CopyCited 28 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 2000 WL 1354234
...t of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit as determinative of a cause pending before that court and for which there is no controlling precedent. Specifically, the Eleventh Circuit has certified the following questions to this Court: (1) UNDER FLA. STAT. § 125.031, WHICH REQUIRES APPROVAL OF THE BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS FOR CERTAIN LEASE-PURCHASE AGREEMENTS, CAN A COUNTY BE HELD TO HAVE APPROVED A CONTRACT ABSENT FORMAL RESOLUTION AND BASED SOLELY ON ACTS AND OMISSIONS OF THE COUNTY COMMISSION?...
...25, 1999). We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(6), Fla. Const. As more fully explained below, we answer the first certified question in the affirmative and determine that a board of county commissioners may approve a lease-purchase agreement under section 125.031, Florida Statutes (1999), even absent formal resolution, if such board is not required by local ordinance or charter to take action by formal resolution, as is the status of the local charter here....
...After considering the above-listed facts, the federal district court made several determinations. See id. at D341-43,
1996 WL 571042, **1-2. First, the court determined that even though the County Commission had not approved the lease-purchase agreement prior to its execution as required by section
125.031, Florida Statutes (1993), the Commission had subsequently approved the agreement by (1) appropriating funds to pay for computer equipment; (2) voting to change its own technology plan to integrate the computer equipment; and (3) taking no action after learning that an elected official in Escambia County had entered into a lease-purchase agreement in possible violation of section
125.031....
...set forth above. Id. at 10. We now address those questions in turn. II. ISSUES AND ANALYSIS A. THE FIRST CERTIFIED QUESTION In the first certified question, the Eleventh Circuit has asked us to determine whether, consistent with the requirements of section 125.031, Florida Statutes, a board of county commissioners may approve a lease-purchase agreement absent formal resolution, and, if so, what standards guide consideration of whether such an approval has occurred. As explained below, we determine that a board of county commissioners may approve a lease-purchase agreement under section 125.031, even absent formal resolution, if a governing charter or ordinance does not require the board to take action by formal resolution, as is the situation here....
...ion their powers and duties shall be fixed and prescribed the Legislature."); Weaver v. Heidtman,
245 So.2d 295, 296 (Fla. 1st DCA 1971) (observing that counties are "subject to legislative prerogatives in the conduct of their affairs"). By enacting section
125.031, the Legislature clearly established that agreements such as the one at issue here may not be entered into without approval by a board of county commissioners....
...This is not an instance where the clerk of the circuit court is acting as an arm of the judicial branch and thus under judicial control and not the control of the Legislature. See Times Publishing Co. v. Ake,
660 So.2d 255, 257 (Fla.1995). Therefore, the Legislature's pronouncement in section
125.031 is controlling here, and Flowers did not have the independent authority to enter into the agreement with Unisys without the approval of the Board. [6] Turning now to the first question certified by the Eleventh Circuit, we must consider the text of section
125.031, Florida Statutes (1999): [7] Counties may enter into leases or lease-purchase arrangements relating to properties needed for public purposes for periods not to exceed 30 years at a stipulated rental to be paid from current or other l...
...one in the first instance may subsequently be adopted or ratified by them with the same effect as though properly done under previous authority."). The dispositive question thus becomes, what constitutes "approval" by the Board within the meaning of section 125.031? Section 125.031 does not define the term "approval" as used in the statute, nor does the legislative history underlying the statute shed any light on the matter....
...City of Tallahassee,
366 So.2d 172 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979) (employing doctrine of estoppel to bar city from challenging validity of agreements on grounds of lack of proper formalities in the passage *1021 of such agreements). As a result, we determine that the term "approval" as used in section
125.031 does not require a board of county commissioners to pass a formal resolution, unless passage of such a resolution is required by the governing law of the county....
...embers of the Board where the members deal with some matter on which foreseeable action will be taken by the Board." Tolar,
398 So.2d at 428. Thus, for a board of county commissioners to approve a lease or lease-purchase agreement in accordance with section
125.031, we find it necessary that such approval be made "in the sunshine." If an "approval" by a board of county commissioners of a lease or lease purchase agreement under section
125.031 must be made in accordance with the Sunshine Law, it necessarily follows that any subsequent ratification of such an agreement must also be made in compliance with the Sunshine Law....
