CopyCited 56 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 2006 WL 1837903
...Nielan, Assistant Attorneys General, Daytona Beach, FL, for Respondent. PARIENTE, J. The decision under review, Tillman v. State,
807 So.2d 106 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002), expressly and directly conflicts with Taylor v. State,
740 So.2d 89 (Fla.1st DCA 1999), on the issue of whether section 7
76.051(1), Florida Statutes (2005), which prohibits the use of force to resist an arrest notwithstanding the illegality of the officer's actions, extends to other types of police-citizen encounters....
...ve that the officer was lawfully executing a legal duty at the time of the alleged battery or violent resistance. Id. However, the district court cited a line of district court cases that have interpreted section
843.01 in pari materia with section 7
76.051(1) to hold that the use of force in resisting an arrest by a person reasonably known to be a law enforcement officer is unlawful regardless of whether the arrest is technically illegal....
...cer's actions does not preclude a conviction of resisting with violence or battery on a law enforcement officer. Id. at 110. The Fifth District expressly declined in this case to follow Taylor. Id. at 109. In Taylor, the First District held section 776.051(1) inapplicable in a prosecution for battery on a law enforcement officer and resisting with violence based on a defendant's violent reaction to an officer who entered the defendant's home in response to a noise complaint and attempted to lead him outside....
...The Fifth District also concluded that the patdown and detention of Tillman were less intrusive than an arrest, "so Tillman was not justified in using force to resist." Tillman,
807 So.2d at 109. We granted review to resolve the conflict between Taylor and Tillman on the scope of section 7
76.051(1). ANALYSIS I. Statutory Provisions and Standard of Review The issues in this case require us to construe sections 7
76.051(1),
784.07, and
843.01, Florida Statutes (2005). Section 7
76.051(1) provides: A person is not justified in the use of force to resist an arrest by a law enforcement officer who is known, or reasonably appears, to be a law enforcement officer....
...When the language is unambiguous and conveys a clear and definite meaning, that meaning controls unless it leads to a result that is either unreasonable or clearly contrary to legislative intent. State v. Burris,
875 So.2d 408, 410 (Fla.2004). II. Construction of Section 7
76.051(1) Section 7
76.051(1) forecloses the defense of justifiable use of force by a defendant who resists an arrest by a law enforcement officer, regardless of the legality of the arrest. The plain meaning of the language used in this provision limits its application to arrest scenarios. This construction comports with another rule of construction governing laws that alter the common law. Enacted in 1974, section 7
76.051(1) abrogates the common-law right to resist an illegal arrest with force....
...Corp.,
675 So.2d 577, 581 (Fla.1996); Carlile v. Game & Fresh Water Fish Comm'n,
354 So.2d 362, 364 (Fla.1977); Guerrier v. State,
811 So.2d 852, 854 n. 2 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002). Thus, to effectuate its plain meaning and displace the common law no more than necessary, section 7
76.051(1) is implicated only when a defendant acts violently against an officer in resisting an arrest....
...o sections
784.07(2) and
843.01 when an actual arrest is not involved. [4] As the Fifth District recognized in reasoning that a patdown and detention are less intrusive than an arrest, policy reasons may support extending the prohibition in section 7
76.051(1) beyond police-citizen encounters involving *1270 an arrest....
...ion of the statute "would produce an `unreasonable or ridiculous conclusion.'" Perkins v. State,
682 So.2d 1083, 1085 (Fla.1996) (quoting Holly v. Auld,
450 So.2d 217 (Fla.1984)). In addition, contrary to the Fifth District's determination, section 7
76.051(1) requires an actual arrest and not merely probable cause for an arrest....
...See Tillman,
807 So.2d at 110 (concluding that "once Tillman placed [the officer] in a headlock," the officer had probable cause to arrest him, rendering Tillman's subsequent actions sufficient to convict for battery on a law enforcement officer). Section 7
76.051(1) does not address the use of force to resist an officer when there are grounds for an arrest but no actual arrest is taking place....
...Beasley,
580 So.2d 139, 142 (Fla.1991) (recognizing that publication in the Laws of Florida or the Florida Statutes gives all citizens constructive notice of the consequences of their actions). Accordingly, we agree with the First District in Taylor and hold that section 7
76.051(1) is limited by its plain terms to situations involving an actual arrest. [5] III. Defining Lawful Execution of a Legal Duty Because the prohibition in section 7
76.051(1) applies only to the use of force to resist arrest, the provision has no application to prosecutions for crimes against law enforcement officers under other circumstances....
...secution for battery on an officer and resisting with violence, did not apply the standards we adopt today when it assessed the sufficiency of the evidence to support Tillman's convictions. See Tillman,
807 So.2d at 108-09. Our holding that section 7
76.051(1) applies only in an arrest scenario requires that the State establish the element of lawful execution of a legal duty under the facts of this case....
...In this case, those limits are found in Fourth Amendment precedent such as Payton and Terry as well as section
901.151(2), Florida Statutes. For the reasons explained herein, we approve the holding in Taylor that the prohibition on the use of force to resist an arrest in section 7
76.051(1) does not extend beyond arrest scenarios....
...He also claimed that he was cooperating with the officers until Henriquez pushed him, causing Tillman to stumble, lose his balance, and fall to the ground on top of Henriquez. Id. at 108,
807 So.2d 106. [4] In arrest situations, Florida courts have consistently read section 7
76.051(1) in pari materia with the offenses described in sections
784.07(2) and
843.01 and, in so doing, have not required the State to prove that the arrest was lawful. See, e.g., Espinosa,
686 So.2d at 1347 and n. 4 (declining to revisit "well-settled" law in applying section 7
76.051 to crime of resisting an officer with violence); see also Delaney v. State,
489 So.2d 891, 892-93 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986); State v. Johnson,
382 So.2d 866, 867 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980). Because the issue is not before us, we decline to address the effect of section 7
76.051 on the "lawful execution" element in arrest situations. [5] The First District stated in dicta that "[t]he comparison between a detention and an arrest may be similar enough in this context," suggesting that it would extend the prohibition in section 7
76.051(1) to the use of force to resist illegal detentions....
