Florida/Georgia Personal Injury & Workers Compensation

...fficial proceeding pursuant to Section 837.02, Florida Statutes (1977). [2] We find this point well taken. *1045 Schramm argues hereunder that there was no evidence to show that his alleged false statements were made during an "official proceeding." Section 837.011, Florida Statutes (1977) defines an "official proceeding" as: ..... "837.011 Definitions In this chapter, unless a different meaning plainly is required: "(1) `Official proceeding' means a proceeding heard, or which may be or is required to be heard, before any legislative, judicial, administrative, or other governmen...

...White, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellant. James T. Miller, Jacksonville, for Appellee. SHAW, Justice. We have on appeal State v. Ellis, 22 Fla. L. Weekly D1298, 722 So.2d 824 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997), wherein the district court declared section 837.011(3), Florida Statutes (1993), unconstitutional....

...r the jury: "Material matter" means any subject, regardless of its admissibility under the rules of evidence, which could affect the course or outcome of the proceeding. Whether a matter is material in a given factual situation is a question of law. § 837.011(3), Fla....

...Stalder, 630 So.2d 1072, 1076 (Fla.1994) ("[I]n assessing a statute's constitutionality, this Court is bound `to resolve all doubts as to the validity of [the] statute in favor of its constitutionality.'"). We reverse Ellis and uphold the constitutionality of section 837.011(3), Florida Statutes (1993), as explained herein....

...ANSTEAD, J., dissents with an opinion, in which KOGAN and PARIENTE, JJ., concur. ANSTEAD, Judge, dissenting. This Court's opinion reverses the First District's decision in State v. Ellis, 22 Fla. L. Weekly D1298, 722 So.2d 824 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997), declaring section 837.011(3), Florida Statutes (1993), unconstitutional in that it removes an element of the offense, materiality, from the jury's consideration in direct violation of the holding in United States v....

...." (emphasis added). For purposes of contrast, section 837.012, Fla. Stat. (1987), which appellants were not charged under, reads the same but pertains to false statements made " under oath, [but] not in an official proceeding ... ." (emphasis added). Section 837.011(1), Fla....

...PEARSON, J. and M. IGNATIUS LESTER, Associate Judge. DANIEL S. PEARSON, Judge. The question in this appeal, one of first impression, is whether a pre-filing conference called by an assistant state attorney is an official proceeding as that term is defined by Section 837.011, Florida Statutes (1981), so as to subject the defendant to a charge of perjury under Section 837.02, Florida Statutes (1981)....

...otherwise aware, that the pre-filing conference was a part of an official proceeding. The State appeals. We reverse. Making a knowing false statement under oath in an official proceeding is a felony under Section 837.02, Florida Statutes (1981). [2] Section 837.011, Florida Statutes (1981), defines an "official proceeding" as *952 " [A] proceeding heard, or which may be or is required to be heard, before any legislative, judicial, administrative, or other governmental agency or official authoriz...

...The Fourth District held that this fact did not as a matter of law make the proceeding unofficial. Once again, the unstated assumption in the case is that the taking of testimony by the state attorney in connection with an investigation is an official proceeding within Section 837.011, Florida Statutes, if all other elements of Section 837.011 are made to appear....

...The thrust of Witte's argument, adopted by the trial court, is that the pre-filing conference, as described, does not have the trappings usually associated with official proceedings and for that reason cannot be considered official. It is clear, however, that, first, the definition of "official proceeding" in Section 837.011 contains no requirement that these trappings be present, and second, the absence of such trappings has never been recognized as affecting the officiality of the proceedings....

...n witnesses to testify before him as to any violations of the criminal law and to administer the required oath. We conclude, therefore, that the pre-filing conference alleged to have occurred *954 here is an official proceeding within the meaning of Section 837.011, that is, one "required to be heard, before [an] ......

...rom the taking of sworn testimony preparatory to the filing of an information, is not, as the proceeding here, one which is required to be heard, see infra, it could be considered "a proceeding heard" or "which may be ... required to be heard" under Section 837.011, Florida Statutes....

