CopyCited 15 times | Published | Florida 1st District Court of Appeal | 1997 WL 174345
...The management agreement is not between Ford and appellant, but rather between FWBLM and appellant. FWBLM is not a manufacturer, factory branch, distributor, or importer. The management agreement cannot be an "agreement" under the statutory definitions, and its termination did not require notice under the statute. Section 320.699 states in relevant part: Administrative hearings and adjudications; procedure. (1) A motor vehicle dealer, or person with entitlements to or in a motor vehicle *66 dealer, who is directly and adversely affected by the action or cond...
CopyCited 8 times | Published | Florida 1st District Court of Appeal | 1991 WL 138127
...(Braman), challenges two final administrative orders from the Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles (Department) dismissing its petitions for formal proceedings due to its lack of standing. Braman asserts that it is entitled to standing under Sections
320.642,
320.699,
320.6992 and
120.57, Florida Statutes....
...in Case No. 90-718 and against University Cadillac, Inc. in Case No. 90-908. [1] We affirm. Appellant Braman Cadillac operates a General Motors franchise dealership in Dade County. It initially filed a petition seeking a formal hearing pursuant to Section 320.699(1)(a), Florida Statutes (Supp....
...nadequate representation in the area." GM subsequently entered the proceedings, adopting WWW's motion to dismiss, arguing that WWW is a proper party under Sections
320.64 and
320.27, Florida Statutes. General Motors Corporation (GM) also argued that Section
320.699(1)(a), Florida Statutes (Supp. 1988) did not set forth grounds for standing independent of those set forth in Section
320.642(3)(b), Florida Statutes. Section
320.699, in pertinent part, states:
320.699 Administrative hearings and adjudications; procedure....
...d forthwith by the hearing officer. A hearing was held on the motion to strike, which Braman acknowledged was moot after GM joined WWW Enterprises in the proceedings. In his order on Braman's motion to strike, the hearing officer stated in part that Section
320.699 did not provide independent standing grounds beyond those expressed in Section
320.642....
...We have also reviewed Braman's other arguments, including their contention that Braman will suffer impairment of its contractual relationship with GM and find this argument to be without merit for purposes of conferring standing under Section
320.642. As its second point, Braman contends that it is entitled to standing under Section
320.699, Florida Statutes....
...ections
320.60 to
320.70. Parties seeking to redress grievances may petition for a hearing under Section
120.57(1)(a) or may pursue an action under Section
320.642, if they file a "written objection or notice of protest." Under the plain language of Section
320.699(1), a dealer, such as Braman, must be "a directly and adversely affected party affected by the action or conduct of an applicant or licensee which is alleged to be in violation of any provision of ss....
...the initial or amended petition. In case 90-908, Braman asserted a violation of a clause in Section
320.605, the legislative intent of the Motor Vehicle Act, which asserts that "maintaining competition" is one of the purposes of the act. We construe Section
320.699 as providing standing to any directly and adversely affected party who can assert a *1051 violation of Section
320.60-320.70 which is substantive in nature....
...We also reject Braman's argument that it qualifies under Section
120.57(1) Florida Statutes, for standing to protest in the present posture of the case. See Agrico Chemical Co. v. Dept. of Environmental Regulation,
406 So.2d 478 (Fla.2d DCA 1981). [4] We have also reviewed Braman's standing claim under Section
320.6992, Florida Statutes, based on the alleged unconstitutional impairment of the franchise agreement with GM and find it to be without merit....
