Florida/Georgia Personal Injury & Workers Compensation

...the claimant in arbitration proceedings when those damages are awarded prior *474 to the claimant's filing of a formal lawsuit. However, under our statutes and rules of civil procedure, if an arbitration occurs after a claimant files a lawsuit under section 44.103, Florida Statutes (1993) ("Court-ordered, nonbinding arbitration") (implemented by Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.820), or section 44.104, Florida Statutes (1993) ("Voluntary binding arbitration") (implemented by Florida Rule of Civ...

...recovering or vindicating a civil right or of redressing some civil wrong." Moreover, they constitute methods of dispute resolution that the legislature has recognized and that the judicial branch has strongly advocated and implemented. See, e.g., §§ 44.103, 44.104, Fla....

...County's payment of $8,872.25 for a portion of the arbitration fees which had been unpaid by Inscho-Kirlin, one of the settling defendants. Centex specifically contests its responsibility for Inscho-Kirlin's share of the arbitration fees. Relying on section 44.103(6), Florida Statutes (1995), the County asserts that Centex was responsible for this amount because it filed a motion for trial de novo upon receiving the arbitrator's decision and did not obtain a more favorable result. Section 44.103, the non-binding arbitration statute, provides in relevant part that: (6) The party having filed for a trial de novo may be assessed the arbitration costs, court costs, and other reasonable costs of the party, including attorney's fees...

...Reiss of Stephens, Lynn, Klein & McNicholas, P.A., Miami, for respondents Coppersmith. FARMER, J. This is a medical malpractice action against several doctors, hospitals and other providers. [1] The trial judge ordered the parties to non-binding arbitration under section 44.103, Florida Statutes (1997)....

...file a timely request for a trial de novo and that their failure to do so made the arbitration award against each of them final and binding. She further contended that when the arbitration award thus became final, the trial judge was required under section 44.103(h) to enter a money judgment against those defendants....

...ns under chapter 682. Accordingly, we proceed on the assumption that we have no ordinary appeal jurisdiction of the present order. If plaintiff has no remedy by appeal as to an order denying confirmation and enforcement of an arbitration award under section 44.103, we must proceed to analyze whether we have extraordinary writ jurisdiction under rule 9.030(b)(3) to review the order by certiorari or writ of mandamus....

...act sought to be compelled is ministerial in its nature, and where the court, if it acts at all, can only act in one certain way." State ex rel. North St. Lucie Drainage Dist. v. Kanner, 152 Fla. 400, 11 So.2d 889, 890 (1943). Plaintiff argues that section 44.103(5) imposes a non-discretionary, mandatory duty to enter judgments in favor of plaintiff and against the liable defendants who failed to request a trial de novo....

...nts as are required to carry out the terms of the decision, which orders shall be enforceable by the contempt powers of the court, and for which judgments execution shall issue on request of a party." [emphasis supplied] We agree with her reading of section 44.103(5). Once a party involved in nonbinding arbitration of a specific dispute under section 44.103 fails to request a trial de novo, by the express terms of the statute the award becomes final and binding....

...ng other things, entering such judgments as may be necessary and proper to enforce a final award made by the arbitrator. We therefore conclude that we have jurisdiction by way of mandamus. On the merits of the petition, we again refer to the text of section 44.103(5), which in relevant part states: "An arbitration decision shall be final if a request for a trial de novo is not filed within the time provided by rules promulgated by the Supreme Court.......

...enter such orders and judgments as are required to carry out the terms of the decision, which orders shall be enforceable by the contempt powers of the court, and for which judgments execution shall issue on request of a party. " [emphasis supplied] § 44.103(5), Fla....

...They merely attack the arbitrator's findings and conclusions. In our view, the trial judge was quite correct in finding that these "exceptions" simply failed to request a trial de novo. Moving on therefore to the second issue, we can find nothing in section 44.103 that requires a trial on all issues against all defendants in a case having multiple and alternative claims against multiple defendants....

...In a case involving multiple, separate and alternative claims and multiple adverse parties, the legislature could reasonably have understood its non-binding arbitration statute as a device that could eliminate some, even if not all, claims otherwise requiring a trial. We read section 44.103 to operate on discrete claims, so that the request of any one of two adverse parties to a discrete claim would be sufficient to require a trial de novo on that claim; but that the failure of all adverse parties to a separate and discre...

...ery was performed on him several days later. He died from a pulmonary thromboembolism. An autopsy revealed widespread pulmonary emboli. Plaintiff alleged that the negligence of one or more defendants, either singly or in combination, killed him. [3] Section 44.103 has been implemented by rule 1.820(h), which provides: "Any party may file a motion for trial....

...If a motion for trial is not made within 20 days of service on the parties of the decision, the decision shall be referred to the presiding judge, who shall enter such orders and judgments as may be required to carry out the terms of the decision as provided by section 44.103(4), Florida Statutes." [emphasis supplied] Rule 1.820, Fla.R.Civ.P....

...The plaintiff filed a complaint for a trip and fall on a walkway owned by the City of Plantation. The complaint alleged negligent maintenance of the walkway. She sought compensatory damages and "interests and costs" associated with the litigation. The court ordered the parties to attend nonbinding arbitration, pursuant to section 44.103, Florida Statutes (2003)....

...The court agreed and did not enter a final judgment. It also adhered to its decision to deny costs. We first address whether the trial court properly denied the plaintiff's motion for entry of a final judgment. Because the answer is dependent on an interpretation of section 44.103(5), Florida Statutes (2003), this court reviews the trial court's decision de novo. See Sullivan v. Fla. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 890 So.2d 417 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004). A court "may refer any contested civil action filed in a circuit court or county court to nonbinding arbitration." See § 44.103(5), Fla. Stat. (2003). The arbitrator's decision "shall be final if a request for a trial de novo is not filed within twenty (20) days...." See § 44.103(5), Fla. Stat. (2003); see also Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.820(h). The arbitrator is permitted to rule only on those issues submitted for arbitration. See Fla. R. Ct. Arb. 11.060(c)(1). Section 44.103(5), Florida Statutes, sets forth the duties of a trial court following an arbitrator's final decision: [t]he decision shall not be made known to the judge who may preside over the case unless no request for trial de novo is made as herein provided or unless otherwise provided by law....

...in the case who shall enter such orders and judgments as are required to carry out the terms of the decision, which orders shall be enforceable by the contempt powers of the court, and for which judgments execution shall issue on request of a party. § 44.103(5), Fla....

...award became final when neither party sought a trial de novo. Alternatively, the City contends an award of costs following an arbitration award would *320 undermine the purpose of the arbitration statute and violate public policy. We disagree. While section 44.103(6) discusses the assessment of fees and costs when the award is challenged, the statute is silent regarding costs and fees incurred when the arbitration award is unchallenged....

...(2) Costs may be collected by execution on the judgment or order assessing costs. § 57.041(1)-(2), Fla. Stat. (2004) (emphasis added). This provision requires the trial court to award costs to the prevailing party. See, e.g., Tacher v. Mathews, 845 So.2d 332 (Fla. 3d DCA 2003). Because section 44.103 fails to address the issue of fees and costs where an arbitration award is unchallenged, we rely upon section 57.041 to resolve the issue. Nothing in section 44.103 prevents us from doing so....

...Howard, Inc., 600 So.2d 511 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992)) and, (2) such being the case, it was without discretion to vacate the judgment notwithstanding the provisions of rule 1.540(a), Florida Rules of Civil Procedure. We see no logical reason why in nonbinding arbitration under section 44.103, Florida Statutes, a judgment on an arbitrator's decision mandatorily entered upon a party's failure to timely request trial de novo should enjoy a degree of finality and immunity from a motion to vacate under rule 1.540, Florida Rules of Civil Procedure, that other judgments and orders do not enjoy....

...ard except upon one of the five grounds set forth in section 682.13(1), Florida Statutes. That statute, pertaining to an award entered in a binding arbitration, is not applicable to this case. An arbitrator's decision in nonbinding arbitration under section 44.103, Florida Statutes, may be "vacated" without any grounds whatever, upon the *261 simple expedient of timely filing a request or motion for trial de novo....

...4th DCA 2006), which is the first case to apply the bright-line trend to a rule outside the triad discussed by the Supreme Court in Saia, Lamb, and Wilson, Rule 1.820(h). In Stowe, an insurance contract dispute was referred to non-binding arbitration under Florida Statutes section 44.103....

...on to confirm the binding decision pursuant to section 682.12. Instead, contractual provisions for nonbinding arbitration are similar to the nonbinding arbitration that the court itself can order pursuant to Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.820 and section 44.103, Florida Statutes (2009)....

...losure case, not in the injunction case. C. The Arbitration Proceeding After extensive pretrial proceedings and a mediation that resulted in an impasse, the trial court ordered the parties in the injunction case to nonbinding arbitration pursuant to section 44.103, Florida Statutes (2001), and Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.800....

...ision of an arbitration board in a "Lemon Law" arbitration. T.A. Enters., Inc. v. Olarte, Inc., 835 So.2d 1235, 1240-41 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003). THE LAW The trial court had the authority to refer the injunction case to nonbinding arbitration pursuant to section 44.103, Florida Statutes (2001), and Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.800....

...If a motion for trial is not made within 20 days of service on the parties of the decision, the decision shall be referred to the presiding judge, who shall enter such orders and judgments as may be required to carry out the terms of the decision as provided by section 44.103(4), Florida Statutes....

...for trial and enter final judgment without further proceedings in the trial court. We will consider these reasons separately. A. Trial Court Discretion The Association argues that after the conclusion of nonbinding arbitration conducted pursuant to section 44.103 and rule 1.800, the trial court has discretion to consider and deny a party's timely motion for trial made pursuant to rule 1.820(h)....

