The 2023 Florida Statutes (including Special Session C)

Title XXIX
PUBLIC HEALTH

Chapter 394
MENTAL HEALTH

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F.S. 394.912

394.912 Definitions.—As used in this part, the term:

(1) “Agency with jurisdiction” means the entity that releases, upon lawful order or authority, a person who is serving a sentence in the custody of the Department of Corrections, a person who was adjudicated delinquent and is committed to the custody of the Department of Juvenile Justice, a person who was involuntarily committed to the custody of the Department of Children and Families upon an adjudication of not guilty by reason of insanity, or a person who is serving a sentence in a county or municipal jail for a sexually violent offense as defined in paragraph (9)(i).

(2) “Convicted of a sexually violent offense” means a person who has been:

(a) Adjudicated guilty of a sexually violent offense after a trial, guilty plea, or plea of nolo contendere;

(b) Adjudicated not guilty by reason of insanity of a sexually violent offense; or

(3) “Department” means the Department of Children and Families.

(4) “Likely to engage in acts of sexual violence” means the person’s propensity to commit acts of sexual violence is of such a degree as to pose a menace to the health and safety of others.

(5) “Mental abnormality” means a mental condition affecting a person’s emotional or volitional capacity which predisposes the person to commit sexually violent offenses.

(6) “Person” means an individual 18 years of age or older who is a potential or actual subject of proceedings under this part.

(7) “Secretary” means the secretary of the Department of Children and Families.

(8) “Sexually motivated” means that one of the purposes for which the defendant committed the crime was for sexual gratification.

(9) “Sexually violent offense” means:

(a) Murder of a human being while engaged in sexual battery in violation of s. 782.04(1)(a)2.;

(b) Kidnapping of a child under the age of 13 and, in the course of that offense, committing:

1. Sexual battery; or

2. A lewd, lascivious, or indecent assault or act upon or in the presence of the child;

(c) Committing the offense of false imprisonment upon a child under the age of 13 and, in the course of that offense, committing:

1. Sexual battery; or

2. A lewd, lascivious, or indecent assault or act upon or in the presence of the child;

(d) Sexual battery in violation of s. 794.011;

(e) Lewd, lascivious, or indecent assault or act upon or in presence of the child in violation of s. 800.04 or s. 847.0135(5);

(f) An attempt, criminal solicitation, or conspiracy, in violation of s. 777.04, of a sexually violent offense;

(g) Any conviction for a felony offense in effect at any time before October 1, 1998, which is comparable to a sexually violent offense under paragraphs (a)-(f) or any federal conviction or conviction in another state for a felony offense that in this state would be a sexually violent offense;

(h) Any criminal act that, either at the time of sentencing for the offense or subsequently during civil commitment proceedings under this part, has been determined beyond a reasonable doubt to have been sexually motivated; or

(i) A criminal offense in which the state attorney refers a person to the department for civil commitment proceedings pursuant to s. 394.9125.

(10) “Sexually violent predator” means any person who:

(a) Has been convicted of a sexually violent offense; and

(b) Suffers from a mental abnormality or personality disorder that makes the person likely to engage in acts of sexual violence if not confined in a secure facility for long-term control, care, and treatment.

(11) “Total confinement” means that the person is currently being held in any physically secure facility being operated or contractually operated for the Department of Corrections, the Department of Juvenile Justice, or the Department of Children and Families. A person shall also be deemed to be in total confinement for applicability of provisions under this part if:

(a) The person is serving an incarcerative sentence under the custody of the Department of Corrections or the Department of Juvenile Justice and is being held in any other secure facility for any reason;

(b) The person is serving a sentence in a county or municipal jail for a sexually violent offense as defined in paragraph (9)(i); or

(c) A court or the agency with jurisdiction determines that the person who is being held should have been lawfully released at an earlier date and that the provisions of this part would have been applicable to the person on the date that he or she should have been lawfully released.

