Florida/Georgia Personal Injury & Workers Compensation

...operly found, after analysis of soil samples showing municipal road grading and intermittent repair, that there was sufficient evidence of municipal maintenance for the streets to be deemed dedi- cated to the City of Apopka by operation of Fla.Stat. § 95.361....

...or severally, the road shall be (deemed to be) dedicated to the public to the extent in width that has been actually maintained for the prescribed period, whether the road has been formally established as a public highway or not." [3] Fla.Stat.Ann. § 95.361 (1976) 26....

...ad not paved the full width of the roadway. And in Dade County v. Harris, 90 So.2d 316 (Fla. 1956), use of a portion of a highway right-of-way as a "grass parkway" was held not incompatible with dedication and user of the whole for highway purposes. Section 95.361, Florida Statutes (1977), which establishes a presumption of dedication when a road has been maintained by public authorities for four continuous years, but only to the extent in width that has actually been maintained for the prescrib...

...of Bayou Boulevard, is distinguished from the instant case on its facts and should not in our opinion be extended to control the determination of ownership and other property rights with respect to land not involved in that litigation. [10] Although section 95.361, Florida Statutes provides for acquisition of fee title to the "dedicated" road, Madden v....

...The surveyor's testimony that the county maintains the road was based on his examination of a document containing hearsay, was disputed by eye witnesses at the trial, and ultimately was refuted by the county itself. See Star Island, 433 So.2d at 1003. Section 95.361(1), Florida Statutes (1995), sets out the requirements for a statutory presumptive dedication....

...to time put some clay down or did some maintenance on some of the unnamed streets or alleys." Evidence was also presented indicating that the City had maintained the roadways over a continuous four-year period. Accordingly, by operation of Fla.Stat. § 95.361, the streets are deemed dedicated to the City of Apopka and, thus, the City has the authority to pave them....

...e or an acceptance by a public authority. See City of Miami Beach v. Miami Beach Improvement Co., 153 Fla. 107, 14 So.2d 172 (1943); City of Palmetto v. Katsch, 86 Fla. 506, 98 So. 352 (1923). Requirements for a statutory dedication are contained in section 95.361(1), Florida Statutes (1981)....

...in this case contends that it constructed and maintained the disputed roadway because it graded the path on the utility easement and put shell on it. Although arguably those facts may not support a showing of road construction within the meaning of section 95.361, see St. Joe Paper Co. v. St. John's County, 383 So.2d 915 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980), petition for review denied, 388 So.2d 1118 (1980), we need not decide that issue because we cannot find that the legislative intent behind section 95.361 was to allow a municipality to claim by dedication land that is located in another municipality. We cannot construe the language of section 95.361(1)(b), which allows title to a road to vest in a municipality if the road is a municipal road to mean that the claimed road may lie outside the boundaries of the claiming municipality....

...The manhole jutting up out of the soft sand was clearly hazardous to such traffic. In its order granting the motions for summary judgment, the trial court relied upon Continental Insurance Company v. Belflower, 355 So.2d 840 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978), and section 95.361, Florida Statutes. Section 95.361(1), Florida Statutes (1975), states: When a road, constructed by a county, a municipality, or the Division of Road Operations, has been maintained or repaired continuously and uninterruptedly for 4 years by the county, municipality, or...

...ced on portions of the road for the convenience of hunters." Id. The district court said there was no evidence these "desultory" activities occurred within a four year period, or that the county performed inspections or repairs within the meaning of section 95.361, Florida Statutes (1975)....

...Andrew Pelino, Assistant County Attorney, West Palm Beach, for appellee The County of Palm Beach. STEVENSON, J. The Chackals timely appeal the trial court's ruling that a portion of a roadway that borders their property is owned by Palm Beach County pursuant to section 95.361, Florida Statutes (2001)....

...med dedication. After a two-day bench trial, the trial court entered final judgment in favor of the County, rejecting its two alternate theories and holding that it had acquired title to the land at issue by statutory presumed dedication pursuant to section 95.361(1), Florida Statutes (2001), as follows: By operation of Florida Statutes Section 95.361, Palm Beach County has obtained full rights, title, and ownership to the entire Disputed Strip as the evidence is *952 undisputed that the County has constructed, maintained and repaired this roadway continuously and uninterruptedly for more than four (4) years....

...Merkin, 902 So.2d 288, 290 (Fla. 3d DCA 2005)), *954 review denied, 973 So.2d 1123 (Fla.2007). The County bears the burden of proving dedication. Trepanier v. County of Volusia, 965 So.2d 276, 285 (Fla. 5th DCA 2007). In 2001, when this lawsuit was filed, section 95.361, Florida Statutes, applied only where a road was "constructed" by a governmental entity, as follows: 95.361....

