CopyCited 200 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 1977 Fla. LEXIS 4079
...Inference and implication cannot be substituted for clear expression. Dudley v. Harrison, McCready & Co.,
127 Fla. 687,
173 So. 820 (1937). The Legislature has, on several occasions, provided for general or specific waivers of sovereign immunity: Section 230.23(9)(d), Florida Statutes (1975); Section
337.19, Florida Statutes (1975); Section 455.06, Florida Statutes (1975); Section 768.15, Florida Statutes (1969); Section
768.28, Florida Statutes (1975). In two of these enactments the Legislature specifically provided for modification of the venue rule: Section
337.19(3) and Section 768.15(3)....
CopyCited 44 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 33 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 493, 38 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. Law Inst.) 20173, 2008 Fla. LEXIS 1240, 2008 WL 2678812
...1st DCA 2007) (citing Pan-Am for the principle that when a party reserves the option not to perform under a contract, the contract is a nullity); Grading & Bush Hog Servs., Inc. v. Fla. Dep't of Transp.,
894 So.2d 1047, 1049 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005) (rejecting DOT's claim that section
337.19, requiring that suit be brought on a contract within 820 days, was a "limited sovereign immunity statute" because Pan-Am held sovereign immunity is waived for express contracts); White Constr....
CopyCited 25 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 15 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 39, 1990 Fla. LEXIS 196, 1990 WL 5442
...ime compensation. It resulted from a legitimate good faith dispute on how the hours and wages of the employees were to be computed. The county thought it had fully paid its employees. With the exception of the right to sue the state road department (section 337.19, Florida Statutes), I can locate no statutory authorization for suits against the state for breach of employment contracts....
CopyCited 18 times | Published | Florida 1st District Court of Appeal | 1978 Fla. App. LEXIS 16910
...Although the court denied judicial review of the State Road Department's action on a contract dispute, it did so construing the 1961 Administrative Procedure Act and in circumstances in which the legislature had provided a remedy in circuit court. Section 337.19, Florida Statutes (1967)....
CopyCited 10 times | Published | Florida 1st District Court of Appeal
...Section
95.031(1), Florida Statutes (1975); Tullo v. Horner,
296 So.2d 502 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1974). The question of discovery is a factual one, not appropriately passed upon at the pleadings stage. The trial judge correctly denied the motion to dismiss as to the first count. Ms. Kinnon next argues Section
337.19(1), Florida Statutes (1975), allows contract actions against the Department....
CopyCited 10 times | Published | Florida 2nd District Court of Appeal
...Appellees argue that the Florida Department of Transportation as an administrative agency has a venue right which, unless waived, requires that the agency be sued only in Leon County, the seat of that administrative agency. Under this attack, venue cannot properly be in Polk County. In Section
337.19(3), Florida Statutes (1975), the Florida Legislature waived the venue privilege in contract suits against the Department of Transportation. State Department of Transportation v. Edward M. Chadbourne, Inc.,
333 So.2d 77 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976). We think it clear that under the facts of this case and the provisions of Section
337.19(3), the DOT's status as an administrative agency did not preclude venue in Polk County....
CopyCited 9 times | Published | Florida 1st District Court of Appeal
...es. Disputes such as these are traditionally settled in the courts of this state by adversary proceedings in which the agency as a contracting party is treated as any other citizen. This is the remedy intended to be provided by the enactment of F.S. Section 337.19, F.S.A., quoted above....
...The venue of the proceedings for such review shall be the appellate district which includes the county wherein hearings before the hearing officer or agency, as the case may be, are conducted, or if venue cannot be thus determined, then the appellate district wherein the agency's executive offices are located." [3] F.S. § 337.19, F.S.A....
