Florida/Georgia Personal Injury & Workers Compensation

...As to the "classification" stage, the statute provides in § 767.12(1), F.S. that "a dog shall not be declared dangerous if the threat, injury, or damage was sustained by a person who ... while lawfully on the property, was tormenting, abusing or assaulting the dog or its owner." The statute expressly provides in § 767.13(1), F.S. that before a dog [who has been] declared dangerous bites again, without provocation, is destroyed, and in § 767.13(2), F.S....

...Freeman appeals his conviction for manslaughter after his six pit bulls mauled an *475 elderly neighbor to death. He makes two arguments. First, he argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion for judgment of acquittal because the actions alleged and proved were specifically prohibited by the "Dangerous Dog Act," section 767.13(2), Florida Statutes (2003)....

...er or later they were going to hurt or kill someone. Clinton called code enforcement and filed a report. Discussion A. Denial of Motion for Judgment of Acquittal Freeman moved for judgment of acquittal, arguing that he should have been charged under section 767.13(2), Florida Statutes (2003), commonly referred to as *477 the "Dangerous Dog Act." See Huie v....

...5th DCA 1994), approved, 654 So.2d 116 (Fla.1995). On appeal, Freeman argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion for judgment of acquittal because the acts charged as manslaughter, a second degree felony, actually constituted a more specific offense in section 767.13(2), a second degree misdemeanor....

...In addition, if the owner of the dog had prior knowledge of the dog's dangerous propensities, yet demonstrated a reckless disregard for such propensities under the circumstances, the owner of the dog is guilty of a misdemeanor of the second degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082 or s. 775.083. § 767.13(2), Fla....

...d have known, was likely to cause death or great bodily injury. (Emphasis added). Although both crimes employ the phrase "reckless disregard," which may create ambiguity as to which statute applies, there are some notable differences. In particular, section 767.13(2) only requires proof of the dog owner's "knowledge of the dog's dangerous propensities" and a "reckless disregard for such propensities under the circumstances." The statute does not define the phrase "dangerous propensities" but it...

...ion is "likely to cause death or great bodily injury." Thus, if a dog owner knew that his dog had been used in dog fighting or had "approached a person . . . in a menacing fashion," he could have knowledge of the dog's "dangerous propensities" under section 767.13(2) but not necessarily knowledge that his failure to contain the dog would be "likely to cause death or great bodily injury" under section 782.07(1). In addition, the manslaughter statute arguably requires a higher standard of recklessness. While section 767.13(2) requires "reckless disregard for such propensities *479 under the circumstances," section 782.07(1) requires a course of conduct showing (1) reckless disregard of human life, (2) reckless disregard of the safety of persons exposed t...

...This placement actually strengthens the State's argument that the legislature intended to punish different levels of conduct. Accordingly, we believe the State had discretion to charge Freeman with manslaughter. B. Denial of Requested Jury Instruction Freeman requested an instruction on section 767.13(2) as a lesser included offense, but did not give the trial court any legal reasons for the request. The trial court denied the request, finding that culpable negligence was the only lesser included offense. On appeal, Freeman argues that if both crimes were authorized, then the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury on section 767.13(2) as a lesser-included offense of manslaughter for two reasons....

...charged offense, the error is not per se reversible, but rather, is subject to harmless error analysis. Pena v. State, 901 So.2d 781, 787 (Fla.2005). In the instant case, the information and evidence both support giving the requested instruction on section 767.13(2)....

...Greene, 348 So.2d 3, 4 (Fla.1977). In the instant case, the unrefuted evidence established that fatal injuries were inflicted. Thus, the culpable negligence in this case was a first degree misdemeanor. Consequently, the requested lesser-included violation of section 767.13(2) was two steps removed and the error in denying the instruction is subject to harmless error analysis....

...r killed a domestic animal while off the owner's property." 767.11(1)(b), Fla. Stat. (2010) (emphasis added). Florida requires the destruction of dogs that have previously been declared dangerous if they attack a domestic animal without provocation. 767.13(1). Thus, chapter 767 does not require the destruction of dogs, such as Mercedes, that have killed a single domestic animal. In fact, reading these two statutes together, a dog would have to kill at least three domestic animals before section 767.13(1) would require its destruction....

...s constitutionality. Id. at 1203-04. It is undisputed that Mercedes is a "dangerous dog" pursuant to Broward ordinance 4-2(k)(2) but not Florida statute section 767.11(1)(b). Likewise, Broward ordinance 4-12(j)(2) requires the dog's destruction, but section 767.13 does not....