...itration decision "contemplates that the appealing party has the right to offer evidence in support of its position." Id. at 1240. The existence of a process for a trial de novo of an arbitration award in nonbinding arbitration conducted pursuant to section 44.103 and rule 1.800 likewise contemplates that a party unwilling to accept the decision of the arbitrator has the right to a trial de novo....

...ess to the courts). A construction of rule 1.820(h) that would give trial courts discretion to deny a timely motion for trial after nonbinding arbitration might call into question the constitutionality of nonbinding arbitration conducted pursuant to section 44.103 and rule 1.800....

...Klein, and Todd E. Brant of Bunnell Woulfe Kirschbaum Keller McIntyre Gregoire & Klein, P.A., Fort Lauderdale, for appellee. GROSS, J. The issue in this case is whether a motion for trial complies with Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.820(h) if it is filed after a section 44.103 arbitration hearing but before the rendition of the arbitrator's decision....

...The trial judge returned the notice to Stowe, because he had failed to comply with the judge's own rule that required a "mandatory hearing" before he would set a trial. In July, 2004, with the parties' agreement, the trial judge referred the case to non-binding arbitration pursuant to section 44.103, Florida Statutes (2004)....

...*158 On September 29, 2004, the arbitrator rendered his decision, finding that the insurance policy did not cover Stowe's claim. After the arbitrator's decision, Stowe did not file a motion for trial. On October 28, 2004, Universal moved for the entry of a final judgment in accordance with the arbitrator's decision. See § 44.103(5), Fla. Stat. (2004); Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.820(h). The trial judge granted the motion and entered final judgment. The legal framework for this case derives from section 44.103 and rule 1.820, which created the procedure to effectuate the statute. Section 44.103(5) states that an "arbitration decision shall be final if a request for a trial de novo is not filed within the time provided by rules promulgated by the Supreme Court." Rule 1.820(h) provides that "[i]f a motion for trial is not made...

...Enterprises timely filed an appeal for trial de novo pursuant to section 681.1095(12), Florida Statutes (2001). After this court reversed an order dismissing this appeal, [2] on remand, the circuit court ordered the parties to non-binding arbitration pursuant to section 44.103, Florida Statutes (2001)....

...According to United Auto, the trial court had a duty to determine coverage and could only send the issue of damages to arbitration. We disagree. "Arbitration is a preferred method of dispute resolution. . . ." Martha A. Gottfried, Inc. v. Paulette Koch Real Estate, 778 So.2d 1089, 1090 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001). Pursuant to section 44.103(2), Florida Statutes (2005), a court "may refer any contested civil action filed in a circuit or county court to nonbinding arbitration." A party dissatisfied with the result of arbitration may file a motion for trial within twenty days of service of the arbitration decision....

...1.820(h). "If no request for trial de novo is made within the time provided, the decision shall be referred to the presiding judge in the case who shall enter such orders and judgments as are required to carry out the terms of the decision. . . ." § 44.103(5), Fla....

...Nowhere in Midwest Mutual did the court state that the parties agreed the arbitrator would determine coverage; it is therefore understandable why the court would conclude that a challenge to coverage was exclusively a judicial question. Here, the entire case was referred to nonbinding arbitration pursuant to Florida Statutes section 44.103. We find nothing in section 44.103 that restricts the issues the arbitrator may determine during arbitration....

...was unenforceable and reversing Cardegna v. Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc., 894 So.2d 860 (Fla.2005)). Accordingly, we hold the issue of coverage may be determined by the arbitrator when a trial court refers a case to nonbinding arbitration pursuant to section 44.103....

...If a motion for trial is not made within 20 days of service on the parties of the decision, the decision shall be referred to the presiding judge, who shall enter such orders and judgments as may be required to carry out the terms of the decisions as provided by section 44.103(5), Florida Statutes....

...Pursuant to the parties’ stipulation, Appellants/Cross-Appellees dismissed several of their claims, including the claims for constructive fraud and fraud. In January 2010, Appellees/Cross-Appellants moved for attorney’s fees pursuant to their proposal for settlement which was rejected and section 44.103(6), Florida Statutes, based upon Appellants/Cross-Appellees’ rejection of the nonbinding arbitration award, their election to pursue a trial de novo on the fraud counts, and their failure to achieve seventy-five percent of the arbitrator’s award....

...ppellees were entitled to prevailing party fees on a limited issue pertaining to the partition and accounting claims that was not settled by the parties and that Appellees/Cross-Appellants were entitled to attorney’s fees under sections 768.79 and 44.103....

...In conclusion, we reverse the Final Judgment Awarding Attorney’s Fees and both attorney’s fee awards. Although the trial court found in its Order on Entitlement to Attorney’s Fees that Appel- *552 lees/Cross-Appellants were also entitled to fees under section 44.103, which is a finding that has not been challenged in this proceeding, the award as set forth in the Order on Attorney’s Fees was based only upon section 768.79. Therefore, on remand, the trial court should determine the amount owed to Appellees/Cross-Appel-lants pursuant to section 44.103....

...ng, the arbitrator finds as follows: 1. For Defendant STATE OF FLORIDA. 2. For Third Party Defendants FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY and BELLSOUTH TELECOMMUNICATIONS, INC. Felix then filed a timely motion for jury trial de novo under Florida Statutes section 44.103 (2002) and Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.820(h)....

...n the case who shall enter such orders and judgments as are required to carry out the terms of the decision, which orders shall be enforceable by the contempt powers of the court, and for which judgments execution shall issue on request of a party." § 44.103(5)....

...If a motion for trial is not made within 20 days of service on the parties of the decision, the decision shall be referred to the presiding judge, who shall enter such orders and judgments as may be required to carry out the terms of the decision as provided by section 44.103(4), Florida Statutes."

...The controlling agreement was the parties' joint stipulation for arbitration, entered after the suit was commenced. This agreement was not ambiguous, and Sonnel was a party to it. Chapter 44, Florida Statutes (2004), authorizes a court to order nonbinding arbitration, § 44.103, and to order voluntary binding arbitration when opposing parties so agree in writing, § 44.104....

...We note, however, that a party's ability to contest an arbitration award is regulated by statute and court rule. See §§ 682.13, .14 (providing grounds for party to seek vacation, modification, or correction of arbitration award within 90 days after delivery of copy of award); § 44.103(5) (directing judge to enter orders or judgments necessary to carry out arbitration decision when no timely motion for trial de novo has been made after nonbinding arbitration); § 44.104(10) (providing limited grounds for party to raise in...

...Solomon failed to pay the filing fee or submit an affidavit of insolvency and the petition was dismissed. Prior to trial, nonbinding arbitration was ordered by the judge. The arbitrators found the defendant liable for damages, but the Pooles refused the award. In contravention of section 44.103(5), Florida Statutes (1993), Solomon filed a request with the trial judge to adopt the arbitrators' finding of liability....

...If a motion for trial is not made within 20 days of service on the parties of the decision, the decision shall be referred to the presiding judge, who shall enter such orders and judgments as may be required to carry out the terms of the decision as provided by section 44.103(5), Florida Statutes....

...Home Corp., 750 So.2d 633, 636 (Fla.1999) (observing that a party may not be forced to submit a dispute to arbitration that the party did not intend and agree to arbitrate) (citing Seaboard Coast Line R.R. Co. v. Trailer Train Co., 690 F.2d 1343, 1352 (11th Cir.1982)). Under section 44.103, Florida Statutes (2000), and Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.830, a court may refer any civil action to nonbinding arbitration on its own motion or that of a party....

...As to Healthgrades, we reverse and remand for entry of a judgment in accordance with the arbitration order. The record reflects that following an arbitration order in favor of Quaregna, Healthgrades failed to file a motion for trial de novo, thus precluding the court from entering summary judgment in Healthgrades' favor. Section 44.103, Florida Statutes, provides, in pertinent part, 5) The arbitration decision shall be presented to the parties in writing....

...Court. . . . If no request for trial de novo is made within the time provided, the decision shall be referred to the presiding judge in the case who shall enter such orders and judgments as are required to carry out the terms of the decision. . . . § 44.103, Fla....

...If a motion for trial is not made within 20 days of service on the parties of the decision, the decision shall be referred to the presiding judge, who shall enter such orders and judgments as may be required to carry out the terms of the decision as provided by section 44.103(5), Florida Statutes....

...gment to confirm the arbitration award. On the same day, Alexander served and filed a motion for trial and a response to Quail Pointe’s request for entry of judgment. At a hearing, Quail Pointe argued that Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.820 and section 44.103, Florida Statutes (2011), mandate entry of a confirmatory judgment because the time to request trial de novo had expired....

...The trial court granted Quail Pointe’s motion and entered judgment confirming the arbitration award. Alexander filed motions for rehearing, for relief from the judgment, and to vacate the judgment. The trial court denied Alexander’s additional motions. Nonbinding arbitration is governed substantively by section 44.103, Florida Statutes, and procedurally by rule 1.820....

...A “nonbinding” arbitration decision, despite its name, becomes “binding” or “final” by default, by operation of law, and without express agreement of the parties, unless a motion for trial de novo is timely filed after the arbitration decision is served. § 44.103(5), Fla....

...for appellees. GERBER, J. This appeal presents the question of whether Stockman v. Downs, 573 So.2d 835 (Fla.1991), requires a party to plead entitlement to attorney's fees incurred during court-ordered, nonbinding arbitration conducted pursuant to section 44.103, Florida Statutes (2004). We answer in the negative and affirm the trial court's award of attorney's fees. In 2004, the plaintiff below filed a negligence action for personal injuries. The trial court ordered the parties to nonbinding arbitration pursuant to section 44.103, which, in 2004, provided in pertinent part: (5) ....