CopyCited 9 times | Published | Florida 1st District Court of Appeal | 1959 Fla. App. LEXIS 3097
...the Constitution does not expressly forbid "damage" to property without just compensation. The appellant, the State Road Department, as an agency of the State, cannot be sued without the consent of the State, and such consent has been given only in Section 337.19, Subsection (1), Florida Statutes, F.S.A., which provides: "Suits at law and in equity may be brought and maintained by and against the department on any claim under contract for work done; provided, that no suit sounding in tort shall...
CopyCited 8 times | Published | Florida 3rd District Court of Appeal
...awful or tortious taking of a portion of appellees' lands and property rights, nevertheless, by statute as well as decisions of our Supreme Court, the appellant, State Road Department, is immune from suit based upon a tort claim. Fla. Stat., F.S.A., § 337.19; Weir v....
CopyCited 7 times | Published | Florida 1st District Court of Appeal
...nshine State Parkway in Palm Beach County. Appellants moved for a change of venue to Leon County and appellee moved for a change of venue to Palm Beach County. The trial judge entered an order transferring the case to Palm Beach County, relying on F.S. 337.19(3)....
...It is axiomatic that statutes must be read in para materia with other related statutes and other related portions of the same statute. An examination of Chapter 337 Florida Statutes readily reveals that it does not purport to govern tort actions nor tort liability. Indeed, the concluding clause of F.S.
337.19(1) specifically provides "That no suit sounding in tort shall be maintained against the department." Appellee urges that the latter provision is unconstitutional and therefore should be ignored as a part of the statute. (State ex rel. Davis v. Love, Sup.Ct. 1930,
99 Fla. 333,
126 So. 374) It is not necessary for us here to determine the constitutionality of that provision. Whether or not the quoted clause from subsection (1) of F.S.
337.19 is constitutional, it clearly reveals that the Legislature did not intend for that statute, F.S.
337.19, to be applicable to tort actions. It is apparent therefore that the language of F.S.
337.19(3) that "All actions and suits brought against the department * * * shall be brought in the county or counties where the cause of action accrued or in Leon County" was intended to relate to actions contemplated by Chapter 337 Florida Statutes and not tort actions. F.S.
337.19(3) may not therefore be construed as a waiver by the State or the Department of Transportation to be sued in Leon County....
CopyCited 7 times | Published | Florida 1st District Court of Appeal
...Further, the rule regarding exhaustion of administrative remedies is inapplicable because no administrative rule, remedy, or procedure is involved. The Florida legislature has provided by statute that the D.O.T. may be sued on any claim under contract for work done by a person or entities contracting with the D.O.T. Section 337.19, Florida Statutes (1977)....
...1st DCA 1968), the State Road Department filed a motion to dismiss the contractor's complaint urging that the contractor was required to file a claim with the department and proceed administratively. The court rejected the State Road Department's argument, holding that Section 337.19 was enacted by the legislature to govern disputes which may arise between contractors and the State Road Department under road-building contracts entered into between them....
CopyCited 6 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida
Confl. of Laws, Sec. 112; 27 C.J.S., Divorce, § 337; 19 C.J., Divorce, § 850; 17 Am.Jur., Divorce and
CopyCited 5 times | Published | Florida 3rd District Court of Appeal
...Therefore, this suit to quiet title could not be maintained against the State Road Department unless provision therefor was made by statute. Our attention has been directed to two statutes dealing with suits against the State Road Department in certain circumstances, §§ 337.19 and 69.17 et seq., Fla. Stat., F.S.A. Neither gives authority to sue the State Road Department to quiet title under this amended complaint. Section 337.19 clearly is not applicable here, as it authorizes suits "against the department on any claim under contract for work done; provided, that no suit sounding in tort shall be maintained against the department." *206 The second statute ment...
CopyCited 4 times | Published | Florida 1st District Court of Appeal | 2003 WL 22887902
...remature, because the Board had not determined whether the contractor's appeal was timely filed and, accordingly, whether it had jurisdiction, and, therefore, the Claims Court proceeding was not ripe for dismissal). With respect to actions in court, section 337.19 provides, in pertinent part: (1) Suits at law and in equity may be brought and maintained by and against the department on any contract claim arising from breach of an express provision or an implied covenant of a written agreement or...
