CopyCited 151 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 2002 WL 31319386
...A person committed under the Ryce Act must submit to a yearly mental health examination, the results of which are submitted to the court. See id. §
394.918(1). Further, an individual seeking release from such commitment must supply the court with a waiver of rights. See id. §
394.918(2). [10] See §
394.916(3), (4), Fla. Stat. (2001). [11] See id. §
394.916(5)....
CopyCited 89 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 2004 WL 2922097
...t "[t]he trial may be continued upon the request of either party and a showing of good cause, or by the court on its own motion in the interests of justice, when the person will not be substantially prejudiced. " Id. at 514 (emphasis added) (quoting § 394.916(2), Fla....
...The court concluded that the statute provided that a "continuance may only be granted when the detainee will not be substantially prejudiced." Id. at 515 (emphasis added). In State v. Goode,
830 So.2d 817 (Fla.2002), we reiterated that in this statute "when" meant "only when." Id. at 824 ("As noted above, section
394.916(2) allows for a continuance, upon a showing of good cause by one of the parties or by the court's own motion, only where the detainee will not be substantially prejudiced....
CopyCited 77 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 2002 WL 31317996
...ember 22, 1999, when a status hearing was held in front of a different judge of the Thirteenth Judicial Circuit, Judge Ralph Steinberg. At the time of the hearing, only six days remained before expiration of the thirty-day time limit provided for in section 394.916(1) to conduct a final hearing in the commitment proceedings....
...l hearing to commence within thirty days of the ex parte finding of probable cause. A written order was entered on the same day, providing: That the Respondent's Motion to Dismiss be, and hereby is, GRANTED; The Court finds that pursuant to Sections 394.916(1), Florida Statutes (1999), the Petitioner failed to bring the Respondent to trial within the required 30 days; the 30 day time limit for trial was not requested to be continued for good cause by either party or by the court on its own motion pursuant to 394.916(2), Florida Statutes, (1999); since the time limit for commencing trial in this case has expired, it is hereby ordered that the petition is dismissed....
...No adversarial probable cause determination was conducted in Goode's case. TIME LIMITATION FOR FINAL HEARING The specific provision of the Ryce Act at issue in this case involves the time for trial after a court has made a determination of probable cause under section
394.915. Section
394.916 states, in pertinent part: (1) Within 30 days after the determination of probable cause, the court shall conduct a trial to determine whether the person is a sexually violent predator. (2) The trial may be continued upon the request of either party and a showing of good cause, or by the court on its own motion in the interests of justice, when the person will not be substantially prejudiced. §
394.916, Fla....
...Importantly, the Kansas courts have found *823 the sixty-day time provision of the Kansas act to be both mandatory and jurisdictional. See In re Brown, 26 Kan.App.2d 117, 978 P.2d 300, 303 (1999). Mandatory v. Directory The Legislature's interest in imposing rigid time constraints is expressly reflected in the language of section 394.916(1), which specifically states that the court "shall" conduct a trial within thirty days after the determination of probable cause. See § 394.916(1), Fla....
...lude that the Legislature used the word "shall" to convey that the thirty-day time limit was mandatory, although not jurisdictional. Several district courts have examined the language of the Ryce Act to determine whether the thirty-day time limit in section 394.916(1) should be construed as mandatory or directory....
...she is brought to trial. See §
394.915(5), Fla. Stat. (1999). The only limit placed upon this detention is the statutory provision providing that a detainee be brought to trial within thirty days of his or her initial detention. Moreover, although section
394.916, Florida Statutes (1999), allows for the thirty-day period to be continued, it also provides that such continuance may only be granted when the detainee will not be substantially prejudiced by it. See §
394.916(2)....
...nd courts should avoid readings that would render part of a statute meaningless. See Unruh v. State,
669 So.2d 242, 245 (Fla.1996); Forsythe v. Longboat Key Beach Erosion Control Dist.,
604 So.2d 452, 456 (Fla.1992). If the thirty-day time period in section
394.916(1) were held to be merely directory and could be routinely ignored without consequence, the limitations on continuances listed in section
394.916(2) would essentially be rendered meaningless. As noted above, section
394.916(2), allows for a continuance, upon a showing of good cause by one of the parties or by the court's own motion, only where the detainee will not be substantially prejudiced....
...Accordingly, based on the importance of the obvious liberty rights at stake, and consistent with the Kansas act upon which Florida's law is modeled, we agree that the Legislature intended that there should be "scrupulous compliance" with the statutory thirty-day time limit set forth in section 394.916(1)....
...e hearing if it determines such hearing is necessary" and that the court should hold the hearing only in cases "where the failure to begin trial is not the result of any delay caused by the respondent." §
394.915(2), Fla. Stat. (1999). Furthermore, section
394.916(1) does not distinguish between the ex parte or adversarial probable cause determinations for purposes of calculating the thirty-day time limit for trial....
...Jurisdictional While we conclude that the time provisions regarding the holding of a trial were meant to be mandatory, we do not believe that the thirty-day period was intended as a rigid jurisdictional bar to further proceedings. In addition to the provision for an adversarial probable cause determination, section 394.916(2) provides that "[t]he trial may be continued upon the request of either party and a showing of good cause, or by the court on its own motion in the interests of justice, when the person will not be substantially prejudiced." By this...
...e is not necessarily jurisdictional because there are limited instances where the court would retain jurisdiction beyond the thirty-day time period, most notably where a continuance for good cause or in the interest of justice has been granted under section 394.916(2)....
...Under the Ryce Act, it is not clear when a potential sexually violent predator should be appointed counsel. The Ryce Act simply states that counsel should be provided "[a]t all adversarial proceedings under this act," but does not indicate when in the process counsel should be appointed. § 394.916(3), Fla....
...ANSTEAD, C.J., and SHAW, PARIENTE, LEWIS, and QUINCE, JJ., concur. HARDING, Senior Justice, dissents with an opinion, in which WELLS, J., concurs. HARDING, Senior Justice, dissenting. I respectfully dissent. I would find the thirty-day time period in section 394.916(1), Florida Statutes (Jimmy Ryce Act) to be directory rather than mandatory....
