Florida/Georgia Personal Injury & Workers Compensation

...tations period for filing claims had then expired. [1] The Third District affirmed the order of dismissal by a two-to-one vote, and reasoned as follows: It is the plaintiffs failure to comply with their duty to conduct an investigation as defined by section 766.202(4), Florida Statutes (1991), that distinguishes this case from the cases relied on by plaintiffs....

...expiration of the appropriate statute of limitations."); Stein v. Feingold, 629 So.2d 998 (Fla. 3d DCA 1993) (affidavit of expert witness timely filed when filed within statute of limitations period). The judicial gloss that the majority applies to section 766.202(4) controls only when the plaintiff has failed to satisfy the presuit requirements prior to the end of the limitations period....

...allow the reasonable investigation required by subsection (1)." Section 766.201(2)(a)1. also provides that a reasonable investigation should precede the filing of malpractice claims and defenses "in order to eliminate frivolous claims and defenses." Section 766.202(4) defines "investigation" to mean "that an attorney has reviewed the case against each and every potential defendant and has consulted with a medical expert and has obtained a written opinion from said expert." After completing the p...

...The district court disagreed, holding that the elements of economic damages available in a voluntary binding arbitration of a medical malpractice claim are controlled by the Medical Malpractice Act rather than the Wrongful Death Act and that sections 766.202(3) and 766.207(7)(a) of the Medical Malpractice Act permit the award for loss of earning capacity....

...A claimant who rejects a defendants offer to arbitrate shall be subject to the provisions of s. 766.209(4). (Emphasis added.) For the purposes of this statute, "claimant" is clearly defined as "any person who has a cause of action arising from medical negligence." § 766.202(1), Fla....

...The Florida Defense Lawyers Association argues that the only elements of economic damages available to the Moglers are the survivors' loss of services and the medical and funeral expenses incurred by the estate, which total $24,072. Three provisions of the Medical Malpractice Act discuss economic damages. Section 766.202(3) defines "economic damages" as "including, but not limited to, past and future medical expenses and 80 percent of wage loss and loss of earning capacity." Section 766.207(7)(a) provides that arbitration shall be undertaken with the...

...We conclude that the arbitration provisions of the Medical Malpractice Act expressly specify the elements of all of the damages available when the parties agree to binding arbitration, regardless of whether the medical malpractice action involves a wrongful death. The plain language of sections 766.202(3) and 766.207(7)(a) indicates that the full range of economic damages is available to claimants as an incentive to forego a jury trial on damages and proceed to arbitration....

...[14] Noneconomic damages are defined as "nonfinancial losses which would not have occurred but for the injury giving rise to the cause of action, including pain and suffering, inconvenience, physical impairment, mental anguish, disfigurement, loss of capacity for enjoyment of life, and other nonfinancial losses." § 766.202(7), Fla....

...In delineating the actions to which it applies, section 766.106, Florida Statutes (1989), defines a "[c]laim for medical malpractice": "Claim for medical malpractice" means a claim arising out of the rendering of, or the failure to render, medical care or services. *949 § 766.106(1)(a), Fla. Stat. (1989). And section 766.202, which applies to medical negligence claims, defines "medical negligence," in turn, as medical malpractice: "Medical negligence" means medical malpractice, whether grounded in tort or in contract. § 766.202(6), Fla....

...Accordingly, we held that section 766.316 requires that health care providers give patients pre-delivery notice of their participation in NICA as a condition precedent to invoking NICA immunity. Id. Notably, the term "health care provider" includes a health care facility. See § 440.13(1)(i), Fla. Stat. (1997); § 766.202(4), Fla....

...s doubt as to the applicability of such a statute, the question is generally resolved in favor of the claimant." NOTES [1] As a "person licensed under" Chapter 466, Florida Statutes (2004), a dentist is a "health care provider" within the meaning of section 766.202(4), Florida Statutes (2004)....

...sicians and hospital deviated from the standard of care. The opinion consists of a notarized letter which the notice of intent to initiate litigation identifies as the sworn statement of a "`medical expert' as that term is defined in Florida Statute 766.202(5)." The signature on the notarized letter is illegible and there is no identifying letterhead....

...See 614 So.2d at 545. *486 We have considered the Ragoonanans' remaining points on appeal and find them to be without merit. Accordingly, we reverse and remand for reinstatement of the complaint. Reversed. CAMPBELL, A.C.J., and BLUE, J., concur. NOTES [1] Section 766.202(5) defines medical expert as "a person duly and regularly engaged in the practice of his profession who holds a health care professional degree from a university or college and has had special professional training and experience or o...

...2010) (holding that a question of law arising from undisputed facts is reviewed de novo). In reviewing this issue, we must *877 consider all facts in the light most favorable to the appellants. See Holden, 39 So.3d at 400. Section 766.203(2) requires a corroborating affidavit from a medical expert as defined in section 766.202(6). Section 766.202(6) provides that a medical expert must meet the requirements of an expert witness as set forth in section 766.102....

...ligence resulted in injury to the claimant. Corroboration of reasonable grounds to initiate medical negligence litigation shall be provided by the claimant's submission of a verified written medical expert opinion from a medical expert as defined in s. 766.202(5), at the time the notice of intent to initiate litigation is mailed, which statement shall corroborate reasonable grounds to support the claim of medical negligence....

...sh the defendant's negligence or prove its case during the presuit screening process. Maldonado v. EMSA Ltd. P'ship, 645 So.2d 86, 88 (Fla. 3d DCA 1994). Section 766.203(2) simply requires a corroborating opinion from a medical expert, as defined in section 766.202(5); it does not require a corroborating opinion from a medical expert as more narrowly defined by section 766.102(6). Id. In Dingler, the first district court, analyzed section 766.202(5), in detail and commented: [T]he legislature has clearly provided for two alternative means for qualifying a "medical expert." It begins by providing that to qualify under section 766.202(5) a "medical expert" must be "a person duly and regularly engaged in the practice of his profession who holds a health care professional degree from a university or college and has had professional training and experience." The statu...

...n." To satisfy this alternative qualification, the expert must be "possessed of special health care knowledge or skill about the subject upon which he is called to testify or provide an opinion." 697 So.2d at 579. We conclude that a plain reading of section 766.202(5) indicates that a nurse or any other medical professional, with appropriate experience or training, may, under the proper facts, be qualified to provide corroboration about medical causation for presuit purposes. [4] See, e.g., Dingler *288 (recognizing that under section 766.202(5), a person may qualify as a medical expert for purposes of providing a presuit corroborating opinion if the person possess special health care knowledge or skill about the subject upon which he is called to testify or provide an opi...

...to corroborate that there were reasonable grounds to initiate a medical *289 malpractice action. [7] Because the trial court did not use the correct legal principles in determining that Nurse Headley was not a qualified medical expert, as defined by section 766.202(5), Florida Statutes (2002), the order dismissing Apostolico's wrongful death medical malpractice action must be reversed....

...Instead, the 2002 version of section 766.203(2) provides, in pertinent part, that "[c]orroboration of reasonable grounds to initiate medical negligence litigation shall be provided by the claimant's submission of a verified written medical expert opinion from a medical expert as defined in s. 766.202(5)...." Section 766.202(5), Florida Statutes (2002), provides that "[a]s used in ss....

...ty or college and has had special professional training and experience or one possessed of special health care knowledge or skill about the subject upon which he is called to testify or provide an opinion." These definitions lead us to conclude that section 766.202(5) provides a less stringent standard for qualification of experts in the medical malpractice presuit screening process than might be required of an expert to offer testimony at trial....

...ractice presuit notice. In rendering this opinion, the court appeared to be stating that only "health care providers" could be the affiants signing presuit affidavits. Specifically, the court stated that "health care providers" as contemplated under section 766.202(5), "includes `physicians licensed under chapter 458 ......

...malpractice' [as] a claim, arising out of the rendering of, or the failure to render, medical care or services." § 766.106(1)(a), Fla. Stat. (2008). "Medical negligence" is defined as "medical malpractice, whether grounded in tort or in contract." § 766.202(7), Fla....

