CopyCited 16 times | Published | Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit | 1987 U.S. App. LEXIS 10534
. The applicable provisions of Fla.Stat. § 924.-065(2) read as follows: The [supersedeas]
CopyCited 11 times | Published | Florida 3rd District Court of Appeal
...viction." §
924.06(2), Fla. Stat. (1979); Murphy v. State,
231 So.2d 263 (Fla. 4th DCA 1970). A supersedeas bond in a criminal appeal (except where the sentence is only for a monetary fine [7] ) is nothing more than a bail bond by a different name. §
924.065, Fla....
...3d DCA 1978). The effect of the order of dismissal was to leave the original order as if no appeal had been taken. Gaskins v. Mack,
91 Fla. 284,
107 So. 918 (1926). [2] Fla.R.App.P. 9.340(a). [3] Fla.R.App.P. 9.310(a). [4] §
924.14, Fla. Stat. (1979). [5] §
924.065, Fla....
CopyCited 10 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida
...238,
92 S.Ct. 2726,
33 L.Ed.2d 346 (1972), and because in Donaldson v. Sacks,
265 So.2d 499 (Fla. 1972), this Court had determined there could be no capital offense without capital punishment. The First District in Rowe also properly concluded that section
924.065(3) did not restore the discretion to the trial court to grant bail in the present situation....
...on as to those convicted of capital offenses. If the legislature had intended to give the courts this discretion, it could have repealed that portion of the rule as well. The First District correctly declined to imply such legislative intention from section 924.065(3)....
...iscretion." But if the legislature believed that the rule did allow bail for non-death sentences, there would be no point in repealing the rule to give the courts discretion which they already possess. I find this latter scenario the more plausible. Section 924.065(3), Florida Statutes (1981), reflects a legislative belief that "capital offense" for bail purposes means one for which the death penalty has been imposed. It states, "[a]n appellant who has been sentenced to death shall not be released on bail." The majority makes the obvious point that if *985 trial judges were without discretion to grant bail in a situation like Mrs. Rowe's, then section 924.065(3) did not "restore" it....
CopyCited 10 times | Published | Florida 1st District Court of Appeal
...226 (1936), Gray v. State,
54 So.2d 436 (Fla. 1951) and Hedden v. State,
275 So.2d 52 (Fla.2d DCA 1973), leaves discretion in the trial judge when one charged and convicted of a capital offense is sentenced to life imprisonment. Defendant further urges that Section
924.065(3), Florida Statutes (1979), authorizes judicial discretion to grant bail for all appellants other than those who have been sentenced to death....
...Under this analysis then, when Hedden was decided, there were no capital offenses and Rule 3.691 (1972) would have allowed the trial court to grant bail to persons convicted of first degree murder but sentenced to mandatory life. Finally, we are not persuaded that Section 924.065(3), Florida Statutes (1979), restores this discretion to the trial court. Section 924.065(3), Florida Statutes (1979), states: "An appellant who has been sentenced to death shall not be released on bail." Presumably then, defendant argues, by implication all other appellants shall, or at least may be admitted to bail pending appeal....
...In so doing, the legislature left intact the portion of the rule which eliminated discretion as to convicted capital offenses. Had the legislature intended that the court have this discretion, it could have also repealed the relevant portions of the rule. We decline to imply such an intention from Section 924.065(3), Florida Statutes (1979)....
CopyCited 3 times | Published | Florida 1st District Court of Appeal | 2004 WL 305748
...Rules of Criminal Procedure. See Ch. 70-339, § 180, Laws of Fla. (repealing Chapter 920). Although there is still a statute pertaining to release on bail after the denial of a motion for new trial, it does not address the grounds for new trial. See § 924.065, Fla....
CopyAgo (Fla. Att'y Gen. 1993).
Published | Florida Attorney General Reports
...Louise Hanaoka 18501 Murdock Circle, Sixth Floor Port Charlotte, Florida 33948 Dear Ms. Hanoaka: On behalf of the Clerk of the Circuit Court for the Twentieth Judicial Circuit, the Honorable Barbara T. Scott, you ask substantially the following question: Does s. 924.065 (1), F.S., require the clerk of the circuit court to approve the super-sedeas bond in addition to approval by the court? In sum: Section 924.065 (1), F.S., does not require the clerk of the circuit court to approve the super-sedeas bond....
...Supersedeas, or stay pending review, occurs with the filing of an appeal from a judgment or sentence and the posting of a supersedeas bond. 1 A supersedeas bond in a criminal appeal has been considered by the courts to be nothing more than a bail bond by a different name. 2 Pursuant to s. 924.065 (1), F.S....
...lease of the defendant." The statute and rules thus clearly state that it is the court which is responsible for approving the sufficiency and adequacy of the bonds. Such bonds approved by the court are to be filed with the clerk of that court. While s. 924.065 (1), F.S., requires the clerk to prepare a certificate which sets forth the filing and approval of the bond, it does not specify that the clerk is required to approve the bond....
...bond has been approved by the court and filed with the clerk of the court. I am not aware of any other statute or rule of court which requires the clerk in addition to the court to approve the supersedeas bond. Accordingly, I am of the opinion that s.
924.065 (1), F.S., does not require the clerk of the circuit court to approve the supersedeas bond. Sincerely, Robert A. Butterworth Attorney General RAB/tjw 1 See, s.
924.14 , F.S., stating that an appeal by a defendant from either the judgment or sentence shall stay execution of the sentence, subject to the provisions of s.
924.065 , F.S....
