Florida/Georgia Personal Injury & Workers Compensation

(1994), and its implementing regulations, 7 C.F.R. § 15.3 (1999). The district court dismissed Appellants’

(1994), and its implementing regulations, 7 C.F.R. § 15.3 (1999). The district court dismissed Appellants’

scope certifications. See 28 C.F.R. § 15.3(a) (1989); Nasuti, 906 F.2d at 804

and legislative facts are all others. Id. at § 15:3, p. 143. " 'Legislative facts ... apply universally

not exceed the size limitations. Id. § 15.3(F)(3). Real estate signs must be removed when the

555 (11th Cir.1984). . McCarthy, supra note 6, § 15:3.

of limitations embodied in Ala.Code § 15-3-1 (1975). The Alabama Supreme Court rejected this

So. 419, 54 A.L.R. 1173; 5 Fla.Jur., Brokers, § 15; 3 F.L.P., Brokers and Brokerage, § 5. A real estate

arising out of termination of the Lease. Section 15.3 provides: 15.3 Additional Expenses

of limitations for violent crimes. See Ala. Code § 15-3-5(a)(2). Nonetheless, DeBruce knows what he said

Attorney General to provide certification); 28 C.F.R. § 15.3 (authorizing Attorney General to delegate certification

acted for the Attorney General. Under 28 C.F.R. § 15.3(a) (1995), the Attorney General has delegated to

implementing regulations, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d and 7 C.F.R. § 15.3. By Order dated February 7, 1996, the Court, inter

to a three-year statute of limitations. Ala.Code § 15-3-1 (1975); Britain v. State, 518 So.2d

P. TRAWICK, JR., FLORIDA PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 15-3 (2004 ed.).[1] The fact that the trial court could

Henry P. Trawick, Florida Practice and Procedure § 15.3, at 237 (1991). This being so, the plaintiffs did

...of directors of the Association a copy of the executed purchase agreement (executed “subject to the board’s waiver of its right of first refusal and consent to the sale or transfer”) and impose maximum time limits for the parties to act. Another provision, section 15.03, authorizes the board of directors of the Association to designate one or more non-Unit Owners “who are willing to purchase upon the same terms as those specified in the [selling] Unit Owner’s notice.” The Association de...

prohibition on the use of amplified sound contained in Section 15-3. 10 The exception in Section 15-4

Litigation, in Florida Condominium Law & Practice § 15.3, at 715-716 (The Florida Bar CLE 1987). The condominium

15 amplified sound contained in Section 15-3.10 The exception in Section 15-4, entitled

alleged by the plaintiff were time-barred under Section 15[3] of the NASD Code and thus not arbitrable. Id

Martin, et al„ Ginsberg & Martin on Bankruptcy § 15.03[D] (2013); 9 Am.Jur. 2d Bankruptcy § 565. . Id

parties, and legislative facts are all others. Id. at § 15:3, p. 143. “ ‘Legislative facts .. . apply universally

we hold that the limitations period set forth in § 15-3-1, Ala.Code 1975, does not bar the prosecution

identical to its counterpart in antitrust, 15 U.S.C. § 15.[3] Considered altogether, the similarity of this

(Fla. 1989); see also art. V, § 15, -3- Fla. Const. In this case, we

Stat. Ann. § 457:46(II) (2022); R.I. Gen. Laws § 15-3.1-13 (2022). In any event, it was the legislature

Ala. Const. art. I, § 14, now codified as § 15). 3 Given that Nichols sues only the

the appellants’ claim, 3 American Law of Property § 15.3 (A. J. Casner ed. 1952) states: Mere assertions

...The Operating Agreement The Court first turns to the issue of whether the parties agreed to arbitrate. Article 15 of the Operating Agreement, entitled "Termination and Dissolution," provides the following: Section 15.01 Impasse. In the event that the Members or the Board of Managers reach an "Impasse" (as defined in Section 15.03 below) with respect to the operations of the Company, either Member shall be entitled to demand mediation in accordance with the procedures set forth below. The purpose of such mediation shall be to make a binding determination as to whether the matter in controversy constitutes an Impasse in order to work to resolve such controversy. (Doc. # 10-4 at 21, § 15.01). Section 15.03 defines "Impasse" and outlines an arbitration and mediation process aimed at its resolution: Section 15.03 Impasse Resolution....

...If the dispute has not been resolved after thirty (30) full days of mediation, then either Member may demand the Termination of the Company, whereupon the Company shall be liquidated and dissolved in accordance with the terms of this Agreement and the LLC Act. (Doc. # 10-4 at 22, § 15.03). [1] The Court notes, as a threshold matter, that the use of the word "mediation," rather than "arbitration," in Sections 15.01 and 15.03 does not bar invocation of the FAA....