...ion that the statutory time period is mandatory, and thus jurisdictional, because the Legislature used the word "shall" in the provision establishing the thirty-day time period, although it provided no consequences for the State's failure to comply. § 394.916, Fla....
...pertains to criminal defendants." See Fla. S. Comm. on Child. & Fams., CS for SB 2192 (1999), Staff Analysis 15 (Mar. 30, 1999). The thirty-day time limit for trial initially appeared in section 916.36, Florida Statutes (Supp.1998), and was moved to section 394.916, Florida Statutes (1999)....
...[4] The Supreme Court has recently examined the Kansas act again in Kansas v. Crane,
534 U.S. 407,
122 S.Ct. 867,
151 L.Ed.2d 856 (2002). [5] See also, e.g., Candace J. Samolinski, Kansas Law Used for Jimmy Ryce Act, Tampa Trib. (Mar. 26, 1998) at 18. [6] In the instant case, no continuance was granted pursuant to section
394.916(2), which allows a party to request a continuance for good cause where the respondent will not be substantially prejudiced....
...re to begin the trial is not the result of a delay caused by the respondent." Id. at 657. Therefore, once a judge finds probable cause after an adversarial hearing pursuant to section
394.915(2), the thirty-day clock for commencement of the trial in section
394.916(1) is reset and begins to run again....
CopyCited 54 times | Published | Florida 5th District Court of Appeal | 2000 WL 1434081
...If the court finds that probable cause does exist, the individual will be transferred to a secure facility. Id. Within 30 days after probable cause is found to exist, the court must conduct a trial to determine whether the person is a sexually violent predator. See § 394.916(1), Fla....
...§
394.917(2), Fla. Stat. (1999). The individual is afforded other procedural safeguards that include the right to appointment of a public defender if the individual is indigent and the right to subsequently petition for release in the future. See §§
394.916(3),
394.920, Fla....
...The Court in Hendricks adopted the same test but required the party challenging the constitutionality of the statute to prove the second prong by the clearest proof. [5] Some of those procedural and substantive rights include the following: (1) the right to counsel, see §§
394.915(3),
394.916, Fla. Stat. (1999); (2) determination of probable cause, see §
394.915, Fla. Stat. (1999); (3) application of the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure and the Florida Evidence Code, see §
394.9155(1),(2), Fla. Stat. (1999); (4) trial by jury, see §
394.916, Fla....
CopyCited 36 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 2006 WL 1548026
...d Families and within seventy-two hours of transfer, the multidisciplinary team shall assess the person. §
394.9135(2), Fla. Stat. (2002). Finally, the trial court is required to conduct a trial within thirty days of a probable cause determination. §
394.916(1), Fla....
...ed by the Legislature to be a fallback procedure for persons who were entitled to release from prison but still had not been brought to trial"). After determining probable cause by either method, the circuit court has thirty days to conduct a trial. § 394.916, Fla....
CopyCited 16 times | Published | Florida 1st District Court of Appeal | 2002 WL 1770486
...y without opportunity for pretrial release or release during the trial proceedings," notwithstanding the fact that the criminal sentence has been served. Id. §
394.915(5). A trial must be held within 30 days of the probable cause determination. Id. §
394.916(1). If either the person *464 or the state attorney so elects, the trial must be before a six-person jury; otherwise, the trial is to the court, without a jury. Id. §
394.916(5). The person is entitled to the assistance of counsel, including appointed counsel if indigent. Id. §
394.916(3)....
CopyCited 13 times | Published | Florida 2nd District Court of Appeal | 2004 WL 3024205
...On March 15, 2001, the State filed a petition to have Branch committed under the Ryce Act. The trial court entered an order finding probable cause and remanding Branch to the custody of the Department of Children and Family Services upon his release from prison. Pursuant to section 394.916(3), the trial court also appointed counsel for Branch to represent him in the Ryce Act proceedings....
CopyCited 12 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 2005 WL 2155160
...The majority takes the view that the automatic stay effectively restores the trial court's earlier finding of probable cause. That is a logical way to construe the effect of the rule, but it does not entirely resolve the constitutional problem presented by this case. Section 394.916(1), Florida Statutes (2002), provides that "[w]ithin thirty days after the determination of probable cause, the court shall conduct a trial to determine whether the person is a sexually violent predator." The imposition of the automatic stay would extend this time period indefinitely....
...Although the court has expedited the appeal, that is not an adequate remedy for a person who is detained without authority. This is a plenary appeal from a final order. Despite our best efforts to expedite the decision, we could not ensure that the appellee *1218 will not be held beyond the thirty-day time limit set by section 394.916(1)....
...ocedural requirement. Except in the limited circumstances listed in the statute itself, the time period cannot be altered or extended. In State v. Goode,
830 So.2d 817, 823 (Fla.2002), the Florida Supreme Court held that the thirty-day time limit in section
394.916(1) is mandatory....
...[2] As noted by Judge Padovano and because of the constitutional considerations implicit in the scheme, there are important protections provided to the respondent under the Act and this Court has affirmed the necessity of those protections. For example, section
394.916(1), Florida Statutes (2000), provides that "[w]ithin thirty days after the determination of probable cause, the court shall conduct a trial to determine whether the person is a sexually violent predator." We have previously held that there shall be "scrupulous compliance" with the thirty-day time limit. Goode,
830 So.2d at 826. [3] Additionally, in State v. Kinder,
830 So.2d 832 (Fla.2002), this Court approved the district court's holding "that the time provisions of section
394.916(1) of the [Ryce Act] are mandatory unless a continuance is granted for good cause." Id....
...egarding the holding of a trial were meant to be mandatory, we do not believe that the thirty-day period was intended as a rigid jurisdictional bar to further proceedings. In addition to the provision for an adversarial probable cause determination, section 394.916(2) provides that "[t]he trial may be continued upon the request of either party and a showing of good cause, or by the court on its own motion in the interests of justice, when the person will not be substantially prejudiced." By this...