History.—s. 4, ch. 98-64; s. 5, ch. 99-222; s. 3, ch. 2000-246; s. 11, ch. 2008-172; s. 1, ch. 2014-2; s. 101, ch. 2014-19; s. 29, ch. 2016-24.

Note.—Former s. 916.32.

F.S. 394.912 on Google Scholar

F.S. 394.912 on Casetext

Amendments to 394.912

Arrestable Offenses / Crimes under Fla. Stat. 394.912

Level: Degree
Misdemeanor/Felony: First/Second/Third

Current data shows no reason an arrest or criminal charge should have occurred directly under Florida Statute 394.912.

Annotations, Discussions, Cases:

Cases from cite.case.law:

R. PESCI, v. BUDZ, LLC, LLC,, 935 F.3d 1159 (11th Cir. 2019)

. . . . §§ 394.912(10)(b) ; 394.915. . . .

GERING, v. STATE, 252 So. 3d 334 (Fla. App. Ct. 2018)

. . . secure facility for long-term control, care, and treatment.' " Phillips, 119 So.3d at 1237 (quoting § 394.912 . . .

T. STENGEL, v. STATE, 248 So. 3d 127 (Fla. App. Ct. 2018)

. . . White , 891 So.2d 502, 506 (Fla. 2004) ; see also § 394.912(10), Fla. Stat. (2015). . . .

BARBER, v. STATE, 207 So.3d 910 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2016)

. . . .” § 394.912(9)(h), Fla. Stat. (2014) (emphasis added). . . . A "sexually motivated” crime is one whose purpose, in part, “was for sexual gratification." § 394.912 . . .

FAY, v. J. O BRIEN,, 187 F. Supp. 3d 241 (D. Mass. 2016)

. . . . §§ 394.912 (2010) (including an indecent act “in the presence of a child" as a predicate offense); . . .

I. ABAUNZA, v. STATE, 180 So. 3d 1201 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015)

. . . See § 394.912(8) and (9), Fla. Stat.' (2014). . . .

PHILLIPS, v. STATE, 178 So. 3d 468 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015)

. . . currently in custody who have- been convicted of a sexually violent offense, as that term is defined in s. 394.912 . . . Corrections, the Department of Juvenile Justice, or the Department of Children and Family Services —” § 394.912 . . . lawful total confinement and Phillips meets the definition of a sexually violent predator under section 394.912 . . .

JAMAAL ALI BILAL, a k a L. v. STATE, 157 So. 3d 1093 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015)

. . . See § 394.912(10), Fla. Stat. Mr. . . . abnormality or personality disorder” diagnosis required for an initial commitment under the Act (see § 394.912 . . .

REED, v. STATE, 159 So. 3d 845 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2014)

. . . . § 394.912(1 l)(a), Fla. Stat. (2012). . See, e.g., http://dictionary.reference.com/ browse/upon? . . .

HARTZOG, v. STATE, 133 So. 3d 570 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2014)

. . . jury determined that he qualified as a “sexually violent predator” as that term is defined in sections 394.912 . . . See § 394.912(10), Fla. Stat. (2012). . . . offense includes a "lewd, lascivious, or indecent assault or act upon or in the presence of the child,” § 394.912 . . . Section 394.912(10) provides: "Sexually violent predator” means any person who: (a) Has been convicted . . .

R. PESCI, v. BUDZ,, 730 F.3d 1291 (11th Cir. 2013)

. . . . § 394.912(10). . . .

WARD, v. STATE, 111 So. 3d 225 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2013)

. . . mental condition obviously could not have been at issue during the earlier proceedings” (quoting § 394.912 . . .

STATE v. PHILLIPS,, 119 So. 3d 1233 (Fla. 2013)

. . . currently in custody who have been convicted of a sexually violent offense, as that term is defined in s. 394.912 . . . .” § 394.912(10)(a), (b), Fla. Stat. (2005). . . . currently in custody who have been convicted of a sexually violent offense, as that term is defined in s. 394.912 . . .

MOREL, v. E. WILKINS,, 84 So. 3d 226 (Fla. 2012)

. . . finding probable cause to believe that Morel was a “sexually violent predator” as defined in section 394.912 . . .

