Florida/Georgia Personal Injury & Workers Compensation

...The information alleged that appellant "did willfully, knowingly and without authorization access or cause to be accessed a computer, computer system or computer network, to wit: the computer system located at the Tropicana Products, Inc., Miramar Sales Center. . . ." Section 815.06(1)(a) and (2)(b)2., Florida Statutes (2003), provides that anyone who "willfully, knowingly, and without authorization ....

...§ 1030(e)(6) (2002) (defining "exceeds authorized access" as "access[ing] a computer with authorization and [using] such access to obtain or alter information in the computer that the accesser is not entitled so to obtain or alter"). Our statute makes no provision addressing such conduct. Additionally, subsection 815.06(6), Florida Statutes (2003), indicates that appellant's conduct is outside the scope of section 815.06. That subsection provides: "This section does not apply to any person who accesses his or her employer's computer system, computer network, computer program, or computer data when acting *1231 within the scope of his or her lawful employment." § 815.06(6), Fla....

...Affirmed in part; Reversed in part; and Remanded for further proceedings. MAY, J., concurs. GROSS, J., concurs in part and dissents in part with opinion. GROSS, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part. I concur in the majority's resolution of the organized scheme to defraud issue. As to the section 815.06, Florida Statutes (2003) violation, I concur with the reversal because I believe that appellant fell under the section 815.06(6) exclusion — he was an employee who "accesse[d] his ....

...(1993) Joyner was charged and convicted under the virtually identical predecessor statute to *422 the one quoted. We find Joyner's conduct similar to Newberger's. They both used the existing abilities of the computer to commit a fraud on their employers. We note that section 815.06, Florida Statutes (1991) [2] , which criminalizes accessing a computer without authorization, is similar to the statute under which Joyner was charged. The chapter defines access as: to approach, instruct, communicate with, store data in, retrieve data from, or otherwise make use of any resources of a computer, computer system or computer network. § 815.03(10), Fla. Stat. (1991). It may be that section 815.06 more aptly describes the conduct Newberger engaged in....

...t whether his acts would have violated it. See generally Gallagher v. State, 618 So.2d 757 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993) (Glickstein, J. dissenting) (an employee who exceeds his authorized access to a computer should not be subject to criminal sanctions under section 815.06)....

...Even if this argument had been raised below, it does not aid Newberger. The overbreadth doctrine applies only to conduct protected by the First Amendment. Southeastern Fisheries, 453 So.2d at 1353. Newberger did not and cannot contend that his conduct is afforded First Amendment protection. [2] The portion of section 815.06 that might be relevant here provides: (1) Whoever willfully, knowingly, and without authorization accesses or causes to be accessed any computer, computer system, or computer network; ......

...Out of curiosity, she also used the computer to check if her boyfriend had a criminal record. It turned out there was a warrant for his arrest, which she did not disclose to her superiors. Appellant resigned shortly thereafter at the agency's request. Appellant argues that her conviction under section 815.06, Florida Statutes (1991), which criminally sanctions a person who accesses a computer system willfully, knowingly and without authorization, is inappropriate because the undisputed facts set forth in her sworn motion to dismiss, which...

...There is no relevant precedent interpreting said statute to ascertain what the Florida legislature meant by "unauthorized access." Consequently, appellant argues that this court should rely on the federal statute on point to guide its determination of whether "exceeding one's authorized use" is proscribed by section 815.06 as "unauthorized access." Appellant correctly argues that both the federal statute and its Florida counterpart regulate access of computer systems without proper authorization. Section 815.06(1), Florida Statutes (1991), provides that: *758 (1) Whoever willfully, knowingly, and without authorization accesses or causes to be accessed any computer, computer system ......

...tions because administrative sanctions are more appropriate. See S.Rep. No. 432, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2479, 2485. I agree with appellant's argument that this court should adopt the same view when interpreting section 815.06 and determine that her conduct should not be punished by criminal means....

...The Committee's proposals include revisions to current standard criminal jury instructions 3.6(a), Insanity, and 12.4, Criminal Mischief, as well as five new instructions: 10.6(a), Discharging a Firearm from a Vehicle Within 1000 Feet of a Person; 12.6, Offenses Against Computer Users (sections 815.06(1) and 815.06(2)(c), Florida Statutes); 12.7, Offenses Against Computer Users (sections 815.06(1) and (2)(b), Florida Statutes); 12.8, Offenses Against Computer Users (section 815.06(3), Florida Statutes); and 21.8, Tampering with or Fabricating Physical Evidence....

...Consistent with standard criminal jury instruction 10.6, Discharging a Firearm in Public, "knowingly" is defined for purposes of instruction 10.6(a) as "with full knowledge and intentionally." The Committee also proposes new jury instructions 12.6, 12.7, and 12.8, in light of section 815.06, Florida Statutes (2009), defining distinct "Offenses Against Computer Users." Instruction 12.7 defines "property" because section 815.06(2)(b) includes as an alternative element that the defendant, having engaged in certain proscribed conduct, "did so for the purpose of devising or *566 executing any scheme or artifice to defraud or obtain property." We modify the defin...

...e and programs in either machine-readable or human-readable form; and any other tangible or intangible item of value. We strike the definition of "property" included in instruction 12.8, however, as the offense to which the instruction pertains, see section 815.06(3), does not require as an element or otherwise reference the term "property." In addition, the definition for "knowingly" has been added to instructions 12.6, 12.7, and 12.8....

