CopyCited 5 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 10 Fla. L. Weekly 629
...Validity of Beach User Fees In oral argument, the state contended that local governmental entities have no constitutional or statutory authority to regulate motor vehicle access to the beaches or to charge a motor vehicle access fee. Subsequently, the 1985 Florida Legislature addressed that issue. Newly enacted section 161.58(2), Florida Statutes (1985), contained in chapter 85-55, Laws of Florida, provides: Vehicular traffic, except that which is necessary for clean-up, repair, or public safety, or for the purpose of maintaining *408 existing authorized public accessways, is prohibited on coastal beaches....
...ermissible classification. Accordingly, we remand these cases to the district court with directions to remand to the trial courts to determine if (1) the beach access fees are reasonable and (2) the ordinances otherwise comply with the provisions of section 161.58, Florida Statutes, which became effective October 1, 1985....
...It is so ordered. ADKINS, McDONALD, EHRLICH and SHAW, JJ., concur. BOYD, C.J., dissents with an opinion. BOYD, Chief Justice, dissenting. Section 36 of chapter 85-55, Laws of Florida, created the Coastal Zone Protection Act of 1985, sections
161.52-
161.58, Florida Statutes (1985). In the provision designated as section
161.58(2), the new law prohibits vehicular traffic on coastal beaches, except where authorized by the local government with jurisdiction by a three-fifths vote of its governing body....
CopyCited 4 times | Published | Florida 5th District Court of Appeal | 1989 WL 48101
...ship. During the pendency of this case, the Legislature enacted Chapter 85-55, Laws of Florida, popularly known as the "Growth Management Bill". Section 36 of Chapter 85-55 created the Coastal Zone Protection Act of 1985. The provision designated as section 161.58(2) prohibited vehicular traffic on the beach unless authorized by local authorities and provided for the charging of a toll and the expenditure of toll revenue for "beach maintenance." The parties stipulated to a continuance while the City passed new ordinances enacted with reference to section 161.58....
...vehicle on weekdays *827 and $2.00 per vehicle on weekends, that the City charged an even dollar amount to avoid making change, and that the City charged $2.00 on the weekends because the weekends were busier. The Finance Director acknowledged that section 161.58 had been amended in 1986 but admitted that the City made no adjustments in accounting after the law changed and used the same accounting methods to allocate expenses to the beach toll fund....
...rs in on overtime duty. In its final judgment the trial court concluded that beach toll collection and expenditures were authorized by the City's home rule powers between March of 1968 and October 1985, that the City had violated the 1985 version of section 161.58 by its expenditure of beach toll revenue between October 1, 1985, and July 1, 1986 for purposes other than beach maintenance, and that the City had violated the 1986 version of section 161.58 by expending beach toll revenue for purposes other than beach maintenance and the beach related categories set out in the statute....
...In accordance with these determinations, the court denied relief to the State regarding revenue prior to October 1985 and denied the City's counterclaim for reimbursement of those expenses. The court also ordered the City to repay to the beach toll special fund the amount of $305,832 for its past violations of section 161.58. Both parties have challenged the final judgment. On appeal, the City contends that the trial court erred in interpreting the 1985 and 1986 versions of section 161.58 and in holding that some of the City's expenditures were not permitted under the statute, arguing that the City always had the right, under its home rule powers, to impose reasonable user fees for access to the beach and to use that revenue for the maintenance, operation and improvement of the beach....
...on the weekends *828 and holidays, was unjustified, unreasonable and discriminates between "outsiders" and residents. [4] On cross appeal, the State argues that the City had no authority to impose a toll prior to October 1985, the effective date of section 161.58, and accordingly all of the toll money should be returned to the public....
...There the state had contended that local governmental entities have no constitutional or statutory authority to regulate motor vehicle access to the beaches or to charge a motor vehicle access fee. In its opinion, the supreme court noted that the Legislature had addressed that issue by enacting 161.58....
...ble fee for the use of the beach within its municipal boundaries from 1968 *829 until October 1, 1985, the effective date of the Act. The Coastal Zone Protection Act, as its name implies, was enacted to control growth in our sensitive coastal areas. Section 161.58 originally provided for the regulation of vehicular traffic on coastal beaches as follows: (2) Vehicular traffic, except that which is necessary for cleanup, repair, or public safety, or for the purpose of maintaining existing authorized public access ways, is prohibited on coastal beaches....
...ave to shoulder the economic burden of the increased costs for law enforcement, life guards, emergency services and liability insurance. There is nothing in the Act to indicate that this outcome was intended. Moreover, the quick response in amending section 161.58 suggests that the Legislature recognized that the term "beach maintenance" could be construed in a limited manner and so more definitive legislation was enacted clearly setting forth specific categories of beach related expenditures. We therefore conclude that the 1986 amendment to section 161.58 was enacted to simply clarify the existing authority by explicitly setting forth specific categories of permissible expenditures from the beach toll revenue fund....
...ason than the amount of revenue generated. This belief does not appear unreasonable. We further conclude that it is reasonable for the City to have a surplus as long as the funds remain in the beach toll fund and are used for the purposes set out in section 161.58....
...mination that differing tolls rose to the level of "unreasonableness" was error. In conclusion, we reverse the portion of the final judgment determining that the toll was unreasonable and that the City had expended beach toll revenue in violation of section 161.58. In all other respects, the judgment is affirmed. On remand, the trial court should review the expenditures of beach toll revenue by the City, keeping in mind the purpose of section 161.58....
