Florida/Georgia Personal Injury & Workers Compensation

...custody on the effective date of the Act (January 1, 1999) and thus the trial court was without jurisdiction to entertain the commitment petition. The district court agreed, granted Atkinson's petition, and ordered the trial court to discharge him. Section 394.925, Florida Statutes (2001), [3] provides in pertinent part that the Ryce Act "applies to all persons currently in custody who have been convicted of a sexually violent offense." The district court determined that the custody requirement must be read to require lawful custody....

...lt in unreasonable, harsh, or absurd consequences. See Thompson v. State, 695 So.2d 691, 693 (Fla.1997); State v. Hamilton, 660 So.2d 1038, 1045 (Fla.1995). It would be contrary to the basic tenets of fairness and due process if we were to interpret section 394.925 as requiring only actual custody....

...ANSTEAD, C.J., and PARIENTE, LEWIS, and QUINCE, JJ., concur. HARDING, Senior Justice, dissents with an opinion, in which SHAW and WELLS, JJ., concur. HARDING, Senior Justice, dissenting. I do not agree with the majority's interpretation of the "in custody" requirement in section 394.925....

...ct appellate procedure." Malone v. Meres, 91 Fla. 709, 720, 109 So. 677, 682 (1926). If a court has jurisdiction of the subject matter and of the parties, the proceeding is not a nullity and the judgment is not void. King. The custody requirement in section 394.925 falls outside the categories of subject matter and personal jurisdiction that would result in a void judgment....

...Thus, he was lawfully held at the time the Ryce Act took effect on January 1, 1999, and *177 was only entitled to an earlier release date after he became subject to the Ryce Act. I do not see how this could be labeled "unfair" under any objective standard. Thus, I would interpret section 394.925 as only requiring actual custody on the date the Act took effect....

...requires only good faith actual custody of the individual against whom a commitment petition is filed. Furthermore, in order to comport with due process guarantees, I would interpret the qualifying sexually violent offense conviction requirement in section 394.925 as a jurisdictional prerequisite....

...ced under those guidelines were entitled to resentencing under the previous guidelines. [3] The Ryce Act was amended and renumbered effective May 26, 1999. Section 916.45, the predecessor statute addressed by the district court below, now appears at section 394.925....

...at 503; see § 394.912(4), (10), Fla. Stat. (1999). This language sufficiently guides the jury and, as we held in White, it satisfies the constitutional requirements explained in Crane. II. The meaning of "Custody" for Purposes of the Ryce Act Hale next argues, citing section 394.925, Florida Statutes (1999), that the Ryce Act does not apply to him because when the civil commitment petition was filed he was not in custody for a sexually violent offense....

...court had agreed that the probationary portion of his sentence could be served out of state. This is an incorrect statement of the law. The Act applies to all persons convicted of sexually violent offenses who are sentenced to total confinement. See § 394.925, Fla....

...Gordon then filed the present petition for writ of prohibition, seeking to have the involuntary commitment proceedings dismissed. [2] The Act, by its terms, applies to persons who committed the predicate sexually violent offense prior to the effective date of the Act. Section 394.925 is entitled "Applicability of act" and states: "This part applies to all persons currently in custody who have been convicted of a sexually violent offense, as that term is defined in s. 394.912(9), as well as to all persons convicted of a sexually violent offense and sentenced to total confinement in the future." [3] Thus, section 394.925 contemplates that, in order for the Act to apply, the person must be in custody or in "total confinement." "Total confinement" means that the person is currently being held in any physically secure facility being operated or contractu...

...Clearly, that person would be securely guarded during the transfer to the secure facility. Under section 394.9135(1), a person against whom involuntary civil commitment proceedings are appropriately commenced will always be in custody immediately prior to the commencement of the proceedings. Accordingly, we hold that section 394.925, which states that the Act applies to all persons "currently in custody" or "sentenced to total confinement in the future," in conjunction with the other provisions in the Act, provides that involuntary civil commitment proceedings ma...

...olent predator petition and to order that Mr. Gordon be released from the custody of the DCF. WHATLEY and NORTHCUTT, JJ., Concur. NOTES [1] The Act could be applicable to Mr. Gordon in the future should he ever be sentenced to total confinement. See § 394.925....