...lly established as a public highway. The dedication shall vest all right, title, easement, and appurtenances in and to the road in: (a) The county, if it is a county road;. . . [1] The appellants argue that the County failed to meet its burden under section 95.361, Florida Statutes (2001), because the County did not "construct" the portion of the road at issue, as it was already a pre-existing shell rock road. We disagree. In Pasco County v. Johnson, 67 So.2d 639, 642 (Fla.1953), the Florida Supreme Court, applying a statutory predecessor to section 95.361(1), broadly defined the term, "constructed." In Johnson, the supreme court held that Pasco County had "constructed" a road where the road had previously been laid out on private property by the owners of that property, but the county c...

...ed heavy rocks and cement along the end wall for essential support. The appellants further maintain that the County failed to meet its burden of proving that the County maintained or repaired the road continuously and uninterruptedly for four years. § 95.361(1), Fla....

...Ideal Holding Co., 427 So.2d 392, 393 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983). In Balbier v. City of Deerfield Beach, 408 So.2d 764, 765 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982), this court reversed a trial court's finding of presumed dedication on the ground that there was insufficient evidence to support dedication under section 95.361....

...purtenance" to the paved portion of the disputed strip. The statute provides that once the governmental entity meets the requirements of the dedication statute, it is entitled to "all right[s], title, easement, and appurtenances in and to the road." § 95.361(1), Fla....

...Further, the Court finds that the riprap rock placed west of the guardrail barrier was necessarily placed where it was to provide lateral and subjacent support to the roadbed. It is appurtenant to the roadbed and is, in fact, an appurtenance as the term is utilized by the legislature in Florida Statute 95.361....

...We grant the appellant's Motion for Clarification and Remand, which was not objected to by appellees, and remand this case to the trial court with instructions that an amended final judgment be entered consistent with this court's September 10, 2008 opinion. STEVENSON, GROSS and MAY, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] In 2003, section 95.361(2), Florida Statutes, was revised to address roads that the governmental entity did not initially "construct" as follows: (2) In those instances where a road has been constructed by a nongovernmental entity, or where the road was not c...

...Van Nortwick, Jr., of Martin, Ade, Birchfield & Johnson, Jacksonville, for appellants. James G. Sisco, St. Augustine, for appellee. BOOTH, Associate Judge: This cause is before us on appeal from a final judgment holding a roadway across property owned by St. Joe had become the property of appellee under Florida Statutes, § 95.361, which is, in pertinent part, as follows: "(1) When a road, constructed by a county, a municipality, or the Division of Road Operations, has been maintained or repaired continuously and uninterruptedly for 4 years by the county, municipalit...

...In 1974, the County paved the access way with asphalt. St. Joe filed its complaint in *917 January of 1976, seeking quiet title to the property and to enjoin further trespass. The County answered, claiming that the access way had been dedicated by operation of § 95.361. The cause was tried to the court without a jury and final judgment entered in favor of the County, awarding a twelve-foot roadway. On appeal to this court, St. Joe contends that Florida Statutes, § 95.361, to the extent that it has been construed to give rise to a conclusive presumption of dedication, is unconstitutional....

...Specifically, we find that the County did not meet the requirement of "construction" of the roadway as required. At common law, and in Florida, twenty years is required in order to create a prescriptive easement and seven years for acquisition of title by adverse possession. [1] Florida Statutes, § 95.361 creates an exception to these general rules by providing a substantially shorter four-year period....

...1953), the owner of property offered to dedicate a strip of his property for a road, and the County entered onto the realty, cleaned up the brush, stumps and trees, filled and made a useable county road. These activities were held to be a "construction" within the terms of the predecessor of Florida Statutes, § 95.361....

...The County appeals an order awarding attorney's fees to appellees, contending that none of the bases for an award of attorney's fees [1] was presented by the County's declaratory judgment action seeking a determination of whether a road across appellees' property had become vested in the County under the provisions of Section 95.361, Florida Statutes. [2] We agree with the County's contentions and reverse. Section 95.361 makes no provision for an award of attorney's fees in litigation to determine whether a roadway has become dedicated to the public and title vested in a public entity (county, municipality, or state) under its terms....

...Appellees assert, however, that attorney's fees were properly awarded because the sovereign power of eminent domain is implicated by the County's actions, in that the County had used portions of appellees' property, and sought by means of the present suit to perfect title to it under Section 95.361....

...right to public use and possession, rather than to acquire appellees' property. [6] There would seem to be no more justification for assessment of attorney's fees against the County for its attempt to clarify the status of the road, in the light of Section 95.361, than there would be to hold that the County must pay attorney's fees to property owners over whose land a roadway is lawfully acquired pursuant to the statute....

...ients of a benefit by "dedication" must nevertheless pay for the privilege by assuming the burden of attorney's fees incurred by those who might contest the dedication. The legislature could, of course, provide for attorney's fees in connection with Section 95.361 dedications, but it has not done so....

...in creating or bringing into court a fund or other property. Rivera v. Deauville Hotel Employees Service Corporation, 277 So.2d 265 (Fla. 1973); Kittel v. Kittel, 210 So.2d 1 (Fla. 1967); Polk County v. Deaton, 352 So.2d 571 (Fla. 2nd DCA 1977). [2] Section 95.361 provides that when a road constructed by a county, municipality, or the state, has been maintained or repaired continuously and uninterruptedly for four years by the governmental entity, the road shall be deemed to be dedicated to the public, and title to the road becomes vested in the public entity....