...ut did not order the action to be transferred. White filed its request for arbitration with the Board on March 21, 2002. DOT opposed the arbitration request arguing that the claim was barred because it was filed beyond the 820-day time limitation in section
337.19, Florida Statutes (1999). In denying arbitration, however, the Board relied upon neither section
337.185(1) nor section
337.19....
...The Hypower court rejected DOT's contention that the 2002 amendments to section
337.185 applied retroactively to bar Hypower's arbitration request, because to give such a retroactive application to the statute would impair Hypower's vested *1067 rights. Id. at 857. In addition, the Hypower court rejected DOT's argument that section
337.19 precludes any arbitration action against DOT filed after the 820-day period provided for in section
337.19(2). This court explained in Hypower: [S]ection
337.19 is not applicable to the instant case, because it relates only to lawsuits and is completely unrelated to section
337.185, Florida Statutes, which sets forth the entire arbitration scheme and establishes the Board. Id. Similarly, we reject DOT's argument that, because the state only agreed to waive sovereign immunity on the condition precedent that suit be brought within 820 days, section
337.19 should be interpreted as a limited sovereign immunity statute....
...Department of Corrections,
471 So.2d 4 (Fla.1984), the argument no longer has any continuing validity. Under Pan-Am, the state has been deemed to waive sovereign immunity for suits alleging breach of an express contract with the state. The waiver applies to DOT. The time limit in section
337.19(2) is solely a limitations period....
CopyCited 3 times | Published | Florida 1st District Court of Appeal | 12 Fla. L. Weekly 2376
...t... . However, a finding that a contractor did not have sufficient personnel, equipment and finances to complete a job in a timely manner shall be prima facie evidence that the contractor was at fault and therefore delinquent.... On the other hand, section 337.19, Florida Statutes, allows for suits at law and in equity to be brought and maintained by and against DOT on any claim under contract for work done....
CopyCited 3 times | Published | Florida 3rd District Court of Appeal
...Thereupon, the Department of Transportation took this interlocutory appeal. The appellant relies heavily on State v. Negrin, Fla.App. 1975,
306 So.2d 606, as authority for its position. In our opinion, Negrin is inapposite to the case at bar since it treats §
337.19(1), Fla....
CopyCited 3 times | Published | Florida 1st District Court of Appeal | 1978 Fla. App. LEXIS 15291
...This interlocutory appeal presents no issue concerning the trial court's venue order on Noonan's claim. The issue is whether San Marco's indemnity claim against DOT may be asserted, over DOT's venue objection, in Noonan's Escambia County action against San Marco. Section 337.19(1), Florida Statutes (1975), provides that actions may be maintained against DOT "on any claim under contract for work done ... ." and Section 337.19(3) provides that suit may be brought "in the county or counties where the cause of action accrued or in Leon County." DOT urges that San Marco's cause of action for indemnity cannot have arisen in Escambia County because no part of the...
...Game & Fresh Water Fish Comm'n,
354 So.2d 362 (Fla. 1977), reh. pending. This case is different from Kelly in that the legislature has in part waived DOT's privilege to be sued at home. DOT may be sued "in the county or counties where the cause of action accrued." §
337.19(3), Fla....
CopyCited 3 times | Published | Florida 2nd District Court of Appeal | 2004 WL 1751464
...The trial court denied the motion to dismiss, and the Department appealed the nonfinal order concerning venue pursuant to Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.130(a)(3)(A). The parties agree that venue is proper where the cause of action accrued, pursuant to section 337.19(3), Florida Statutes (1997)....