...Section 766.102 provides, in pertinent part: (1) In any action for recovery of damages based on the death or personal injury of any person in which it is alleged that such death or injury resulted from the negligence of a health care provider as defined in s. 766.202(4), [1] the claimant shall have the burden of proving by the greater weight of evidence *812 that the alleged actions of the health care provider represented a breach of the prevailing professional standard of care for that health care provider....

...Thereby your client's claim is hereby denied. Enclosed is a copy of the required corroborating affidavit to support our position. Attached was the following unnotarized statement of Dr. Edgerton: I hereby state the following: 1. That I am a medical expert as defined by Florida Statute 766.202(5); 2....

...Edgerton reviewed nor the factual bases upon which his ultimate legal conclusion rests. It does not set forth Dr. Edgerton's professional qualifications, so that one might attempt to "verify" whether Dr. Edgerton qualifies as a "medical expert," as that term is defined in Section 766.202(5)....

...Section 766.203(3) requires the defendant or the insurer to conduct an investigation prior to issuing its response, to ascertain whether there are reasonable grounds to believe that: (a) The defendant was negligent in the care or treatment of the claimant; and (b) Such negligence resulted in injury to the claimant. Section 766.202(4) defines "investigation" to mean "that an attorney has reviewed the case against each and every potential defendant and has consulted with a medical expert and has obtained a written opinion from said expert." The presuit investigations must be "verifiable," section 766.201(2)(a)....

...s claims. See ch. 88-1, § 48, at 164, Laws of Fla. Pursuant to section 766.203(1), presuit investigation requirements apply to all medical negligence claims, a term which is defined as "medical malpractice, whether grounded in tort or in contract." § 766.202(6), Fla....

...ligence resulted in injury to the claimant. Corroboration of reasonable grounds to initiate medical negligence litigation shall be provided by the claimant's submission of a verified written medical expert opinion from a medical expert as defined in s. 766.202(5), at the time the notice of intent to initiate litigation is mailed, which statement shall corroborate reasonable grounds to support the claim of medical negligence....

...Dingler and Staci L. Dingler, respondents. Petitioners argue that the trial court departed from the essential requirements of law in refusing to dismiss the instant action because respondents' corroborating expert lacked the qualifications required by section 766.202(5), Florida Statutes (1991), and respondents failed to remedy such defect within the applicable statute of limitations. Because we conclude that the trial court did not depart from the essential requirements of law in ruling that the corroborating expert's qualifications satisfied section 766.202(5), we deny the petition....

...regular practice of medicine in June 1992 to attend law school and has not been licensed to practice medicine in any jurisdiction since December 1992. Dr. Oppenheim's first affidavit stated that he considers himself a "medical expert" as defined by section 766.202(5), Florida Statutes (1991)....

...d by section 766.203(3), Florida Statutes (1991), because Dr. Oppenheim, their corroborating expert, was not duly and regularly engaged in the practice of his profession at the time his investigation was undertaken and affidavit filed as required by section 766.202(5)....

...Subsequently, petitioners filed motions seeking dismissal of this action arguing that Dr. Oppenheim's affidavits could not constitute corroboration of respondents' claims as contemplated by the presuit investigation since the affidavits showed that he was not qualified as a "medical expert" as defined in section 766.202(5), Florida Statutes (1991)....

...e practice or teaching of medicine within the 5-year period before the incident giving rise to the claim. Sections 766.201 through 766.206 set forth more detailed requirements for the presuit investigation and notice. Relevant to the instant action, section 766.202(4) requires the claimant's attorney to consult with and obtain an opinion from a medical expert....

...to the claimant. Paragraph (2)(b) requires: Corroboration of reasonable grounds to initiate medical negligence litigation shall be provided by the claimant's submission of a verified written medical expert opinion from a medical expert as defined in s. 766.202(5), at the time the notice of intent to initiate litigation is mailed, which statement shall corroborate reasonable grounds to support the claim of medical negligence. Section 766.202(5) defines "medical expert" in a manner which provides two alternative bases for a person to qualify to render a medical expert opinion under section 766.203(2)(b)....

...lth care professional degree from a university or college and has had special professional training and experience or one possessed of special health care knowledge or skill about the subject upon which he is called to testify or provide an opinion. § 766.202(5), Fla. Stat. (1991)(emphasis added). III Petitioners argue that respondents failed to comply with the requirements of section 766.203(2) to obtain from a medical expert, as defined in section 766.202(5), a verified written medical opinion corroborating reasonable grounds to believe that petitioners were negligent in their care or treatment of the claimant. Specifically, they contend that Dr. Oppenheim does not meet the definition of a medical expert in section 766.202(5) because, at the time he signed his initial and amended affidavits, he was not "duly and regularly engaged in the practice of his profession." In response, the respondents argue that Dr. Oppenheim was qualified under section 766.102(2)(c)2. to give an opinion. They note that Florida courts have made a distinction between the qualifications of a presuit investigation medical expert under section 766.202(5) and the qualifications of the expert who will be permitted to testify at a subsequent malpractice trial under section 766.102....

...denied, Huddleston v. Faber, 675 So.2d 927 (Fla.1996), Pena v. Faber, 675 So.2d 928 (Fla.1996), and Wrobel v. Faber, 675 So.2d 931 (Fla.1996); Maldonado v. EMSA Ltd. Partnership, 645 So.2d 86, 88 (Fla. 3d DCA 1994). Respondents contend that those cases hold that section 766.202(5) *579 provides a less stringent standard for the qualifications of a presuit investigation medical expert than the standard for admitting expert testimony at trial....

...s constitutionally guaranteed access to the courts, while at the same time carrying out the legislative policy of screening out frivolous lawsuits and defenses. In interpreting these statutes, at the outset we point out that petitioners have misread section 766.202(5). They argue that this section provides a single set of qualifications that must be met by any "medical expert" who provides a presuit corroborating opinion. In section 766.202(5), however, the legislature has clearly provided for two alternative means for qualifying a "medical expert." The statute speaks in the disjunctive. [1] It begins by providing that to qualify under section 766.202(5) a "medical expert" must be "a person duly and regularly engaged in the practice of his profession who holds a health care professional degree from a university or college and has had professional training and experience." The statu...

...sessed of special health care knowledge or skill about the subject upon which he is called to testify or provide an opinion." We agree with the trial court below that Dr. Oppenheim clearly meets this latter qualification for a "medical expert" under section 766.202(5)....

...n the evidence that Dr. Oppenheim was qualified to offer an opinion on appropriate surgical procedures, the petitioners' arguments must fail. Even if we limit our examination of the definition of "medical expert" to the first alternative provided by section 766.202(5), the petitioners' arguments are without merit....

...standards for the qualifications of a "medical expert" who may issue an opinion corroborating a claimant's presuit investigation—the standard set forth in section 766.102(2)(c)2, as allowed by section 766.104(1), and that the standard set forth in section 766.202(5). [2] Nonetheless, as applied in the instant case, the standards in both sections 766.202(5) and 766.102(2)(c)2 seek to achieve the same legislative intent....

...Kukral and the legislative intent of these two provisions are best satisfied by interpreting these standards for a presuit investigation medical expert in a consistent manner. Thus, we reject petitioners' argument that, to qualify as an expert under section 766.202(5), a medical expert must be "regularly engaged in the practice of his profession" at the time the corroborating opinion and affidavit are signed. We believe it is logical that the legislature intended the more specific time period in section 766.102(2)(c)2 to define when the proposed expert must have been "engaged in the practice" under section 766.202(5). Thus, an expert satisfies the section 766.202(5) requirement of engagement in the practice so long as the expert's "active involvement" in the practice occurred "within the five-year period before the incident giving rise to the claim," as provided by section 766.102(2)(c)2. Here, Dr. Oppenheim meets each of the alternative requirements for qualification as a "medical expert" under section 766.202(5). His opinion, therefore, satisfies the requirements of both sections 766.102(2)(c)2. and 766.202(5)....