...The plaintiff, however, filed for a trial de novo. A jury subsequently returned a verdict for the defendants. The defendants sent the plaintiff a proposed final judgment stating that the trial court would reserve jurisdiction to consider the defendants' motion to tax fees and costs pursuant to section 44.103(6)....

...attorney's fees by failing include that claim in their pleadings. In response, the defendants contend that the plaintiff waived his pleading argument by not raising it before agreeing to entitlement, and that a claim for attorney's fees pursuant to section 44.103(6) need not be pled....

...60 after judgment." 649 So.2d at 891 (emphasis added). The Ganz analysis applies here as well. To paraphrase the supreme court, it is extremely difficult, if not impossible, for a party to plead in good faith its entitlement to attorney's fees under section 44.103 before the case is ended. There is certainly no way for a litigant to know in advance whether the fee-shifting provision of 44.103 will become effective and, therefore, to plead in good faith its entitlement to attorney's fees under that statute....

...It is only after the case has been terminated that a party can determine whether the fee-shifting provision has become effective, and, if so, to file an appropriate motion seeking an entitlement to said attorney's fees. Just as the Second District found with section 768.79 in Tampa Letter Carriers, section 44.103 seems to provide that requests for attorney's fees also be made by motion after judgment. Even if the law had required the defendants to have pled their claim for attorney's fees pursuant to section 44.103, we agree with the defendants that the plaintiff waived that argument by not raising it before agreeing to entitlement....

...that party waives any objection to the failure to plead a claim for attorney's fees. 573 So.2d at 838. The Stockman exception applies here. The defendants put the plaintiff on notice that they were claiming entitlement to attorney's fees pursuant to section 44.103 in three ways: by sending the plaintiff a proposed final judgment stating that the trial court would reserve jurisdiction to consider the defendants' motion to tax fees and costs pursuant to section 44.103; by filing a motion for entitlement to attorney's fees based upon the plaintiff's rejection of the arbitrator's decision; and by sending the plaintiff a proposed order granting the motion....

...rmally seeking such fees where appellants agreed to order reserving jurisdiction to resolve issue of attorney's fees). Affirmed. HAZOURI, J., concurs. FARMER, J., dissents with opinion. FARMER, J., dissenting. I would reverse the award of fees under § 44.103(6) for failure to file a pleading in the court case seeking an award of fees under the statute....

...After a party has clearly learned that it has prevailed on the merits, any notice about wanting fees can hardly be considered prior. It is most decidedly ex post facto, the very concern that the Stockman rule was meant to alleviate. All either party need have done to preserve a right to fees under § 44.103(6) was, upon the entry of the order requiring arbitration under § 44.103(2), promptly file a written notice in the court file of the intention to seek fees should the outcome afford an entitlement to such a claim....

...udgment statute. See Sarkis v. Allstate Ins. Co., 863 So.2d at 210. We therefore reverse the fee award. On appeal, the plaintiff alternatively argues that Sarkis does not prohibit the use of a contingency risk multiplier in a fee awarded pursuant to section 44.103, Florida Statutes (2003) (court-ordered, nonbinding arbitration statute). The plaintiff maintains section 44.103, unlike section 768.79, contains no specific enumerated factors to be considered by a trial court in awarding fees....

...The real basis for its decision in Sarkis is that the underlying philosophy of section 768.79 and Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.442 is to encourage settlement rather than extend litigation. Id. at 218. For this same reason, we hold a court may not apply a contingency risk multiplier when awarding fees, pursuant to section 44.103, Florida Statutes (2003)....

...We reverse the order awarding fees and remand the case to the trial court for entry of an attorney’s fees award based upon the already established reasonable hourly rate and number of hours expended, and without the contingency risk multiplier. However, because the Florida Supreme Court did not address section 44.103 in Sarkis , and we deem this issue to be of great public importance, we certify the following question. MAY A COURT APPLY A CONTINGENCY RISK MULTIPLIER IN AWARDING ATTORNEYS FEES PURSUANT TO SECTION 44.103, FLORIDA STATUTES (2003)? Affirmed in part, reversed in part and remanded....

...In case number 2D07-897, Midway Services, Inc., ("Midway") seeks review of the final judgment in which the trial court declined to award attorney's fees incurred during court-ordered nonbinding arbitration. Because the trial court erred in determining that section 44.103(6), Florida Statutes (2005), precludes an award of these attorney's fees, we reverse....

...ettlement. The trial court entered a final judgment awarding Midway all of its fees except those incurred during the arbitration proceedings. In denying Midway's request for attorney's fees incurred during the arbitration, the trial court found that section 44.103(6) precludes an award of fees....

...Midway filed an appeal of this order, which was assigned case number 2D07-2220. CME filed a cross-appeal of the cost order in case number 2D07-2220. The cases were consolidated for appellate review. Case No. 2D07-897 Midway argues that the trial court erred in ruling that section 44.103(6) precludes an award of attorney's fees and costs under the contract and proposal for settlement. Because this issue involves a question of law regarding statutory interpretation, our review is de novo. Bell-South Telecomms. v. Meeks, 863 So.2d 287, 289 (Fla.2003). Section 44.103 addresses *429 court-ordered nonbinding arbitration....

...y, including attorney's fees, investigation expenses, and expenses for expert or other testimony or evidence incurred after the arbitration hearing if the judgment upon the trial de novo is not more favorable than the arbitration decision. Id. Thus, section 44.103(6) provides a vehicle for awarding attorney's fees against a party who filed for a trial de novo and failed to obtain a judgment more favorable than the arbitration decision. Section 44.103(6) is otherwise silent regarding attorney's fees for court-ordered nonbinding arbitration. The question is whether this silence somehow works to preclude an award of attorney's fees that is authorized by contract or another statutory provision. There are no Florida cases discussing the application of section 44.103(6) to an award of attorney's fees. However, there are two Florida cases discussing, an analogous issue in the context of the application of section 44.103(6) to a cost award....

...The court denied the plaintiff's motion to tax costs. Id. at 319. On appeal, the plaintiff argued that she was entitled to costs as the prevailing party pursuant to section. 57.041, Florida Statutes (2003). M at 320. The Fourth District agreed and reversed. In so doing, the court held that section 44.103(6) did not preclude an award of costs under section 57.041. The court held that because section 44.103(6) was silent on "the issue of fees and costs where an arbitration award is unchallenged," then section 57.041 controlled....

...In Buscemi, the court followed its precedent in Connell without further elaboration. 901 So.2d 979. Although Connell did not involve an award of attorney's fees after a trial de novo, its rationale is applicable to such an award. As noted in Connell, section 44.103(6) is silent on the award of attorney's fees and costs other than those awardable against a party who filed for a trial de novo and failed to obtain, a judgment more favorable than the arbitration decision. A plain language reading of section 44.103(6) reveals that it does not preclude attorney's fees otherwise awardable to a party who prevails at trial de novo. Section 44.103(6) does not state or imply that it is the sole authority for an award of attorney's fees incurred in court-ordered nonbinding arbitration. There is simply no authority in section 44.103(6) that would permit a trial court to ignore a valid statutory or contractual basis for attorney's fees incurred in such an arbitration proceeding. Thus, the trial court erred in determining that section 44.103(6)'s silence regarding attorney's fees for a party who prevailed at a trial de novo somehow works to preclude attorney's fees that are authorized on some other basis....

...In fact, the "Renewed Motion for Recovery of Litigation Costs" was not even necessary because the earlier motion for costs remained pending. Thus, the trial court did not err in determining that Midway's motion for costs was timely filed. Conclusion Because the trial court erred in determining that section 44.103(6) precludes an award of attorney's fees incurred during court-ordered nonbinding arbitration, we reverse the final judgment in case number 2D07-897 and remand for further proceedings....

of arbitrators subject to the limitations in section 44.103(g)(3), Florida Statutes. Committee Notes 2003

..., J. Lyle S. Saltzman, M.D., and Brevard Anesthesia Services, P.A. (collectively, “Dr. Saltzman”), appeal from the trial court’s order denying their motion for attorney’s fees against Marsha Lynn Had-lock. On appeal, Dr. Saltzman argues that section 44.103(6), Florida Statutes (2002), requires the trial court to award attorney’s fees....

...This appeal arose out of a medical malpractice action Hadlock brought against Dr. Saltzman. After a court-ordered nonbinding arbitration hearing, the arbitrator found no negligence on the part of Dr. Saltzman. Dissatisfied with the result of the arbitration, Hadlock requested a jury trial de novo pursuant to section 44.103(5), Florida Statutes (2002), and Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.820(h). Following trial, the jury returned a verdict in favor of the defense, and the trial court entered a final judgment in favor of Dr. Saltzman. Dr. Saltzman subsequently filed a motion *774 for attorney’s fees pursuant to section 44.103(6), which the trial court denied....

...Because statutes awarding attorney’s fees are in derogation of the common law rule requiring each party to pay its own attorney’s fees, they are to be strictly construed. See Winter Park Imports, Inc. v. JM Family Enters., 66 So.3d 336, 340 (Fla. 5th DCA 2011). Section 44.103(6), Florida Statutes (2002), provides that “[t]he party having filed for a trial de novo may be assessed ......

...Saltzman asserts he is entitled to attorney’s fees because neither the arbitrator nor the jury awarded Hadlock any damages, and the result at trial was thus no more favorable to her than the arbitration decision. Dr. Saltz-man suggests that such an interpretation of section 44.103(6) effectuates the statute’s purpose — to discourage parties from miscalculating the strength of their cases and encourage acceptance of the arbitrator’s decision....