CopyCited 10 times | Published | Florida 2nd District Court of Appeal | 2000 WL 1800574
...person is a sexually violent predator. (2) The trial may be continued upon the request of either party and a showing of good cause, or by the court on its own motion in the interests of justice, when the person will not be substantially prejudiced. § 394.916, Fla....
...is brought to trial. See §
394.915(5), Fla. Stat. (1999). The only limit placed upon this detention is the statutory provision providing that a detainee *515 be brought to trial within thirty days of his or her initial detention. Moreover, although section
394.916, Florida Statutes (1999), allows for the thirty-day period to be continued, it also provides that such continuance may only be granted when the detainee will not be substantially prejudiced by it. See §
394.916(2)....
...e governed by statutes enacted by the legislature. See TGI Friday's, Inc. v. Dvorak,
663 So.2d 606 (Fla.1995). The State does not, however, urge us to find that the legislature unconstitutionally usurped the court's rule making authority in enacting section
394.916(1)....
...be released pending trial is one of exceptional importance. We therefore certify the following question to the Supreme Court of Florida as one of great public importance: WHETHER THE FAILURE TO COMMENCE A COMMITMENT TRIAL WITHIN THE 30-DAY PERIOD OF SECTION 394.916(1), FLORIDA STATUTES (1999), ABSENT A PRIOR CONTINUANCE FOR GOOD CAUSE, AUTHORIZES THE RELEASE OF *516 THE DETAINED INDIVIDUAL, WHEN THE COMMITMENT CASE HAS NOT BEEN DISMISSED, AND THE TRIAL COURT HAS PREVIOUSLY MADE AN EX PARTE DETER...
CopyCited 9 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 2005 WL 1118031
...Stat. (1999). PROCEEDINGS TO DATE Stephen Lloyd Osborne moved to dismiss the Ryce Act petition against him on the basis that the State failed to bring the case to trial within the thirty days of the trial court's probable cause finding, as required by section 394.916(1), Florida Statutes (1999)....
...use a trial was not commenced within the mandatory thirty-day time period provided by statute, and no continuance for good cause was ordered prior to the expiration of that period." Id. at 818. We further interpreted the thirty-day time provision in section 394.916, Florida Statutes (1999), as being "mandatory but not jurisdictional." Id. at 821. Hence, we have already concluded that dismissal is appropriate if the mandatory time standards of section 394.916 are not met....
...The remaining issue is whether the dismissal *508 should be with or without prejudice to the State to refile. In our analysis of the Ryce Act's thirty-day trial window in Goode, this Court explained why the thirty-day period was mandatory, but not jurisdictional, stating: If the thirty-day time period in section 394.916(1) were held to be merely directory and could be routinely ignored without consequence, the limitations on continuances listed in section 394.916(2) would essentially be rendered meaningless. As noted above, section 394.916(2), allows for a continuance, upon a showing of good cause by one of the parties or by the court's own motion, only where the detainee will not be substantially prejudiced....
...intended that commitment proceedings would occur in a prompt and timely manner. Id. at 824 (footnote omitted). Additionally, in State v. Kinder,
830 So.2d 832 (Fla. 2002), this Court approved the district court's holding "that the time provisions of section
394.916(1) of the [Ryce Act] are mandatory unless a continuance is granted for good cause." Id....
...the trial period has exceeded thirty days without a continuance for good cause, the respondent's remedy is release from detention and a dismissal without prejudice of the pending proceedings. See Kinder,
830 So.2d at 833 ("[A]fter the time period in section
394.916(1) has run, trial is no longer pending and section
394.915(5) no longer requires the defendant to be detained pending trial.")....
...period is further evidence of the legislature's intent to require strict adherence to the mandated time frame."). Florida, South Carolina, and Kansas all have virtually identical provisions controlling any exceptions to the mandatory trial time. See § 394.916(2), Fla....
...Accordingly, based on the importance of the obvious liberty rights at stake, and consistent with the Kansas act upon which Florida's law is modeled, we agree that the Legislature intended that there should be "scrupulous compliance" with the statutory thirty-day time limit set forth in section 394.916(1)....
CopyCited 7 times | Published | Florida 5th District Court of Appeal | 2001 WL 201527
...No further action was taken on the petition until December 17, 1999, when Osborne filed his motion to dismiss alleging that the trial court had lost jurisdiction over him because a trial was not conducted within thirty days of the initial probable cause determination, nor was any continuance granted. The motion cited to section 394.916 of the Act which provides, in relevant part: 394.916 Trial; counsel and experts; indigent persons; jury. (1) Within 30 days after the determination of probable cause, the court shall conduct a trial to determine whether the person is a sexually violent predator. (2) The trial may be continued upon the request of either party and a showing of good cause, or by the court on its own motion in the interests of justice, when the person will not be substantially prejudiced. § 394.916(1),(2), Fla.Stat....
...We next considered Osborne's contention that the statutory time period is mandatory, and thus jurisdictional, because the Legislature used the word "shall" in the provision establishing the thirty-day time period, although it provided no consequences for the State's failure to comply. § 394.916, Fla.Stat....
CopyCited 7 times | Published | Florida 4th District Court of Appeal | 2000 WL 485131
...Under section
394.915(1), the trial judge makes an ex parte probable cause determination after the state attorney files a petition seeking to have a person declared a sexually violent predator. The Ryce Act trial on the merits must be set within 30 days after the determination of probable cause. See §
394.916(1), Fla....
...It is difficult to see how an adversarial probable cause hearing will be meaningful if a Ryce Act respondent has no attorney prepared to litigate that issue. Section
394.915(3) provides that a Ryce Act respondent is entitled to be represented by counsel at the adversarial probable cause hearing. See also §
394.916(3), Fla....
CopyCited 6 times | Published | Florida 4th District Court of Appeal | 1999 WL 1037986
...We must reject this argument. We find that even if, as petitioner argues, the legislature intended that the thirty-day time period for trial be jurisdictional, the statute itself allows for an extension of that period and continuances under certain circumstances. [3] Section 394.916 provides: (1) Within 30 days after the determination of probable cause, the court shall conduct a trial to determine whether the person is a sexually violent predator....