CopyCited 2 times | Published | Florida 1st District Court of Appeal | 2003 Fla. App. LEXIS 3065, 2003 WL 882373
...The Board declined the request, reasoning that the request was submitted more than 820 days after the final acceptance of the work. Hypower appealed. We hold that Hypower's request was timely. The FDOT argues that the 820-day period within which to file an arbitration request, set forth in section
337.19, Florida Statutes, is a limited waiver of sovereign immunity. However, section
337.19 is not applicable to the instant case, because it relates only to lawsuits and is completely unrelated to section
337.185, Florida Statutes, which sets forth the entire arbitration scheme and establishes the Board....
CopyCited 2 times | Published | Florida 2nd District Court of Appeal | 92 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (West) 668, 2017 WL 1536070, 2017 Fla. App. LEXIS 5902
...claim arising from breach of an express provision or an implied covenant of a written agreement .... In any such suit, the department and the contractor shall have all of the same rights and obligations as a private person under a like contract .... § 337.19(1), Fla....
...5th DCA 2009), to argue that sovereign immunity prevents it from having to pay United Capital. 4 Those cases are inapposite. In each ease the Department cites, a party sought to compel a government agency to perform an obligation that *136 was not stated in an express written contract. Since Pan-Am and, as applicable here, section 337.19(1) waive sovereign immunity only as to an express written contract, sovereign immunity bars an action to enforce obligations not contained in such a contract....
CopyCited 1 times | Published | District Court of Appeal of Florida | 1977 Fla. App. LEXIS 16944
...Section
95.031(1), Florida Statutes (1975); Tullo v. Horner,
296 So.2d 502 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1974). The question of discovery is a factual one, not appropriately passed upon at the pleadings stage. The trial judge correctly denied the motion to dismiss as to the first count. Ms. Kinnon next argues Section
337.19(1), Florida Statutes (1975), allows contract actions against the Department....
CopyCited 1 times | Published | Florida 5th District Court of Appeal | 2005 WL 176606
...ul termination of said contract. FDOT filed a motion to dismiss the third-amended complaint, arguing that Bush Hog had failed to state a cause of action because it had failed to attach a written notice of final acceptance of the work, as required by section 337.19(2) of the Florida Statutes. Without citing any case law to support its position, FDOT argued that section 337.19(2) required a contractor to obtain a notice of final acceptance as a condition precedent to filing a lawsuit against FDOT. The trial court entered an order granting FDOT's motion to dismiss with prejudice, basing its decision on the fact that Bush Hog's complaint failed to comport with the requirements of section 337.19(2). Section 337.19 of the Florida Statutes governs lawsuits filed against FDOT. Subsection two of the statute provides, in relevant part, as follows: 337.19....
...Suits by and against department; limitation of actions; forum * * * (2) Suits by and against the department under this section shall be commenced within 820 days of the final acceptance of the work. This section shall apply to all contracts entered into after June 30, 1993. § 337.19(2), Fla. Stat. (2001). Bush Hog challenges the trial court's dismissal order, arguing that section 337.19(2) of the Florida Statutes does not constitute a condition precedent to filing a lawsuit against FDOT, but rather, only acts as a time limitation on the maximum number of days which can pass before an action is barred. We agree. The plain language of section 337.19(2) establishes a time period during which a lawsuit can be brought against FDOT....
...1st DCA 2003), the First District recognized this fact, explaining as follows: *1049 Similarly, we reject DOT's argument that, because the state only agreed to waive sovereign immunity on the condition precedent that suit be brought within 820 days, section 337.19 should be interpreted as a limited sovereign immunity statute....
...Department of Corrections,
471 So.2d 4 (Fla.1984), the argument no longer has any continuing validity. Under Pan-Am, the state has been deemed to waive sovereign immunity for suits alleging breach of an express contract with the state. The waiver applies to DOT. The time limit in section
337.19(2) is solely a limitations period....