...[3] The effective date of the Involuntary Civil Commitment of Sexually Violent Predators Act was January 1, 1999. Atkinson v. State, 791 So.2d 537 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001), aff'd, 831 So.2d 172 (Fla.2002). [4] In State v. Atkinson, 831 So.2d 172 (Fla. 2002), our supreme court held that the custody requirement imposed by section 394.925, Florida Statutes (2001), must be read to require that the custody was lawful....

...the foundation of the case"). Because the act does not link current incarceration to the sexually violent crime, and expressly includes convictions for such crimes from jurisdictions other than Florida, we hold that the act does apply to appellant. Section 394.925, Florida Statutes (2000) provides: Applicability of act....

...r state or in federal court, the agency with jurisdiction shall give written notice to the multidisciplinary team and a copy to the state attorney of the circuit where the person was last convicted of any offense in this state. Appellant argues that section 394.925, which makes the act applicable to those "currently in custody who have been convicted of a sexually violent offense" is unclear....

...However, there is a substantial distinction between the Jimmy Ryce Act, which was the legislative enactment that was addressed in Atkinson, and the PRR Act that is involved here. The Jimmy Ryce Act "`applies to all persons currently in custody who have been convicted of a sexually violent offense.' " Id. at 173 (quoting § 394.925, Fla....

...currently in custody who have been convicted of a sexually violent offense ... as well as to all persons convicted of a sexually violent offense and sentenced to total confinement in the future." Ch. 99-222, § 20, at 1385, Laws of Fla. (codified at § 394.925, Fla....

...r DJJ and is being held in any other secure facility. § 394.912(11), Fla. Stat. (1999). Thus, total confinement means that the person is in state custody. As amended in 1999, the Act applies in two different circumstances. Under the first clause of section 394.925, the Act applies to all persons in custody on the effective date of the Act, January 1, 1999, who have been convicted of a sexually violent offense....

...the effective date if they have been convicted of a sexually violent offense and they are sentenced to total confinement after the effective date of the Act, i.e., "in the future." Ward contends that both of the requirements in the second clause of section 394.925 must occur in the future....

...custody at the time the Act took effect) and involved the pre-1999 version of the Act, we find our reasoning in Hale applicable to the instant case. The statutory definition of a sexually violent offense applies to both clause one and clause two of section 394.925 and still includes federal convictions and convictions in other states....

...nt confinement need not be for a sexual offense as long as the individual has been convicted of a sexually violent offense sometime in the past. See Ward, 936 So.2d at 1147-49. We agree that these other provisions of the Act, when read together with section 394.925, "lead to the conclusion that the legislature did not intend that the [amended] Act apply only to persons currently incarcerated for sexually violent offenses." Hale, 891 So.2d at 521....

...Judge Cope's Opinion I would quash the decision under review and adopt Judge Cope's opinion in full as properly construing the meaning of the statute in question: The question before us is how to interpret the portion of the Jimmy Ryce Act which defines who is eligible for civil commitment. See § 394.925, Fla....

..."Provisions of the original act or section which are repeated in the body of the amendment, either in the same or equivalent words, are considered a continuation of the original law." 1A Norman J. Singer, Statutes and Statutory Construction § 22:33, at 392 (2002).[n. 9] [N. 9.] The amendment at issue here stated: 394.925 916.45 Applicability of act.—This part applies Sections 916.31-916.49 apply to all persons currently in custody who have been convicted of a sexually violent offense, as that term is defined in s....

...Section III, titled "Effect of Proposed Changes," follows the order of Section II and spells out what the amended bill would mean to each section. Included here is a subsection titled "Miscellaneous," that explains, "Section 20 transfers and renumbers s. 916.45, F.S. (Supp.1998), as s. 394.925, F.S., and clarifies that the Act applies to all persons convicted of a sexually violent offense and sentenced to total confinement in the future." Id....

