Florida/Georgia Personal Injury & Workers Compensation

...Relying on the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, Fla. Const., art. I, § 12, F.S.A., and Fla. Stat. § 933.07, F.S.A., defendant argues that each of these requires that warrants particularly describe the items to be seized; also, that Fla. Stat. § 933.14, F.S.A., provides for the return of property taken when it is not the same as that described in the warrant....

...483, 93 S.Ct. 2789, 37 L.Ed.2d 745 1973); Roaden v. Kentucky, 413 U.S. 496, 93 S.Ct. 2796, 37 L.Ed.2d 757 (1973); and Alexander v. Virginia, 413 U.S. 836, 93 S.Ct. 2803, 37 L.Ed.2d 993 (1973). [7] Fla. Const. art. V, § 3(b)(1), F.S.A. [8] See Fla. Stat. § 933.14, F.S.A....

...Director of Public Safety Department of Metropoilitan Dade County, 400 So.2d 990 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981). [2] Because the attache case was seized pursuant to a search warrant, Brown arguably should have applied to the magistrate before whom the warrant application was made. § 933.14, Fla. Stat. (1991). However, in view of the department's concession that it holds and is willing to return the attache case, we believe any technical deficiencies in Brown's pro se pleading can be overlooked. In any event it is doubtful that section 933.14 constitutes the sole remedy available to Brown....

...d with its execution "return this warrant and bring the property ... before a court having competent jurisdiction of the offense." Pursuant to this directive, the offense being a felony, return was required to be made to the Circuit Court. [4] Under Section 933.14(1), Florida Statutes (1979), jurisdiction to order the return of the seized property became vested in the Circuit Court....

...It is not clear from the record whether the trial judge doubted her jurisdiction, ab initio, or whether that doubt arose because the criminal case against Sawyer was terminated with the State's nolle prosequi. Therefore, we first address the respondent's jurisdiction ab initio. Section 933.14(1) provides a mechanism for the expeditious return of property seized pursuant to a search warrant....

...e airplane — is not being held for use as evidence. Thus, while neither Garmire nor Harvey is precisely on target, the target is bracketed by them. It is clear under Harvey v. Drake, supra , that any circuit judge *995 would have jurisdiction under Section 933.14 to entertain a motion to return the property....

...[6] Additionally, important considerations of judicial economy compel the same result. In United States v. Wilson, 540 F.2d 1100 (D.C. Cir.1976), the defendant, arrested for possession of narcotics, moved under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41(e) [7] (the Federal analogue to Section 933.14) for return of money seized from his house pursuant to a search warrant....

...e property seized. II. We hold further that the termination of the criminal case, here by the entry of a nolle prosequi, did not divest the trial court of jurisdiction to entertain Sawyer's motion for return of property. [9] While concededly neither Section 933.14, Florida Statutes (1979), nor any other statute, confers jurisdiction on the court before which the criminal proceedings are held to return property seized after the termination of the criminal case, that power inheres in the court's jurisdiction over the criminal case....

...Presumably, if criminal charges are not brought or no motion for return of the seized property is made, the return and the seized property remain in limbo. [6] The identical issues of the existence vel non of probable cause and unreasonable search are involved in a motion under Section 933.14 and a motion to suppress....

...[13] As we have held, supra, the Circuit Court has jurisdiction over Sawyer's motion for return of property and, by Section 943.44, jurisdiction over forfeiture proceedings. We note also that the legality of the search and seizure of the aircraft, an issue under Section 933.14(1), is an issue as well in forfeiture proceedings in which the exclusionary rule applies....

...e in his prosecution or presented as such. He therefore requested the court to grant a hearing and order the return of the property to him. Although the statutes provide procedures for the return of certain evidence taken under a search warrant, see Section 933.14, Florida Statutes (1989), and for return of money or a motor vehicle taken under circumstances constituting larceny, see Section 812.061, Florida Statutes (1989), the statutes do not provide a procedure for return of property seized from a criminal defendant without a warrant....

..."Probable cause" is a concept that is confined to criminal investigations. Id. When a warrant would not serve this prophylactic purpose, it is inapplicable. Id. Indeed, a search warrant is not available unless police are searching for criminals, evidence of crimes, instruments of crimes, fruits of crimes or contraband. § 933.14, Fla....

...legis ). The manner and mode of the Humane Society's obtaining possession of Popeye is a factual issue, which should be resolved. There is also a statutory procedure for the return of property obtained by the State pursuant to a search warrant. See § 933.14, Fla....