LARIMORE, v. STATE, 76 So. 3d 1121 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012)

. . . .” § 394.912(10), Fla. Stat. (2010). . . .

L. BOATMAN, v. STATE, 77 So. 3d 1242 (Fla. 2011)

. . . .” § 394.912(11), Fla. Stat. (2008). . . . Department of Children and Family Services upon an adjudication of not guilty by reason of insanity.” § 394.912 . . .

In COMMITMENT OF J. JACKSON. J. v., 77 So. 3d 651 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011)

. . . 2009, Jackson argued that he did not qualify as a “sexually violent predator,” as defined by section 394.912 . . . Section 394.912(10), Florida Statutes (2008), defines a “sexually violent predator” as any person who . . . sexual violence if not confined in a secure facility for long-term control, care, and treatment.” § 394.912 . . .

MILNER, v. STATE, 50 So. 3d 711 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010)

. . . White, 891 So.2d 502, 502-03 (Fla.2004); § 394.912(10), Fla. Stat. . . .

J. SHAW, v. STATE, 29 So. 3d 1161 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010)

. . . .” § 394.912(10)(B), Fla. Stat. (2008). We affirm. . . .

STEPHENS, v. STATE, 43 So. 3d 709 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010)

. . . . § 394.912(10), Fla. Stat. (2009). . . .

COTTON, v. STATE, 22 So. 3d 638 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009)

. . . . §§ 394.912 and 394.9155, Fla. Stat. Appellant raises four issues with several sub-issues. . . . See § 394.912(10)(b), Fla. . . . sexual violence if not confined in a secure facility for long-term control, care, and treatment.” § 394.912 . . . See § 394.912(10)(b), Fla. Stat. . . .

In FLORIDA RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE FOR INVOLUNTARY COMMITMENT OF SEXUALLY VIOLENT PREDATORS, 13 So. 3d 1025 (Fla. 2009)

. . . defined under the Act, is one who has been convicted of a sexually violent offense as defined by section 394.912 . . . Statutes (2008), and who is likely to reoffend due to “mental abnormality” or “personality disorder.” § 394.912 . . .

MARSH, v. STATE, 14 So. 3d 1214 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009)

. . . of the Department of Corrections ("DOC”), DOC was the "agency with jurisdiction” pursuant to section 394.912 . . .

SPIVEY, v. STATE, 12 So. 3d 880 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009)

. . . .” § 394.912(9)(e), Fla. Stat. (2008). . . .

J. LUEDTKE, v. STATE, 6 So. 3d 653 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009)

. . . Section 394.912(9)(d), Florida Statutes (2004), of the Jimmy Ryce Act defines “sexually violent offense . . .

LARIMORE, v. STATE, 2 So. 3d 101 (Fla. 2008)

. . . “Agency with jurisdiction” is defined in section 394.912(1), Florida Statutes (2004), as follows: [T] . . . Department of Children and Family Services upon an adjudication of not guilty by reason of insanity- § 394.912 . . . "Total confinement” is defined in section 394.912(11), Florida Statutes (2004), as follows: [T]he person . . . the Department of Juvenile Justice and is being held in any other secure facility for any reason. § 394.912 . . .

WASHINGTON, v. STATE, 988 So. 2d 724 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008)

. . . probation, is deemed to have been “convicted of a sexually violent offense” within the meaning of section 394.912 . . . delinquent of a sexually violent offense after a trial, guilty plea, or plea of nolo contendere. § 394.912 . . . In JRA section 394.912(2)(a), the Legislature explicitly defined conviction to require a formal adjudication . . . defendant was never “convicted of a sexually violent offense”, as expressly defined by JRA section 394.912 . . .

A. BARBER, v. STATE, 988 So. 2d 1170 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008)

. . . currently in custody who have been convicted of a sexually violent offense, as that term is defined in § 394.912 . . . Section 394.912(11), the definitional provision of the Jimmy Ryce Act, specifically defines the term . . .