...WOLF, J., specially concurs with written opinion. WOLF, Judge, specially concurring. While I do not agree with the majority that we should engraft the definition of expert in section 766.102(2)(c)2, Florida Statutes, onto the definition of expert contained in section 766.202(5), Florida Statutes, in light of the ambiguous wording of section 766.202(5), Florida Statutes, I agree with the alternative reason for denying the petition....

...imilar health care providers. Garcia does not dispute that the petitioners are considered health care providers for purposes of the presuit screening requirements of chapter 766. Section 766.102(1) refers to the definition of health care provider in section 766.202(4), which includes physical therapists licensed under chapter 486 and professional association partnerships of physical therapists....

...As part of that presuit investigation, section 766.203(2) requires that the claimant provide "[c]orroboration of reasonable grounds to initiate medical negligence litigation," including "submission of a verified written medical expert opinion from a medical expert as defined in s. 766.202(6)." Section 766.202(6) defines a "medical expert" as -3-  a person duly and regularly engaged in the practice of his or her profession who holds a health care professional degree...

...The dispute here focuses upon whether respondents satisfied the requirements of section 766.203(2): *116 Corroboration of reasonable grounds to initiate medical negligence litigation shall be provided by the claimant's submission of a verified written medical expert opinion from a medical expert as defined in s. 766.202(6), at the time the notice of intent to initiate litigation is mailed, which statement shall corroborate reasonable grounds to support the claim of medical negligence....

...In determining whether the trial court complied with the essential requirements of law in construing the presuit notice requirements, we begin with section 766.203(2), Florida Statutes, which requires written corroboration by "a medical expert as defined in s. 766.202(6)." The latter statute would require such an expert to be "a person duly and regularly engaged in the practice of ....

...ttings. She served as an operating room staff nurse from 1990 to 2004. She has conducted extensive research in the field of nursing and is widely published in journals and academic texts. Section 766.102(5), Florida Statutes (2009), as referenced in section 766.202(6), defines the "requirements of an expert witness....

...is "a licensed health care provider" and meets certain other criteria. "Health care provider" includes "any person licensed under . . . part I of chapter 464," which is the Nurse Practice Act, sections *117 464.001-.027, Florida Statutes (2009). See § 766.202(4), Fla....

...Under this section, then, she may "give expert testimony concerning the prevailing professional standard of care." Petitioner's counsel stated at the hearing on the motion to dismiss that petitioner had not contested whether nurse Byrne "qualifies under 102." Counsel instead challenged Dr. Byrne's qualifications under section 766.202, Florida Statutes (2009), which defines "medical expert" in subsection (6) and cross-references the requirements of section 766.102, Florida Statutes (2009)....

...Although our review of *118 the trial court's ruling has required us to consider the requirements of section 766.102, petitioner's concession at the hearing suggests further focus on Byrne's qualifications "under 202." The term "medical expert" as used in section 766.202(6) is a term of art delineated by that statute....

...atives set forth in sub-subsection (5)(c)1.-3. Baptist argues the record established that for more than five years, Byrne has not been "duly and regularly engaged" in the practice of nursing, contrary to the requirements for a "medical expert" under section 766.202(6), because she stopped working as a staff nurse in the operating room in 2004....

...tice to include "supervision and teaching" of nursing. Given Dr. Byrne's extensive and varied credentials, the trial court did not misconstrue the statutes by concluding that Dr. Byrne is "duly and regularly engaged" in the practice of nursing under section 766.202(6) and satisfies the temporal requirements of section 766.102(5)(c)....

...orroboration of negligence by a medical expert: *639 "Investigation" means that an attorney has reviewed the case against each and every potential defendant and has consulted with a medical expert and has obtained a written opinion from said expert. § 766.202(4), Fla....

...of active clinical practice or instruction of students, has knowledge of the applicable standard of care for ... nurse practitioners"); see also § 766.203(2), Fla. Stat. (2004) (requiring a corroborating opinion from a medical expert as defined in section 766.202(6)); § 766.202(6), Fla....

...ligence resulted in injury to the claimant. Corroboration of reasonable grounds to initiate medical negligence litigation shall be provided by the claimant's submission of a verified written medical expert opinion from a medical expert as defined in s.766.202(5), at the time the notice of intent to initiate litigation is mailed, which statement shall corroborate reasonable grounds to support the claim of medical negligence....

...s of the medical malpractice act in chapter 766. Alternatively, the defendants argued that the complaint failed to state a cause of action. In their memorandum of law, the defendants indicated that the doctor was a health care provider as defined in section 766.202(4) and was licensed under chapter 458....

time the presuit affidavit was executed in 2011. § 766.202(6), Fla. Stat. (2011). The record reveals that

...h negligence resulted in injury to the claimant. The claimant must corroborate the reasonable grounds to initiate and support a medical malpractice action by submitting a verified written medical expert opinion from a medical expert as defined under section 766.202(6). § 766.203(2). Section 766.202(6), in turn, defines a "medical expert" as someone who meets the requirements of an expert witness as set forth under section 766.102....

...Foster, a board-certified emergency department physician. Dr. Oken filed a motion to dismiss, alleging the plaintiff's malpractice action failed to timely comply with the statutory presuit requirements because he did not attach a corroborating affidavit of a medical expert that complied with section 766.202(6)....

...ot a medical care provider and thus cannot be held vicariously liable for the alleged medical malpractice of its shipboard doctors. In response, Hesterly argues that whether Royal Caribbean is a medical care provider within the meaning of Fla. Stat. § 766.202(4) is a question of fact which cannot be resolved at the Motion to Dismiss stage....

...The work a physician or surgeon does in such cases is under the control of the passengers themselves. It is their business, not the business of the carrier."). In an attempt to characterize Royal Caribbean as a medical care provider Hesterly cites Fla. Stat. § 766.202(4), which states in relevant part: "Health care provider" means any hospital, ambulatory surgical center, or mobile surgical facility; a blood bank; a plasma center; and industrial clinic; a renal dialysis facility; or a professional association or partnership, corporation, joint venture, or other association for professional activity by health care providers. Fla. Stat. § 766.202(4)....

...As such, Hesterly's argument that Royal Caribbean is as a medical care provider is clearly without merit. A cruise line is not a ". . . corporation, joint venture, or other association for professional activity by health care providers." Fla. Stat. § 766.202(4)....

...Further, based upon the above cited case law and the long established maritime principal that a carrier does not have a duty to furnish a doctor for its passengers' use. I find that Royal Caribbean is not a health care provider and thus Fla. Stat. § 766.202(4) is inapplicable [4] Moreover, review of the Amended Complaint shows that Count III restates the allegation that "[t]he errors in judgement and/or negligence in treatment performed by Defendants BERGHALL, SHAU, and UATE in regard to Plai...

...at he was incompetent or that the company was negligent in hiring him." Jackson v. Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc., 203 F.Supp.2d 1367, 1374 (S.D.Fla.2002) (quoting Cummiskey Chandris, 719 F.Supp. 1183 (S.D.N.Y.1989)). [4] Even if I had found Fla. Stat. § 766.202(4) to be applicable, any cause of action arising under this statute would run counter to maritime case law, which states that a shipping company is not in the business of providing medical services to passengers, and as such could not provide a basis for a cause of action....

...This trial court was, of course, correct in its understanding of the law governing corroborating affidavits. For presuit purposes, [2] the corroboration must come from a medical professional with appropriate experience or training about the subject upon which he or she is called to provide an opinion. See § 766.202(5), Fla....

...ailed after the new statute became effective. Thus, the new statute does not apply to the present case. The distinction between an expert for presuit purposes and an expert for purposes of testifying at trial appears to have been eliminated. Compare section 766.202(6), Florida Statutes (2003), with section 766.202(5), Florida Statutes (2002).