...e court may award prevailing party fees). Given the overriding principles that statutes awarding attorney’s fees are to be strictly construed and that the plain language of a statute controls, we find that by using the permissive term “may” in section 44.103(6), the Legislature vested the trial court with discretion to award or deny attorney’s fees. Because the statutory language is unambiguous, the Court need not look to legislative intent. Accordingly, we affirm. AFFIRMED. ORFINGER, C.J., and SAWAYA, J., concur. . Section 44.103(6) was amended effective October 1, 2007....

...2007-206, § 1, at 1888, Laws of Fla. It now provides, in pertinent part, that reasonable attorney's fees "may be assessed” against a plaintiff who, "having filed for a trial de novo, obtains a judgment at trial which is at least 25 percent less than the arbitration award.” § 44.103(6)(a), Fla....

...ccident between her and a city vehicle driven by an employee of the City of Plantation. In her complaint she demanded taxable costs as damages as well as compensatory damages. The trial court referred the case for non-binding arbitration pursuant to section 44.103, Florida Statutes (2003)....

...The arbitrator found the City of Plantation negligent and awarded the plaintiff $8,947.00 plus any amounts "to which there is an outstanding lien to which the parties will agree to the amount." The award did not address costs. Neither party requested a trial de novo within the twenty days provided by section 44.103(5), Florida Statutes (2003)....

...Because respondents did not request a trial, the trial court was required by statute to enter a judgment, and we accordingly grant the petition. We reject the respondents’ argument that a judgment is premature because a trial was requested after arbitration on a claim contained in a separate count in the complaint. Section 44.103, Florida Statutes (2003), entitled “Court-ordered, nonbinding arbitration,” authorizes trial courts to refer civil actions to nonbinding arbitration. A party dissatisfied with the result of arbitration may, within twenty days of service of the arbitration decision, file a motion for trial. If a motion for trial is not filed the trial court “shall” enter a judgment. § 44.103(5), Fla....

...im. As to the availability of the remedy, we held in Johnson that mandamus is available to direct entry of a judgment pursuant to our nonbinding arbitration statute. The entire argument advanced by respondents is that, based on the plain language of section 44.103(5), Florida Statutes (2003), a motion for trial as to any claim precludes the entry of a judgment as to all claims....

...ismissal, we must decide whether one of the exceptions developed in the case law applies. To answer that question we have looked at how the failure to timely request a trial de novo affects the rights of the parties and the power of the trial court. Section 44.103(5), Florida Statutes (2003), states in pertinent part: If no request for trial de novo is made within the time provided, the decision shall be referred to the presiding judge in the case who shall enter such orders and judgments as are...

...(PHSA), in the amount of $644,359.72. The judgment was entered after PHSA failed to file a motion for trial in accordance with Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.820(h) within twenty days of the service of an arbitrator's decision in a nonbinding arbitration. See § 44.103(5), Fla....

...NCH responded, filing its own statement of facts and identification of issues of law on December 15, 2017. On January 2, 2018, NCH filed a "Notice of Referral of Non- Binding [sic] Arbitration Decision," wherein it argued that no party had moved for a trial de novo within the time required by section 44.103(5), Florida Statutes (2017), and rule 1.820(h)....

...in 20 days of service on the parties of [a nonbinding arbitration] decision, the decision shall be referred to the presiding judge, who shall enter such orders and judgments as may be required to carry out the terms of the decision as provided by section 44.103(5)." Section 44.103(5), in turn, provides in relevant part that "[a]n arbitration decision shall be final if a request for a trial de novo is not filed within the time provided by rules promulgated by the [s]upreme [c]ourt." However, in Nicholson-Kenny Capital Management, Inc....

...de Acosta to believe that NCH was also prepared to proceed to the already set trial date. It was only after the twenty-day period set forth in rule 1.820(h) expired that NCH sought to have a final judgment entered in its favor pursuant to rule 1.820(h) and section 44.103(5)....

...s. Reversed and remanded. KHOUZAM, C.J., Concurs. ATKINSON, J., Dissents with opinion. -5- ATKINSON, Judge, Dissenting. I respectfully dissent because the language of section 44.103(5), Florida Statutes (2017), and Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.820(h) does not permit the conclusion reached by the majority....

...served on the parties, the decision becomes final and must be enforced by the trial court: "An arbitration decision shall be final if a request for a trial de novo is not filed within the time provided by rules promulgated by the Supreme Court." § 44.103(5) (emphasis added)....

...(emphasis added). "If a motion for trial is not made within 20 days of service on the parties of the decision, . . . the presiding judge . . . shall enter such orders and judgments as may be required to carry out the terms of the decision as provided by section 44.103(5)." Fla....

...Those circumstances include the fact that Mrs. de Acosta made filings in preparation for trial after service of the arbitrator's decision and that NCH made its own pretrial filings in response. But the statute provides that a party is only entitled to a trial de novo upon request, § 44.103(5), and the rule requires that the request be made in the form of a "motion for trial," Fla....

...But even assuming a court could confidently divine a party's desire for a trial de novo from that party's participation in trial preparation after receipt of the arbitration decision, such an inference is irrelevant in light of the plain language of section 44.103 and rule 1.820....

...-8- party makes "a motion for trial" within twenty days—not implies, not tacitly communicates, not indicates a desire as the majority suggests, but moves for a trial. Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.820(h); see § 44.103(5)....

...4th DCA 2006), as having expressed that the rule does not require a pleading styled "motion for trial." However, that proposition is questionable in light of the language of the relevant subsection of the rule, which is entitled "Time for Filing Motion for Trial." Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.820(h). Section 44.103(5) sets forth that the "arbitration decision shall be final if a request for a trial de novo is not filed within the time provided" by rule 1.820(h), which provides that a party "may file a motion for trial." (Emphasis added.) At any rate, the rule unambiguously requires that a motion be made. See Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.820(h) (requiring the court to enforce the arbitration decision "[i]f a motion for trial is not made"); see also § 44.103(5) (requiring enforcement "[i]f no request for trial de novo is made")....

...Topel of Butler Weihmuller Katz Craig LLP, Tampa, and Rebecca Brownell of Guideone Insurance, Des Moines, Iowa, for appellee. PER CURIAM. This is an appeal of a final judgment entered on an arbitration decision in favor of appellee after appellant failed to request a trial de novo, pursuant to section 44.103(5), Florida Statutes, and Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.820(h)....

2 pursuant to section 44.103, Florida Statutes (2023). The trial court must

...because the homeowners’ notice demanding a trial de novo did not also expressly reject the arbitration decision, which rejection is expressly required under the recently amended Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.820(h). We agree with the insurer’s argument and grant its petition. Section 44.103(5) and Amended Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.820(h) Section 44.103(5), Florida Statutes (2024), provides: “An arbitration decision shall be final if a request for a trial de novo is not filed within the time provided by rules promulgated by the Supreme Court.” § 44.103(5), Fla....

...If a motion for trial is not made within 20 days of service on the parties of the decision, the decision shall be referred to the presiding judge, who shall enter such orders and judgments as may be required to carry out the terms of the decision as provided by section 44.103(5), Florida Statutes. Fla....

...not made within 20 days of service on the parties of the decision, the decision must be referred to the presiding judge, who must enter such orders and judgments as may be required to carry out the terms of the decision as provided by section 44.103(5), Florida Statutes. Fla....

...4th DCA 2023).” The circuit court’s denial of the insurer’s motion, and its reliance on Vitesse, was reversible error. In Vitesse, the circuit court had found, due to a scrivener’s error in the appellants’ motion for trial de novo, that the appellants had not appropriately requested a trial de novo pursuant to section 44.103(5) and rule 1.820(h)....

...4th DCA 2024). In Lawnwood, we receded from Nicholson-Kenny Capital Management, Inc. v. Steinberg, 932 So. 2d 321 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006), which had deviated from our well-established recognition of the mandatory, ministerial, and non-discretionary enforcement of section 44.103(5)....

...rbitration award and renewing its demand for trial. Id. (citing Nicholson-Kenny, 932 So. 2d at 924). Lawnwood rejected that reasoning: “Nicholson-Kenny’s ‘some notice’ 4 approach clearly conflicts with section 44.103(5) and rule 1.820(h), and no valid reliance interest or other reason exists not to recede from that precedent.” Id. Lawnwood further reasoned: Put another way, Nicholson-Kenny essentially wove into both section 44.103(5) and rule 1.820(h) an unauthorized “some notice” exception. Such an exception, besides not appearing in section 44.103(5)’s or rule 1.820(h)’s plain language, is ambiguous on its face and begs the question: “What exactly constitutes ‘some notice,’ if not in the form of a ‘request for trial de novo’ or a ‘motion for tri...

...opposing party should have been on “some notice” that its adversary is rejecting an arbitration award and renewing its demand for trial. … Simply stated, upon a court ordering nonbinding arbitration, any reasonable person reading section 44.103(5)’s and rule 1.820(h)’s plain language—as they are expected to do—would understand the requirement to file a “request for trial de novo” or “motion for trial” within twenty days of service of an arbitrator's unfavorable decision....

...We should enforce such a bright-line and easy-to- follow requirement, not only because of our obligation to enforce statutes and rules as written, but also because Nicholson- Kenny’s “some notice” requirement precludes predictability and consistency in our enforcement of section 44.103(5) and rule 1.820(h). 5 Id....

...ion); Vitesse, 358 So. 3d at 438- 40 (reversing a circuit court’s order which had found, due to a trivial scrivener’s error in the appellants’ motion for trial de novo, the appellants had not appropriately requested a trial de novo pursuant to section 44.103(5) and rule 1.820(h)). Conclusion Based on the foregoing, we grant the insurer’s petition for writ of mandamus....