WARD, v. STATE, 986 So. 2d 479 (Fla. 2008)

. . . . § 394.912(11), Fla. Stat. (1999). . . . (Supp.1998) (renumbered as § 394.912(9)(g), Fla. Stat. (1999)). . . . See § 394.912(9)(g) (defining “sexually violent offense” as including “any federal conviction or conviction . . . The 1999 amendment also expanded the definition of “total confinement” in section 394.912(10) to include . . . First, it would render section 394.912(9)(g), defining a sexually violent offense as including a federal . . . See § 394.912(9)(10), Fla. Stat (2004). . . . currently in custody who have been convicted of a sexually violent offense, as that term is defined in s. 394.912 . . .

JOHNSON, v. STATE, 971 So. 2d 212 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008)

. . . currently in custody who have been convicted of a sexually violent offense, as that term is defined in s. 394.912 . . . Section 394.912(9)(e) defines "sexually violent offense” as including a "[l]ewd, lascivious, or indecent . . .

GREENE, v. STATE, 970 So. 2d 900 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007)

. . . currently in custody who have been convicted of a sexually violent offense, as that term is defined in s. 394.912 . . .

HOO, v. STATE, 969 So. 2d 411 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007)

. . . .” § 394.912(10)(b), Fla. Stat. (2004). . . .

UNITED STATES v. COMSTOCK, Jr. v. v. v. v., 507 F. Supp. 2d 522 (E.D.N.C. 2007)

. . . . § 394.912(10(a)))("sexually violent predator” is a person who “has been convicted of a sexually violent . . .

DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILIES, v. A. BLACKBURNE,, 961 So. 2d 1028 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007)

. . . that probable cause exists to believe that he is a “sexually violent predator” as defined by section 394.912 . . . address competency proceedings for convicted felons subject to civil commitment proceedings under section 394.912 . . .

In COMMITMENT OF J. STEEN. J. a k a v., 954 So. 2d 110 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007)

. . . Swan’s testimony regarding her interpretation of the definition of the term “likely” in section 394.912 . . .

TROVILLE, v. STATE, 953 So. 2d 637 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007)

. . . The definitions in the Ryce Act, section 394.912(4) and (5) provide: (4) “Likely to engage in acts of . . .

WARD, v. STATE, 936 So. 2d 1143 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006)

. . . currently in custody who have been convicted of a sexually violent offense, as that term is defined in s. 394.912 . . . Section 394.912, Florida Statutes (1999), referred to above in the amended Act, is the definitional section . . . Section 394.912(9)(g) defines a “sexually violent offense” as including “any federal conviction or conviction . . . Section 394.912(11), Florida Statutes (1999), defines “total confinement” as, among other things, “being . . . A plain reading of the amendment, when read in conjunction with section 394.912(9)(g), which defines . . . See § 394.912(9)00), Fla. Stat (2004). . . . currently in custody who have been convicted of a sexually violent offense, as that term is defined in s. 394.912 . . . currently in custody who have been convicted of a sexually violent offense, as that term is defined in s^ 394.912 . . . was not in custody for a sexually violent offense, as that term is defined under the Ryce Act, see § 394.912 . . . currently in custody who have been convicted of a sexually violent offense, as that term is defined in s. 394.912 . . . currently in custody who have been convicted of a sexually violent offense, as that term is defined in s. 394.912 . . . Juvenile Justice [shall include persons] being held in any other secure facility for any reason.” § 394.912 . . .

STATE v. SHAW,, 929 So. 2d 1145 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006)

. . . See § 394.912(9)(d), Fla. Stat. (2001). . . . emotional or volitional capacity which predisposes the person to commit sexually violent offenses.” § 394.912 . . .

SLOSS, v. STATE, 925 So. 2d 419 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006)

. . . White, 891 So.2d 502, 502-08 (Fla.2004); § 394.912(10), Fla. Stat. (2008). . . . sexual violence if not confined in a secure facility for long-term control, care, and treatment.” § 394.912 . . .