...[7] Cf. State, Department of Transportation v. Florida East Coast Railway Company, 262 So.2d 480 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1972), in which the State, although it claimed a dedication of the right of way sought under Section 337.31 (the predecessor of the present Section 95.361, Florida Statutes), filed a condemnation action, thereby unequivocally invoking the State's power of eminent domain and incurring liability for the landowner's attorney's fees in defending the litigation....

...imely appeal from the initial denial; and (4) failure to state a cause of action. Both the city and Arnold filed motions for summary judgment. Arnold's motion asserted that Long Street was a "street" under the ordinances of the city as well as under Section 95.361, Florida Statutes (1979), the road dedication statute....

..."street," contrary to the determination of the city, either because the *412 city's subdivision ordinance defining "street" does not apply, or because Long Street became a "street" or roadway by dedication and acceptance of a recorded plat, or under Section 95.361, Florida Statutes, by virtue of four years maintenance or repair by the city....

...The trial court's order is likewise silent on this point. Further, our review of the evidence before the trial court also discloses that factual issues preclude a finding, as to a matter of law, that Long Street became a dedicated public street either by recording of the plat or under Section 95.361, Florida Statutes (1979)....

...t in this action." In response, the Pascos admitted only that the City "maintained the road since it was constructed." The City then moved for summary judgment, asking the court to rule that the roadway was presumed to be dedicated to the City under section 95.361(1), Florida Statutes (2004)....

...Bank, FSB, 703 So.2d 1101, 1102 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997). On appeal from a summary judgment, all facts and inferences are viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Valk v. J.E.M. Distribs. of Tampa Bay, Inc., 700 So.2d 416, 419 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997). Section 95.361 creates a presumption that a road is dedicated to the public when it was both constructed by a governmental entity and "maintained or repaired continuously and uninterruptedly for 4 years" by the governmental entity. § 95.361(1) (emphasis added)....

...To establish the absence of disputed facts for the remainder of its case, the City relied heavily on the Pascos' admission that the City maintained the road since its construction. But this fell far shy of establishing the statutory requirements for a presumption of dedication. Section 95.361(1) requires more than occasional, or even periodic, *770 maintenance or repair; it requires continuous and uninterrupted maintenance or repair. See Cont'l Ins. Co. v. Belflower, 355 So.2d 840, 840 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978) (reversing conclusion that road was dedicated to county under section 95.361 when "there was an entire absence of evidence that even these desultory activities [of cutting the road and twice causing shell to be placed on portions] occurred within four years, or that the county performed any inspection or repair...

...s title and with owner's permission). The Objectors do not claim that title was transferred to the County by adverse possession. They urge that fee title to the land under the roadway was transferred to the County by statutory dedication pursuant to § 95.361, Fla.Stat., and that contiguity is thereby destroyed. Statutory dedication under § 95.361 (and its predecessor § 341.66) vests fee title to a dedicated road if the conditions of the statute are strictly met. Madden v. Florala Tel. Co., 362 So.2d 475, 477 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978). Section 95.361, the "Presumed Dedication Statute," provides in pertinent part that if a road is (i) constructed by a county and (ii) maintained by the county continuously and uninterruptedly for four years, then the road is presumed "dedicated to the public" and "[t]he dedication shall vest all right, title, easement, and appurtenance in and to the road in . . . the county." Fla.Stat. § 95.361(1)(a)....

...Bankruptcy Rule *747 4003(c). Moreover, under state law a party asserting statutory dedication of a road to a county bears the burden of proving the county's construction and maintenance of the road. Downing, 100 So.2d at 61. Florida courts hold that the requirements of § 95.361 must be strictly met....

...Johns County, 383 So.2d 915, 917 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980) (explaining that presumption in favor of public deprives legal title owner of his property within relatively short time period only if requirements of statute are strictly met). If the Objectors can prove that § 95.361 applies, then fee title passes to the County and contiguity of the claimed homestead is destroyed. If the Objectors cannot carry their burden of proving compliance with the statute, then § 95.361 does not apply....

...h the rights of the owner, or (ii) that the possession was exclusive as required to acquire title under adverse possession. Since there is no claim of adverse possession in this case, the County's only claim to title is by statutory dedication under § 95.361. Similar to the facts of Downing, the debtor asserts that the County cannot satisfy the construction requirement of § 95.361....

...Additionally, the minutes do not reveal any specific actions performed on the roadway that would constitute "construction" by the County. The County's smoothing of a pre-existing three trail road with a grader does not constitute "construction," and therefore fails to satisfy the strict requirements of § 95.361....

...Absent any evidence of actual work done to the road or of the road's completion, the Court finds that the minutes of the County Commission Meetings, standing alone, are insufficient to prove that the County constructed the road at issue. Therefore, § 95.361, Fla.Stat....