...pon to ensure compliance with the most recent, applicable version of a rule of procedure. Second, it would seem, in the context of this case, that a request for a trial de novo is tantamount to a rejection of an arbitration decision. After all, section 44.103(5), Florida Statutes (2024), requires only that a “request for a trial de novo” be filed....

...Landing Group contends that the expiration of twenty days after entry of the arbitration award, filed October 3, 2005, started the clock on the thirty-day window for filing a fees motion under Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.525. We cannot credit this contention. Under section 44.103(2), Florida Statutes (2006), a court “may refer any contested civil action filed in a circuit or county court to nonbinding arbitration.” If a request for trial de novo is not made within twenty days, “the decision shall be refer...

...the case who shall enter such orders and judgments as are required to carry out the terms of the decision, which orders shall be enforceable by the contempt powers of the court, and for which judgments execution shall issue on request of a party.” § 44.103(5), Fla....

...We agree that under Rule 1.525, the trigger for the thirty-day deadline to file a motion for fees and costs is “the judgment.” The arbitration award is not a judgment, as the trial court still must “enter such orders and judgments as are required to carry out the terms of the decision.” § 44.103(5), Fla....

...For this reason, Florida's Supreme Court interpreted applicable arbitration code provisions in reaching its decision in Moser. Id. at 233-37 . Section 682.02 of Florida Statutes indicates that the code only governs voluntary arbitrations. Separate provisions apply to non-binding, court-ordered arbitration. See § 44.103, Fla....

...“appellants”) appeal a final judgment enforcing an arbitration award entered after completion of a second nonbinding arbitration proceeding. The trial court found that due to a scrivener’s error in their motion appellants did not appropriately request trial de novo pursuant to section 44.103(5), Florida Statutes (2020), and Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.820(h)....

...This was error, and we reverse. When a party timely requests a trial de novo following nonbinding arbitration, this court reviews the denial of the request de novo. See Dungarani v. Benoit, 312 So. 3d 126, 128 (Fla. 5th DCA 2020). Trial courts may refer civil cases to nonbinding arbitration. § 44.103(2), Fla. Stat. (2020). Once referred, the arbitration decision “shall be final if a request for a trial de novo is not filed within the time provided by rules promulgated by the Supreme Court.” § 44.103(5), Fla....

...Steinberg, 932 So. 2d 321, 325 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006). Similarly, the intention of rule 1.820(h) is to send “some notice to the opposing party that its adversary is rejecting an arbitration award and renewing its demand for trial.” Id. at 324. The purpose of section 44.103 is fulfilled when a party is placed on reasonable notice of the opposing side’s intention to proceed to trial, and that intention is conveyed within rule 1.820(h)’s twenty-day timeframe....

...operative motion was trivial and did not substantially impair either appellee or the lower court from having reasonable notice of appellants’ desire to proceed to trial. Our review plainly shows the notice both timely and substantially complied with section 44.103 and rule 1.820(h)....

SILBERMAN, Judge. Section 44.103, Florida Statutes (2012), and Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.820(h) provide that a party to court-ordered, nonbinding arbitration has twenty days after service of the arbitrator’s decision to request a trial de novo before the decision is referred to the trial court for entry of a final judgment....

...The final judgment notes that no party filed a request for trial de novo within twenty days of service of the arbitration decisions. On that same date, Harold filed an objection to the arbitration decisions and a demand for trial de novo. Harold argues that her objection and demand for trial de novo were timely under section 44.103 and rules 1.820(h) and 1.090(e). Section 44.103 sets forth the process for court-ordered, nonbinding arbitration....

...for trial is not made within 20 days of service on the parties of the decision, the decision shall be referred to the presiding judge, who shall enter such orders and judgments as may be required to carry out the terms of the decision as provided by section 44.103(5), Florida Statutes. Thus, section 44.103(5) and rule 1.820(h) provide a party twenty days after service of the arbitrator’s decision to request a trial de novo before the matter is referred to the trial court for entry of a final judgment....

...service of the arbitrator’s decision to request a trial de novo. See Furia v. Ziccarelli, 935 So.2d 103, 104 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006). The Appellees assert that applying the five-day extension of time in rule 1.090(e) contravenes the express intent of section 44.103(5) and rule 1.820(h) that a party’s *340 right to trial de novo be forfeited if the party fails to make a request within twenty days of service of the arbitration decision. The Appellees argue that Florida courts have consistently held that upon expiration of the twenty-day time period enforcement of the arbitration award is mandatory. We are not persuaded by these arguments because neither section 44.103(5) nor rule 1.820(h) provides that rule 1.090(e) does not apply....

...3d 1129, 1132 (Fla. 2011) (quoting Reeves v. Fleetwood Homes of Fla., Inc., 889 So. 2d 812, 822 (Fla. 2004)). The latter 1Although Fountainbleau and Hire Us agree that the court ordered the parties to nonbinding arbitration pursuant to section 44.103, Florida Statutes (2018), the court did not reference the statute or use the phrase "nonbinding arbitration" at any point during the hearing or in the order on review. See § 44.103(2) ("A court, pursuant to rules adopted by the Supreme Court, may refer any contested civil action filed in a circuit or county court to nonbinding arbitration.")....

...1st DCA 1995) ("On questions of arbitrators' 'in personam' jurisdiction, the parties are entitled to judicial interpretation of the pertinent contractual language." (emphasis added)). Thus, before the court could invoke the nonbinding arbitration statute, section 44.103, Florida Statutes (2018), and refer the action to arbitration, it was required to determine that it had personal jurisdiction over Fountainbleau....

invoke the nonbinding arbitration statute, section 44.103, Florida Statutes (2018), and refer the action

invoke the nonbinding arbitration statute, section 44.103, Florida Statutes (2018), and refer the action

...The coversheet would seemingly serve the same purpose as filing a sealed copy of an arbitrator’s decision—i.e., prevent the presiding judge from unwittingly reviewing the decision as part of the electronic case file—and its use would seemingly not significantly alter the existing procedures 2. Under section 44.103(5), Florida Statutes (2023), an arbitrator’s “decision [must] not be made known to the judge who may preside over the case unless no request for trial de novo is made ....

...HEARING PROCEDURES FOR NON-BINDING ARBITRATION (a) Authority of the Chief Arbitrator. The chief arbitrator shall havehas authority to commence and adjourn the arbitration hearing and carry out other such duties as are prescribed byunder section 44.103, Florida Statutes....

...trial is not made within 20 days of service on the parties of the decision, the decision shallmust be referred to the presiding judge, who shallmust enter such orders and judgments as may be required to carry out the terms of the decision as provided by section 44.103(5), Florida Statutes. Committee Notes - 11 - [No Change] - 12 - FORM 1.923(a)....

...So in his complaint initiating the action against his former employer, he divided his claims into two counts. Count I was based on the first agreement; count II was based on the second agreement. In due course the trial court entered an order requiring nonbinding arbitration under section 44.103(2), Florida Statutes (2006)....

...Neither side demanded a trial as to the claim represented by the second count within 20 days of the arbitration decision. Both sides accepted the arbitrator’s decision as to the first count, and so that claim was decided by the arbitration and was no longer subject to litigation. Nonbinding arbitration under section 44.103 is meant to be just that — nonbinding....

...Just as they may limit by contract the issues which they will arbitrate, so too may they specify by contract the rules under which the arbitration will be conducted"); see also United Auto. Ins. Co. v. Ortiz, 931 So.2d 1025, 1026 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006) ("Pursuant to section 44.103(2), Florida Statutes (2005), a court `may refer any contested civil action filed in a circuit or county court to nonbinding arbitration.'"); Preferred Mut. Ins. Co. v. Davis, 629 So.2d 259, 260-261 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993) ("An arbitrator's decision in nonbinding arbitration under section 44.103, Florida Statutes, may be `vacated' without any grounds whatever, upon the simple expedient of timely filing a request or motion for trial de novo.")....

...The trial court denied this motion and Morgado's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict on CB's claim. Both parties appealed the final judgment and orders. First Sealord also moved for fees and costs incurred subsequent to the arbitration award, pursuant to section 44.103(6), Florida Statutes (2006)....

...We reverse for the trial court to order an additur and, should Morgado refuse to accept, for a new trial on damages. See § 768.74(4), Fla. Stat. [2] After the trial First Sealord moved for all fees and costs incurred subsequent to the arbitration award, pursuant to section 44.103(6), Florida Statutes (2006), which provides: "The party having filed for a *533 trial de novo may be assessed" reasonable costs and fees "incurred after the arbitration hearing if the judgment upon the trial de novo is not more favorab...

...If a motion for trial is not made within 20 days of service on the parties of the decision, the decision shall be referred to the presiding judge, who shall enter such orders and judgments as may be required to carry out the terms of the decision as provided by section 44.103(5), Florida Statutes.” Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.820(h); § 44.103(5), Fla....

...Diaz (“the Defendant”), asserting claims for conversion (Count I) and civil theft under section 812.014(1), Florida Statutes (2001) (Count II). The trial court referred the parties to nonbinding arbitration on all issues, including attorney’s fees and costs, in accordance with section 44.103, Florida Statutes (2006), and Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.820....

...r section 57.105(l)(b) attorney’s fees,and his entitlement to a setoff. On October 6, 2006, the Plaintiff filed a Motion for Entry of Judgment Pursuant to Non-Binding Arbitration Award (“Motion for Entry of Judgment”), arguing that pursuant to section 44.103, Florida Statutes (2006), 4 and Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.820(h), 5 because the Defendant did not file a request for a trial de novo within twenty days of the arbitrator’s decision, the trial court must enter orders and judgments necessary to carry out the terms of the arbitrator’s decision....