D. HADI, v. LIBERTY BEHAVIORAL HEALTH CORPORATION, v., 927 So. 2d 34 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006)

. . . (emphasis in original) (citing § 394.912(10), Fla. Stat. (2001)). . . . (quoting § 394.912(5)). “ ‘Likely to engage in acts of sexual violence’ is defined as ‘the person’s propensity . . . (quoting § 394.912(4), Fla. . . .

In AMENDMENTS TO FLORIDA RULE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, 911 So. 2d 763 (Fla. 2005)

. . . First, we add language addressing section 394.912(9)(h), Florida Statutes (2004), which states that the . . .

STATE v. BRYANT,, 901 So. 2d 381 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005)

. . . See § 394.912(10)(b), Fla. Stat. (2003). . . .

ORTEGA- MANTILLA, v. STATE, 898 So. 2d 1164 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005)

. . . probable cause to believe that Ortega-Mantilla was a sexually violent predator, as defined in section 394.912 . . . See §§ 394.912(9), 912(10), Fla. Stat. (1999); Hale v. . . .

ADAWAY, v. STATE, 902 So. 2d 746 (Fla. 2005)

. . . See §§ 394.912-394.931, Fla. Stat. (2004). . . . .” § 394.912(10)(b), 394.917(1), Fla. Stat. (2004). . . .

In COMMITMENT OF T. HEATH. v. T., 895 So. 2d 1258 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005)

. . . See § 394.912(10). The circuit court issued an ex parte order finding probable cause to detain Mr. . . .

STATE v. WHITE,, 891 So. 2d 502 (Fla. 2004)

. . . See § 394.912(10), Fla. Stat. (1999). . . . sexual violence if not confined in a secure facility for long-term control, care, and treatment.” § 394.912 . . . The term “sexually violent offense” is defined to include several specified crimes. § 394.912(9), Fla . . . emotional or volitional capacity which predisposes the person to commit sexually violent offenses.” § 394.912 . . . (Crim.) 32; see also § 394.912(4);(5), Fla. Stat. (1999) (containing identical definitions). . . . construed an act with the same definition of “likely to engage in acts of sexual violence” as section 394.912 . . . This instruction tracks section 394.912(4), Florida Statutes. . . .

HALE, v. STATE, 891 So. 2d 517 (Fla. 2004)

. . . See § 394.912(10), Fla. Stat. (1999). . . . White, op. at 503; see § 394.912(4), (10), Fla. Stat. (1999). . . .

In COMMITMENT OF BRANCH. v., 890 So. 2d 322 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004)

. . . .” § 394.912(10)(b) (emphasis added); see also § 394.912(5) (“ ‘Mental abnormality’ means a mental condition . . .

WILLIAMS, v. STATE, 889 So. 2d 804 (Fla. 2004)

. . . . § 394.912(10), Fla. Stat. (2002). . . . .

In COMMITMENT OF BURTON. v., 884 So. 2d 1112 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004)

. . . See § 394.912(10), Fla. Stat. (1999). . . .

WILLIAMS, v. STATE, 882 So. 2d 1082 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004)

. . . . § 394.912(100)), Fla. . . .

ROELING, v. STATE, 880 So. 2d 1234 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004)

. . . Order of Commitment” adjudging him to be a “sexually violent predator” within the meaning of section 394.912 . . . petition to have appellant declared a “sexually violent predator” as that term is defined in section 394.912 . . .

K. ELMAN, Jr. v. STATE, 877 So. 2d 782 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004)

. . . .” § 394.912(10)(b), Fla. Stat. (2001) (emphasis added). . . . . § 394.912(10)(a), Fla. Stat. (2002) . . . .

BARKER, v. STATE, 877 So. 2d 59 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004)

. . . Pursuant to section 394.912(1), Florida Statutes (2002), in order to establish Barker as a sexually violent . . . With respect to the first element, section 394.912(9) contains a list of crimes that are considered sexually . . . This is not one of the sexually violent offenses enumerated in section 394.912(9). . . . prove that the burglary was sexually motivated, it would fall within the catch-all provision of section 394.912 . . . means that one of the purposes for which the defendant committed the crime was sexual gratification. § 394.912 . . . See § 394.912(10), Fla. . . . See § 394.912(9), Fla. . . . [e.s.] § 394.912(9)(h), Fla. Stat. (2003). . . .