...rnet established good cause for permitting defendant to withdraw his guilty plea). Johnson, thus, correctly argues that he should have been allowed to withdraw his plea because his attorney misadvised him about crucial aspects of the Jimmy Ryce Act. Section 394.925, Florida Statutes, provides: "[Involuntary Civil Commitment of Sexually Violent Predators] applies to all persons currently in custody who have been convicted of a sexually violent offense, as that term is defined in s. 394.912(9), [2] as well as to all persons convicted of a sexually violent offense and sentenced to total confinement in the future. " § 394.925, Fla....

...this Court and the district courts on this issue. Recently, the Second District Court of Appeal in Gordon v. Regier, 839 So.2d 715 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003), addressed the same issue that is now before this Court. In that case, the district court construed section 394.925, Florida Statutes (1999), [2] which was formerly section 916.45, Florida Statutes (Supp.1998)....

...stody at the time the petition was filed. After the trial court denied Gordon's motion, he petitioned for writ of prohibition in the Second District seeking to have the commitment proceedings dismissed. See Gordon, 839 So.2d at 716-17. In construing section 394.925, the Second District first concluded that the terms "in custody" and "total confinement" were synonymous....

...Because Gordon was not transferred to the custody of DCF in accordance with section 394.9135, but instead was released into society upon his immediate release from DOC custody, the court concluded he was not "in custody" for purposes of the Act. *539 The court ultimately concluded that under section 394.925, the Act is only applicable to those persons in custody at the time the commitment proceedings are commenced....

...ced. Thus, taking the Second District's interpretation to its logical conclusion, the Act would not apply to those persons who were not in lawful custody at the time commitment proceedings commenced. I believe the Second District's interpretation of section 394.925 was correct and can also be applied to section 916.45....

...attorney in the judicial circuit where the person committed the sexually violent offense may file a petition with the circuit court alleging that the person is a sexually violent predator and stating facts sufficient to support such allegation. [2] Section 394.925 reads in pertinent part, "This part applies to all persons currently in custody who have been convicted of a sexually violent offense ......

...The provision reads as follows: Applicability of [the][A]ct This part applies to all persons currently in custody who have been convicted of a sexually violent offense, as that term is defined in s. 394.912(9), as well as to all persons convicted of a sexually violent offense and sentenced to total confinement in the future. § 394.925, Fla....

...th "in custody" despite the employment by the legislature of different terminology in each clause. Gordon v. Regier, 839 So.2d 715, 718-19 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003)(concluding that "the word `custody' is synonymous with `total confinement'" for purposes of section 394.925)....

...the legislature necessarily intended a single-day prism for purposes of gathering all past offenders to be rationally farfetched. Cf. Gordon, 839 So.2d at 716 n. 1 (stating that while the petitioner could not be committed under the "first clause" of section 394.925 because he was not in custody at the time the proceeding was commenced, "[t]he [Ryce] Act could be applicable to [him] in the future should he ever be sentenced to total confinement"); Tabor v....

...to custody in Florida after January 1, 1999, for a non-sexual offense where the qualifying sexual offense is a prior conviction in a non-Florida state court or a federal court anywhere in the United States. The interpretation of the second clause of section 394.925 pressed by Ward would render this portion of section 394.913(1) of the Florida Statutes meaningless....

...sary dread in defendants considering or making pleas if prior convictions for sexually violent offenses could not later be used as a basis for a Ryce Act action. Amended Rule 3.172 is consistent with our reading of the Ryce Act. Because we find that section 394.925 authorizes the State to seek to involuntarily commit Ward for care and treatment under the Jimmy Ryce Act, we deny the writ....

...ly in custody who have been convicted of a sexually violent offense, as that term is defined in s. 916.32(8), as well as to all persons convicted of a sexually violent offense in the future. On May 26, 1999, this particular section was renumbered as section 394.925 and modified to add the words "and sentenced to total confinement" to the second clause. As modified, section 394.925 provides that the Ryce Act applies: to all persons currently in custody who have been convicted of a sexually violent offense, as that term is defined in s. 394.912(9), as well as to all persons convicted of a sexually violent offense and sentenced to total confinement in the future. § 394.925, Fla....

...Not only does this interpretation pass constitutional muster, it makes absolute sense. COPE, C.J. (concurring in part, dissenting in part). The question before us is how to interpret the portion of the Jimmy Ryce Act which defines who is eligible for civil commitment. See § 394.925, Fla....