...The Defendant contends that the trial court erred by entering final judgment in favor of the Plaintiff based solely on his failure to file a request for trial de novo within twenty days of the arbitrator’s written decision. Based on the circumstances of this case, we agree. Section 44.103(2), Florida Statutes (2006), authorizes a court to “refer any contested civil action filed in a circuit or county court to nonbinding arbitration.” Upon completion of the arbitration process, the written arbitration decision must be presented to the parties. § 44.103(5); Fla....

...Thereafter, if a party does not request a trial de novo within twenty days of the service of the written arbitration decision, “the decision shall be referred to the presiding judge, who shall enter such orders and judgments as may be required to carry out the terms of the decision as provided by section 44.103(5), Florida Statutes.” Fla....

...2d DCA 2007) ("While a crime victim is entitled to pursue both a criminal restitution award and a civil damages award, section 775.089(8) specifically requires that the amount of the restitution award be set off against the civil judgment so that the victim does not receive a double recovery."). . Section 44.103(5), Florida Statutes (2006), provides in relevant part as follows: The arbitration decision shall be presented to the parties in writing....

...If a motion for trial is not made within 20 days of service on the parties of the decision, the decision shall be referred to the presiding judge, who shall enter such orders and judgments as may be required to carry out the terms of the decision as provided by section 44.103(5), Florida Statutes.

...Schwarz of Link & Rockenbach, PA, West Palm Beach, and Michael V. Baxter of Schuler, Weisser, Zoeller, Overbeck & Baxter, P.A., West Palm Beach, for appellee Gwendolyn Rouse. EN BANC GERBER, J. In this appeal, we enforce section 44.103(5), Florida Statutes (2021), which provides: “An arbitration decision shall be final if a request for a trial de novo is not filed within the time provided by the rules promulgated by the Supreme Court.” Here, because the appellant...

...seek to show excusable neglect for their untimeliness under Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.540(b)(1), the circuit court correctly entered judgment against the appellants as “required to carry out the terms of the [arbitration] decision as provided by section 44.103(5), Florida Statutes.”  We issue this opinion en banc to recede from Nicholson-Kenny Capital Management, Inc. v. Steinberg, 932 So. 2d 321 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006). As we will discuss in more detail below, Nicholson-Kenny did not require the filing of a motion for trial under certain circumstances. That precedent clearly conflicts with section 44.103(5) and rule 1.820(h), and no valid reliance interest or other reason exists not to recede from that precedent....

...Regan, and two hospitals, including appellant Lawnwood, and related entities. In March 2022, the circuit court entered an order setting the case on a September 2022 trial docket. In the same order, the court referred all issues to nonbinding arbitration, pursuant to section 44.103, Florida Statutes (2021), and Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.820. Section 44.103 pertinently provides: (2) A court, pursuant to rules adopted by the Supreme Court, may refer any contested civil action filed in a circuit or county court to nonbinding arbitration. … (5) The arbitration decision shall be presented to the parties in writing....

...… If no request for trial de novo is made within the time provided, the decision shall be referred to the presiding judge in the case who shall enter such orders and judgments as are required to carry out the terms of the decision …. § 44.103(2), (5), Fla....

...… If a motion for trial is not made within 20 days of service on the parties of the decision, the decision shall be referred to the presiding judge, who shall enter such orders and judgments as may be required to carry out the terms of the decision as provided by section 44.103(5), Florida Statutes. Fla....

...prosecute her case. As such, these narrow interactions between counsel are dissimilar to those in [other cases] that plainly manifested their intentions to proceed with trial. 8  … Finally … Section 44.103(5)’s and Rule 1.820(h)’s requirements for entry of judgment treat direct and indirect (vicarious liability) claims the same....

...Regan’s and Lawnwood’s “substantial compliance” argument relies—Nicholson-Kenny Capital Management, Inc. v. Steinberg, 932 So. 2d 321 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006)—was incorrectly decided. Before we issued Nicholson-Kenny in 2006, we had a long and consistent history of enforcing section 44.103(5)’s and rule 1.820(h)’s plain language that when a motion for trial de novo is not timely filed, judgment must be entered. See Klein v. J.L. Howard, Inc., 600 So. 2d 511, 512 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992) (“[U]nder the clear and mandatory provisions of section 44.303(4), Florida Statutes (1987) [section 44.103(5)’s predecessor], and rule 1.820(h), … upon the failure to move for a trial de novo within [twenty] days of the service of an arbitration award … the trial court is required to enforce the award and lacks discretion to do otherwise.”); Johnson v. Levine, 736 So. 2d 1235, 1238 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999) (“Once a party involved in non-binding arbitration of a specific dispute under section 44.103 fails to request a trial de novo, by the express terms of the statute the award becomes final and binding....

...2d 954, 955 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004) (“Petitioner seeks a writ of mandamus to compel the trial court to enter a final judgment for damages awarded in nonbinding arbitration. Because respondents did not request a trial, the trial court was required by [section 44.103(5)] to enter a judgment, and we accordingly grant the petition.”); Connell v. City of Plantation, 901 So. 2d 317, 319 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005) (“In this case, neither party requested a trial de novo within twenty days. Thus, pursuant to [section 44.103(5)], the presiding judge was required to ‘enter such orders and judgments as are required to carry out the terms of the decision.’ Id....

...The trial court has no discretion to deny such a request.”) (quoting Connell, 901 So. 2d at 319). However, with our issuance of Nicholson-Kenny in 2006, we deviated from our well-established recognition of the mandatory, ministerial, and non-discretionary enforcement of section 44.103(5)....

...“some notice” had been given to the opposing party that its adversary is 10 rejecting an arbitration award and renewing its demand for trial. 932 So. 2d at 324. Nicholson-Kenny’s “some notice” approach clearly conflicts with section 44.103(5) and rule 1.820(h), and no valid reliance interest or other reason exists not to recede from that precedent....

...We again reiterate our disdain for such litigation conduct. Id. at 324-26 (emphases added; internal citations omitted). b. Why We Recede From Nicholson-Kenny We recede from Nicholson-Kenny because that precedent clearly conflicts with section 44.103(5) and rule 1.820(h), and no valid reliance interest or other reason exists not to recede from that precedent. Thus, such precedent must yield. State v. Poole, 297 So. 3d 487, 507 (Fla. 2020). As stated above, section 44.103(5) pertinently provides: An arbitration decision shall be final if a request for a trial de novo is not filed within the time provided by rules promulgated by the Supreme Court....

...… If no request for trial de novo is made within the time provided, the decision shall be referred to the presiding judge in the case who shall enter such orders and judgments as are required to carry out the terms of the decision …. § 44.103(5), Fla....

...… If a motion for trial is not made within 20 days of service on the parties of the decision, the decision shall be referred to the presiding judge, who shall enter such orders and judgments as may be required to carry out the terms of the decision as provided by section 44.103(5), Florida Statutes. Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.820(h) (emphases added). As can be seen, nothing in section 44.103(5)’s or rule 1.820(h)’s mandatory plain language provides—as we held in Nicholson-Kenny—that the filing of a motion for trial “does not seem required” under certain circumstances, or that rule 1.820(h) instead merely requires “some notice” to the opposing party that its adversary is rejecting an arbitration award and renewing its demand for trial. 932 So. 2d at 324 (emphases added). Rather, section 44.103(5)’s and rule 1.820(h)’s plain language require a party to file a “request for trial de novo,” as provided in section 44.103(5), or a “motion for trial,” as provided in section 1.820(h). Thus, Nicholson- Kenny clearly conflicts with, if not nullifies, section 44.103(5)’s and rule 1.820(h)’s mandatory filing requirement. Put another way, Nicholson-Kenny essentially wove into both section 44.103(5) and rule 1.820(h) an unauthorized “some notice” exception. Such an exception, besides not appearing in section 44.103(5)’s or rule 1.820(h)’s plain language, is ambiguous on its face and begs the question: “What exactly constitutes ‘some notice,’ if not in the form of a ‘request for trial de novo’ or a ‘motion for trial’?” The...

...Why should those actions and communications necessarily constitute “some notice” that Dr. Regan and Lawnwood were rejecting the arbitrator’s decision and renewing their demand for trial, when within those same twenty days, Dr. Regan and Lawnwood could have complied, but did not comply, with section 44.103(5)’s and rule 1.820(h)’s plain language requirement to also file a “request for trial de novo” or “motion for trial”? Simply stated, upon a court ordering nonbinding arbitration, any reasonable person reading section 44.103(5)’s and rule 1.820(h)’s plain language—as they are expected to do—would understand the requirement to file a “request for trial de novo” or “motion for trial” within twenty days of service of an arbitrator’s unfavorable decision....

...We should enforce such a bright-line and easy-to-follow requirement, not only because of our obligation to enforce statutes and rules as written, but also because Nicholson-Kenny’s “some notice” requirement precludes predictability and consistency in our enforcement of section 44.103(5) and rule 1.820(h). Further, our decision to recede from Nicholson-Kenny actually eliminates the “gotcha” litigation concern of which Nicholson-Kenny forewarned. Our straightforward enforcement of section 44.103(5)’s and rule 1.820(h)’s bright-line requirement means that, after an arbitrator’s decision, regardless of what actions or communications may subsequently occur between the parties, any party rejecting the arbitrator’s decision...