STATE v. HARRIS, v., 881 So. 2d 1079 (Fla. 2004)

. . . .” § 394.912(10), Fla. Stat. (2003). . . . proceedings under this part, has been determined beyond a reasonable doubt to have been sexually motivated. § 394.912 . . . See §§ 394.912(10), 394.917. . . .

STATE v. MITCHELL,, 866 So. 2d 776 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004)

. . . Appellee was convicted in 1983 of a sexually violent offense, as defined in section 394.912(9), Florida . . . State, 864 So.2d 1171 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004), that Appellee’s argument is refuted by sections 394.913(1), 394.912 . . . (9)(g), and 394.912(11), Florida Statutes. . . .

TABOR, v. STATE, 864 So. 2d 1171 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004)

. . . in custody who have been convicted of a sexually violent offense, as that term is defined in section 394.912 . . . Section 394.912(9)(g) defines “sexually violent offense” as including “any federal conviction or conviction . . . Section 394.912(11) defines “total confinement” as, among other things, “being held in any other secure . . . sexually violent offense” includes federal convictions or convictions in other states. §§ 394.913(1) and 394.912 . . .

D. LEE, v. STATE, 854 So. 2d 709 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003)

. . . . § 394.912(10)(b), Fla. Stat. (2001). . . .

GORDON, v. REGIER,, 839 So. 2d 715 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003)

. . . currently in custody who have been convicted of a sexually violent offense, as that term is defined in s. 394.912 . . . the Department of Juvenile Justice and is being held in any other secure facility for any reason. § 394.912 . . . See § 394.912(1). . . .

MURRAY, v. REGIER,, 872 So. 2d 217 (Fla. 2002)

. . . Section 394.912(10), ‘ Florida Statutes (2000), defines a sexually violent predator as any person who . . .

STATE v. GOODE,, 830 So. 2d 817 (Fla. 2002)

. . . .” § 394.912(10), Fla. Stat. (1999). . . .

WESTERHEIDE, v. STATE, 831 So. 2d 93 (Fla. 2002)

. . . . § 394.912(10), Fla. Stat. (2001). . . . See § 394.912(10), Fla. Stat. (2001). . . . Id. § 394.912(5). . . . Id. § 394.912(4). . . . Id. § 394.912(10)(b) (emphasis added). . . .

KEPHART, H. J. v. KEARNEY,, 826 So. 2d 517 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002)

. . . .” § 394.912(10)(b). . . .

In COMMITMENT OF SMITH, v. STATE, 827 So. 2d 1026 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002)

. . . Section 394.912(10), Florida Statutes (2001), defines a sexually violent predator as one who: (a) Has . . . Section 394.912(9) defines sexually violent offense as: (a) Murder of a human being while engaged in . . .

HUDSON, v. STATE, 825 So. 2d 460 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002)

. . . trial, holding that he qualified as a “sexually violent predator” as that term is defined in section 394.912 . . . Id. § 394.912(10). . . . A “sexually violent offense” is one of those listed in section 394.912(9), including sexual battery and . . . Id. § 394.912(5). The term “personality disorder” is not defined. . . . Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 362, 117 S.Ct. 2072; see also § 394.912(10), Fla. Stat. (1999). . . .

HARRIS, v. STATE, 879 So. 2d 1223 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002)

. . . Section 394.912(10) defines “sexually violent predator” as any person who: (a) Has been convicted of . . . See § 394.912(9)(e), Fla. Stat. (1999). I. . . . Either of these convictions standing alone would satisfy the requirement of section 394.912(10)(a). . . . Appellant satisfied the requirement for a sexually violent offense pursuant to section 394.912(10)(a) . . . Therefore, the trial court properly found, pursuant to section 394.912(10)(b), that Appellant suffers . . .