...Fla. Stat. (Supp.1998). In the 1999 session of the Florida legislature, it was inserted and the provision renumbered. See discussion, infra, at n. 5. [4] Not surprisingly, the intra-section parallelism and uniformity that has been found to exist in section 394.925 is mirrored by the similarly parallel and uniform action of other sections of the Act on the two jurisdictional clauses of section 394.925....

...the defendant does not qualify for civil commitment under the Act as a matter of law. See majority opinion at 2 n. 1; Atkinson v. State, 791 So.2d 537, 538 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001), aff'd, 831 So.2d 172 (Fla.2002). [9] The amendment at issue here stated: 394.925 916.45 Applicability of act.—This part applies Sections 916.31 916.49 apply to all persons currently in custody who have been convicted of a sexually violent offense, as that term is defined in s....

...idual from custody does not prevent the State from instituting proceedings under the Act"). B. The Second District Court of Appeal arrived at a different conclusion in Gordon v. Regier, 839 So.2d 715 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003). The Second District held that section 394.925, which states that the Act applies to all persons "currently in custody" or "sentenced to total confinement in the future," in conjunction with the other provisions in the Act, provides that involuntary civil commitment proceedings ma...

...y before the expiration of his sentence because the Act provided that the time limits prescribed in the Act were not jurisdictional. 880 So.2d at 537. Furthermore, the court distinguished its decision in Atkinson, which construed section 916.45 (now section 394.925), stating that Atkinson pertained only to the retroactivity of the Act and had no bearing on the issue of whether the Act required a commitment petition to be filed while a person was still in lawful custody....

...Our decision is controlled by post-April 23, 2002 Florida Supreme Court decisions interpreting the immediate release provision, section 394.9135(1) of the Jimmy Ryce Act, and its application only to those “persons currently in custody who have been convicted of a sexually violent offense ....”§ 394.925, Fla....

...in violation of s. 794.011." Under the Act, a person is subject to civil commitment proceedings if he or she has been convicted of a sexually violent offense and is sentenced to total confinement after the effective date of the Act, January 1, 1999. § 394.925....

...98-64, § 24, at 455, Laws of Fla.; §§ 916.31-.49, Fla. Stat. (Supp.1998). The Act has since been renumbered and now appears in Florida Statutes Chapter 394, Part V, "Involuntary Civil Commitment of Sexually Violent Predators" (2006). At all times relevant to the instant appeal, section 394.925, the so-called "jurisdictional" section of the Act, provided as follows: This part [part V or chapter 394 governing the involuntary civil commitment of sexually violent predators] applies to all persons currently in custody who have been convicted of a sexually violent offense, as that term is defined in § 394.912(9), as well as to all persons convicted of a sexually violent offense and sentenced to total confinement in the future. § 394.925, Fla....

...iolent offense and who were "in custody" on January 1, 1999 (Clause One) and (2) those who have been convicted of a sexually violent offense and who are " sentenced to total confinement [ [1] ] in the future [post January 1, 1999]" (Clause Two). See § 394.925, Fla. Stat.; Ward v. State, 986 So.2d 479, 481 (Fla.2008) (answering certified question in the affirmative). Barber contends that he does not fall within either class of persons defined by section 394.925....

...onfinement in the future" within the meaning of the Act. In determining whether the facts before us fall within the ambit of Clause One, we must answer this question: Are the terms "in custody" and "total confinement," as used in separate clauses of section 394.925, synonymous in the context of a person on conditional release? Barber, and the dissent, concludes that they are, citing State v....

...Such a conclusion dismisses without discussion the ambiguity created by the use of these terms in difference clauses of the same provision. It also ignores the presumption that the legislature intended different meanings by its use of different terminology in the two clauses of section 394.925....

...cur "in the future"—after the effective date of the Act. In reaching its decision, the court relied in part on its holding in Hale v. State, 891 So.2d 517 (Fla.2004). Hale, important to our analysis here, involved an interpretation of Clause One of section 394.925 of the Act prior to the May 1999 amendment....