...As we have explained in this opinion, the latter argument lacks merit as a matter of law. In Vitesse, we reversed a circuit court’s order which had found, due to a scrivener’s error in the appellants’ motion for trial de novo, the appellants had not appropriately requested a trial de novo pursuant to section 44.103(5) and rule 1.820(h)....

...Here, unlike in Vitesse, we are not faced with a motion for a trial de novo containing a mere scrivener’s error. Rather, in the instant case, Dr. Regan and Lawnwood simply failed to file any “request for trial de novo” or “motion for a trial de novo” as section 44.103(5) and rule 1.820(h) require. Conclusion Based on the foregoing, we recede from Nicholson-Kenny, and affirm the circuit court’s order granting the personal representative’s motion for final jud...

...the trial court entered a final judgment in accordance with the arbitration decision. As set out in rule 1.820(h), the trial court was required to enter ‘such orders and judgments as may be required to carry out the terms of the decision as provided in section 44.103(5), Florida Statutes.’ The language is straightforward....

...which I find problematic, although it was not raised by the parties. That is, whether the filing of the motions for trial by appellees and other defendants was sufficient under the statute for a trial de novo as to all the parties. The court-ordered nonbinding arbitration statute, section 44.103(5), Florida Statute (2021), provides: “An arbitration decision shall be final if a request for a trial de novo is not filed within the time provided by rules promulgated by the Supreme Court.” Id. (emphasis added). In Johnson v. Levine, 736 So. 2d 1235 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999), we noted that section 44.103(5) referred to a request, but we held that the statute was party-specific. The court said: We read section 44.103 to operate on discrete claims, so that the request of any one of two adverse parties to a discrete claim would be sufficient to require a trial de novo on that claim; but that the failure of all adverse parties to a s...

...5th DCA 2020), the term “trial de novo” refers to “a specific type of legal proceeding,” which “contemplates a trial of the entire case in the circuit court.” Id. at 129–30, Thus, a partial request for a trial on some issues is inconsistent with the term “trial de novo” that the legislature used in section 44.103....

...Even so, she observed: But of course, even in enacting a procedural rule to effectuate a legislative grant, separation of powers prohibits the judiciary from amending it. Thus, we ascribe the same meaning to “request for a trial de novo” as referenced in section 44.103 and “motion for trial” as referenced in rule 1.820, despite the rule’s incongruous replication of the phrase. Id....

PER CURIAM. The record reflects Appellant’s failure to file a motion for trial de novo within 20 days after service of the decision in this nonbinding arbitration. Therefore, we affirm as to all issues. See § 44.103(4), Fla....

...in their favor, that all of the parties had received written notice of the decision on October 31, 2000, and that because no party had requested a trial de novo within twenty days of service of the arbitrators’ decision, that decision, pursuant to section 44.103, Florida Statutes (1999), and applicable court rules, should be made final by the trial court....

...The trial court entered a final judgment in favor of the six defendants. In its effort to promote alternative dispute resolution, the Florida Legislature has enacted statutes creating or codifying a whole raft of “ADR” 2 procedures and devices. Section 44.103, Florida Statutes (1999), entitled “Court-ordered Nonbinding Arbitration,” provides in relevant part: (1) Court-ordered, nonbinding arbitration shall be conducted according to the rules of practice and procedure adopted by the Supreme Court....

...If a motion for trial is not made within 20 days of service on the parties of the decision, the decision shall be referred *1241 to the presiding judge, who shall enter such orders and judgments as may be required to carry out the terms of the decision as provided by section 44.103(4), Florida Statutes....

...Moreover, it was not filed with the clerk until nearly a month after the hearing. Ironically, virtually the only aspect of the statute or rule that was followed in this case was entry of judgment for all defendants. This case presents two questions: first, whether enactment of section 44.103 and the rule implementing the statute have made this procedure the only means by which parties may now engage in nonbinding arbitration ordered by a court....

...� to both questions. The defendants’ main argument is that because the Gallardos participated in the arbitration which they knew to be “court-ordered” and “nonbinding,” they were on constructive notice that such arbitration was governed by section 44.103 and Rule 1.820....

...e court’s lack of compliance with the governing procedures. It was never specified by the court, the arbitrators, nor their opponents, that the nonbinding arbitration verbally ordered by the judge was to be the nonbinding arbitration controlled by section 44.103 and rule 1.820....

...e had caused an impairment in the fairness of the proceedings, or the correctness of the action. 736 So.2d at 1239 . We do not disagree with the result in Klein and we do not believe the Klein court means to say that no matter how many provisions of section 44.103 or Rule 1.820 are ignored, the trial de novo deadline of section 44.103(4) alone must inflexibly be applied simply because it is the only one with an express consequence....

...s of the many defects in this proceeding leading up to entry of the judgment. REVERSED and REMANDED. PETERSON, J., concurs. PLEUS, J., dissents, with opinion. . Presumably, this means the two groups of defendants. . Alternative Dispute Resolution. . § 44.103(5), Fla....

...Foster, Judge. July 12, 2024 STARGEL, J. The “City” of Naples appeals a final judgment confirming an arbitration award in favor of Heidi and Joseph Wolff. In the proceedings below, the trial court ordered the parties to nonbinding arbitration pursuant to section 44.103, Florida Statutes (2022), and Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.820....

...The City then filed its motion for trial de novo on October 7, 2022. Thereafter, the trial court rejected the magistrate’s recommendation and ruled that it lacked the authority to extend the deadline under Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.090.1 We reverse. Section 44.103(5) provides that a nonbinding arbitration decision “shall be final if a request for a trial de novo is not filed within the time provided by rules promulgated by the [Florida] Supreme Court.” Rule 1.820(h) in turn sets a deadline...

...Subject to limited exceptions not applicable here, rule 1.090(b) authorizes trial courts to extend, for cause shown, deadlines imposed by the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure. Id. In establishing the deadline for a party to request a trial de novo after nonbinding arbitration, the legislature, in section 44.103(5), expressly deferred to the rules promulgated by the supreme court, which includes the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure....

...statutory directive that an arbitration decision “shall be final” if the motion is not filed within the deadline are cast in mandatory terms. Id. at 117-18. However, Gambrel did not address any other procedural rules which interact with rule 1.820(h) and section 44.103(5), as the movant in that case had not raised any such grounds for relief. Accordingly, because the trial court erroneously relied on Gambrel in finding that it lacked the authority to grant the City’s requested extension,...

...2d DCA 2017) (alteration in original) (quoting Raza v. Deutsche Bank Nat'l Tr. Co., 100 So. 3d 121, 123 (Fla. 2d DCA 2012)). Here, Carpenter claimed a statutory right to attorney's fees and costs; thus, we review the order de novo. Nonbinding arbitration is governed substantively by section 44.103, Florida Statutes (2024), and procedurally by Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.820. Section 44.103(6) specifies that a motion for attorney's fees and costs must be filed "within 30 days after entry of judgment." Section 44.103 does not, however, specify a method of computing time. Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.090 sets forth several time provisions pertinent to civil litigation....

...superseded 'any rule of procedure, local rule, court order, or statute that 4 does not specify a method of computing time.' " McCray v. State, 151 So. 3d 449, 451 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014) (quoting Fla. R. Jud. Admin. 2.514(a)). Because section 44.103 does not specify a method of computing time, rule 2.514 applies. Here, the consolidated final judgment was entered on June 2, 2023, and Carpenter's motion for attorney's fees and costs was filed on July 5, 2023....

...Therefore, thirty days after entry of the final judgment was July 4, 2023. July 4, 2023, was a legal holiday, resulting in the filing deadline being extended to July 5, 2023––the day that Carpenter's motion was filed. Accordingly, Carpenter's motion for attorney's fees and costs was timely filed in accordance with section 44.103(6), rule 1.090(a), and rule 2.514(a), and the trial court erred in denying Carpenter's motion based on untimeliness. The trial court also stated that Carpenter obtained a judgment which was at least twenty-five percent less than the arbitration award. However, that statement failed to recognize key points....

...In 2004, some of the counts of the amended complaint were voluntarily dismissed and others were dismissed or withdrawn in exchange for a payment. In October, 2004, an arbitrator awarded the plaintiffs $90,000, but the plaintiffs invoked their right to a trial de novo under section 44.103(5), Florida Statutes (2004)....

...filed a second amended complaint as the sole plaintiff. There was a jury trial. Moghaddam attended as the plaintiff's corporate representative. The jury found for Dunkin' and awarded no damages. Dunkin' then moved for the imposition of attorney's fees against Moghaddam and 330545 Donuts, Inc. under section 44.103(6), Florida Statutes (2004)....

...The circuit court awarded fees against the corporation, but declined to award fees against Moghaddam. The judge reasoned that after the voluntary dismissal and the filing of the second amended complaint by only the corporate plaintiff, Moghaddam was not a "party" or a "plaintiff" within the meaning of section 44.103(6)....

...the power to correct errors after entry of a voluntary notice of dismissal"). Because Moghaddam took a stipulated voluntary dismissal under rule 1.420(a)(1)(B), he was no longer a "party" subject to an award of attorney's fees within the meaning of section 44.103(6). That section provides that a court "may" assess attorney's fees against a "party" upon a "motion made by either party within 30 days after the entry of judgment." § 44.103(6). The trigger for assessing fees against a plaintiff occurs when a plaintiff files for a trial de novo after arbitration and "the judgment upon the trial de novo is not more favorable than the arbitration decision." § 44.103(6), Fla. Stat. (2004). Statutes authorizing awards of attorney's fees, such as section 44.103(6), *714 are in derogation of common law and must be strictly construed....