...[10] See also State v. Tsavaris, 394 So.2d 418, 426 (Fla.1981)(distinguishing between search warrants and subpoenas and holding that requirements of Fourth Amendment apply to subpoenas in criminal case only to ensure that breadth of subpoena is reasonable). [11] See § 933.14(1), Fla....

...is admissible. See Stone v. State, 630 So.2d 660 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994). AFFIRMED as modified. DAUKSCH and THOMPSON, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] "Cripi" is a street name for marijuana, usually describing high potency contraband with a large THC content. [2] Section 933.14(1), Florida Statutes (1995) provides for the return of property taken pursuant to a search warrant....

...In the case sub judice appellant did not claim that he was prejudiced by the fact that the property was not physically delivered to the court. In addition, since the properties seized were narcotic drugs, they could never be returned to him under the provisions of F.S. § 933.14 F.S.A....

...Real Property, 588 So.2d at 968 (upon a forfeiture verdict, the court shall issue a final order of forfeiture disposing of the property in accordance with law). The original property owner’s motion to return the res is a recognized procedure in Florida case law. Cf. Sawyer v. Gable, 400 So.2d 992, 994 (Fla.3d DCA 1981) (section 933.14, providing for return of property seized under a search warrant, does not provide statutory mechanism for motion seeking return of property, but implicit in the court’s authority to order the property returned is “the right of the person from whom it was seized to move for its return”)....

...VACATED and REMANDED with directions. . Due to this disposition of the case, we do not reach the other issues raised on appeal. . Florida law also provides that the circuit court judge may order a return of property seized under a warrant not supported by probable cause. Fla.Stat. § 933.14(1)....

...news article from DeFuniak Springs. The orders made by the County Judge on these several motions, as shown by the exhibits to the answer, were to the effect that the court had jurisdiction of the subject matter and the parties (evidently overlooking section 933.14 , Florida Statutes, 1941, F.S.A.) and that the Court reserved jurisdiction and postponed further orders until June 7, 1948, within which time those, or some of them, making the search and seizure, should make under oath some affidavit...

...Fabisinski was one of the two Circuit Judges, was tantamount to making the returns to or filing them with the Circuit Judge, as such, and also to the Circuit Court of Walton County, of which he and Honorable D. Stuart Gillis were the Circuit Judges. Section 933.14 of the chapter of Florida Statutes 1941, F.S.A....

...izing officers subject to the order of either of the Judges of the Circuit Court of Walton County. It was not L.L. Fabisinski as an individual who issued this search warrant, but L.L. Fabisinski as one of the Circuit Judges in and for Walton County. Section 933.14 , Florida Statutes, 1941, F.S.A....

...t described in the warrant, or that there is no probable cause for believing the existence of the grounds upon which the warrant was issued, the judge or magistrate may order a return of the property taken." (Italics ours.) But the next paragraph of section 933.14 , Florida Statutes, 1941, F.S.A....

...dge's court of Walton County, was not the magistrate or judge before whom the search warrants were returned; and even if he had been, the "motions for judgment and for return of the property seized" were entirely insufficient under the provisions of section 933.14 , Florida Statutes, 1941, F.S.A. above quoted from. Aside from that, if the movants in the County Judge's Court had any right whatever to relief, by way of return of the property seized, or otherwise, their remedy was that outlined in said section 933.14 , Florida Statutes, 1941, F.S.A....

...emedy was an action in replevin. Golding appealed and the appellate court concluded that the magistrate or judge before whom the search warrant was returned had jurisdiction to entertain the motion and to grant the accelerated relief contemplated by section 933.14, independent of a civil action for replevin....

...itioned the appellate court for a writ of mandamus. Judge Pearson, writing for the majority in Sawyer, noted that execution of a search warrant in a case where the offense is a felony requires that a return be made to circuit court. Therefore, under section 933.14(1), Florida Statutes (1979), the circuit judge to whom the return was made had statutory authority to order a return of the property taken....

...t Miami International Airport, and seized an attache case containing $201,500 in United States currency and a raincoat. Shortly thereafter, Golding filed a motion in the Criminal Division of the Circuit Court seeking the return of the property under Section 933.14, Florida Statutes (1979)....

...e which could have been brought. The Florida Supreme Court, on an appeal by the Department of Beverages from a denial of a writ prohibiting the county judge from exercising jurisdiction, held that motions for the return of property are controlled by Section 933.14, Florida Statutes (1941), [2] which gives jurisdiction to "the magistrate or judge before whom the warrant is returned," which in Harvey, by the terms of the warrant, was the circuit court. [3] Three propositions pertinent to the present case emerge from Harvey v. Drake, supra : first, movants seeking return of property seized under a warrant have as an available remedy a motion under Section 933.14, quite apart from an action for replevin [4] ; second, the court before which the warrant is returned has jurisdiction to entertain this motion [5] ; third, the filing of criminal charges is not a prerequisite to *992 relief under Section 933.14....