...Thus, I would reverse and hold that the trial court had no authority to civilly commit appellant under the Ryce Act. A person is subject to civil commitment proceedings under the Ryce Act if he has been convicted of a sexually violent offense and was "in custody" on the effective date of the Ryce Act, January 1, 1999. See § 394.925, Fla....

...I also acknowledge that a person freed from prison on conditional release remains under a degree of supervision by the state. I simply do not agree that the legislature intended to include the legal fiction of "constructive custody" when it used the term "in custody" in section 394.925 of the Ryce Act....

...tive date of the Ryce Act. [1] The second clause of the jurisdictional provisions of the Ryce Act applies to those who have been convicted of a sexually violent offense and "sentenced to total confinement in the future [i.e., post January 1, 1999]." § 394.925, Fla....

...have been sustained and may "return the releasee to prison to serve the sentence imposed." § 947.141(4), Fla. Stat.; see also Sutton v. Fla. Parole Comm'n, 975 So.2d 1256 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008). According to appellant, the word "sentenced," as used in section 394.925, requires a judicial action and, thus, he is not subject to the Ryce Act since he had been "sentenced" to confinement many years prior to the Ryce Act's effective date....

...A person shall also be deemed to be in total confinement for applicability of provisions under this part if the person is serving an incarcerative sentence under the custody of the Department of Corrections or the Department of Juvenile Justice and is being held in any other secure facility for any reason. § 394.925(11), Fla....

...This issue and the interpretation of Clause One were not determinative in Ward or Johnson. The issue before us in Johnson was whether the appellant should have been allowed to withdraw his plea because of the misadvice of his attorney regarding the effect of the plea under the Jimmy Ryce Act—specifically Clause Two of section 394.925....

...hin its scope "all persons currently in custody who have been convicted of a sexually violent offense ... as well as to all persons convicted of a sexually violent offense in the future." The amendment, which codified the jurisdictional provision at section 394.925, made no change to Clause One, but changed Clause Two to read that it applied "to all persons convicted of a sexually violent offense and sentenced to total confinement in the future." [16] This conclusion was reached in that part of...

...3 Lawful Custody Requirement The Act “applies to all persons currently in custody who have been convicted of a sexually violent offense, as that term is defined in s. 394.912(9), as well as to all persons convicted of a sexually violent offense and sentenced to total confinement in the future.” § 394.925, Fla....

...In his motion to dismiss the petition, Appellee asserted the trial court was without subject matter jurisdiction to commit him under the Ryce Act because his current incarceration was not for a sexually violent crime. He argued that a strict construction of section 394.925, Florida Statutes, allowed commitment of only those individuals who are in the custody of the Department of Corrections and serving a sentence for a sexually violent offense at the time the petition is filed....

...the legislative enactment that was addressed in Atkinson , and the PRR Act that is involved here. The Jimmy Ryce Act “ ‘applies to all persons currently in custody who have been convicted of a sexually violent offense.’ ” Id. at 173 (quoting § 394.925, Fla....

...Greene was transferred to the custody of the Department of Children and Families for secure confinement pending the completion of the Jimmy Ryce commitment action. A jury thereafter found him to be a sexually violent predator, the trial court rendered its final order, and this appeal ensued. Mr. Greene asserts that section 394.925, Florida Statutes (1999), does not apply to him....

...The issue raised by Mr. Greene appears to have been answered contrary to the argument he makes before us by the Third District Court of Appeal in Ward v. State, 936 So.2d 1143 (Fla. 3d DCA), review granted, 939 So.2d 96 (Fla.2006). After an exhaustive review of section 394.925, our sister court concluded that section 394.925 authorizes the State to seek involuntary civil commitment of a person: (1) who had been convicted of a sexually violent offense before the effective date of the Jimmy Ryce Act and had been totally confined as a result; and (2) who was...

...JRA provides for involuntary civil commitment of sexually violent predators. It applies to “all persons currently in custody who have been convicted of a sexually violent offense ... as well as to all persons convicted of a sexually violent offense and sentenced to total confinement in the future.” § 394.925....

...JRA provides for involuntary civil commitment of sexually violent predators. It applies to "all persons currently in custody who have been convicted of a sexually violent offense ... as well as to all persons convicted of a sexually violent offense and sentenced to total confinement in the future." § 394.925....