...[5] WARNER, C.J., and HAZOURI, J., concur. NOTES [1] The Ryce Act respondent is entitled to the assistance of counsel and, if indigent, appointment of the public defender. In addition, either the State or the respondent may demand trial by jury. See § 394.916(3), (5). [2] The Ryce Act respondent is entitled to a trial within thirty days after the determination of probable cause. See § 394.916(1)....
CopyCited 6 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 34 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 405, 2009 Fla. LEXIS 1020, 2009 WL 1956384
...The Court modifies the Committee's proposal to include the requirement that, in addition to releasing the respondent upon a finding that the State failed to meet its burden, the court also enter an order of no probable cause. As adopted, rule 4.260, Continuance of Trial, tracks the language of section 394.916(2), Florida Statutes (2008), which provides that [t]he trial may be continued once upon the request of either party for not more than 120 days upon a showing of good cause, or by the court on its own motion in the interests of justice, when the person will not be substantially prejudiced....
CopyCited 6 times | Published | Florida 1st District Court of Appeal | 2012 WL 3210623, 2012 Fla. App. LEXIS 13241
...On October 14, 2009, a few months before Appellant’s scheduled release from custody, the State filed a petition to involuntarily commit him as a sexually violent predator. Two days later, on October 16, 2009, the trial court found probable cause that Appellant met the criteria for commitment, triggering section 394.916, Florida Statutes (2009), which requires a trial occur within thirty days, absent a continuance....
...Analysis In Jimmy Ryce proceedings, after the State files a petition for commitment and the trial court determines probable cause exists to classify a respondent as a sexually violent predator, the respondent must be brought to trial within thirty days, unless a continuance is granted. Specifically, section 394.916 provides: (1) Within 30 days after the determination of probable cause, the court shall conduct a trial to determine whether the person is a sexually violent predator....
...ze we are not using the invited error doctrine to confer jurisdiction on the court; in this case, it had jurisdiction because Appellant was in lawful custody. Instead, the invited error doctrine overcomes the mandatory time requirements set forth in section 394.916, Florida Statutes (2009)....
CopyCited 5 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 2002 WL 31318012
...Judicial Circuit, Tampa, FL, for Respondent. PER CURIAM. We have for review a decision of a district court of appeal on the following question of great public importance: WHETHER THE FAILURE TO COMMENCE A COMMITMENT TRIAL WITHIN THE 30-DAY PERIOD OF SECTION 394.916(1), FLORIDA STATUTES (1999), ABSENT A PRIOR CONTINUANCE FOR GOOD CAUSE, AUTHORIZES THE RELEASE OF THE DETAINED INDIVIDUAL, WHEN THE COMMITMENT CASE HAS NOT BEEN DISMISSED, AND THE TRIAL COURT HAS PREVIOUSLY MADE AN EX PARTE DETERMINAT...
...State,
779 So.2d 512, 515-16 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000). We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const. We have answered the certified question in State v. Goode,
830 So.2d 817 (Fla. 2002), and we approve the Second District's holding herein that the time provisions of section
394.916(1) of the Jimmy Ryce Act (the Ryce Act), are mandatory unless a continuance is granted for good cause....
...t proceed to trial until ... some eleven months after the ex parte probable cause hearing that resulted in Kinder's confinement." Id. at 513. In State v. Goode,
830 So.2d 817 (Fla. 2002), we held that the thirty-day time period provided for trial in section
394.916(1), although not jurisdictional, is mandatory and, if there has not been a prior continuance for good cause granted pursuant to section
394.916(2), commitment proceedings should be dismissed. Thus, after the time period in section
394.916(1) has run, trial is no longer pending and section
394.915(5) no longer requires the defendant to be detained pending trial....
...she is brought to trial. See §
394.915(5), Fla. Stat. (1999). The only limit placed upon this detention is the statutory provision providing that a detainee be brought to trial within thirty days of his or her initial detention. Moreover, although section
394.916, Florida Statutes (1999), allows for the thirty-day period to be continued, it also provides that such continuance may only be granted when the detainee will not be substantially prejudiced by it. See §
394.916(2)....
...It is unclear under the Ryce Act when a potential sexually violent predator is to be appointed counsel. The Ryce Act simply states that counsel should be provided at all adversarial proceedings under the act, but does not list any time limit for appointment of counsel. See § 394.916(3), Fla....
CopyCited 4 times | Published | Florida 1st District Court of Appeal | 2003 WL 21511102
...The majority takes the view that the automatic stay effectively restores the trial court's earlier finding of probable cause. That is a logical way to construe the effect of the rule, but it does not entirely resolve the constitutional problem presented by this case. Section 394.916(1), Florida Statutes (2002), provides that "[w]ithin thirty days after the determination of probable cause, the court shall conduct a trial to determine whether the person is a sexually violent predator." The imposition of the automatic stay would extend this time period indefinitely....
...Although the court has expedited the appeal, that is not an adequate remedy for a person who is detained without authority. This is a plenary appeal from a final order. Despite our best efforts to expedite the decision, we could not ensure that the appellee will not be held beyond the thirty-day time limit set by section 394.916(1)....
...ocedural requirement. Except in the limited circumstances listed in the statute itself, the time period cannot be altered or extended. In State v. Goode,
830 So.2d 817, 823 (Fla.2002), the Florida Supreme Court held that the thirty-day time limit in section
394.916(1) is mandatory....
CopyCited 3 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 37 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 161, 2012 WL 739209, 2012 Fla. LEXIS 490
...igent., Consequently, the circuit court appointed the Office of the Public Defender to represent Morel, and an assistant public defender was there to represent him. After consultation with counsel, Morel agreed in open court to waive his right under section 394.916(1), Florida Statutes (2002), to have a commitment trial held within thirty days of the court’s probable cause determination, and he executed a written waiver to the same effect....