...before a court reporter and to testify under a grant of immunity. Jones replied: Well, then you have to always say something. That's always the answer from what I've been told. Just don't remember. Don't remember. There's nothing wrong with amnesia. Section 837.011(1), Florida Statutes (1979), defines an official proceeding: "Official proceeding" means a proceeding heard, or which may be or is required to be heard, before any legislative, judicial, administrative, or other governmental agency or...

...ry, hearing examiner, commissioner, notary, or other person taking testimony or a deposition in connection with any such proceeding. Jones's statements are sufficient to justify a conviction of solicitation to commit perjury within the definition of section 837.011(1)....

...— (1) Whoever makes a false statement, which he does not believe to be true, under oath in an official proceeding in regard to any material matter shall be guilty of a felony of the third degree, ... [e.s.] The term "official proceeding" as used in Chapter 837 is defined in Section 837.011: [4] 837.011 Definitions....

...The State's requested instruction filled a gaping omission of crucial evidence in that at the time of the telephone conversations between Jones and Rouen, recorded on instruction of both Florida and Maryland agents, there was no evidence of any ongoing or planned official proceeding as defined in Section 837.011....

...[6] Since the question before us is whether making a sworn statement before a notary public acting as an "official court reporter" [7] constitutes an "official proceeding," we begin our analysis with the statutory definition of "official proceeding" and the statutes specifically applying to notaries and court reporters. Section 837.011(1) provides: "Official proceeding" means a proceeding heard, or which may be or is required to be heard, before any legislative, judicial, administrative, or other governmental agency or official authorized to take evidence under oath...

...ier. The conviction was under Section 837.02, Florida Statutes, perjury in official proceedings, a third degree felony. The judgment below should be affirmed since the evidence showed that there was an "official proceeding" [1] within the meaning of Section 837.011, Florida Statutes which states, in pertinent part as follows "(1) `Official proceeding' means a proceeding heard, or which may be or is required to be heard, before any ......

...A reading of that statute shows that the legislature intentionally used "proceeding" to encompass taking of deposition before or after claim was filed. The taking of the deposition here was a "proceeding" and was "official" as authorized by law and taken before an "official" as defined in Section 837.011....

...n any manner, and the defendant was not aware that it was part of an official proceeding. On appeal, the District Court reasoned otherwise and held that the pre-filing conference would qualify as a proceeding required to be heard within the terms of Section 837.011....

...[2] The third surveillance film was taken by another person after the deposition and received in evidence upon stipulation of the parties. [3] Appellant argues that he was never identified in the film. The transcript of testimony, however, reveals that appellant was repeatedly identified as the person in the film. [4] §§ 837.011(3) and 837.02(2), Fla....

...the right to appeal the trial court's ruling that his false statement was in regard to "a material matter" as required for conviction under the statute. He also reserved his right to appeal upon the alternative grounds that the perjury statute, and Section 837.011(3), providing that whether a matter is "material" for purposes of perjury is a matter of law for the court, are unconstitutional because they deny the accused the right to trial by jury protected by the Sixth Amendment, Constitution o...

...r the punishment for perjury are to deter persons from testifying under oath to false statements in order to mislead the trier of the facts such as the court or the jury or both and thereby to thwart and pervert justice. Wolfe, 271 So.2d at 134. See § 837.011(3), Fla....

...Butterworth, Attorney General, and Stephen R. White, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Petitioner. James T. Miller of Corse, Bell & Miller, P.A., Jacksonville, for Respondent. ALLEN, J. The petitioner seeks a writ of certiorari, challenging the trial court's determination that section 837.011(3), Florida Statutes, is unconstitutional in describing the issue of materiality in a perjury prosecution as a "question of law" so as to remove the issue from the jury....

...Gaudin was predicated on the defendant's Fifth Amendment right to due process, and Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial, under the United States Constitution. These protections are applicable to the states, see Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 113 S.Ct. 2078, 124 L.Ed.2d 182 (1993), and the constitutionality of section 837.011(3) therefore must be assessed in light of Gaudin....

