County policy required....
...hat his employment required him to' intervene in the dangerous situation that confronted him and other motorists — a factual finding that is not contested — his status changed from a mere commuter to one falling squarely within the parameters of section
440.091(1), thereby supporting the JCC’s legal conclusion that he was acting within the course of his employment and his accident compensable. That Deputy Allen falls within the criteria for compensability in section
440.091(1) is not inconsistent with the history and purpose of section
440.092(2), • which was adopted in 1990 and stated: Going or coming....
...This Court found that the officer was discharging his “primary responsibility while traveling to the police station, and it was not necessary to actually issue a citation or take any affirmative action in this regard for the officer to be within the course of his employment as delineated in section 440.091.” Id....
...ument that no appellate court has addressed since section
440.092(2) was amended in 2001. But as mentioned earlier, we view the current, post-2001 version of section
440.092(2), as not inconsistent with a finding of compensability in this case under section
440.091(1)....
...in which a presumption of compensability arises as exceptions to its general “going or coming” provisions. We divine no legislative intent that the addition of these two exceptions in 2001 were intended to alter the long-standing principle under section 440.091(1) that the status of an off-duty law enforcement officer can change to on-duty when a situation arises requiring the officer’s exercise of her primary responsibility....
CopyPublished | District Court of Appeal of Florida | 1997 Fla. App. LEXIS 257, 1997 WL 26465
...scene of the accident was not enough to place this accident within the course and scope of employment. The JCC erred not only in finding Schiel was acting within the course and scope of his employment at the time of the injury but also in relying on section 440.091, Florida Statutes (1993). Section 440.091 creates an exception to the deviation rule for law enforcement officers such that officers are within the course of their employment when they are acting in discharge of their “primary responsibility” as long as they are not being paid by a private employer and the public employer had no agreement providing for workers’ compensation coverage for that private employment. § 440.091, Fla....
CopyAgo (Fla. Att'y Gen. 2005).
Published | Florida Attorney General Reports
...An injured employee is entitled to compensation under the statute only if he or she was an employee of the employer at the time of the injury and the accidental compensable injury or death arose out of work performed in the course and the scope of employment. Section 440.091 , Florida Statutes, addresses when a law enforcement officer is acting within the scope of his or her employment....
...mployee of the hospital. The court found that the off-duty officer was performing a service for which he was paid by the hospital and was not performing a police function at the time he was injured. Under these circumstances the court concluded that section 440.091 , Florida Statutes, provides that the officer should not be deemed to have been acting within the course of his employment with the City of Miami Beach at the time of his injury....
...s do not also constitute a service for which he or she is paid by a private employer, unless the public employer had agreed to provide workers' compensation coverage for the private employment. Accordingly, I am of the opinion that the provisions of section 440.091 , Florida Statutes, govern whether a police officer working off-duty is covered by the city workers' compensation plan....
...f work performed in the course and scope of employment is the major contributing cause of the injury or death." 3 Cf. Klyse v. City of Largo ,
765 So.2d 270 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000), review denied ,
789 So.2d 344 (Fla. 2001), in which the court held that s.
440.091 , Fla....
CopyPublished | Florida 1st District Court of Appeal | 1998 Fla. App. LEXIS 15969, 1998 WL 883281
...Section
440.09(1), Florida Statutes, limits an employee's right to obtain workers' compensation benefits to injuries "arising out of work performed in the course and the scope of employment." Whether a police officer was acting in the course of employment is an issue governed by a special rule. As provided in section
440.091, Florida Statutes, a police officer who was discharging a primary law enforcement responsibility "shall be deemed to have been acting in the course of employment" regardless of the officer's duty status at the time....
...ugh she had her crime scene investigation kit and police radio with her at the time of her automobile accident. As these cases illustrate, the officer must be engaged in a primary law enforcement duty at the time of the event that caused the injury. Section 440.091 is often applied when an off-duty police officer is suddenly thrust into *1232 a situation that requires the performance of an official duty....
...ot into an argument with a man who happened to be a potential suspect. In short, the encounter in the bar did not occur "under circumstances reasonably consistent" with the manner in which an officer's primary responsibility would be discharged. See § 440.091(2) Fla.Stat....
...Therefore, he was not entitled to recover workers' compensation benefits for the injuries he sustained. Reversed. BOOTH and VAN NORTWICK, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] This case is governed by the law in effect in 1987, but the applicable statute remains unchanged in the present version of the Workers' Compensation Law. See § 440.091 Fla.Stat....
CopyPublished | Florida 1st District Court of Appeal | 1992 Fla. App. LEXIS 12817, 1992 WL 365349
...Southern Intermodal Logistics,
380 So.2d 1145 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980). Because the E/C presented no evidence of a subsequent substantial deviation, the claim was compensable. Metropolitan Dade County v. Nieves,
440 So.2d 434, 435 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983). We reject the E/C’s contention that section
440.091, Florida Statutes, requires affirmance....
CopyPublished | Florida 1st District Court of Appeal | 2000 Fla. App. LEXIS 10325, 2000 WL 1152519
WOLF, J. This is an appeal from an order denying compensability of an automobile accident on March 10, 1998. Appellant alleges that the judge of compensation claims (JCC) mistakenly applied section 440.091, Florida Statutes, to an officer who is on duty at the time of the accident....
...The claimant filed a petition for benefits for injuries sustained in that accident. At the hearing on the claim, the employer/carrier defended on the grounds that the accident was not within the course and scope of employment, and the claimant was not discharging responsibilities of a law enforcement officer per section 440.091, Florida Statutes....
...required to carry their identification, their radio, their handcuffs, and their weapons. The JCC found that the officer’s radio was on at the time of the accident, and the claimant testified that he had his badge, gun, and identification with him. Section 440.091, Florida Statutes (1997), provides that a full-time law enforcement officer who is discharging his primary re *272 sponsibility within the state in a place and under circumstances reasonably consistent with that primary responsibility...
...e course of employment for the purposes of workers’ compensation. In City of Fort Lauderdale v. Abrams,
561 So.2d 1294 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990), and Palm Beach County Sheriffs Office v. Ginn,
570 So.2d 1059 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990), we held that pursuant to section
440.091, Florida Statutes, an off-duty officer who is not carrying out his primary responsibilities is not acting within the course of his employment for workers’ compensation purposes....
...for duty and has a police radio and other indicia of his authority in his possession is not dispositive in determining whether an off-duty officer is acting within the course of his employment.” Ginn,
570 So.2d at 1060 . We conclude, however, that section
440.091, Florida Statutes, does not apply to on-duty officers. In Abrams , we determined that one of the purposes of section
440.091, Florida Statutes, was to abrogate the decision in Sweat v....
...anged; the officer was never considered to be off duty because the accident occurred during regular working hours while the officer was on call. In Gilreath v. Charlotte County Bd. of County Comm’rs,
610 So.2d 88 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992), we found that section
440.091, Florida Statutes, does not diminish a law enforcement officer’s rights under the Workers’ Compensation Act. We determine here that section
440.091 is inapplicable to an officer who is on duty during his normal working hours; therefore, the officer here should be provided protection under the workers’ compensation statute....