...In contrast, the FAA presumes that the arbitration process itself will produce a resolution independent of the parties' acquiescence—an award which declares the parties' rights and which may be confirmed with the force of a judgment. Id. at 1240 (internal citations omitted). Here, Section 15.03 prescribes a two-phase resolution mechanism for impasses consisting of arbitration in the first instance followed by mediation....

...bound by, the Alternative Dispute Resolution Rules of the Georgia Supreme Court, who possess experience in "financial, accounting and general business matters," and who will make "binding" determinations regarding the nature of the impasses. Id. at § 15.03....

...Because a deadlock "with respect to the operations of the Company" triggers Section 15. 03, the Court determines that Counts I and II are subject to the arbitration and mediation process. Harrell's and Florala suggest that Counts I and II should be excluded from the procedures set forth in Section 15.03 on the basis that they "do not seek money damages [or injunctive relief], but rather a judicial declaration of whether, on two alternative theories, [Agrium Advanced] is liable for breach of the duty of loyalty to Florala and/or Harrell's." (Doc. # 16 at 18). The Court is not persuaded by this argument. The critical factor is not, as Harrell's and Florala suggest, the form of relief sought; rather, it is whether the claims in this case are encompassed within the scope of Section 15.03....

...Count V seeks restitution by disgorgement of all unlawful profits. Id. at 13. Because these claims, like Counts I and II, are steeped in the substance of the disputes engendering deadlock at the meeting held on September 13, 2010, the Court determines that they are subject to Section 15.03's arbitration and mediation requirement....

...Moreover, the transcript of the September 13, 2010, meeting shows that the Board of Managers deadlocked regarding issues impacting the breach of contract claim in Count VI. ( See Doc. # 10-3 at 26-27, 59-60, 68-69, 71-72). As such, Count VI falls within the ambit of Section 15.03's arbitration and mediation procedure....

...of arbitration." Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp., 460 U.S. at 24-25, 103 S.Ct. 927. None of the contract provisions referenced by Harrell's and Florala bar the disputes in this case from activating the arbitration and mediation procedures set forth in Section 15.03. After a careful review of the record and the arguments presented, the Court determines that the arbitration and mediation procedures prescribed in Section 15.03 encompass all of the claims of this case....

...ve dispute resolution process. NOTES [1] The Court notes that Section 15.02 excludes a specified class of disagreements from constituting an "Impasse." ( See Doc. # 10-4 at 21-22, § 15.02). Section 15.02 does not affect the Court's analysis because Section 15.03 expressly delegates the task of "mak[ing] a binding determination as to whether the matter in controversy . . . does not constitute a Non-Impasse Item" to the arbitrators. (Doc. # 10-4 at 22, § 15.03); see First Options of Chicago, Inc., 514 U.S....

...pon what the parties agreed about that matter.") (internal citations omitted). [2] Implicit in this argument is Harrell's and Florala's agreement that the Operating Agreement contains an agreement to arbitrate. [3] Harrell's and Florala suggest that Section 15.03 may be evaluated by considering whether the dispute was reasonably foreseeable to the parties when they entered into the Operating Agreement....

...Harrell's and Florala argue that the "arbitration of claims for . . . tortious breach of loyalty by direct competition with Florala [cannot] be deemed `reasonably foreseeable'" because Section 15.02 of the Operating Agreement excludes a specific class of disagreements from being an "Impasse Item" pursuant to Section 15.03. (Doc. # 16 at 9; see Doc. # 10-4 at 21-22, § 15.02). The Court rejects this argument because, as explained in Footnote 1, Section 15.03 specifically designates that it is the arbitrators who "will make a binding determination as to whether the matter in controversy . . . does not constitute a Non-Impasse Item." (Doc. # 10-4 at 22, § 15.03). [4] Harrell's and Florala urge the Court to adopt a "collateral agreement" analysis to determine whether the scope of Section 15.03 encompasses Count VI....

of limitations for violent crimes. See Ala. Code § 15-3-5(a)(2). Nonetheless, DeBruce knows what he said

unpaid rent against his tenant. See S.C. Code Ann. § 15-3-600. If his tenant does not voluntarily make payments

(2012); CMS Medicare Program Integrity Manual Ch. 15 .§ 15.3 DE 195-4). At the *1334provider’s request, the

modified as follows: Except as provided in Section' 15.3(v), below, regarding the Class Action Waiver

(Second), Conflict of Laws (Tent.Draft Xo. 2, 1954) § 15(3).