...As to the procedures prior to trial and commitment, the Act does not contemplate lengthy pretrial detention and provides that a trial to determine whether a person is a sexually violent predator “shall” be conducted within thirty days after the determination of probable cause. § 394.916(1), Fla. Stat. At the time of Morel’s initial confinement in April 2002, section 394.916(2) provided that “[t]he trial may be continued upon the request of either party and a showing of good cause, or by the court on its own motion in the interest of justice, when the person will not be substantially prejudiced.” 6 At...
...he State act promptly in bringing the matter to trial so that the respondent’s detention after the criminal sentence expires be kept to a minimum”). Concerns over an individual’s right to due process prompted the drafters of the Act to include section 394.916(1), which requires that a trial to determine whether a person is a sexually violent predator be conducted within thirty days of the probable cause determination. See § 394.916(1), Fla....
...Stat. With its inclusion of this provision, the Legislature sought to “temper the drastic effects of the indefinite detention scheme by the imposition of rigid time constraints set out in explicit language.” Goode,
830 So.2d at 822 . Interpreting section
394.916(1) in the context of both its express language and the right to due process, this Court has affirmed that the Act’s thirty-day deadline is mandatory, although not jurisdictional. See id. at 830 ; State v. Kinder,
830 So.2d 832, 833-34 (Fla.2002). Moreover, we have routinely emphasized that “there should be ‘scrupulous compliance’ with the statutory thirty-day time limit set forth in section
394.916(1).” Goode,
830 So.2d at 826 ; see also Kephart v....
...The Osborne remedy does not apply in cases where the respondent either seeks and obtains the continuance or consents to the delay. See Boatman v. State,
77 So.3d 1242, 1249 (Fla.2011). Accordingly, pretrial delay under either scenario does not necessarily offend due process principles. Before its revision in 2006, section
394.916(2) of the Act provided that “[t]he trial may be continued upon the request of either party and a showing of good cause, or by the court on its own motion in the interests of justice, when the person will not be substantially prejudiced.” When interpreting the interplay between section
394.916, subsections (1) and (2), the Second District in Curry v. State,
880 So.2d 751 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004), rejected the argument that the right to a commitment trial within thirty days under section
394.916(1) could not be waived and concluded that a waiver was “essentially equivalent to a request by the defendant for a continuance under section
394.916(2).” Id....
...4th DCA 2001) (“Once a waiver of speedy trial rights has occurred, a defendant may ‘start the clock running again’ by invoking a demand for speedy trial.”)). 12 Two years after the Second District decided Curry , the Legislature imposed an outer limit on the length of continuances a trial court could grant, amending section 394.916(2) to read as follows (additions emphasized, deletions in strike-through): (2) The trial may be continued once upon the request of either party for not more than 120 days upon and a showing of good cause, or by the court on its own mo...
...e 30 day period. Further continuances shall be allowed only on good cause shown. A future trial date shall be set if a further continuance is allowed. (Emphasis added.) Rule 4.260, which is entitled “Continuance of Trial,” tracks the language of section 394.916(2), Florida Statutes (2011), and provides in full: A motion for continuance by either party shall be in writing unless made in a hearing in open court and shall be signed by the party or attorney requesting the continuance....
...Once a waiver is entered, this prompts the court to set a trial date not less than ninety days from the date the waiver was executed. If either party seeks a continuance of the trial date as originally set, and good cause is shown, rule 4.260, which follows the language of section 394.916(2), prohibits the trial court from extending that trial date beyond 120 days....
...ther continuances of that trial date are permitted. We recognize that Morel’s case falls into an unusual category, in that he executed a waiver of the thirty-day time limit in April 2002 — almost four years before the Legislature’s revision to section 394.916(2) and almost seven years before the Jimmy Ryce Rules of Procedure went into effect....
...ion authored by Keri Fitzpatrick, a recreational therapist at the FCCC. . Morel explains the factual basis for the delay as a separate issue, but he does not set forth a claim for relief with respect to that issue. . In 2006, the Legislature revised section 394.916(2) to impose an outer time limit on the length of continuances a trial court could grant....
...t of his or her life. . Several other Florida courts have reached conclusions similar to the Second District in Curry. See, e.g., Kolin v. State,
927 So.2d 198, 200 (Fla. 5th DCA 2006) (concluding that the thirty-day deadline may be waived and that "section
394.916(2) of the Act provides for waiver of the deadline upon the trial court’s granting of a well-founded motion to continue”); Wi lliams v....
CopyCited 3 times | Published | Florida 2nd District Court of Appeal | 2004 WL 1196083
...This is another case in which the lack of specific procedural rules governing the civil commitment of sexually violent predators creates difficulties. Although we deny the petition, we conclude that a defendant such as Mr. Curry who stipulates to either a waiver of his right to a trial within thirty days under section 394.916(1), Florida Statutes (2002), or to a continuance of his trial pursuant to section 394.916(2), Florida Statutes (2002), can reassert his right to a trial within thirty days by filing a notice, motion or pleading, or making a request in open court that expressly and unequivocally demands a trial within thirty days pursuant to section 394.916(1)....
...On August 5, the court appointed the Office of the Public Defender as counsel for Mr. Curry, and an assistant public defender was present to represent him. Counsel noted that Mr. Curry had a significant portion of his sentence remaining and indicated that Mr. Curry was thus willing to waive his "thirty-day trial rights." See § 394.916(1), Fla....
...ion." It appears there was no further action on the case until May 15, 2003, when Mr. Curry's new counsel filed a "notice that action is at issue and ready to be set for trial." [5] This notice did not refer to the thirty-day time limit set forth in section 394.916(1)....
...s of the law in denying Mr. Curry's motion to dismiss because Mr. Curry waived his right to a trial within thirty days and never unequivocally sought to recapture that right. Mr. Curry's motion to dismiss alleged that the State failed to comply with section 394.916(1), which provides, "Within 30 days after the determination of probable cause, the court shall conduct a trial to determine whether the person is a sexually violent predator." Mr....
...petition did not apply to the amended petition and that his counsel did not or could not waive the right upon the filing of the amended petition. We recognize that the Florida Supreme Court has determined that the thirty-day time period set forth in section 394.916(1) is mandatory....