...Since Broward's definition of dangerous dog in section 4-2(k)(2) cannot coexist with the definition provided in section 767.11(1)(b), the ordinance and statute are in conflict. Accordingly, the definition of "dangerous dog" in Broward County ordinance section 4-2(k)(2) is null and void. The argued conflict between section 767.13 and Broward County ordinance section 4-12(j)(2), however, is not as clear. Section 767.13(1) requires the destruction of a dog that has previously been declared dangerous if it attacks or bites a domestic animal without provocation. Mercedes was not previously declared dangerous, so that section is inapplicable. Section 767.13(2) requires the destruction of a dog not previously declared dangerous only if it attacks and causes severe injury or death to a human. Mercedes did not attack a human, so that section is also inapplicable. Broward ordinance section 4-12(j)(2) substantially mirrors section 767.13(2) insofar as it refers to attacks on humans, but it additionally requires the destruction of a dog not previously declared dangerous when it causes the death of a domestic animal. As noted previously, Florida requires a dog's destruction if it has killed at least three domestic animals. See 767.11(1)(b); 767.13(1). Although Broward has not authorized an action that the legislature has expressly forbidden, see Mulligan, 934 So.2d at 1247, the destruction of a dog that has killed only a single domestic animal is forbidden when section 767.13 is read together with sections 767.11(1)(b) and 828.27(7)....

...Broward ordinance section 4-12(j)(2), however, regulates an area that is covered by state law. By requiring the destruction of a dog that has killed a single animal, Broward has vitiated the framework for dealing with dog attacks on other domestic animals that is set forth in chapter 767. See 767.11(1)(b); 767.13....

...babysitter be an adult in order to be responsible under [section 827.03(3) ] to the victim in this case.” The court further found that although the facts showed Nowlin knew her dog had previously bitten a small child, she could not be liable under section 767.13, Florida Statutes, for the acts of her dangerous dog since one must be an adult to be a responsible dog “owner” under section 767.11(7)....

on appeal that the dog is not dangerous. See § 767.-13(1), F3a.Stat. (1991). Section 767.12(1) states

...Green then sought relief in the circuit court, which stayed the order. After a hearing, the circuit court concluded that the proceeding against Ms. Green and Max was procedurally flawed because Ms. Green was not prosecuted and convicted criminally for violating Florida's dog bite law, section 767.13, Florida Statutes (2007)....

...Int'l, Ltd., 787 So.2d 838 (Fla.2001); see also City of Deerfield Beach v. Vaillant, 419 So.2d 624 (Fla.1982). Section 14-62 of the City of Ocala Code, concerning dangerous dogs, provides in pertinent part: Sec. 14-62. Attack or bite by dangerous dog. (a) The provisions of F.S. s. 767.13 are adopted by reference. (b) All references in F.S. s. 767.13(1), (2) and (3), as adopted in this section, to a notification or hearing under F.S....

...-61. All hearings required by such subsections shall be held before the code enforcement board pursuant to F.S. s. 167.07. (c) Penalties. A violation of this section shall be punished in accordance with the schedule of fines listed in section 14-33. Section 767.13(1), Florida Statutes, the statute "adopted by reference" in section 14-62, provides: 767.13....

...The owner shall be responsible for payment of all boarding costs and other fees as may be required to humanely and safely keep the animal during any appeal procedure. *116 As Ms. Green and her counsel properly and candidly concede, [2] the trial court erred by concluding that section 767.13 required that the dog owner be criminally prosecuted and found guilty, as a condition precedent to the dangerous dog's confiscation and destruction. While section 767.13(1) permits the criminal prosecution of a dangerous dog's owner, the statute also further provides that "[i]n addition," the dog "shall be immediately confiscated" and held for ten business days to afford the owner an opportunity to request a hearing....

...o resort to the rules of statutory interpretation; rather, the court must give the statute its plain and obvious meaning. Holly v. Auld, 450 So.2d 217, 219 (Fla.1984) (quoting A.R. Douglass, Inc. v. McRainey, 102 Fla. 1141, 137 So. 157, 159 (1931)). Section 767.13(1) is clear....

...u as an irresponsible owner. However, steps should now be taken to correct situations that may contribute to its misbehavior. (Emphases in original.) The letter set forth sections 767.01, 767.13(2), and 784.05(1), Florida Statutes (2015), which apply to owners whose dogs have caused damage, injury, or death. That version of section 767.13(2), notably, prescribed criminal liability for an owner "[i]f a dog that has not been declared dangerous attacks and causes severe injury to or death of any human ....

...propensities that could potentially deem him dangerous" and that Animal Services had provided information "for responsible pet ownership." The letter further stated that "the County has determined that no further action is deemed appropriate." 2Section 767.13(2) has since been amended and no longer imposes liability for a dog that has not been declared dangerous....

...is allegations did not establish a present, bona fide dispute between him and the County that places him in doubt regarding his rights. Although the County stated that his dog exhibits potentially "dangerous propensities," which is a term used in section 767.13(2), designating an animal as having "dangerous propensities" as that term is used in section 767.13(2) is not within the County's authority.4 See generally § 767.12....