...er circumstances. Id. Based on the above principles well established in Florida jurisprudence, we determine that a three-prong test is appropriate for determining whether an after-the-fact "approval," or ratification, has occurred in satisfaction of section 125.031, Florida Statutes....
...rmative. [15] III. CONCLUSION As we have analyzed, the first certified question is answered in the affirmative *1027 upon our determination that a board of county commissioners may approve in the form of ratification a lease-purchase agreement under section 125.031, Florida Statutes, even absent formal resolution, where the board is not required by local ordinance or charter to take action by formal resolution....
...[4] To support this third finding, the federal district court stated: "[T]he evidence shows the accounting firm of Saltmarsh, Cleveland & Gund advised the County Commission through a 1994 independent audit that an elected official of the county had entered into a long-term lease agreement in possible violation of section 125.031." Frankenmuth Mut....
...[that] appear to fall within the category of transactions which must be approved by the governing body of the County." This language is almost identical to that contained in the same auditing firm's 1991 report, which also did not specify what officials had entered into lease-purchase agreements in possible violation of section 125.031. [5] The parties have not referred us to any provision in the Escambia County Code requiring the Board to take action in some specified manner. [6] It is interesting to note that Flowers entered a nolo contendere plea to the charge of violating section 125.031, Florida Statutes; if Frankenmuth's argument were correct, then Flowers' plea would have responded to a charge having absolutely no basis in law....
...[7] We quote the current version of the statute because the Legislature has not amended the statute since 1989. See ch. 89-103, § 1, at 279, Laws of Fla. Thus, the current version of the statute is the same as the version in effect at the time the events in the present case transpired. [8] The Legislature created section 125.031, Florida Statutes, in 1971, see chapter 71-240, section 1, at 1318-19, Laws of Florida, and, as stated in footnote 6, supra, has amended the statute only once since that time....
CopyAgo (Fla. Att'y Gen. 1980).
Published | Florida Attorney General Reports
...rles H. Hood Clerk Circuit Court Palatka QUESTION: Is a noncharter county authorized by general statute to make interest payments pursuant to a lease-purchase agreement, regardless of whether the interest rate is specified in the agreement? SUMMARY: Section 125.031 , F....
...1906); it is assumed, however, for the purposes of this inquiry that the lease and purchase of such property serve a valid county purpose authorized by law. A copy of correspondence between other parties, which you submitted with your request, suggests that s. 125.031 , F. S., `confers all the authority needed by counties to make interest payments' when `making lease purchases' but also indicates that the `Auditor General's field supervisor for [Putnam County] does not believe there is adequate authority.' Section 125.031 provides: Counties may enter into leases or lease-purchase arrangements relating to properties needed for public purposes for periods not to exceed 30 years at a stipulated rental to be paid from current or other legally available fun...
...(Emphasis supplied.) Thus, the statute expressly authorizes noncharter counties to enter into lease-purchase agreements at stipulated rentals , provided that, when the terms of such leases are for longer than 24 months, the rental shall not be paid from ad valorem taxes. While s. 125.031 authorizes the payment of rent from legally available funds of the county, it does not purport to authorize, nor does it mention, the payment of finance charges, interest, or charges in the nature of interest in such lease-purchase arrangements....
...on all things not expressly mentioned — expressio unius est exclusio alterius — is thus applicable so that by clear implication the payment of finance charges or interest in lease-purchase arrangements entered into under the authority of s. 125.031 is prohibited....
...ay be inferred or implied from authority expressly given). Although counties have been given the express power to make and enter into leases and lease-purchase arrangements at stipulated rentals for a designated term of years under the provisions of s. 125.031 , F....
...S., the payment of finance charges, interest, or charges in the nature of interest pursuant to a contractual financing device or plan, such as the one in question, is not affirmatively and necessarily implied therefrom or in terms expressly authorized by s. 125.031 itself....
...AGO 079-72 in which this office concluded that the amended statute authorizing the purchase of commodities by installment sales or lease-purchase contracts (s.
287.042 ) does not authorize a state agency to grant a security interest in the personal property being purchased. Thus, I am of the opinion that neither s.
125.031 nor s....
...Fla., 1978); Broward County Port Authority v. Arundel Corporation,
206 F.2d 220 (5th Cir. 1953); and 20 C.J.S. Counties s. 306. Thus, in the absence of statute or an express lawful agreement to the contrary, counties are not liable for interest on their obligations. While s.
125.031 , F....