...Staley testified that in his opinion title to said parcel was in appellant. The City sought to offset this proof by evidence showing either a prescriptive easement resulting from continuous public use of the beach area since the late 1920's, or a presumed dedication under Section 95.361, Florida Statutes (1977), because of the City's alleged maintenance of the property for the statutory period of time. We would first dispose of the City's contention that it owns the property by presumed dedication pursuant to Section 95.361, Florida Statutes (1977). The statute provides: 95.361 Roads presumed to be dedicated....

...No testimony at all was adduced relative to the construction of the road; yet in our opinion that element is vital to proof of a presumed dedication under this statute. In Downing v. Bird, 100 So.2d 57 (Fla. 1958), the Supreme Court, in construing the predecessor of Section 95.361, Florida Statutes (1977), pointed out that a municipality could acquire title to a road right of way by complying with subsection (2) by filing a map with the Clerk of the Circuit Court, etc., or: The City could, without the filing of...

...UPCHURCH, JOHN J., IV, Associate Judge, concurs. HURLEY, J., dissents with opinion. HURLEY, Judge, dissenting. I concur with the majority's holding that the proof below was inadequate to support a finding of prescriptive easement or dedication pursuant to Section 95.361, Florida Statutes (1977)....

...Appellants contended that, since their lot abuts the dedicated right-of-way of S.E. 7th Street, they are entitled to recover the value of the fee in the right-of-way. The City's position, which was adopted by the trial judge, is that the City owns the right-of-way pursuant to the authority of Section 95.361, Florida Statutes (1979), since it has maintained it as a roadway for more than four years prior to the taking....

...The maintenance involved was installing trash containers near the beach, building steps to the beach with railroad ties, and placing boulders and fill to stem erosion. Thus, we are compelled to hold that the City has failed to bring itself within the statute in question. In pertinent part, Section 95.361 provides: " Roads presumed to be dedicated "(1) When a road, constructed by a county, a municipality, or the Division of Road Operations, has been maintained or repaired continuously and uninterruptedly for 4 years by the county, munic...

...SUSAN DARLEY'S STATUS ON THE SUNRISE MUSICAL THEATER PREMISES. Appellant first contends that the trial court erred when it refused to instruct the jury as a matter of law that at the time of the accident Susan Darley was an invitee on the premises. Appellant argues that under section 95.361(1), Florida Statutes (1987), the parking lot roadway became a public road because appellee, the City of Sunrise, and/or its agent, appellee, Marquee of Sunrise, Inc., manager of the theater, maintained and repaired the parking *718 lot road continuously and uninterruptedly for at least four years prior to the date of the accident. [1] The record at best contains conflicting evidence concerning the applicability of section 95.361(1)....

...an invitee on the premises. Appellant next contends that the trial court erred when it refused to submit to the jury the issue of Susan's status as an invitee on the premises. We agree. Although appellant did not present sufficient evidence to apply section 95.361 as a matter of law, the record does contain disputed and conflicting evidence concerning the maintenance of the parking lot roadway for the four-year period preceding the accident....

...We reverse the judgment awarding costs without prejudice to appellees to seek the costs awarded in the event of a favorable verdict and final judgment on retrial. AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN PART and REMANDED for a new trial. HERSEY, C.J., and GLICKSTEIN, J., concur. NOTES [1] Section 95.361, Florida Statutes (1987) provides in pertinent part: (1) When a road, constructed by a county, a municipality, or the Division of Road Operations has been maintained or repaired continuously and uninterruptedly for 4 years by the count...

...On appeal from the Circuit Court for Duval County. Robert M. Dees, Judge. March 28, 2019 B.L. THOMAS, C.J. Appellants appeal the trial court’s final judgment quieting title of the subject property to the Florida Department of Transportation under section 95.361, Florida Statutes....

...maintenance map claiming title to the subject property. Appellants sued the Department for inverse condemnation, arguing that their property had been taken for public use without compensation. The Department filed a counterclaim to quiet title, arguing that section 95.361, Florida Statutes, had vested all right, title, and interest in the subject property to the Department. At a bench trial, the maintenance contracts manager for the Department testified that, from 2006 until the time of trial, the...

...communications were private, and that the recording and transcript were inadmissible under section 934.06, Florida Statutes. The trial court found that the Department had been maintaining the subject property since May 22, 2007 at the latest, and that pursuant to section 95.361(1), Florida Statutes, the property vested in the Department four years later, on May 22, 2011, before Appellants filed suit on August 18, 2015....