...." Also, when providing for arbitration in medical malpractice cases in subsection 766.207(7)(c), Florida Statutes (1995), the legislature provides that "damages for future economic losses shall be awarded to be paid by periodic payments pursuant to section 766.202(8), and shall be offset by future collateral source payments." There is no doubt or ambiguity in the language chosen....

...failing to render, medical services. Specifically, Correa and Res Care assert that the affidavit offered in support of the notice of intent was inadequate because the affiant is not a physician. It is contended that a "medical expert" as defined by section 766.202(5), Florida Statutes (1995), must be a physician....

...determining that the affiant, who does not have a medical degree or license but holds a masters degree in hospital administration and has had extensive experience administering geriatric care facilities, was a qualified medical expert as defined in section 766.202(5). Faber v. Wrobel, 673 So.2d 871, 872 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995). Section 766.202(5) defines a medical expert as: [a] person duly and regularly engaged in the practice of his profession who holds a health care professional degree from a university or college and has had special professional training and experience...

...evidence. For purposes of sections 766.201-.206, "`[i]nvestigation' means that an attorney has reviewed the case against each and every potential defendant and has consulted with a medical expert and has obtained a written opinion from said expert." § 766.202(4), Fla....

...The Fabers subsequently filed their complaint. The defendants filed separate motions to dismiss the complaint, alleging, among other *872 grounds, that the Fabers' notice of intent failed to provide a verified written medical opinion from a medical expert qualified pursuant to section 766.202(5)....

...4th DCA 1990) (quoting Lake Hospital and Clinic, Inc. v. Silversmith, 551 So.2d 538, 545 (Fla. 4th DCA 1989)). Accordingly, this court's review is limited to whether the trial court applied the correct legal principles in determining that Dr. Gardner was not a qualified medical expert as defined in section 766.202(5). Section 766.202(5) defines a medical expert as: [a] person duly and regularly engaged in the practice of his profession who holds a health care professional degree from a university or college and has had special professional training and experience...

...Gardner's disqualification as an expert at trial, including his lack of hospital privileges and his nine previous disqualifications from testifying at trial. [2] However, the factors that might support Dr. Gardner's disqualification as a trial expert are not within the purview of section 766.202(5)....

...EMSA Limited Partnership, 645 So.2d 86 (Fla. 3d DCA 1994), the Third District reviewed the trial court's ruling that the claimant's presuit expert was unqualified to render an opinion pertaining to emergency medical services. The Third District determined that: [s]ection 766.202(5), which defines medical expert as expressly applicable to section 766.203, provides a less stringent standard than the section delineating the standard for admission of expert testimony in an action involving emergency medical services. The less stringent standard of section 766.202(5) is in keeping with the legislative aim of preventing frivolous lawsuits without denying a claimant's access to court. 645 So.2d at 88. We agree that section 766.202(5) limits the trial court's discretion and provides a less stringent standard for the qualifications of a presuit investigation medical expert than the *873 qualifications required to offer testimony at trial. Because the evidence presented to the trial court in this case failed to show that Dr. Gardner's qualifications did not meet the requirements of section 766.202(5), the trial court erred in disqualifying him and in granting the defendants' motions to dismiss on this ground....

...[2] Specifically, *1311 the doctors argue that (1) neither of the two written opinions provided to the them by the Plaintiffs contains information sufficient to establish that the persons rendering the opinions possess the credentials necessary to qualify them as a medical expert as defined in § 766.202(5), Florida Statutes; [3] and (2) neither of the written opinions contain any information regarding whether any previous opinion by the same "expert" has been disqualified in another legal proceeding, as specifically required by § 766.203(4)....

...care professional degree from a university or college and has had special professional training and experience or one possessed of a special health care knowledge or skill about the subject upon which he is called to testify or provide an opinion." § 766.202(5), Fla....

...yo Clinic of Florida) motion to dismiss respondent's (plaintiff, Ted Williams) malpractice action for failing to timely comply with the statutory presuit requirements by failing to attach a corroborating affidavit of a "medical expert" as defined by section 766.202(6), Florida Statutes....

...Oken, to the extent that those are specialties that include the evaluation, diagnosis, or treatment of acute chest pain and impending myocardial infarction. Pursuant to this information, the trial judge found Dr. Foster to be a qualified medical expert within the meaning of section 766.202, Florida Statutes (2007)....

...Prior to instituting a claim based on medical negligence, a claimant must comply with the presuit requirements outlined in section 766.203(2), Florida Statutes. One of these requirements is the filing of a corroborating affidavit of reasonable grounds to initiate medical negligence from a medical expert as defined in section 766.202(6), Florida Statutes. Section 766.202(6) defines a medical expert as: [A] person duly and regularly engaged in the practice of his or her profession who holds a health care professional degree from a university or college and who meets the requirements of an expert witness as set forth in s....

...r medical malpractice" as a "claim arising out of the rendering of, or the failure to render, medical care or services." Sections 766.201-766.212, Florida Statutes (1997), concern presuit investigation and arbitration of "medical negligence claims." Section 766.202(6) defines "[m]edical negligence" as "medical malpractice, whether grounded in tort or in contract." Reading these sections together, the supreme court has held that "chapter 766's notice and presuit screening requirements apply to cl...

...himself or herself, as well as protect the other residents from [the resident] if [the resident is] violent.” The nurses testified that the purpose of a TACT hold is “[f]or 4. It is undisputed that the National Deaf Academy is not a health care provider, as defined in section 766.202(4), Florida Statutes (2008)....

...[1] The issue in this case is whether or not this lawsuit is one for "medical malpractice" as encompassed and defined by section 766.106. The statute defines claims for medical malpractice as ones "arising out of the rendering of, or the failure to render, medical care or services." [2] Section 766.202 further defines "medical negligence" as "medical malpractice, whether grounded in tort or in contract." § 766.202(6), Fla....

...DAUKSCH and GOSHORN, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] Shands Teaching Hospital & Clinics, Inc. v. Barber, 638 So.2d 570 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994); Miami Physical Therapy Associates, Inc. v. Savage, 632 So.2d 114 (Fla. 3d DCA 1994). [2] § 766.106(1)(a), Fla. Stat. (1989). [3] § 766.202(6), Fla....

...uffering, inconvenience, . . . mental anguish,. . . loss of capacity for enjoyment of life, and other nonfinancial losses to the extent the claimant is entitled to recover such damages under general law, including the Wrongful Death Act." Fla. Stat. § 766.202(8) (incorporated in Fla....

...Supreme Court or a United States court of appeals); Fla. R.App. P. 9.150 (same). [35] "Claimant" is defined as "any person who has a cause of action for damages based on personal injury or wrongful death arising from medical malpractice." Fla. Stat. § 766.202(1)....

...On the other hand, defendants contend that per incident clearly means "per incident of malpractice," and applies so as to limit non-economic damages to $250,000 no matter how many claimants there are. Defendants also point out that claimant is defined in the definitional provisions in section 766.202 as "any person who has a cause of action arising from medical negligence" and that for purposes of a wrongful death action there is only one claimant, the personal representative of the deceased's estate....

...Defendants' argument would require us to read into the statutes a requirement that the number of payments coincide with the life expectancy of the victim. Section 766.207(7)(c) provides that "[d]amages for future economic losses shall be awarded to be paid by periodic payments pursuant to s. 766.202(8) and shall be offset by future collateral source payments." The definitional provisions of the Medical Malpractice Act, namely section 766.202(8)(c), provide that: "(8) `Periodic payment' means provision for the structuring of future economic damages payments, in whole or in part, over a period of time, as follows ......

...The problem with this argument is that the claim for economic damages in this arbitration is controlled by the Medical Malpractice Act, and not by the Wrongful Death Act. At least two provisions of the Medical Malpractice Act authorize an award for lost earning capacity. See §§ 766.202(3) ("`Economic damages' means financial losses which would not have occurred but for the injury giving rise to the cause of action, including, but not limited to, past and future medical expenses and 80 percent of wage loss and loss of ear...

