CopyCited 19 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 23 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 29, 1998 Fla. LEXIS 36, 1998 WL 10586
...We have jurisdiction pursuant to article V, section 3(b)(4) of the Florida Constitution. The facts of the two cases at issue here are essentially the same. Both cases involve drivers operating their motorcycles on prohibited *1361 pathways, in violation of section 316.1995, Florida Statutes (1995)....
...maintained by Florida Power and Light Company (FP & L). The trial court granted FP & L's motion for summary judgment. The trial court reasoned that FP & L owed no duty to the plaintiff, because operating a motorcycle on a bike path is prohibited by section 316.1995....
...ective sidewalk, which was maintained by the Department of Transportation (DOT). The trial court granted DOT's motion for summary judgment. The trial court held that DOT owed no duty to the plaintiff and that operating a motorcycle was prohibited by section 316.1995 and was therefore unforeseeable....
...rs, whereas the latter is part of a much more specific factual requirement that must be proved to win the case once the courthouse doors are open." Id. (footnote omitted). We agree with the Fourth District Court of Appeal that Periera's violation of section
316.1995 does not relieve FP & L of a duty as a matter of law. As the district court stated, "FP & L's guy wire was as much as a hazard to bicyclists, who were lawfully on the bike path, as to motorcyclists, who were not." Periera,
680 So.2d at 618. We read Powell to say that the plaintiff's violation of section
316.1995 relieved DOT of its duty to maintain a safe sidewalk....
...f fact left for the fact-finder. See McCain,
593 So.2d at 503-04. In this *1362 context, the focus is on specific, narrow facts of the case, not the broader zone of risk that the defendant created. See id. at 503. We find that Periera's violation of section
316.1995 is prima facie evidence of comparative negligence....
...Accordingly, we approve the decision below to reverse summary judgment and disapprove Powell to the extent that it is inconsistent with our opinion. It is so ordered. KOGAN, C.J., and OVERTON, SHAW, WELLS and ANSTEAD, JJ., and GRIMES, Senior Justice, concur. NOTES [1] Section 316.1995, Florida Statutes (1995), states that "[n]o person shall drive any vehicle other than by human power upon a bicycle path, sidewalk, or sidewalk area, except upon a permanent or duly authorized temporary driveway." The cases at issue...
CopyCited 3 times | Published | Florida 4th District Court of Appeal | 1996 Fla. App. LEXIS 10401, 1996 WL 577394
...Florida Department of Transportation,
626 So.2d 1008 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993), rev. denied,
639 So.2d 980 (Fla.1994). In Powell plaintiff sued the DOT as a result of being injured while riding his motorcycle on a defective sidewalk maintained by the DOT. Citing the same statute as is involved in this case, section
316.1995 Florida Statutes (1987), which prohibits motorized vehicles on bike paths or sidewalks, the first district affirmed a summary judgment in favor of the DOT, stating that the DOT "owed no duty to make sidewalks safe for motorcycle traffic." Id....