...Goode,
830 So.2d 817, 825-26 (Fla.2002). However, there is nothing preventing a defendant from waiving the right to this expedited trial. In light of the very short time limits placed on these proceedings, we conclude that a waiver is permitted under section
394.916(1) and is essentially equivalent to a request by the defendant for a continuance under section
394.916(2). [6] Section
394.916(2) specifically provides that a trial may be continued "upon the request of either party and a showing of good cause" if "the person will not be substantially prejudiced." A defendant in a civil commitment proceeding may often need more than thirty days to prepare a defense....
...Curry may have attempted to renew his right to a trial within thirty days when he filed the notice that the action was at issue pursuant to rule 1.440. However, Mr. Curry has not argued that this document was a demand for trial within thirty days in accordance with section 394.916(1). The notice did not expressly demand trial within thirty days nor specifically reference the thirty-day time period set forth in section 394.916(1)....
...Curry's situation, who has waived the right to a trial within thirty days but seeks to recapture that right, must file some notice, pleading, or motion, or make a request in open court that expressly and unequivocally demands and renews his right to a trial within thirty days pursuant to section 394.916(1)....
...[5] This notice was filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.440. This seems like a logical step by counsel because, as specified by the legislature, these actions are generally governed by the standard rules of civil procedure. See §
394.9155(1), Fla. Stat. (2002). [6] Because section
394.916(1) requires a trial within thirty days of a determination of probable cause, it is unclear when a defendant is supposed to answer the State's petition. The general time limits for filing pleadings and setting an action for civil trial cannot function within this framework. See Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.140, .200, .440. This is the primary reason that we conclude a waiver under section
394.916(1) and a defendant's request for a continuance under section
394.916(2) are essentially equivalent....
CopyCited 3 times | Published | Florida 2nd District Court of Appeal | 2008 WL 465589
...See also In re Interest of E.H.,
609 So.2d 1289 (Fla.1992). Jimmy Ryce Act proceedings similarly implicate a constitutionally recognized right liberty. A person facing involuntary Jimmy Ryce commitment is entitled to counsel for those proceedings at state expense. §
394.916(3)....
CopyCited 3 times | Published | Florida 5th District Court of Appeal | 2005 WL 1842615
...t the definition of a sexually violent predator. We have been given no citation to, nor have we found, any legal authority to support a claim that the state is required to provide such a program. AFFIRMED. THOMPSON and MONACO, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] § 394.916(1), Fla....
CopyCited 2 times | Published | Florida 4th District Court of Appeal | 2014 WL 1908830, 2014 Fla. App. LEXIS 7108
...ommitment, and that he should be placed in the custody of DCF while the State’s SVP petition was pending. Several days later and after consultation with appointed counsel, Defendant agreed in both open court and in writing to waive his right under section 394.916(1), Florida Statutes (2002), to have a commitment trial held within thirty days of the court’s probable cause determination....
CopyCited 2 times | Published | Florida 1st District Court of Appeal | 2010 Fla. App. LEXIS 8980, 2010 WL 2483749
...inition of "substantial prejudice." The following day, the court entered an order granting the state's motion for continuance, finding that the state demonstrated good cause and that the defense did not establish substantial prejudice as required by section 394.916(2), Florida Statutes....
...predator. The following day, the trial court entered a final judgment that found appellant was a sexually violent predator and involuntarily committed him to the custody of the Department of Children and Families under the Act. This appeal follows. Section 394.916, Florida Statutes (2008), provides in pertinent part: (1) Within 30 days after the determination of probable cause, the court shall conduct a trial to determine whether the person is a sexually violent predator....
CopyCited 2 times | Published | Florida 2nd District Court of Appeal | 2001 WL 1635587
...Although the circuit court's lack of jurisdiction is dispositive, we note that Burton had counsel representing him in the commitment proceeding. Burton's motion, filed by counsel, requested computer and Westlaw access so Burton could assist counsel in identifying relevant issues and precedent. Pursuant to section 394.916(3), Florida Statutes (2000), Burton is entitled to the assistance of counsel....
CopyCited 2 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 38 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 211, 2013 Fla. LEXIS 567, 2013 WL 1338042
...ngton v. Texas,
441 U.S. 418, 425 ,
99 S.Ct. 1804 ,
60 L.Ed.2d 323 (1979). Under the Act, the trial court must conduct a trial to determine whether the individual is a sexually violent predator within thirty days after the finding of probable cause. §
394.916(1), Fla....
CopyCited 2 times | Published | Florida 3rd District Court of Appeal | 2004 WL 840294
...*923 Before GERSTEN, GODERICH, and FLETCHER, JJ. PER CURIAM. Craig Williams seeks to be released from custody because he was not brought to trial within 30 days of the trial court's finding of probable cause that he is a sexually violent predator, pursuant to section 394.916, Florida Statutes (2003)[Jimmy Ryce Act]....
CopyCited 2 times | Published | Florida 2nd District Court of Appeal | 2004 WL 690572
...(2002). Because these provisions clearly do not apply to Ennis, he is not entitled to relief on this basis, and we affirm the dismissal on these grounds. However, Ennis also asserts that he was not brought to trial within thirty days as required by section 394.916(1)....
CopyCited 1 times | Published | Florida 4th District Court of Appeal | 29 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. D 2011
...care, and treatment."). [3] See §
394.913(3), Fla. Stat. (2003) (requiring multi-disciplinary evaluation prior to state's petition for involuntary commitment). [4] We note that JRA expressly enables defendants to retain their own expert witnesses. §
394.916(4), Fla....
CopyCited 1 times | Published | Florida 2nd District Court of Appeal | 2002 WL 31396927
...As we did in Smith,
827 So.2d 1026, however, we emphasize that Mr. Sutton may be able to object during the deposition to answering specific questions on the grounds that they violate his right against self-incrimination or his right to privacy. We note that section
394.916(1), Florida Statutes (2000), provides that a sexually violent predator detainee "shall" receive a *1083 jury trial within thirty days of the determination of probable cause to determine whether he or she qualifies for long-term civil confinement....
