Florida/Georgia Personal Injury & Workers Compensation

...He points out that this particular feature was not present in the cases for conflict. It makes no difference. The point involved is respondent's claim of the basic materiality of the date involved and not any special defense or particular item of evidence that he intended to rely upon. Fla. Stat. § 910.11(1) is also asserted by respondent as distinguishing and controlling....

...endment in Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 , 89 S.Ct. 2056 , 23 L.Ed.2d 707 (1969). Florida’s Constitution provides that "[n]o person shall ... be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense_” Fla. Const, art. I, § 9. Florida Statutes Annotated § 910.11 (West 1985) further provides that: No person shall be held to answer on a second indictment, information, or affidavit for an offense for which he has been acquitted....

...[1] Article I, section 9, Florida Constitution, provides: Due Process. — No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law, or be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense, or be compelled in any criminal matter to be a witness against himself. Section 910.11, Florida Statutes, provides: Conviction or acquittal bar to prosecution....

...County. The State concedes that if the Orange County kidnapping convictions relate to the same episode as the Polk County kidnapping convictions, then the Orange County convictions would be improper. The State acknowledges the following authorities. Section 910.11(2), Florida Statutes (2003) states, "When a person may be tried for an offense in two or more counties, a conviction or acquittal in one county shall be a bar to prosecution for the same offense in another county." In Adams v. State, 659 So.2d 396 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995), the court noted that even though a kidnapping was committed in more than one county, it was still one offense. In Nash v. State, 547 So.2d 147 (Fla. 4th DCA 1989), *1081 the court held pursuant to section 910.11(2), that a defendant's conviction for grand theft in the county in which he stole automobile and in the county to which he drove automobile violated double jeopardy....

...nty (even though Stephen's initial entry in Volusia County was unlawful), I would sustain the jury's verdict and find venue was proper in Seminole County. Section 910.05, Fla. Stat. (1987). No double jeopardy problems can arise in Florida because of section 910.11(2)....

...Present Burglary Statute ", Latimer, 9 Stetson L.Rev. 347 (1980). [16] See Hambrick v. State, 174 Ga. App. 444, 330 S.E.2d 383 (Ga. App. 1985). [17] The converse also should follow: If Stephens was not properly charged and tried in Seminole County, section 910.11(2) should not bar a trial in Volusia County....

...Therefore the double jeopardy clause bars a second prosecution of the defendant on any criminal charge based on that homicide. Here the defendant did not move for judgment of acquittal based on the variance but merely held the state to its burden of proof. The state did not carry its burden. Reprosecution is barred. See § 910.11, Fla....

Broward County conviction of grand theft. Section 910.-11(2), Florida Statutes (1987), bars the prosecution

“each offense occurred in a different venue.” Section 910.11(2), Florida Statutes (1985), provides: “When