...nto a contract fairly authorized by the powers granted by general law, the defense of sovereign immunity will not protect the State from an action arising from the State's breach of that contract). Accordingly, since Bush Hog was not required, under section 337.19(2) of the Florida Statutes, to receive a final notice of acceptance of its work from FDOT prior to filing suit, the trial court's order dismissing Bush Hog's third-amended complaint must be reversed....
...he initial contract by 5% or when a contractor provides unforeseen work. Noteworthy, the issuance of such as an agreement is necessary to insure the contractor's ability to seek payment for work performed but not covered by the initial contract. See § 337.19, Fla....
CopyPublished | District Court of Appeal of Florida | 1965 Fla. App. LEXIS 3678, 1965 A.M.C. 2738
...We wish to make it clear, however, that this decision of affirmance is without prejudice to the right of appellants to institute in the trial court a proper action seeking the relief they ask of this court, if they are so advised. The judgment appealed is affirmed. RAWLS, C. J., and STURGIS and WIGGINTON, JJ., concur. . Section 337.19, F.S.A....
CopyPublished | District Court of Appeal of Florida
...odifications thereof. The suggestion alleges that the defendant Road Department filed a motion to dismiss the complaint in which it challenged the jurisdiction of the court to entertain the action on *749 the ground of sovereign immunity; that under Section 337.19(1), Florida Statutes, F.S.A., suits at law and in equity may he brought and maintained by and against the State Road Department on any claim under contract for work done; provided, that no suit sounding in tort shall be maintained agai...
...mmune from suits at law or in equity except in those instances in which the State has given its consent to be sued. It takes the further position that the only statute giving consent of the State for suit to be brought against the Road Department is Section 337.19(1) which authorizes such suits only on claims under contract for work performed and completed....
...J., and WIGGINTON and RAWLS, JJ., concur. . “Suits at law and in equity may be brought and maintained by and against the department on any claim under contract for work done; provided, that no suit sounding in tort shall be maintained against the department.” F.S. § 337.19'(1), F.S .A....
CopyPublished | District Court of Appeal of Florida | 1976 Fla. App. LEXIS 14486
...ting Chief Judge. By this interlocutory appeal, 1 appellant Department of Transportation challenges the trial court’s order denying a change of venue. The sole point on appeal is : “Whether or not an action pursuant to a contract predicated upon Section
337.19, Florida Statutes, may be brought in a county other than Leon County, which is the headquarters of Appellant State of Florida Department of Transportation pursuant to Section
334.05, Florida Statutes, absent a waiver by the Appellant.” The complaint, filed by appellee Chad-bourne in Escambia County, seeks damages pursuant to a contract with the Department of Transportation. The cause of action accrued in Escambia County. Florida Statute
337.19 2 is clear; suits at law upon a contract may be brought against the Department of Transportation within two years from and after the time of the completion of the work done and shall be brought in the county or counties where the cause of action accrued or in Leon County....
...be sued only in Leon County. In support of its position, the department relies heavily upon this court’s opinion in State v. Negrin. 3 Negrin, which involved a suit in tort, clearly states: “. . . It is apparent therefore that the language of F.S. 337.19(3) that ‘All actions and suits brought against the department * * * shall be brought in the county or counties where the cause of action accrued or in Leon County’ was intended to relate to actions contemplated by Chapter 337 Florida Statutes and not tort actions.” (emphasis supplied) Interlocutory appeal dismissed. McCORD and SMITH, JJ., concur. . Florida Appellate Rule 4.2. . Florida Statute 337.19 provides: “337.19 Suits by and against department; limitation of actions; form....
CopyPublished | Florida 3rd District Court of Appeal
...whereby a “transformative Signature Bridge project to uplift and ameliorate a
long-blighted stretch of interstate” was to be replaced with a “‘plain-Jane’
segmental box bridge.”
1 We refer to both appellants collectively as “FDOT.”
2 § 337.19(1), Fla....