...iminal mischief conviction shall be determined beyond a reasonable doubt in a bifurcated proceeding. State v. Harbaugh, 754 So.2d 691 (Fla.2000). This instruction was adopted in 1981 and amended in 1992 and 2010. 12.6 OFFENSES AGAINST COMPUTER USERS § 815.06(1), (2)(c), Fla....

..."Knowingly" means with full knowledge and intentionally. "Willfully" means intentionally and purposely. Lesser Included Offenses No lesser included offenses have been identified for this offense. Comment This instruction was adopted in 2010. 12.7 OFFENSES AGAINST COMPUTER USERS § 815.06(2)(b), Fla....

...able form, and any other tangible or intangible item of value. "Willfully" means intentionally and purposely. Lesser Included Offenses *572 -------------------------------------------------------------------------- OFFENSES AGAINST COMPUTER USERS — 815.06(2)(b) -------------------------------------------------------------------------- CATEGORY ONE CATEGORY TWO FLA. STAT. INS. NO. -------------------------------------------------------------------------- Offenses Against 815.06(1) -------------------------------------------------------------------------- Computer Users -------------------------------------------------------------------------- Attempt 777.04(10) 5.1 -------------------------------------------------------------------------- Comment This instruction was adopted in 2010. 12.8 OFFENSES AGAINST COMPUTER USERS § 815.06(3), Fla....

...The undisputed evidence presented at trial established that Appellant logged into his ex-girlfriend’s Instagram account and posted nude photographs of her without her permission. The sole issue raised by Appellant on appeal is whether these actions constitute a violation of section 815.06(1)(a), Florida Statutes (2013), the statute under which he was charged. On this record, we hold that they do not. Section 815.06 was enacted in 1978, long before the advent of the Internet and the proliferation of social media accounts such as Instagram....

...events giving rise to this case, the statute provided in pertinent part that “[w]hoever willfully, knowingly, and without authorization [a]ccesses or causes to be accessed any computer, computer system, or computer network . . . commits an offense against computer users.” § 815.06(1)(a), Fla....

...On this record, we agree with Appellant. The plain language of the statutory definitions of “computer,” “computer system,” and “computer network” refer to tangible devices, not the data and other information located on the device. Thus, to prove a violation of section 815.06(1)(a) the State must establish that the defendant accessed one of the listed tangible devices without authorization, not that the defendant accessed a program or information stored on the device without authorization. See Rodriguez v. State, 956 So. 2d 1226, 1230 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007) (reversing conviction under section 815.06 because evidence only established that the defendant accessed a “computer function” that he was not authorized to access). Here, the charge against Appellant was based only on the unauthorized access of his ex-girlfriend�...

...essing a specific computer, computer system, or computer network. Accordingly, in this case, the 4 State failed to provide the necessary evidentiary foundation to prove that Appellant’s actions violated section 815.06(1)(a). We do not foreclose the possibility that the State could present sufficient evidence to prove a violation of section 815.06 for unauthorized, sexually-explicit Internet postings such as those in this case....

...State failed to prove that he accessed a computer network and that the access was unauthorized. Appellate review of the denial of a motion for judgment of acquittal is by the de novo standard. State v. Shearod, 992 So.2d 900, 903 (Fla. 2d DOA 2008). Section 815.06(2)(a), Florida Statutes (2014), provides as follows: (2) A....

...did not prove that he accessed any social media site’s server or network. He relies upon Crapps v. State, 180 So.3d 1125 (Fla. 1st DCA 2015), for the proposition that accessing a person’s specific account was insufficient to prove a violation of section 815.06....

...nt’s actions amounted to accessing a specific computer, computer system, or computer network,” Id. In fact, the court stated that it “d[id] not foreclose the possibility that the State could present sufficiént evidence to prove a violation of section 815.06 for unauthorized, sexually-explicit Internet postings such as those in this case.” 180 So.3d at 1127 . And the case cited in Crapps, Rodriguez v. State, 956 So.2d 1226 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007), is distinguishable from the present case. There, an employee was charged with a violation of section 815.06 for accessing his employer’s computer system and adjusting the inventory....

...d the laptop. Upon inspection, the police discovered that Willoughby had emailed her employer’s client trust fund master list to her laptop. Willoughby was arrested and charged with unlawfully accessing a computer database in violation of sections 815.06(1) and (2)(a), Florida Statutes (2006) (count one), and obtaining trade secret or confidential data in violation of sections 815.04(S)(b) and (4)(a), Florida Statutes (2006) (count two)....

...ss the computer database. The motions were denied, and the jury returned a verdict of guilty as to both counts. The trial court withheld adjudication and placed defendant on probation for four years. This appeal followed. Turning first to count one, section 815.06(l)(a) of the Florida Statutes provides that anyone who “willfully, knowingly, and without authorization ......

...commits an offense against computer users.” Access is defined as *1212 “to approach, instruct, communicate with, store data in, retrieve data from, or otherwise make use of any resources of a computer, computer system, or computer network.” § 815.03(1). Subsection (6) of section 815.06 clarifies that the section “does not apply to any person who accesses his or her employer’s computer system ......

...Additionally, Willoughby’s personal laptop was connected to the Our Kids computer network by the employer’s network administrator. Accordingly, because Willoughby received authorization to access Our Kids’ computer network, count one is reversed as the State failed to prove that Willough-by’s conduct violated section 815.06....