...recorded in the Department maintenance map. Analysis I. Whether Competent, Substantial Evidence Supports the Trial Court’s Final Judgment An appellate court reviews a trial court’s application of section 95.361, Florida Statutes, de novo, and any factual findings supported under the competent, substantial evidence standard of 4 review must be upheld. Chackal v. Staples, 991 So. 2d 949, 953 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008). Section 95.361(1), Florida Statutes, provides that when a road is constructed by a governmental entity, and the width of that road is maintained by that entity “continuously and uninterruptedly for 4 years,” the entire maintained width of the road is “dedicated” to the public, vesting to the public the right, title, easement, and appurtenances. Section 95.361(2), Florida Statutes, provides that when a road is constructed by a nongovernmental entity, and the width of that road is regularly maintained by a governmental entity for seven years, the entire maintained width of the road is “dedi...

...Therefore, competent, substantial evidence supported the trial court’s finding that the Department had continuously and uninterruptedly maintained the subject property from at least May 22, 2007 until the time of the suit in August 2015, and that, under section 95.361(1), Florida Statutes, title vested in the Department in 2011, after four years of maintenance, and would have vested after seven years of maintenance if the court had determined the widening of State Road 5 had been constructed by a nongovernmental entity....

...nts actually discovered it on April 7, 2015, citing Sarasota Welfare Home, Inc. v. City of * The trial court found that the widening of State Road 5, although actually constructed by a contractor, was done by the Department for the purposes of section 95.361(1), Florida Statutes; therefore, only four years of continuous maintenance was required before titled vested in the Department. 6 Sarasota, 666 So....

...The testimony at trial was consistent with the transcript, as the Department’s maintenance engineer testified that he presented Appellants with two options 8 before later proceeding under the “dedication” in section 95.361, Florida Statutes....

...Appellant's primary argument centers on the contention that there neither was nor could be a formal acceptance of the dedication of the disputed strip under Section 177.081, Florida Statutes (1983), and that the evidence is not sufficient to support a claim of ownership by any governmental authority under Section 95.361, Florida Statutes (1983)....

...Schrader of Nabors, Giblin & Nickerson, P.A., Tallahassee, for Appellee. PER CURIAM. John and Brenda Mathers (the Matherses) appeal from a final summary judgment entered in favor of Wakulla County (“the County”). The Matherses argue, among other things, that the trial court erred in its application of section 95.361(2), Florida Statutes. Because acceptance is not an element of statutory-presumed dedication under section 95.361, and section 95.361 may be invoked by private parties, we agree and reverse the trial court’s judgment with respect to Counts 1 and 3....

...that Kristin Lane is a private road. The Matherses filed a four-count complaint naming the Mitchells and the County as defendants. Count 1 of the complaint sought a declaratory judgment confirming that Kristin Lane had become a county road pursuant to section 95.361(2) and that the County was under a duty to maintain and repair it....

...After a hearing on the merits, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the County on all three counts. While acknowledging that there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Kristin Lane had been regularly maintained or repaired by the County for seven years as required by section 95.361(2), the trial court reasoned that 1) section 95.361(2) cannot be invoked by private parties and 2) a dedication did not occur under section 95.361(2) because the County did not accept ownership of Kristin Lane. II. There are two distinct forms of dedication in Florida with regard to roads: common-law dedication and statutory-presumed dedication....

...maintenance and improvement by the proper authorities of part of the land dedicated.” Id. The Matherses do not rely on this form of dedication. There are two types of statutory-presumed dedication. The first type is set 5 forth in section 95.361(1) and involves roads constructed by a county, municipality, or the Department of Transportation. Under this provision, a private road becomes a public road when it “has been maintained or repaired continuously and uninterruptedly for 4 years by the county, municipality, or the Department of Transportation.” § 95.361(1), Fla....

...This provision dates to the 1940s. See Sun Plaza W. Dev. Corp. v. City of Holmes Beach, 465 So. 2d 542, 544 n.2 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985) (“The law has been in essentially the same form for more than forty years though under different numbers. Therefore, references to section 95.361 in this opinion should be read to include its predecessor statutes.”). The second type of presumed dedication is set forth in section 95.361(2) and applies to roads not constructed by a government entity. Enacted in 2003, this provision employs nearly the same language used in section 95.361(1), the only differences being that the road must have been “regularly maintained or repaired” rather than “maintained or repaired continuously and uninterruptedly” and such maintenance must occur for seven years rather than four years....

...The dedication shall vest all rights, title, easement, and appurtenances in and to the road in: (a) The county, if it is a county road; .... whether or not there is a record of conveyance, dedication, or appropriation to the public use. § 95.361(2), Fla. Stat. Because it was enacted so much later than section 95.361(1), no case law construes section 95.361(2). However, because the statutory language of each provision is virtually the same, we look to case law on section 95.361(1) for guidance. In those cases applying common-law dedication and statutory-presumed dedication under section 95.361(1), the concepts are discussed separately and analysis of each is not mixed. Importantly, there are no cases applying section 95.361(1) so that the common law elements of offer and acceptance are made requirements of statutory-presumed dedication....

...2d 1257, 1259 (Fla. 5th DCA 1983); Balbier v. City of Deerfield Beach, 408 7 So. 2d 764, 765 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982); Campanella v. Shuford, 336 So. 2d 1257, 1258 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976). The County argues that section 95.361 provides for acceptance by the filing of a map with the clerk. The County points to section 95.361(3), which states as follows: (3) The filing of a map in the office of the clerk of the circuit court of the county where the road is located showing the lands and reciting on it that the road has vested in the sta...