...is inapplicable. 12 Id. (emphasis added). As for the applicability of chapter 766, the supreme court read section 766.106(1)(a), Florida Statutes (defining a claim for medical negligence), and section 766.202, Florida Statutes (defining “medical negligence” as “medical malpractice”), “in conjunction” and concluded “chapter 766’s notice and presuit screening requirements apply to claims that ‘aris[e] out of the rendering of, or the failure to render, medical care or services.’” Id....

...s... ." Weinstock, 629 So.2d at 838. The judgments under review run counter to this rule of construction. The record shows that Maldonado's expert was qualified to render an opinion as to defendants' negligence in compliance with the requirements of section 766.202(5) defining "medical expert." Contrary to defendants' contention, section 766.102(6), Florida Statutes (1989), does not delineate the requisite qualifications of the expert offering the presuit affidavit....

...[7] Section 766.203(2) provides, in pertinent part, that "[c]orroboration of reasonable grounds to initiate medical negligence litigation shall be provided by the claimant's submission of a verified written medical expert opinion from a medical expert as defined in s. 766.202(5). ..." (e.s.). Section 766.202(5) provides that "[a]s used in ss....

...th care professional degree from a university or college and has had special professional training and experience or one possessed of special health care knowledge or skill about the subject upon which he is called to testify or provide an opinion." Section 766.202(5), which defines medical expert as expressly applicable to section 766.203, provides a less stringent standard than the section delineating the standard for admission of expert testimony in an action involving emergency medical services. The less stringent standard of section 766.202(5) is in keeping with the legislative aim of preventing frivolous lawsuits without denying a claimant's access to court....

...2d DCA 1993); Stebilla v. Mussallem, 595 So.2d 136 (Fla. 5th DCA), review denied, 604 So.2d 487 (Fla. 1992). Section 766.102(6) concerning the admissibility of expert testimony in cases involving emergency medical services need not be read in pari materia with sections 766.202(5), and 766.203(2)....

...Southwest Florida Blood Bank, 601 So.2d 1184, 1188 (Fla. 1992). Compare Duffy v. Brooker, 614 So.2d 539, 543 (Fla. 1st DCA), review denied, 624 So.2d 267 (Fla. 1993). The plain words of section 766.203(2) require a corroborating opinion from a medical expert as defined in section 766.202(5); it does not require that claimant submit an affidavit from an expert as described in sections 766.102(6)(a) and (b)....

...from Chapter 766 definitions *89 of health care provider evidences a legislative intent that psychologists not be classified as health care providers). Moreover, we may not engraft the more stringent requirements of section 766.102(6) onto sections 766.202(5) and 766.203(2) in contravention of the express language of the statute....

...The medical malpractice claimant must conduct an investigation to ascertain whether reasonable grounds exist to believe that defendants negligently treated claimant and that such negligence resulted in injury to the claimant. § 766.203(2)(a) and (b), Fla. Stat. (1989). Section 766.202(4) states that "`investigation' means that an attorney has reviewed the case against each and every potential defendant and has consulted with a medical expert and has obtained a written opinion from said expert." Maldonado's attorney has conducted a reasonable investigation and the claim is not frivolous....

...Based on my experience and review of the records, I have reasonable grounds to believe that this negligence caused Mr. Maldonado damages and injuries, including a below the knee amputation of the right extremity. [2] Cedars' affiant stated, in pertinent part: 1. That I am a medical expert as defined by Florida Statute § 766.202(5); 2....

...ant's injuries resulted in a 50-percent reduction in his capacity to enjoy life would warrant an award of not more than $125,000 noneconomic damages. (c) Damages for future economic losses shall be awarded to be paid by periodic payments pursuant to s. 766.202(8) and shall be offset by future collateral source payments....

...imited to, past and future medical expenses and 80 percent of wage *1196 loss and loss of earning capacity, offset by any collateral source payments. (c) Damages for future economic losses shall be awarded to be paid by periodic payments pursuant to s. 766.202(8), and shall be offset by future collateral source payments....

...We also conclude that the circuit court correctly refused to relieve appellants of all liability for future economic damages, notwithstanding the purchase by appellants of an annuity designed to ensure the payment of such sums. Resolution of this issue requires construction of section 766.202(8), Florida Statutes (1993), which the parties agree was properly considered by the arbitrators in arriving at the periodic payments required on account of future economic damages to be experienced by appellees....

...ich, according to the award, are to be paid in specified annual amounts through the year 2018. In an apparent effort to avoid having to pay the full amount of future economic damages, reduced to their present value, in a lump sum, as contemplated by section 766.202(8)(b), appellants offered to purchase an annuity from TransAmerica Occidental Life Insurance Company to guarantee that the future periodic payments would be made....

...(According to the evidence presented, TransAmerica was rated A + by Best's, and was "one of the highest rated companies offering annuities to fund structured settlements.") However, appellants also argued to the circuit court (and argue on appeal) that, upon posting security acceptable pursuant to section 766.202(8)(b) to permit periodic payments (as opposed to a lump-sum payment) of future economic damages, appellees could be required to accept such security in full satisfaction of the award of future economic damages, and appellants would be entitled to be relieved of any further *1198 liability for such damages. The circuit court held that the annuity would be satisfactory "security" pursuant to section 766.202(8)(b) to permit periodic payments of future economic damages, as opposed to a lump-sum payment....

...However, it refused to relieve appellants of all liability for future economic damages, concluding, instead, that they would remain contingently liable because of the possibility that, for some reason, the payments contemplated by the annuity might not all be timely made. We find nothing in section 766.202(8)(b) to support appellants' argument that, by posting "security" satisfactory to permit periodic payments of future economic damages, they are entitled to be relieved of all further liability for such damages. On the contrary, it seems to us from a reading of the language used by the legislature that the sole intent behind section 766.202(8)(b) was to permit defendants to avoid having to pay the entire amount of future economic damages, reduced to present value, in a lump sum....

...between, at most, only two people. In contrast, medical malpractice and wrongful death claimants subject to the cap include "any person having a cause of action for damages based on personal injury or wrongful death arising from medical negligence." § 766.202(1), Fla....

...ant's injuries resulted in a 50-percent reduction in his capacity to enjoy life would warrant an award of not more than $125,000 noneconomic damages. (c) Damages for future economic losses shall be awarded to be paid by periodic payments pursuant to s. 766.202(8) and shall be offset by future collateral source payments....

...not limited to, past and future medical expenses and 80 percent of wage loss and loss of earning capacity, offset by any collateral source payments. (c) Damages for future economic losses shall be awarded to be paid by periodic payments pursuant to s. 766.202(8), and shall be offset by future collateral source payments....

...Limitations on the noneconomic damages components of large awards to provide increased predictability of outcome of the claims resolution process for insurer anticipated losses planning, and to facilitate early resolution of medical negligence claims. [14] Section 766.202(7), Florida Statutes (Supp....

...he claimant; and (b), [s]uch negligence resulted in injury to the claimant. " § 766.203(2)(a),(b), Fla. Stat. (1999) (emphasis supplied). A claimant under the Act is defined as "any person who has a cause of action arising from medical negligence." § 766.202(1), Fla....

...ical expert opinion.... The chapter defines "investigation" to mean "that an attorney has reviewed the case against each and every potential defendant and has consulted with a medical *288 expert and has obtained a written opinion from said expert." § 766.202(4)....

...Tracy's treatment fell below the standard of care; and the pre-operative tests did not indicate that Gonzalez had a tissue mass, and therefore, surgery was not warranted. During the ninety-day presuit period, Dr. Tracy advised Gonzalez that Dr. Lazzarin's affidavit failed to satisfy the requirements of sections 766.102, 766.202, and 766.203, Florida Statutes (2006)....

...1976), the Florida Supreme Court held that the statute of limitations begins to run in a medical malpractice action either when the "plaintiff has notice of the negligent act giving rise to the cause of action or when the plaintiff has notice of the physical injury which is the consequence of the negligent act." [4] Section 766.202(6), Florida Statutes (2006), defines "medical expert" as "a person duly and regularly engaged in the practice of his or her profession who holds a health care professional degree from a university or college and who meets the requirements of an expert witness as set forth in s....