CopyCited 1 times | Published | Florida 2nd District Court of Appeal | 2009 Fla. App. LEXIS 17229, 2009 WL 3837238
...the State's petition, we reverse and remand. I. Background In 1999, the State filed its original petition for civil commitment. However, that petition was dismissed due to the State's failure to bring Goode to trial within thirty days as required by section 394.916(1), Florida Statutes (1999)....
...Liggett Group, Inc.,
945 So.2d 1246, 1259 (Fla.2006). In the supreme court's Goode opinion, the court was asked to determine whether a dismissal of a civil commitment petition was required where the State failed to bring a detainee to trial within the thirty-day time period set forth in section
394.916(1)....
...Because the trial court erroneously applied rule 1.420(b) and the doctrine of res judicata to bar the State's petition for civil commitment, we reverse and remand for proceedings in conformance with this opinion. Reversed and remanded. FULMER and KHOUZAM, JJ., Concur. NOTES [1] Section 394.916(1) provides that "[w]ithin 30 days after the determination of probable cause, the court shall conduct a trial to determine whether the person is a sexually violent predator." The statute allows for the trial to be continued upon a request of either party and a showing of good cause, see § 394.916(2), but no such showing was made in Goode's case....
CopyCited 1 times | Published | Florida 1st District Court of Appeal | 2011 Fla. App. LEXIS 7427, 2011 WL 1938186
...The trial court found probable cause in an ex parte hearing that day and appointed counsel. An adversarial probable cause hearing was set for July 10, 2002, a date more than thirty days from the finding of probable cause and therefore beyond the time limit for trial. See § 394.916(1), Fla....
...Taylor was in lawful custody when the state filed the second petition for involuntary commitment. To answer this question, we must first consider the effect of the order dismissing the first petition on the ground that the trial had not been held within the statutory time limit. Section 394.916(1) states that “[wjithin 30 days after the determination of probable cause, the court shall conduct a trial to determine whether the person is a sexually violent predator.” The supreme court con- *535 eluded in State v....
CopyCited 1 times | Published | Florida 4th District Court of Appeal | 2003 Fla. App. LEXIS 10840, 2003 WL 21658606
...pon the holding in Goode, involving the Jimmy Ryce Act time limitation. Because the dependency statute has a similar time limitation, the father contends it also should be mandatory. See
830 So.2d at 828 The particular section under review in Goode, section
394.916(1), Florida Statutes (1999), *476 states, that "[w]ithin 30 days after the determination of probable cause, the court shall conduct a trial to determine whether the person is a sexually violent predator." (Emphasis added)....
CopyCited 1 times | Published | Florida 4th District Court of Appeal | 2000 WL 60930
...s presently detained under the Act in Martin County. The ground of his petition is that he has been denied a speedy trial under the Act, which provides that the court shall conduct the trial within thirty days after the probable cause determination. Section 394.916(1)....
CopyCited 1 times | Published | Florida 5th District Court of Appeal | 2006 WL 1144292
...At a March 10, 2005, docket sounding, prior to a March 14, 2005 trial date, Kolin filed yet another motion to continue, which was denied. On the day of trial, March 14, 2005, Kolin, for the first time, raised the thirty-day deadline in a "Motion to Dismiss for Violation of Section 394.916(1)." The trial court denied the motion, finding that Kolin's decision not to file the motion at or prior to the original trial date was a tactical decision for which there was no relief....
...State, 907 *
200 So.2d 505 (Fla.2005), and may be waived. Williams v. State,
909 So.2d 939 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005); Curry v. State,
880 So.2d 751 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004); Williams v. State,
870 So.2d 922 (Fla. 3d DCA 2004); State v. Kobel,
757 So.2d 556 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000). Further, section
394.916(2) of the Act provides for waiver of the deadline upon the trial court's granting of a well-founded motion to continue....
...[3] Even after waiving the initial thirty-day deadline, a Jimmy Ryce respondent "can reassert his right to a trial within thirty days by filing a notice, motion or pleading, or making a request in open court that expressly and unequivocally demands a trial within thirty days pursuant to section
394.916(1)." Curry,
880 So.2d at 752....
CopyCited 1 times | Published | Florida 5th District Court of Appeal | 2001 WL 427394
...Upon remand, it is within the discretion of the trial court after reevaluating the doctor's testimony to either continue with the adversarial hearing, or if the trial court finds probable cause under the new standard, the matter shall proceed to trial in accordance with section 394.916....
CopyPublished | Florida 1st District Court of Appeal | 2001 WL 1518295
...of determining whether a person should be declared a sexually violent predator. See §
394.914, Fla. Stat. (2000). The legislation provides that this proceeding, if it seeks civil commitment, will culminate with a trial, by jury if so requested. See §
394.916, Fla....
CopyPublished | Florida 1st District Court of Appeal | 2012 Fla. App. LEXIS 3321, 2012 WL 676319
...Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Charlie McCoy, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee. WOLF, J. Appellant challenges a final order of civil commitment under the Jimmy Ryce Act, sections
394.910-932, Florida Statutes (2007). Section
394.916(1) provides the court shall conduct a trial within 30 days after the determination of probable cause. Section
394.916(2) states the court may grant one continuance for "not more than 120 days." Appellant argues the limit on continuances in subsection (2) is jurisdictional....
CopyPublished | Florida 5th District Court of Appeal
...The court held an evidentiary hearing the following month where it
found probable cause that Fetzer should be committed as a sexually violent
predator.
2
thirty days of the State’s filing of the petition. See § 394.916(1), Fla....
CopyPublished | Florida 3rd District Court of Appeal
...Torrance Rogers petitions this Court for a writ of prohibition seeking to
dismiss a petition, filed below, for civil commitment of a sexually violent predator
(a “Ryce Act” petition). Rogers claims the trial court violated his rights under
section 394.916, Florida Statutes (2017), when it did not commence a jury trial
within thirty days of his request in open court....
...State,
907 So. 2d 505, 507 (Fla. 2005) (“[Defendant] moved to dismiss
the Ryce Act petition against him on the basis that the State failed to bring the case
to trial within the thirty days of the trial court's probable cause finding, as required
by section
394.916(1), Florida Statutes (1999).”); State v....