...[7] But in our view, Golding is entitled to have the Circuit Court exercise jurisdiction, which it has refused to do, over his distinct and separate motion for return of property. Thus, the issue before us is not moot. Golding was entitled to seek the expeditious remedy afforded by Section 933.14....

...o review. Our refusal to decide the case before us on mootness grounds would sanction the trial court's wrongful refusal to exercise jurisdiction and penalize Golding for his impatience, when in fact the remedy which he was entitled to utilize under Section 933.14, and which he was deprived from utilizing, was precisely designed to accelerate the return of seized property to justifiably impatient movants....

...Accordingly, we hold that appeal does not lie. However, since Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.040(c) authorizes us to treat the cause as if proper remedy had been sought, we treat this appeal as a petition for writ of mandamus. See Estevez v. Gordon, 386 So.2d 43 (Fla.3d DCA 1980). [2] Section 933.14, under consideration in Harvey v....

...under review, we may do so when mootness is suggested and to best subserve the ends of justice. Aurora Enterprises, Inc. v. State of Florida, Department of Business Regulation, 395 So.2d 604, 606 n. 7 (1981). [8] The merits of Golding's claim under Section 933.14, Florida Statutes (1979), are not before us....

...riminal defendant, if it is no longer needed as evidence against him. Garmire v. Red Lake, 265 So.2d 2 (Fla. 1972); Estevez v. Gordon, 386 So.2d 43 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980). Except where property taken pursuant to a warrant is concerned, in which instance section 933.14, Florida Statutes (1987), governs, there are no established methods for exercising this inherent power....

...Soud, 685 So.2d 1376, 1379-80 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997) (striking down an administrative order which effectively amended a statute). Therefore, as the administrative order in question here could not amend or add to the statute it cited, the pertinent question is whether section 933.14(3) required or permitted the Sheriff to retain Appellant’s weapons....

...Section 933,14 provides that “no pistol or firearm taken by any officer with a search warrant or without a search warrant upon a view by the officer of a breach of the peace shall be returned except pursuant to an order of a trial court judge.” § 933.14(3), Fla. Stat. (2014). Because there was no search warrant here, whether the Sheriffs actions fell under the parameters of section 933.14(3), and the Administrative Order depends on whether Appellant committed a “breach of the peace.” “ ‘Breach of the peace’ is a generic term including all violations of the public peace,- order or decorum....

...at 87, 92 S.Ct. at 1997, 32 L.Ed.2d at 573. No property rights exist in per se contraband, the mere possession of which constitutes a crime. See One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania, 380 U.S. 693, 699, 85 S.Ct. 1246, 1250, 14 L.Ed.2d 170 (1965); § 933.14, Fla....

...... `restrains itself so as not to unduly interfere with the States' legitimate activities.'" Id., 91 S.Ct. at 750. It is clear that plaintiff does have a course of action in state court through which the seized projectors may be returned. Fla.Stat. § 933.14....

sought. Contrary to the trial court’s ruling, Section 933.14, Florida Statutes (1979) is the pertinent statute

...Section 790.08 1 deals with fire *407 arms taken from an arrested person, used in the commission of an armed felony, or which had been abandoned or discarded. It has utterly no application to this case. The present situation is instead governed by section 933.14(3), which provides as follows: No pistol or firearm taken by any officer with a search warrant or without a search warrant upon a view by the officer of a breach of the peace shall be returned except pursuant to an order of a circuit judge or a county court judge....

...ould be returned. After being informed by the assistant state attorney that no forfeiture proceeding had been instituted, the criminal court, Judge Luce presiding, accepted the appellant’s plea and ordered the return of the requested property. See § 933.14, Fla.Stat....

appellant seeking a return of his property under section 933.14, Florida Statutes (1993), which provides: If

PER CURIAM. Affirmed. See § 933.14(1), Fla.Stat....

...ent in their favor upon the state’s claim of forfeiture and upon the state’s assessment of storage charges. See U.S. v. Lace, 502 F.Supp. 1021 (D.Vt.1980); aff’d 669 F.2d 46 (2d Cir.1982); Bloom v. State, 283 So.2d 134 (Fla. 4th DCA 1973); and § 933.14, Fla.Stat....