...ed
a written settlement agreement; (2) communications between FDOT and others
corroborate the existence of such an agreement; (3) FDOT partly performed under
6
the purported settlement agreement; and (4) section 337.19(1), Florida Statutes
(2017), permits local lawsuits against FDOT for breach of contract when the claim
arises from “breach of an express provision or an implied covenant of a written
agreement or written directive issued by the department pursuant to the written
agreement.” These arguments fail....
...First,
did the parties enter into an enforceable written settlement agreement in 2013 as
part of the dismissal of the earlier lawsuit? Second, are the documents relied upon
by Mr. Sarnoff public contracts subject to chapter 337, including that chapter’s
statutory waiver of FDOT’s home venue privilege in section 337.19(1)?
“Settlement Agreement”
“Settlement agreements are to be interpreted by and are governed by the
same principles of law interpreting and governing contracts.” Gaines v....
...Sarnoff, but from non-parties residing and working in the
County in which the project-in-process was to be located. They do not establish a
meeting of the minds of the parties with specific, enforceable terms, as required
under Gaines and the cases cited in that opinion.6
Statutory Waiver; Section 337.19
Section 337.19, captioned “Suits by and against department; limitation of
actions; forum,” unquestionably establishes an exception to Florida’s home venue
privilege....
...rty, the acquisition of necessary
aggregate materials for construction, the development and retention of vendors and
professional services providers, and other aspects of building and maintaining
transportation infrastructure.
Importantly, section 337.19(1) addresses actions by and against FDOT and a
“contractor:” “In any such suit, the department and the contractor shall have all of
the same rights and obligations as a private person under a like contract except that
no liabi...
...al design and construction contracts are
underway does not resemble a complete, written contract procured and signed
under the strictures of the public contracts statutes applicable to FDOT.
The limited waiver available to contractors under section 337.19 is
inapplicable to the joint motion to dismiss the 2013 lawsuit and other documents
contended by Mr....
...Sarnoff and his counsel were civic-minded7
and sought to impress upon FDOT’s district office the importance of local advice
and input relating to an important local transportation project. The trial court
recognized that and duly noted, in the hearing on FDOT’s motion, the language of
section 337.19 allowing a contract claim against FDOT to be “brought in the
county where the cause of action accrued.”
We are constrained, however, to carefully review the details of the purported
“contract” or “settlement agreement,” as well as the limitations on the statutory
waiver in section 337.19....
CopyPublished | District Court of Appeal of Florida | 1995 Fla. App. LEXIS 6913, 1995 WL 376673
...Although money damages may remedy the breach, it cannot be said that DOT breached a specific contractual promise to pay. Consequently, the place of payment is not a proper venue for Anderson’s suit. REVERSED and REMANDED. ERVIN, JOANOS and MINER, JJ., concur. . Section 337.19(3), Florida Statutes (1993), provides: “Any action or suit brought against the department shall be brought in the county or counties where the cause of action accrued or in Leon County.”
CopyPublished | District Court of Appeal of Florida | 1964 Fla. App. LEXIS 3963
...on under the Constitution. * * * ” ****** If the Legislature gave to the public the right to sue the State Road Department by the statute set forth in the last quoted portion of Justice Terrell’s opinion [which was the predecessor of the present § 337.19, Fla.Stat., F.S.A.], this certainly was not a hollow right....
CopyPublished | United States Bankruptcy Court, M.D. Florida | 15 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. B 202, 2002 Bankr. LEXIS 557
...ary from effectuating a permanent forfeiture, i.e., a non-payment of the balance claimed to be due as the final payment with respect to the Project. The Debtor also seeks declaratory relief that the Statute of Limitations imposed by Florida Statutes § 337.19 was tolled pursuant to 11 U.S.C....
...law. It is clear that what the relief really sought by the Debtor is nothing more and nothing less than a declaration of this Court that 11 U.S.C. § 108 (a)(2) did extend the applicable statute of limitations period as set forth in Florida Statutes § 337.19....
