Florida/Georgia Personal Injury & Workers Compensation

...It is undisputed that Mercedes is a "dangerous dog" pursuant to Broward ordinance 4-2(k)(2) but not Florida statute section 767.11(1)(b). Likewise, Broward ordinance 4-12(j)(2) requires the dog's destruction, but section 767.13 does not. Broward attempts to avoid this suggestion of conflict by pointing to section 767.14, Florida Statutes (2010)....

...To wit, if a dog is designated as a "dangerous dog" as defined in section 767.11(1)(b), then the local government may enact additional restrictions or requirements on the owners of such dogs. Mercedes, however, is not a dangerous dog as defined by section 767.11(1)(b). Thus, Broward's argument that section 767.14 authorizes additional restrictions on owners of dogs such as Mercedes is misplaced. Section 767.14 narrowly applies to owners of statutorily defined "dangerous dogs," and neither authorizes nor prohibits additional restrictions or requirements for dogs that are not included within the state's definition of "dangerous dog." See Nicholson v....

...State, 600 So.2d 1101, 1103 (Fla.1992) ("When a definition of a word or phrase is provided in a statute, that meaning must be ascribed to the word or phrase whenever it is repeated in the statute unless contrary intent clearly appears."). Accordingly, section 767.14 is not directly applicable to our conflict analysis....

...which is identical to the provisions of this chapter or any other state law, except as to penalty. However, no county ... ordinance relating to animal control ... shall conflict with the provisions of this chapter or any other state law. (Emphasis added.) Together, sections 828.27(7) and 767.14 clarify that the state has not preempted the area of animal control and, although local governments may enact their own ordinances regarding dangerous dogs, those ordinances must not conflict with state law....

...The legislature expressly defined a dangerous *1181 dog as having more than once severely injured or killed a domestic animal. Broward's designation of Mercedes as a dangerous dog pursuant to its own definition in section 4-2(k)(2) cannot stand. Nothing in section 767.14, section 828.27(7), or general conflict law authorized Broward to alter the definition of the statutory term "dangerous dog." See Nicholson, 600 So.2d at 1103....

...severely injured another domestic animal, or chased a person in a menacing fashion. 6  required to humanely and safely keep the animal pending any hearing or appeal. § 767.12(1)(a), Fla. Stat. (2023). Section 767.14 expressly authorizes local governments to adopt procedures and criteria for the implementation of chapter 767.4 Pursuant to section 767.14, the County adopted section 5-22 of its Code of Ordinances. Relevant to this case is section 5-22(g), captioned “Confiscation and confinement.” Although nothing in section 767.12(1)(a)’s immediate confiscation authority refere...

...at are the subject of dangerous dog investigations, and the Director is hereby authorized to institute appropriate proceedings in any court of competent jurisdiction if necessary to effectuate the seizure of the dog. 4 Section 767.14 reads, in relevant part, as follows: This act does not limit any local government ....

...; or developing procedures and criteria for the implementation of this act, provided that no such regulation is specific to breed, weight, or size and that the provisions of this act are not lessened by such additional regulations or requirements. § 767.14, Fla....

...investigation because of severe injury to a human being” – contains any specific authorization for an animal control authority to invoke the jurisdiction of the county court. The Legislature’s broad delegation of implementation authority to local governments found in section 767.14, however, provides specific authorization for a local government, such as the County, to “develop[] procedures and criteria for the implementation” of section 767.12(1)(a)....