MELVIN, v. STATE v. D. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. B. v. v. v. v., 804 So. 2d 460 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001)

. . . .” § 394.912(10). . . .

C. ATKINSON, v. STATE, 791 So. 2d 537 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001)

. . . currently in custody who have been convicted of a sexually violent offense, as that term is defined in s. 394.912 . . .

STATE v. ROBBINS,, 785 So. 2d 620 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001)

. . . ordinary prudence to believe that the respondent is a sexually violent predator as defined by section 394.912 . . . Section 394.912(10) defines "sexually violent predator” as a person who (1) has been convicted of a sexually . . . sufficiently shown that Robbins had been convicted of a sexually violent offense as defined in section 394.912 . . .

WATROUS, v. STATE, 793 So. 2d 6 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001)

. . . See §§ 394.912(10), 394.917. . . . See § 394.912. . . . See §§ 394.913(3), 394.912(10). . . .

STATE v. OSBORNE,, 781 So. 2d 1137 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001)

. . . .” § 394.912(10), Fla. Stat. (1999). . . .

SJUTS, v. STATE Dr. J., 774 So. 2d 783 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000)

. . . personality afflictions that together would qualify him as a sexually violent predator under section 394.912 . . .

PEDROZA, v. STATE, 773 So. 2d 639 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000)

. . . . § 394.912(10), Fla. Stat. . . . that has at any time been determined beyond a reasonable doubt to have been sexually motivated.” § 394.912 . . . sexual violence, if not confined in a secure facility for long term control, care and treatment.” § 394.912 . . . defined as any mental condition “which predisposes the person to commit sexually violent offenses.” § 394.912 . . . engage in acts of sexual violence” is defined “as a propensity to commit acts of sexual violence.” § 394.912 . . .

MURRAY, v. A. KEARNEY,, 770 So. 2d 273 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000)

. . . Renumbered to § 394.912, Fla. Stat. (1999), effective May 26, 1999. . . . .

STATE v. SIDDAL,, 772 So. 2d 555 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000)

. . . currently in custody who have been convicted of a sexually violent offense, as that term is defined in s. 394.912 . . .

WESTERHEIDE, v. STATE, 767 So. 2d 637 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000)

. . . .” § 394.912(9)(h), Fla. Stat. . . . sexual violence, if not confined in a secure facility for long term control, care and treatment.” § 394.912 . . . an elevated standard of proof is necessary to protect the rights and interests of the accused). . § 394.912 . . . .” § 394.912(10), Fla. Stat. (1999). . . . .” § 394.912(5), Fla. Stat. (1999). . . . See § 394.912(5), Fla. Stat. (1999). . . . See § 394.912(9), Fla. Stat. (1999). . . . .” § 394.912(5), Fla. Stat. (1999). . . .

STATE v. BREWER,, 767 So. 2d 1249 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000)

. . . sexual violence if not confined in a secure facility for long-term control, care and treatment” [section 394.912 . . . Section 394.912(10), Florida Statutes. . . . Section 394.912(2), Florida Statutes. . . .

STANDARD JURY INSTRUCTIONS- CRIMINAL CASES, 777 So. 2d 366 (Fla. 2000)

. . . See § 394.912(9)(g) Fla. Stat. 7. . . . See § 394.912(9)(h), Fla. Stat. . . . This jury instruction is based upon the definitions found in sections 787.01, 787.02, 794.011, 800.04, 394.912 . . . .” § 394.912(10), Fla. Stat. (1999). . . . .

STATE v. KOBEL,, 757 So. 2d 556 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000)

. . . .” § 394.912(11), Fla. Stat. (1999). . . .

MEADOWS, v. KRISCHER, W. A., 763 So. 2d 1087 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999)

. . . See §§ 394.912(9X11), 394.914 (stating that the probable cause petition must allege that the respondent . . .

VALDEZ, S. v. W. MOORE, A., 745 So. 2d 1009 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999)

. . . . § 394.912(10). . . .