...In this "breast implant" action brought against, among others, the appellant's physician, we hold that the trial court correctly determined that the alleged expert who executed the verified written opinion in attempted compliance with the pre-suit screening requirements of sections 766.202(5), 766.203(2)(b), Florida Statutes (1993) was not "duly and regularly engaged in the practice of his profession," as defined by section 766.202(5)....

...This type of entity is not listed in any of chapter 766’s definitions, nor is it apparent from the complaint that Park Place otherwise met any of the descriptions in those definitions. Section 766.203 is governed by the definition of health care provider in section 766.202(4). See § 766.202. Section *495 766.202(4) does not list mental health facilities licensed under chapter 394, and it is likewise not apparent that Park Place otherwise met that section’s definition....

...e of action, including, but not limited to, past and future medical expenses and 80 percent of wage loss and loss of earning capacity to the extent the claimant is entitled to recover such damages under general law, including the Wrongful Death Act. § 766.202(3), Fla....

...omic damages found in Florida Statute § 766.118. III. Non-economic damages Under Florida law, "non-economic damages" include non-financial losses such as pain and suffering, inconvenience, mental anguish, and loss of capacity for enjoyment of life. § 766.202(8), Fla....

...medical care or services." Presuit investigation is covered by section 766.203, Florida Statutes (1995). Section 766.203(1) provides that "presuit investigation of medical negligence claims and defenses... shall apply to all medical negligence ... claims and defenses." [e.s.] The term "medical negligence" is defined in section 766.202(6) to mean "medical malpractice, whether grounded in tort or in contract." The standard for recovery under medical negligence is addressed in section 766.102(1), which embraces: "any action for recovery of damages based on the death or personal injury of any person in which it is alleged that such death or injury resulted from the negligence of a health care provider." [e.s.] Under section 766.202(6), we don't think it much matters whether the plaintiffs' claim is framed as an intentional tort or instead as negligence....

...the presuit notice requirements. Id. at 145. Section 766.203(2) requires "[c]orroboration of reasonable grounds to initiate medical negligence litigation" in the form of "a verified written medical expert opinion from a medical expert as defined in s. 766.202(6)." Section 766.202(6) defines medical expert as "a person duly and regularly engaged in the practice of his or her profession who holds a health care professional degree from a university or college and who meets the requirements of an expert witness as set forth in s....

...ider and meets the following criteria." Subsections (a)—(c) set forth differing criteria for expert witnesses depending upon the status of the person against whom or on whose behalf the testimony is being presented. Thus, under sections 766.203(2), 766.202(6), and 766.102(5), the written expert opinion that accompanies a claimant's notice of intent must be rendered by a person who (1) is "duly and regularly engaged in the practice of his or her profession," (2) has a degree in health care from...

...professional degree from a university or college and has had special professional training and experience or one possessed of special health care knowledge or skill about the subject upon which he or she is called to testify or provide an opinion." § 766.202(5), Fla....

...ligence resulted in injury to the claimant. Corroboration of reasonable grounds to initiate medical negligence litigation shall be provided by the claimant's submission of a verified written medical expert opinion from a medical expert as defined in s. 766.202(6), at the time the notice of intent to initiate litigation is mailed, which statement shall corroborate reasonable grounds to support the claim of medical negligence....

...Following a pre-suit investigation, the hospital requested, and Afonso agreed, to voluntary binding arbitration pursuant to sections 766.207(2) and (3), Florida Statutes (2003). The arbitration panel decided that the economic damages recoverable pursuant to sections 766.202(3) and 766.207(7), were not limited to the damages available under the Wrongful Death Act, section 768.21, Florida Statutes....

...imitations: (a) Net economic damages shall be awardable, including, but not limited to, past and future medical expenses and 80 percent of wage loss and loss of earning capacity, offset by any collateral source payments. The legislature also amended section 766.202(3), adding the underlined language: "Economic damages" means financial losses that would not have occurred but for the injury giving rise to the cause of action, including, but not limited to, past and future medical expenses and 80 p...

...ge loss and loss of earning capacity to the extent the claimant is entitled to recover such damages under general law, including the Wrongful Death Act. *767 The arbitration panel rejected the hospital's argument that the 2003 amendments to sections 766.202 and 766.207(7) limited Afonso's economic damages to those recoverable in a wrongful death action....

...difies "the Wrongful Death Act," so as to supplement the damages otherwise awardable under the Wrongful Death Act, why would the legislature use the word "limitations"? Whatever clarity is lacking in section 766.207(7) seems to have been resolved in section 766.202(3), where the legislature added the language, "to the extent the claimant is entitled to recover such damages under general law, including the Wrongful Death Act." Only a strained reading of the statute would lead us to conclude that...

...its received by her husband prior to his death, because the Medical Malpractice Act did not provide for the application of that provision. Accordingly, the Florida Supreme Court rejected the argument that the legislature's decision to amend sections 766.202(3) and 207(7) indicated that St....

...Plaza Materials Corp., 908 So.2d 360, 368 (Fla.2005). Here, construing the "subject to the following limitations" language added to section 766.207(7) to permit the recovery of loss of earning capacity damages would negate the language simultaneously added to section 766.202(3). That language provides for recovery of economic damages only "to the extent" claimants are entitled to recover them under the Wrongful Death Act. Section 766.202(3) must be read in pari materia with section 766.207(7)....

...ain test was negligence resulting in the stillbirth. Section 766.203, Florida Statutes (2003) requires a medical malpractice claimant to provide, in the presuit process, an affidavit of a medical expert. The definition of medical expert contained in section 766.202(6) is one who meets the requirement of a trial expert witness under section 766.102....

...The trial court denied defendants' motion to dismiss because the court erroneously concluded that section 766.102(9)(a) applies only to experts testifying at trial and not experts making presuit affidavits. As is apparent from our analysis above, however, section 766.202(6), which was enacted in 2003, has eliminated the distinction between an expert for presuit purposes and for testifying at trial. Yocom v. Wuesthoff Health Sys., Inc., 880 So.2d 787 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004). Although the incident in this case occurred in 2001, prior to the passage of section 766.202(6), the statute is procedural and therefore applicable here....

...Katt each filed a motion to dismiss. Section 766.203(2) requires a medical malpractice claimant to corroborate the assertion that reasonable grounds exist to file the claim with "a verified written medical expert opinion from a medical expert as defined in s. 766.202(6), at the time the notice of intent to initiate litigation is mailed." Section 766.202(6) requires an expert to meet the requirements contained in section 766.102....

...d by controlling precedent of the Supreme Court of Florida. Fla.Stat. § 766.106(l)(a) defines a “[cjlaim for medical malpractice” as “a claim arising out of the rendering of, or the failure to render, medical care or services.” In addition, § 766.202 defines a “claimant” as “any person who has a cause of action arising from medical malpractice.” Section 766.202(6) defines “medical negligence” as “medical malpractice, whether grounded in tort or in contract.” Section 95.11 (4) (b) sets out a two-year statute of limitations for medical malpractice actions and defines the type of conduc...

...Spring, we reverse the summary final judgment on that basis as well. Conclusion For these reasons, the summary final judgment for HealthSpring is reversed, and the case is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. Reversed and remanded. . § 766.202(4), Fla....

...resulted in injury. Further, the existence of reasonable grounds to support a claim of medical negligence must be corroborated by the claimant's submission of a verified written medical expert opinion from a medical expert as that term is defined in section 766.202(6)....

...the nurse practitioner's negligence. Their argument suggests that when the corroborating affidavit is from a physician, then all physicians involved, even though unnamed, are assumed to be negligent. I think this is in derogation of the statute. See § 766.202(5), Fla....