CopyPublished | Florida 2nd District Court of Appeal | 2011 Fla. App. LEXIS 8975, 2011 WL 2421041
...release from pretrial detention and dismissal of the petition for involuntary civil commitment without prejudice because of the State's failure to bring him to trial within thirty days from the date of the probable cause determination as required by section 394.916(1), Florida Statutes (2009)....
...service of the summons as required by Florida Rule of Civil Procedure for Involuntary Commitment of Sexual Predators 4.240(a), and that the State did not bring Richards to trial within thirty days from the probable cause determination as required by section 394.916(1)....
...The trial was held a little over three months after the probable cause determination. Id. at 392-93. Immediately prior to trial, Boatman moved to dismiss the commitment petition on the basis that he was not brought to trial within thirty days from the date of the probable cause determination as required by section 394.916(1)....
...We therefore conclude that Richards did not waive the issues raised in the petition for writ of habeas corpus by failing to file the petition "immediately" following the circuit court's denial of his motion to dismiss. The Kolin court, citing Osborne v. State,
907 So.2d 505 (Fla.2005), noted that the requirement under section
394.916(1) that trial commence within thirty days after the circuit court determined that probable cause existed to believe that a detainee was a sexually violent predator is not jurisdictional and can be waived....
...Instead, on the day trial was set, Kolin moved to continue the case, asserting the need for more preparation time. Id. For more than three years, he filed additional motions to continue as each trial date approached. Id. Finally, on the day of trial, Kolin filed a motion to dismiss the commitment petition for a violation of section 394.916(1)....
...t before he had filed four motions to continue the trial date. Id. In the present case, the commitment petition was filed on January 20, 2010, with the probable cause determination being made on that same date. The motion to dismiss for violation of section 394.916(1) was filed on March 31, 2010, which was a little more than two months after the probable cause determination....
...Richards alternatively argues that the commitment petition should be dismissed without prejudice and that he should be released because the State did not bring him to trial within thirty days from the date of the probable cause determination as required by section 394.916(1)....
...have modified the proposed rules by adding a proviso that the thirty-day period begins to run only upon the filing of an answer, but the court did not do so. Such a rule would be in direct conflict with the intent of the legislature as reflected in section 394.916(1) that the thirty-day period commence upon the date of the probable cause determination....
...n scheme by the *1270 imposition of rigid time constraints set out in explicit language in the acts. Id. at 822. The court went on to state that the "Legislature's interest in imposing rigid time constraints is expressly reflected in the language of section 394.916(1), which specifically states that the court `shall' conduct a trial within thirty days after the determination of probable cause." Id....
CopyPublished | Florida 4th District Court of Appeal | 2011 Fla. App. LEXIS 8939, 2011 WL 2329596
...time period for trial was unnecessary for two reasons. First, the court mistakenly believed that due to "statutory guidelines" the case "needs to be tried this *1255 week." We presume that the "statutory guidelines" to which court was referring was section 394.916(1), Florida Statutes (2009), which states: "Within 30 days after the determination of probable cause, the court shall conduct a trial to determine whether the person is a sexually violent predator." However, section 394.916(1) no longer sets the date by which trial is to commence....
...Among those rules was rule 4.240(a), which states, in pertinent part: "The trial to determine if the respondent is a sexually violent predator shall be commenced within 30 days after the summons has been returned served and filed with the clerk of the court. " (emphasis added). Because rule 4.240 conflicts with section 394.916(1) as to the date by which trial is to commence, the rule controls....
...Second, the time periods set forth in the Jimmy Ryce Act and the new rules of procedure are unrelated to the constitutional right to a speedy trial. Under both the Act and the rules, a court can continue a trial "on its own motion in the interests of justice, when the person will not be substantially prejudiced." § 394.916(2), Fla....
CopyPublished | Florida 2nd District Court of Appeal | 2005 WL 155468
...The statute provides that the multidisciplinary team "shall include, but is not limited to, two licensed psychiatrists or psychologists or one licensed psychiatrist and one licensed psychologist." [3] §§
394.914-.915(1), Fla. Stat. (2004). [4] §
394.915(1), Fla. Stat. (2004). [5] §
394.915(2), (4), Fla. Stat. (2004). [6] §
394.916(1), Fla....
CopyPublished | Florida 2nd District Court of Appeal | 2005 Fla. App. LEXIS 563
...The statute provides that the multidisciplinary team "shall include, but is not limited to, two licensed psychiatrists or psychologists or one licensed psychiatrist and one licensed psychologist.” . §§
394.914-.915G), Fla. Stat. (2004). . §
394.915(1), Fla. Stat. (2004). . §
394.915(2), (4), Fla. Stat. (2004). . §
394.916(1), Fla....
CopyPublished | Florida 1st District Court of Appeal | 2000 Fla. App. LEXIS 16841, 2000 WL 1862089
...d the failure to begin the trial is not the result of a delay caused by the respondent. We construe the statutory scheme so that, once the circuit judge finds probable cause after an adversarial hearing, the 30 day clock for commencement of trial in section 394.916(1) begins to run anew....
...ring. Because the statute contemplates an adversarial hearing more than 30 days after the ex parte hearing, it must also contemplate that an alleged sexually violent predator will be held beyond 30 days after the ex parte determination. Moreover, as section 394.916(2) provides that the time for commencement of trial may be extended upon “a showing of good cause”, it appears the time limitation is directory, and does not establish a procedural bar, so as to divest the trial court of jurisdiction to proceed....
CopyPublished | Florida 2nd District Court of Appeal | 2010 Fla. App. LEXIS 18305, 2010 WL 4861507
...ALTENBERND, KHOUZAM, and CRENSHAW, JJ., Concur. . If the individual was convicted of a sexually violent offense in another state or in federal court, the petition is filed in the circuit where the individual was last convicted of any offense in this state. §
394.913(1). . Section
394.916(1), Florida Statutes (1999-2010), states that the court shall conduct a trial on the petition within thirty days after the court has determined that there is probable cause to believe that the individual named ■ in the petition is a sexually violent predator....