...se may be. The County misunderstands this particular provision. Filing a map is not necessary to accomplish dedication under the statute. See Sun Plaza W. Dev. Corp., 465 So. 2d at 544 (noting that a government entity may obtain title under section 95.361 without the filing of a map). Instead, the filing of the map, as the statute states, creates “prima facie evidence of ownership of the land.” § 95.361(3), Fla. Stat. Again, there is nothing in section 95.361 requiring that the government entity accept ownership. 8  Next, the County argues that acceptance must be a requirement of statutory- presumed dedication because a government entity cannot acquire property without intending to do so. The County points out that section 95.361 resides within a chapter entitled “Limitations on Action; Adverse Possession” and argues that it “would be contrary to the concept of adverse possession that an entity could unintentionally meet the requirements to adversely p...

...4th DCA 1968) (“[W]e reject appellant’s contention that the occupier must have the subjective intent to appropriate property of another in order for his possession to be adverse.”)). Similarly, there is no requirement that a government entity intend to acquire property under section 95.361....

...To the extent the County is concerned with inadvertently assuming heavy financial burdens, it should bear in mind that roads may be abandoned pursuant to section 336.10, Florida Statutes. In concluding that Kristin Lane was not publicly owned under section 95.361(2) because the County had not accepted ownership, the trial court either inadvertently conflated the concepts of common-law dedication and statutory- presumed dedication, or uncritically assumed that because acceptance is a require...

...However, as discussed above, the plain language of the statute compels a different conclusion. Once dedication occurs, “[t]he dedication shall vest all rights, title, easement, and appurtenances in” one of three government entities, here, the County. § 95.361(2), Fla....

...ar maintenance and repair for the prescribed period of time, regardless of any acceptance on the part of the government entity. Finally, the County argues that summary judgment was warranted because the trial court correctly concluded that section 95.361 cannot be invoked by a private party. However, we see no reason that section 95.361 should be limited to use by government entities. Furthermore, there are a variety of cases in which private 10 parties have been permitted to claim that a roadway became public property by operation of section 95.361. See e.g., In re Jackson, 169 B.R. at 746 (permitting private objector to invoke section 95.361 in order to destroy contiguity of land for purposes of homestead exemption); Darley v. Marquee Enters., Inc., 565 So. 2d 715, 717-18 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990) (holding that trial court erred in refusing to instruct jury on plaintiff’s theory that city owned road on which auto accident occurred by operation of section 95.361); Premer v. State, Dep’t of Transp., 346 So. 2d 1219, 1220 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977) (stating that personal injury plaintiff’s theory that Department of Transportation owned road pursuant to predecessor statute of section 95.361 was question of law). III. In conclusion, acceptance is not an element of statutory-presumed dedication under section 95.361, and section 95.361 may be invoked by private parties....

...Under the language of the applicable statutes governing statutory dedications, a statutory dedication vests title in a state, county, or municipal government—depending on the circumstances—and divests the dedicator of his or her title in the underlying land. See § 95.361, Fla....

...side of the dedicated street holds title to the entire street. See Bonifay v. Dickson, 459 So. 2d 1089, 1095-96 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984). - 16 - dedication to municipalities—when Gulf Avenue was vacated by Sarasota County in 1983. See § 95.361, Fla....

...But we also recognize the existence of the theory that the 1944 replat or the operation of statutes that had been codified after 1912 may have converted the easement into a dedicated road that divested the dedicator of title to it and vested it with the Sarasota County. See, e.g., § 95.361, Fla. Stat....

PER CURIAM: In this case, Boothe asserts that the title to Tallevast Road, on which her property faces, was taken without just compensation and without due process. Boothe challenges the constitutionality of Fla.Stat. *1373 Ann. § 95.361 (West 1982) which provides in relevant part as follows: (1) When a road, constructed by a county, a municipality, or the Division of Road Operations, has been maintained or repaired continuously and uninterruptedly for 4 years by the county...

...or many more than four years. It was also established that Boothe’s predecessor in title, and Boothe’s ex-husband who was involved in Boothe’s purchase of the property, believed that the county owned the road. The Florida courts have held that Section 95.361 is a statute of repose, which, when its terms have been satisfied, presumes that the owners had dedicated the road for public use....

LEHAN, Judge. We affirm the trial court’s summary judgment for DeSoto County on its counterclaim asserting ownership of roads under Section 95.361, Florida Statutes (1983). The county filed its counterclaim on June 4, 1982, claiming ownership of the *512 roads under that statute. Subsection (1) of Section 95.361 provides that When a road, constructed by a county ......

...e with the statute. A certified copy of that right-of-way map was thereafter attached to the county’s motion for summary judgment. It is our conclusion that the county thereby properly employed the second of the two methods of proof spelled out in Section 95.361 to establish its ownership of the roads and that appellant landowner did not controvert that proof so as to preclude summary judgment for the county....