...The majority posits several reasons for concluding that Trombley complied with the pre-suit investigatory affidavit requirement. First, I address the statement that section 766.203 does not require the corroborating affidavit to name each individual defendant. Section 766.202(5) defines "investigation" to mean "that an attorney has reviewed the case against each and every potential defendant and has consulted with a medical expert and has obtained a written opinion from said expert" (emphasis added)....

...Id. Second, since Silva and Damiano were decided, the Legislature has made crucial changes to the medical malpractice statute, in particular, broadening its application to blood banks. See Ch.2003-416, Laws of Fla. In 2003, the Legislature amended section 766.202, Florida Statutes, to define "health care provider" to specifically include blood banks....

...tuations of medical negligence involving diagnosis, treatment, and care. In addition, in section 766.102(1), Florida Statutes (2003), entitled "Medical negligence; standards of recovery; expert witness," the Legislature added a specific reference to section 766.202(4) which, as previously stated, now includes blood banks. Section 766.102(1), Florida Statutes, now provides: In any action for recovery of damages based on the death . . . of any person in which it is alleged that such death or injury resulted from the negligence of a health care provider as defined in s. 766.202(4), the claimant shall have the *383 burden of proving by the greater weight of evidence that the alleged actions of the health care provider represented a breach of the prevailing professional standard of care for that health care provider. . . . (Emphasis added). Additionally, as previously stated, section 766.202(4), Florida Statutes (2003), provides: "Health care provider" means ....

...Clinical laboratories are, according to OCGA § 31-22-9.1(a)(8), health care facilities. Similarly, in this case, blood banks are required to be licensed as clinical laboratories in Florida under chapter 483. Clinical laboratories licensed under chapter 483 are health care providers as defined in section 766.202(4).

breaches in medical negligence actions. See, e.g., § 766.202, Fla. Stat. One specific example of a provision

compliance with the requirements of F.S. 766.203(2), F.S. 766.202(6) and F.S. 766.102.” This assertion was sufficiently

...litigation for medical negligence. § 766.106(2)(a), Fla. Stat. (2012). With the notice, a potential plaintiff is required to submit a “verified written medical expert opinion from a medical expert 4 as defined in s. 766.202(6)” which supports a claim of medical negligence. § 766.203(2)(b), Fla. Stat. (2012). A medical expert as defined in section 766.202(6) is “a person duly and regularly engaged in the practice of his or her profession who holds a health care professional degree from a university or college and who meets the requirements of an expert witness as set forth in s....

.... including pain and suffering, inconvenience, physical impairment, mental anguish . . . loss of capacity for enjoyment of life, and other nonfinancial losses to the extent the claimant is entitled to recover such damages under general law, including the Wrongful Death Act.” § 766.202(8), Fla....

...Florida’s Caps on Noneconomic Damages Section 766.118, Florida Statutes (2005), places limitations on noneconomic damages 11 in medical malpractice cases, and the limitations vary depending upon the circumstances. For cases involving the negligence of practitioners providing 11. Section 766.202(8), Florida Statutes (2005), defines noneconomic damages as “nonfinancial losses that would not have occurred but for the injury giving rise to the cause of action, including pain and suffering, inconvenience, physical impairment, m...

...Moreover, the plaintiffs did not present any evidence indicating that they consulted with any medical expert or that they conducted a good faith and reasonable investigation prior to mailing the notices as the statutes require. It is the plaintiffs failure to comply with their duty to conduct an investigation as defined by section 766.202(4), Florida Statutes (1991), that distinguishes this case from the cases relied on by plaintiffs....

...expiration of the appropriate statute of limitations."); Stein v. Feingold, 629 So.2d 998 (Fla. 3d DCA 1993) (affidavit of expert witness timely filed when filed within statute of limitations period). The judicial gloss that the majority applies to section 766.202(4) controls only when the plaintiff has failed to satisfy the presuit requirements prior to the end of the limitations period....

...rsonal representative of the person who received the negligent medical care. The University alleges that this requirement was not met in the instant case *776 because Ms. Wilson and Ms. Salmon were not "claimants" pursuant to sections 766.106(2) and 766.202(1) of Florida's Medical Malpractice Act ("Act"), and had not been appointed as personal representatives at the time they served their notice....

...ndant by certified mail, return receipt requested, of intent to initiate litigation for medical malpractice. ง 766.106(2), Fla. Stat. (2002)(emphasis added). However, the majority ignores the fact that a "claimant" is expressly defined in the Act. Section 766.202(1) states: "Claimant" means any person who has a cause of action for damages based on personal injury or wrongful death arising from medical negligence. ง 766.202(1), Fla....

...12, 744 P.2d 695 (1987)(listing cases including Ash ). As in Ash, we likewise are confronted here with an express statutory provision. The provision commands that the person who gives notice must be the "claimant [with the] cause of *787 action." ง 766.202(1), Fla....

...ecover, in part, [n]et economic damages ... including, but not limited to, past and future medical expenses and 80 percent of wage loss *658 and loss of earning capacity, offset by any collateral source payments. § 766.207(7)(a), Fla. Stat. (2002). Section 766.202 defines " economic damages " as financial losses which would not have occurred but for the injury giving rise to the cause of action, including, but not limited to, past and future medical expenses and 80 percent of wage loss and loss of earning capacity. § 766.202(3), Fla....

...ractice Act specify the damages available when the parties agree to binding arbitration, regardless of whether the medical malpractice action involves a wrongful death. See 769 So.2d at 973. Specifically, we concluded: The plain language of sections 766.202(3) and 766.207(7)(a) indicates that the full range of economic damages is available to claimants as an incentive to forego a jury trial on damages and proceed to arbitration....

...o be reduced in only two ways. First, a claimant is entitled to only 80 percent of wage loss and loss of earning capacity. See § 766.207(7)(a). Second, economic damages are to be offset by payments from those collateral sources expressly defined in section 766.202(2). See §§ 766.202(2), 766.207(7)(a). Thus, subject only to these reductions, claimants are entitled to a full range of economic damages, which include net "financial losses which would not have occurred but for the injury giving rise to the cause of action. " § 766.202(3) (emphasis supplied)....

...Act and made consistent with the damages available under sections 766.209(2) and 766.209(3)(a). [4] I. THE DEFINITION OF "NET" Section 766.207(7)(a), Florida Statutes, provides for an award of "net economic damages." Economic damages are defined in section 766.202(3)....

...The relevant section states: "Economic damages" means financial losses which would not have occurred but for the injury giving rise to the cause of action, including, but not limited to, past and future medical expenses and 80 percent of wage loss and loss of earning capacity. § 766.202(3), Fla....

...Barlow now receives. Mrs. Barlow's argument, which the majority accepts, that she should receive the full amount of the lost social security benefits as a "financial loss [ ] which would not have occurred but for the injury giving rise to the cause of action," § 766.202(3), Fla....

...found that the Task Force had established that the medical malpractice crisis could be alleviated by enacting reforms. See ch. 2003-416, § 1(8) — (10), at 4035, Laws of Fla. That Task Force expressly recommended that the Legislature amend sections 766.202 and 766.207 to specifically state that "damages are recoverable in voluntary binding arbitration only if the claimant has the right to recover such damages under general law, including the Wrongful Death Act." Governor's Select Task Force on Healthcare Professional Liability Insurance 300 (2003). And the Legislature followed this recommendation by so amending sections 766.202 and 766.207....

...d access to the courts, while at the same time carrying out the legislative policy of screening out frivolous lawsuits and defenses. In Kukral, it was the plaintiffs who had their case dismissed for failure to comply with the presuit requirements of section 766.202(4), Florida Statutes (1991)....

...od he had received. LifeSouth moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the Fitchners had not sent a presuit notice of intent to initiate litigation for medical negligence. In support of its motion, Life-South relied on the 2003 amendment to section 766.202(4) Florida Statutes, which added blood banks to the class of potential defendants who are entitled to the procedural safeguards afforded by the statute....