...It is clear that materiality is an element of the crime in this case, and Gaudin thus supersedes decisions such as Kline v. State, 444 So.2d 1102 (Fla. 1st DCA), rev. denied, 451 So.2d 849 (Fla.1984), which permitted the issue to be withdrawn from the jury. Although section 837.011(3) provides a definition of materiality in such prosecutions, and states that whether a matter is "material in a given factual situation is a question of law," this recitation cannot serve to remove the issue from the jury in light of the ruling in Gaudin. The trial court correctly determined that section 837.011(3) is unconstitutional in this respect, and properly indicated that the issue of materiality in this case would be submitted to the jury....

...an essential element of the crime of perjury and that U.S. v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 115 S.Ct. 2310, 132 L.Ed.2d 444 (1995), requires this issue to be determined by a jury. In so doing, the trial court struck as unconstitutional the last sentence of section 837.011(3), [2] which provides that, in perjury prosecutions, materiality is a question of law to be determined by the court....

...Section 837.02 now clearly defines the elements of perjury consistent with previous case law and does in fact include the words "material matter." As part of the rewriting of Chapter 837, however, the Florida Legislature also added a definition section (section 837.011(3)) that both defines materiality and provides that materiality is a question of law. A decade after Wolfe and the substantial amendments to the perjury statute, this court was also presented with the argument that section 837.011(3) and the perjury statute are unconstitutional because they deny an accused his constitutional right to a jury trial....

...essential element of the crime of perjury? Again, for the reasons that follow, I would likewise answer that question in the affirmative. Although it is true that the words "material matter" appear in the body of section 837.02, it is also true that section 837.011(3), in addition to defining "material matter", provides that materiality "in a given factual situation is a question of law." What might appear at first reading to be an ambiguity or an inconsistency, turns out, on closer analysis, to my mind, at least, to be altogether reasonable and logical....

...When a subject lies within the police power of the state, debatable questions as to the reasonableness of the exercise of that power are not for the courts but for the legislature to determine. See Gandy v. Borras, 114 Fla. 503, 154 So. 248 (1934). Section 837.011(3) provides that a matter is material in perjury if on "any subject regardless of its admissibility under the rules of evidence, which could affect the course or outcome of the proceeding." If the emphasized language means that it was...

...Ellis and confirmed that the travel time was, indeed, fifteen minutes. [6] This so-called "C-4 procedure" permits a pretrial determination of the law of the case where the facts are not in dispute. [7] Such a construction of the statute seems to me to be eminently reasonable because by defining material matter in section 837.011(3) and expressly assigning determination of the issue to the court, the legislature removed materiality as an element of the crime to be presented to the jury and assigned it to the court....

...Rairden's interview of Yerk was not an "official proceeding”, so Fla. Stat. § 837.02 would not apply in any case. See Schramm v. State, 374 So.2d 1043 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1979) (finding statement under oath to police is not “official proceeding”); see also Fla. Stat. § 837.011 ....

...We reverse because the state failed to show that the false statement was “in regard to any material matter.” § 837.02(1), Fla. Stat. (1993) , 1 The determination of whether a false statement is “in regard to any material matter” is a question of law. State v. Barbu-to, 571 So.2d 484 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990); see also § 837.011(3)....

...The third district found that when this rule is considered in conjunction with section 27.04, Florida Statutes, which provides the state attorney with the authority to summon witnesses to testify before him as to any violations of the criminal law, the pre-filing conference is an official proceeding within the meaning of section 837.011, Florida Statutes (1993).

...conviction where such statement was the only substantive evidence of guilt. Unlike Moore , the sworn statement of the victim was not the sole evidence of the appellant’s guilt. AFFIRMED. THOMPSON, J., concurs. JOANOS, J., dissents with opinion. . Section 837.011(1), Florida Statutes (1985) defines "official proceeding" thusly: (1) "Official proceeding" means a proceeding heard, or which may be or is required to be heard, before any legislative, judicial, administrative, or other governmental...