...The Lees appeal a final judgment wherein, the trial court found that the Board of County Commissioners of Calhoun County had constructed a dirt road upon the Lees’ property and has since maintained the road, and therefore that the road is a county road pursuant to section 95.361, Florida Statutes....

...Accordingly, we REMAND the final judgment to the trial court to correct the last phrase of the description reading, “thence West back to the Point of Beginning,” to read instead, “thence East back to the Point of Beginning.” JOANOS and BARFIELD, JJ., concur. . Section 95.361(1), entitled "Roads presumed to be dedicated,” provides: [W]hen a road, constructed by a county, ......

purported to show compliance with the requirements of § 95.361, Florida Statutes (1975), which provides in pertinent

for more than the four-year prescriptive period, § 95.361, F.S.1975, to a width “set forth in the deposition

...In 1994, James filed an amended complaint to quiet title alleging his ownership pursuant to a 1937 Special Master’s Tax Deed. He attached an abstract of the property to the complaint. In response, DOT denied James’ ownership and raised the affirmative defense of ownership based on section 95.361, Florida Statutes (1993)....

...Shortly thereafter, DOT executed a quit claim deed in favor of James. James sought attorney’s fees pursuant to section 57.105(1) contending that DOT was aware that the State had conveyed its interest in the 1937 tax deed and that it could not prove compliance with section 95.361. In response, DOT argued that justiciable issues existed whether the tax deed conveyed the property due to a confusing legal description and whether DOT held title pursuant to section 95.361....

...sed its defense and at all times thereafter.” DOT had a duty to make a good faith, reasonable effort to determine whether the property was conveyed to James’ predecessor-in-interest pursuant to the 1937 tax deed before raising a defense based on section 95.361....

...3d DCA 1991); Moretti v. State, Dep’t of Transp., 592 So.2d 790 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992). Thus, DOT could have discerned from that information that the tax deed conveyed the property in 1937. That property conveyance rendered DOT’s assertions of ownership pursuant to section 95.361 “completely untenable”: DOT concedes that it could not prove the statutory requisites if the tax deed conveyed the property....

...rity and wisdom, has, by the enactment of Section 57.105(1), decided to place a pricetag upon such unwarranted litigation.” Hernandez v. Leiva, 391 So.2d 292, 293 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980) (citation omitted). Accordingly, we affirm the order. Affirmed. . Section 95.361(l)(c) states: (1) When a road, constructed by ......

...The County argued that the Property Owners did not have a claim of title to the land because the plat limited their property by metes and bounds. The County argued that it owned Avenida Del Norte and any land adjacent to the road *1252 way by operation of Florida’s road dedication statute, as codified in section 95.361, Florida Statutes....

together. Applicable were Section 337.31 (now section 95.361, Florida Statutes 1975) under which the State

...se foreclosed issues in the related controversy between the parties which was resolved by the 1979 judgment now appealed. We also find substantial competent evidence to support the trial court’s finding that the County acquired, by compliance with Section 95.361(1), Florida Statutes (1979), the dedicated roads and appurtenances, including the described ditches, in the contested property....

...The issue at trial was whether that portion of a right-of-way being condemned, which exceeded in width a right-of-way previously acquired by the state, inured to the state by virtue alternatively of (a) common-law dedication, (b) proscriptive easement or (c) maintenance pursuant to Section 95.361, Florida Statutes (1981)....

...Underwood, as personal representative for the estate of one Lucy Jones, was the record titleholder of the property. The County sought a ruling that it had sole title to the property, because the land had been dedicated to public use as a roadway by operation of the state dedication statute. See § 95.361, Florida Statutes (2002)....

...Unlike a takings case, in which the property owner is entitled to the fair market value of the land converted to public use, a quiet title action brought under the dedication statute does not allow for payment of compensation for the dedicated property. Nothing in the dedication statute, section 95.361, authorizes a court to award a property owner compensation for dedicated lands. No other statute of which we are aware provides for such an award, either. Nor is there a statutory basis for an attorney’s fee award to the owner of dedicated property. See § 95.361, Fla....

...In sum, we affirm the ruling that the property was dedicated to public use, but we reverse the portions of the judgment ordering the County to pay Underwood’s attorney’s fees and compensation for the dedicated property. Affirmed in part, reversed in part and remanded. WOLF, C.J., PADOVANO and POLSTON, JJ., concur. . Section 95.361(1) provides, When a road, constructed by a county, a municipality, or the Department of Transportation, has been maintained or repaired continuously and uninterruptedly for 4 years by the county, municipality, or the Department of Tran...

...ad; (b) The municipality, if it is a municipal street or road; or (c) The state, if it is a road in the State Highway System or State Park Road System, whether or not there is a record of a conveyance, dedication, or appropriation to the public use. § 95.361(1), Fla....

substantially the following question: Whether section 95.361, Florida Statutes, may be utilized to establish

...The Florida Department of Transportation brought an action to determine title to a portion of a parcel of real property owned by Ward. The Department contended that a portion of the right-of-way of old State Road 4A was situated on a portion of the parcel in question. The Department asserted that under section 95.361, Florida Statutes (1989), and its predecessors, title to the right-of-way had vested in the Department....