...The statute contemplates an award of fees against a "party" that demands a trial de novo and receives an unfavorable result relative to the arbitration award. As a "party," Moghaddam did not participate in the trial de novo. We reject Dunkin's argument that for section 44.103(6) we should adopt the third district's broad definition of the term "parties" in section 57.105, Florida Statutes (1985)....

...Lage, 521 So.2d at 300 (quoting Theller v. Hershey, 89 F. 575 (C.C.N.D.Cal.1898)). Lage is a unique case, where there was no true party plaintiff, only the attorneys who acted in bad faith and without authorization. Its reasoning does not apply to a section 44.103(6) scenario. Section 44.103(6) is directed at the miscalculation of the strength of a case after an arbitration award; the purpose of the statute is to encourage acceptance of the arbitration award, not to punish litigation misconduct....

...erpetuate monopoly, or to protect knavery or crime, the courts will draw aside the web of entity ... and will do real justice between real persons." (quoting Barnes v. Liebig, 146 Fla. 219, 1 So.2d 247, 254 (1941))). Apart from our interpretation of section 44.103(6), a separate reason exists to affirm the circuit court's order....

...her parties, including attorneys' fees. . . ." We find Wedgewood's argument unpersuasive. First, paragraph 18 expressly applies only where a party has requested a trial de novo. Second, in that context, attorney's fees are authorized by statute. See § 44.103, Fla....

...We agree. The Housens filed an insurance claim with Universal. After Universal denied the claim, the Housens filed a breach of contract action. Before trial, the parties agreed to attend non-binding arbitration under Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.800 and section 44.103, Florida Statutes (2020). The arbitrator filed its decision with the court per Rule 1.820(g)(3)....

...If a motion for trial is not made within 20 days of service on the parties of the decision, the decision shall be referred to the presiding judge, who shall enter such orders and judgments as may be required to carry out the terms of the decision as provided by section 44.103(5), Florida Statutes.” Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.820(h); § 44.103(5), Fla....

...In the absence of a contract or other agreement between the parties calling for arbitration, Florida's trial courts have the authority to order parties to participate only in nonbinding arbitration, although the parties can voluntarily stipulate to binding arbitration. See § 44.103(2), Fla....

...In the absence of a contract or other agreement between the parties calling for arbitration, Florida's trial courts have the authority to order parties to participate only in nonbinding arbitration, although the parties can voluntarily stipulate to binding arbitration. See § 44.103(2), Fla....

...The Morgans filed an action against the Mall, Bath & Body Works, and Southeast Service, the provider of janitorial services at Coastland Center Mall. The trial court entered an order directing all the parties to participate in nonbinding arbitration pursuant to section 44.103, Florida Statutes (2002), and Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.800....

...ach party and the total amount to be awarded for Mrs. Morgan's medical expenses, her noneconomic damages, and Mr. Morgan's loss of consortium. *1226 Only one of the defendants, Southeast Service, filed a timely motion for a trial de novo pursuant to section 44.103(5)....

...We find this argument unpersuasive. On appeal, the Morgans first challenge the trial court's ruling on Southeast Service's unusual motion. This appeal presents an issue of first impression as to whether a party who has participated in nonbinding arbitration can limit a section 44.103(5) trial de novo to encompass only the issue of liability as to that party but otherwise to enforce the decision of the arbitrator concerning the issue of damages....

...dings and because the counterclaim appeared to be nonviable. While the appellate opinion addressed other aspects of the dispute between the Bacon Family Partners and the condominium association, this court specifically held that there was nothing in section 44.103 or rule 1.820 which supported a conclusion that the trial court had any discretion to deny a party's timely motion for trial de novo....

...causes of action, not the component parts of liability and damages of a single claim against a single defendant as in the present case. As the Fourth District stated in Johnson v. Levine, 736 So.2d 1235 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999): [W]e can find nothing in section 44.103 that requires a trial on all issues against all defendants in a case having multiple and alternative claims against multiple defendants....

...ete claims against Southeast Service but involved only one claim which it attempted to dissect into liability and damages. The appellate standard of review is de novo when reviewing a trial court's decision relating to a motion for trial pursuant to section 44.103....

...der rule 1.820(h) after the service by mail of an arbitration decision. Evan Ziccarelli sued Allen and Carol Furia for motor vehicle negligence. After Ziccarelli noticed the case for trial, the trial court ordered the case to arbitration pursuant to section 44.103, Florida Statutes (2004), and rule 1.800....

...After the arbitration hearing, the arbitrator rendered a written decision awarding Ziccarelli $27,000 in damages. The arbitration decision was mailed to the parties on February 23, 2005. Twenty-one days later, on March 16, 2005, the Furias filed a notice for jury trial/trial de novo. See § 44.103(5), Fla....

...Ziccarelli moved (1) to strike the notice for trial and (2) for the entry of a final judgment confirming the arbitration award. The trial court ruled that the Furias' notice for trial was untimely and entered a final judgment in favor of Ziccarelli. Section 44.103(5) states that the time limit for filing a request for a trial de *104 novo shall be established "by rules promulgated by the Supreme Court." Rule 1.820 "created the procedure to effectuate the statute." Stowe v....

...1.250(b) (stating that parties may be dropped through the procedure outlined in Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.420(a)(1)). If American ever pursued Swank’s failure to honor counsel’s agreement, our record does not reflect it. The trial court later referred the matter to non-binding arbitration. See § 44.103, Fla....

...The arbitrator did not mention Universal Property or Universal Risk in his award; indeed, throughout the award, he referred to American as the only “Defendant.” If a party to a non-binding arbitration award does not timely file a motion for trial de novo, the decision becomes binding. See § 44.103(5); Fla....

...Whitfield later sought an award of taxable costs, which the trial court granted in the amount of $2,072.75. On March 1, 2006, a final judgment was entered in the amount of $9,475.75, including the verdict and taxable costs. Whitfield also moved for the award of attorney's fees and costs pursuant to section 44.103(6), Florida Statutes (2006), claiming that her award was more favorable at trial than at arbitration....

...The trial court agreed with Whitfield, and on October *1177 10, 2006, awarded her $6,482.50 in attorney's fees and costs. This appeal followed that award. The issue presented here is this — when considering a prevailing party's entitlement to attorney's fees pursuant to section 44.103(6), should taxable costs be considered as part of the judgment in a trial de novo when determining whether a party received a more favorable award at trial than in non-binding arbitration? Prior to October 1, 2007, section 44.103(6) read: The party having filed for a trial de novo may be assessed the arbitration costs, court costs, and other reasonable costs of the party, including attorney's fees, investigation expenses, and expenses for expert or other testimony or evidence incurred after the arbitration hearing if the judgment upon the trial de novo is not more favorable than the arbitration decision. However, as of October 1, 2007, section 44.103(6) was amended to read (in applicable part): Upon motion made by either party within 30 days after entry of judgment, the court may assess costs against the party requesting a trial de novo, including arbitration costs, court costs, re...

...t amounts by which the verdict was reduced. In considering whether the facts of this case would trigger an entitlement to attorney's fees, this court must first determine whether the pre-October 1, 2007 or the amended post-October 1, 2007 version of section 44.103(6) applies....

...s, including matters on appeal, are determined under the law in effect at the time of decision rather than that in effect when the cause of action arose or some earlier time. Id. at 1353 (emphasis added). Thus, in order to determine which version of section 44.103(6) to apply, this court must determine whether section 44.103(6) relates to procedure or remedies, or instead, is substantive in nature....

...1st DCA 1999) ("Remedial statutes simply confer or change a remedy in furtherance of existing rights and do not deny a claimant his or her vested rights."). In this case, Whitfield's right to obtain attorney's fees was affected by the amendment to section 44.103(6) because it altered the requirements that needed to be met before an award would have been proper. Her right to attorney's fees had vested prior to the October 1, 2007 amendment, since a final judgment was entered pursuant to the requirements of the original section 44.103(6)....

...e of the injury and are not subject to impairment by subsequent amendment to the law"). Considered in the light of the issues presented here, the "bright line" analysis of these First District cases is persuasive. We hold that since the amendment to section 44.103(6) affects the right to attorney's fees, it is substantive in nature, regardless of any procedural aspect it might otherwise have. Having found that the original section 44.103(6) applies, we next turn to the dispositive issue — whether taxable costs [1] should be considered as part of the judgment when determining whether a party received a more favorable award at a trial de novo or in non-binding arbitration....

...Antunez makes no mention of section 57.041 in his arguments. He simply argues that the verdict at trial was less that the arbitration award ($7,403.00 vs. $8,860.08) and thus attorney's fees should not be awarded. While he concedes that the intent of section 44.103(6) is to encourage parties to accept the results of arbitration, he contends that it would be unfair to include taxable costs when determining the judgment because it would be impossible for him to predict his opponent's success in litigating the suit after arbitration....

...award only reasonable costs. Antunez also contends that the supreme court's opinion in White v. Steak & Ale of Florida, Inc., 816 So.2d 546 (Fla. 2002), supports the exclusion of taxable costs when determining what is included in a "judgment" under section 44.103(6)....

...onsidered part of the judgment. White, which only addressed pre-settlement offer costs, simply stated that costs are part of the "judgment obtained." Id. *1181 at 551. [2] Antunez' arguments do not find support in White, nor is his interpretation of section 44.103(6) otherwise persuasive. We find that under the pre-October 1, 2007 version of section 44.103(6), costs are to be included as part of the judgment when determining entitlement to attorney's fees....

...NOTES [1] Black's Law Dictionary defines "taxable costs" as "[a] litigation-related expense that the prevailing party is entitled to as part of the court's award." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 372 (8th ed. 1999). [2] Even if we were to find support in White for the exclusion of post-arbitration costs under section 44.103(6), this issue was not properly preserved in this case....