...We have jurisdiction. Art. V, § 3(b)(3), Fla. Const.; Jollie v. State, 405 So.2d 418 (Fla.1981). Sims was charged with perjury for allegedly lying in a deposition concerning her role in an armed robbery. The trial court found the perjury statute, section 837.011(3), Florida Statutes (1995), unconstitutional, reasoning that the statute removes an element of the offense, i.e., materiality, from the jury’s consideration....

...As used in the perjury statute, “‘[m]aterial matter’ means any subject, regardless of its admissibility under the rules of evidence, which could affect the course or outcome of the proceeding. Whether a matter is material in a given factual situation is a question of law.” § 837.011(3), Fla. Stat....

...al investigation *523 when the deputy also happens to be a notary public. We do not perceive it to have been the legislative intent to elevate all such criminal investigations by law enforcement officers to an “official proceeding” as defined in section 837.011(1), Florida Statutes (1983), when the investigation is conducted under oath by a law enforcement officer who also happens to be a notary public....

...to the same police officer who actually placed Schramm under oath, we find Schramm indistinguishable. The sole consideration by our sister court in Schramm was whether a police interrogation, under oath, equated to an “official proceeding” under section 837.011(1)....

...or more trials, hearings, investigations, depositions or affidavits.” (Emphasis added.) Sections 53 and 56 of chapter 74-383 amended section 837.021 to prohibit contradictory statements when made “in one or more official proceedings” and added section 837.011(1), which defined “official proceeding” as: “Official proceeding” means a proceeding heard, or which may be or is required to be heard, before any legislative, judicial, administrative, or other governmental agency or official...

PER CURIAM. The petition for writ of certiorari is granted, and the circuit court’s order finding section 837.011(3), Florida Statutes, to be unconstitutional, is quashed....

...8, 1990 which resulted in his being remanded to custody and a bond increase was due to his taking his girlfriend’s daughter, Desera Hollie, to the emergency room of the Central Florida Regional Hospital in Sanford, contrary to Sections 837.02 and 837.011, Florida Statutes, COUNT II AND ......

...Appellant’s remaining argument is that it was fundamental error to not allow the jury to decide the issue of materiality. We have held materiality to be an essential element of the crime of perjury. See State v. Ellis, 22 Fla. L. Weekly D1298 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997) (holding section 837.011(3) to be unconstitutional to the extent it describes materiality as a question of law and serves to remove from the jury the issue of materiality), rev....

...The employee filed a response in opposition, arguing that a deposition is a judicial proceeding in the context of litigation privilege, under the Florida Rules of Judicial Administration, and for purposes of perjury in an official proceeding under section 837.011, Florida Statutes (2017). The trial court dismissed only count 2, agreeing with the reasoning of Speights v....

...Additionally, the rule clarifies that judicial proceedings include depositions. If the rule were so clear that judicial proceedings include depositions, then it would be unnecessary to have this clarifying language. The employee also argues that depositions are judicial proceedings pursuant to the perjury statute, section 837.011, Florida Statutes....

...erial matter.” Similarly, section 837.021, Florida Statutes, defines perjury by contradictory statements as “whoever, in one or more official proceedings, willfully makes two or more material statements under oath which contradict each other.” Section 837.011(3), Florida Statutes, defines material matter as “any subject, regardless of its admissibility under the rules of evidence, which could affect the course or outcome of the proceeding.” The state argues on appeal that Calabrese’s...

...those false statements that concern ‘material matters.’” See id. at 189; §§ 837.02(1), Fla. Stat. (1993), 837.012(1), Fla. Stat. (2019). And, as in Ellis, the applicable statute here provides that the issue of materiality is a question of law. § 837.011(3), Fla....

...‘“Material matter’ means any subject, regardless of its admissibility under the rules of evidence, which could affect the course or outcome of the proceeding. Whether a matter is material in a given factual situation is a question of law.” § 837.011(3), Fla....