...ch the Department contends is part of the State Road 4A right-of-way. Under the road dedication statute, title would vest in the Department only “to the extent in width that has been actually maintained for the prescribed [four year] period....” § 95.361(1), Flá.Stat....

...to the land remains in the dedicator or his successors in title, discharged of the easement. Robbins v. White, 42 So. 841, 843-44 (Fla. 1907) (emphasis added). By contrast, a statutory dedication divests the owner of title to the land. § 95.361, Fla....

...way System or State Park Road System, Whether or not there is a record of a conveyance, dedication, or appropriation to the public use. Id. Additionally, filing a map of the dedication and referring to section 95.361 serves as prima facie evidence that the government owns the land. Id. Here, the dedication on the plat map does not refer to section 95.361, and no other record evidence suggests an intent by Pelican Developers to create a statutory 5 dedication.2 Therefore, the dedication to the public was a common law dedication, and,...

...conveyance shall carry the reversionary interest in the abutting street to the centerline or other appropriate boundary, unless the owner clearly provides otherwise in the conveyance. 2We recognize that section 95.361 references only roads and does not specifically include dedication of a navigable body of water such as canal one....

...ad 789. The disputed land is adjacent to the paved portion of the road and lies within the deed description of lots owned by the plaintiff. The land was never condemned nor was it ever dedicated. Holmes Beach claimed title through the application of section 95.361, Florida Statutes (1983), 2 and a subsequent transfer from the State of Florida. Section 95.361, Florida Statutes (1983), reads as follows: 95.361 Roads presumed to be dedi cated.— (1) When a road, constructed by a county, a municipality, or the Division of Road Operations, has been maintained or repaired continuously and uninterruptedly for 4 years by the county, municipality, or Divi...

...uit Court of Manatee County. The map reflected a forty-foot right of way for State Road 789 which contained a certificate of an appropriate officer of the state road department that the land traversed by such road had vested in the state pursuant to section 95.361....

...She stated that neither the city nor any other governmental agency had maintained the disputed land during her period of ownership. She said that she often mowed the grass in the disputed area, and that the plaintiff had recently improved it by the addition of swa-le and sodding. The filing of the map pursuant to section 95.361(2) was prima facie evidence that the state had acquired ownership of the road right of way through the construction and maintenance as provided by subsection (1) of the same statute....

...Von Dissen’s affidavit as it pertains to the years 1967 and 1968. However, the statute does not require that the four years of continuous maintenance or repair immediately precede the filing of the map and certificate. In construing a forerunner of section 95.361, our supreme court held that a city “could, without the filing of such a map, prove its construction and maintenance of the road, continuously and uninterruptedly, for the prescribed period.” Downing v....

...map. Therefore, the state had already acquired title long before the period of time encompassed by Ms. Von Dissen’s affidavit. The affidavit of the plaintiff’s survey- or consists of nothing more than conclusions. Admittedly, our construction of section 95.361 would theoretically permit a city to assert ownership predicated upon an isolated four-year period of maintenance or repair which occurred many years ago....

...balance of plaintiffs property, would allow the construction of an extra condominium unit under existing zoning laws. . The law has been in essentially the same form for more than forty years though under different numbers. Therefore, references to section 95.361 in this opinion should be read to include its predecessor statutes.

...The evidence was insufficient to submit to the jury the issue of the County’s asserted negligence in failing to clear obstacles from the grassy area adjoining the road and in failing to post signs warning of such obstacles. There is no evidence of formal dedication of the road. Belflower’s case rests entirely on Section 95.361, Florida Statutes (1975), which presumes dedication from county maintenance and repair “continuously and uninterruptedly for four years.” There was evidence that a county commissioner caused the road to be cut many years ago and th...

...tion of a road amounted to a taking for which appellees are entitled to recover compensation. Competent substantial evidence supports the trial court’s determinations that the closed portion of the road had been dedicated to the public pursuant to section 95.361, Florida Statutes, and that the closing of the road resulted in damage to appellees Wickses’ property, as well as to the property of appellees Sumlins....

...Osceola County appeals from a final judgment in favor of Arthur and Melinda Castelli. The county had sought an injunction to require the Castellis to remove a fence which they had erected across Wren Drive, a roadway which passes through their property. We affirm. Section 95.361, Florida Statutes (1981), provides that a county may acquire title to a roadway under certain circumstances: (1) When a road, constructed by a county, a municipality, or the Division of Road Operations, has been maintained or repaired...

...lic highway or not.... (emphasis added) In this case, while there is evidence of county maintenance of Wren Drive for almost ten years, the evidence also establishes that the road was constructed by a private developer and not the county. Therefore, section 95.361 is inapplicable here....