...Thus, according to the Fitchners, the medical malpractice statute did not apply, and the failure to comply with statutory presuit notice requirements in the statute was not a proper basis for dismissal. The trial court agreed with the Fitch-ners. The court ruled that LifeSouth is a health care provider, as defined in section 766.202(4), but it denied LifeSouth’s motion to dismiss the complaint, concluding that a blood recipient’s claim against a blood bank was not considered a claim for medical malpractice under section 766.102(1) Florida Statutes (2008)....

...resulted in injury to the" prospective plaintiff. § 766.203(2). The reasonable grounds must be corroborated by "submission of a verified written medical expert opinion from a medical expert as defined in 4 [section] 766.202(6)." Id. Section 766.202(6) defines "[m]edical expert" as "a person duly and regularly engaged in the practice of his or her profession who holds a health care professional degree from a university or college and who meets the requirements of an expert witnes...

...(citing United States v. Obando, 891 F.3d 929, 934 (11th Cir. 2018), for the proposition that the ordinary meaning of a term "will yield when the term has 'a technical meaning' or is a 'term of art' ")). We know that "[t]he term 'medical expert' as used in section 766.202(6) is a term of art delineated by that statute." Baptist Med....

...3d at 1261, disapproved of on other grounds by Carmody, 372 So. 3d 246. The legislature has authority to impose conditions on the initiation of medical malpractice suits, and while the supreme court has "emphasize[d] that we must construe sections 766.102 and 766.202 in a manner that favors access to the courts, never did it endorse" the proposition that "any qualification requirement that has the effect of narrowing the universe of available experts in a way that might foreclose a medical-malpractice claim" is an access-to-the-courts defect....

...after the potential plaintiff completes a presuit investigation pursuant to section 766.203(2). The potential plaintiff must also provide any potential defendant with a "verified written medical expert opinion from a medical expert as defined in s. 766.202(6)," which serves as corroboration of "reasonable grounds to support the claim" for medical negligence litigation....

...Dr. Hamburger satisfies the "medical expert" presuit requirement. 8 We look first to the plain language of the statute. Borden v. E.-Eur. Ins. Co., 921 So. 2d 587, 595 (Fla. 2006). Under the clear language of section 766.202(6), "medical expert" is defined as "a person duly and regularly engaged in the practice of his or her profession who holds a health care professional degree from a university or college and who meets the requirements of an expert witness as set forth in s....

...expert opinion from a specialist in the "same specialty" as the defendant healthcare provider. Because Dr. Hamburger practices in the "same specialty" as Dr. Perez Ortiz, his affidavit met the statutory requirement for medical experts under section 766.202(6)....

...v. Moore, 731 So.2d 95 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999). In that case, this court affirmed the dismissal of the pro se incarcerated plaintiff's petition for medical malpractice because he failed to produce a verifiable, corroborating medical expert opinion under section 766.202(6), Florida Statutes....

cause of action arising from medical negligence.” § 766.202(1) Fla. Stat. (1995). Except for the fact of his

...Charles Edward Kollmer, M.D., and New Smyrna Orthopedics, P.A. (collectively, “Defendants”). This medical-malpractice appeal requires us to decide whether Plaintiff’s alleged expert, Dr. Richard Shure, M.D., was a “medical expert” qualified under sections 766.102(5) and 766.202(6), Florida Statutes (2019), to provide a pre-suit, corroborating “verified written medical expert opinion,” as required by section 766.203(2)....

...Plaintiff, his sole employment was as an expert witness at R.L. Shure, M.D., Consulting, LLC. Defendants served several pre-suit discovery requests concerning whether Dr. Shure was qualified to provide a corroborating opinion under sections 766.102 and 766.202....

...Plaintiff timely appealed. 3  II. On appeal, Plaintiff assigns error to the circuit court’s conclusion that Dr. Shure was unqualified to serve as a pre-suit corroborating expert under sections 766.102 and 766.202....

...5th DCA 2020). Section 766.203(2) requires a medical-malpractice claimant to conduct a pre-suit investigation. As part of that investigation, the claimant must submit “a verified written medical expert opinion from a medical expert as defined in section 766.202(6), at the time the notice of intent to initiate litigation is mailed, which statement shall corroborate reasonable grounds to support the claim of medical negligence.” § 766.203(2), Fla. Stat. (2019). Section 766.202(6), in turn, defines “[m]edical expert” as “a person duly and regularly engaged in the practice of his or her profession who holds a health care professional degree from a university or college and who meets the requirements of an expert witness as set forth in section 766.102.” § 766.202(6), Fla....

...clinical research program in the same specialty. § 766.102(5)(a), Fla. Stat. Dr. Shure does not meet these statutory qualifications. First, he was not regularly engaged in the practice of his profession— medicine—as required by section 766.202(6)....

...“[p]ractice of medicine” as “the diagnosis, treatment, operation, or prescription for any human disease, pain, injury, deformity, or other physical or mental condition.” § 458.305(3), Fla. Stat. (2019). Insofar as it applies to licensed physicians, we presume that section 766.202 accords the same meaning to the phrase, “practice of his or her profession.” § 766.202(6)....

...At no time since December 31, 2014, has Dr. Shure diagnosed, treated, operated upon, or prescribed medication for a patient as his or her physician. Therefore, at no time since that date has Dr. Shure practiced medicine, much less “regularly” so. See § 766.202(6); see also Winson v....

...3d DCA 1995) (holding that a physician who “had not been engaged in the actual practice for more than a decade prior and had apparently confined his recent professional activities to acting as a ‘litigation expert’” “was not ‘duly and regularly engaged in the practice of his profession’” (quoting § 766.202(5), Fla. Stat. (1993))). Second, Dr. Shure was not a “health care provider” as required by section 766.102(5) because, as a legal consultant, he did not 5 provide any health care. 1 We are aware that section 766.202 defines “[h]ealth care provider” as, among other persons, “any person licensed under chapter 458.” § 766.202(4)....

...However, this definition applies only to sections 766.201 through 766.212. And, critically, those statutes use the term “health care provider” only in relation to medical-malpractice tortfeasors, thus presupposing that the licensed individual has provided health care to the claimant. See, e.g., § 766.2021, Fla....

...health care provider with whom the licensed or certified entity has entered into a contract in any amount greater than the amount of damages that may be imposed by law directly upon the health care provider . . . .”). In its proper context, then, section 766.202(4) does not broaden the plain meaning of “health care provider”—one who provides health care....

...The Court in Morris held that, because the defendants “presented no evidence to refute” the expert’s sworn statements that she had regularly treated patients until March 2008 while attending law school, the undisputed facts established that she was qualified under sections 766.102 and 766.202....

...That theory, if accepted, would eviscerate the Legislature’s authority to impose conditions on the initiation of medical-malpractice suits. We find no support, in either law or logic, for such a broad assertion. While the Court in Morris did emphasize that we must construe sections 766.102 and 766.202 in a manner that favors access to the courts, see, e.g., id. at 1146, 1151, 1154, 1159, never did it endorse so sweeping a proposition....

...After conducting this investigation, the plaintiff must then serve each defendant with a notice of intent to initiate litigation. § 766.106(2)(a). This notice must be corroborated with a "verified written medical expert opinion from a medical expert as defined in s. 766.202(6)." § 766.203(2)....

...A medical expert is "a person duly and regularly engaged in the practice of his or her profession who holds a health care professional degree from a university or college and who meets the requirements of an expert witness as set forth in s. 766.102." § 766.202(6)....

...ould be resolved absent fact-finding at an evidentiary hearing. [6] The Apostolico panel held that a registered nurse could provide a medical causation opinion, in certain cases, for presuit purposes. Id. at 287 ("We conclude that a plain reading of section 766.202(5) indicates that a nurse or any other medical professional, with appropriate experience or training, may, under the proper facts, be qualified to provide corroboration about medical causation for presuit purposes.") This holding was...

Resolution of this issue requires construction of section 766.202(8), Florida Statutes (1993), which the parties

...§ 766.203(2). The Legislature defines “medical expert” as “a person duly and regularly engaged in the practice of his or her profession who holds a health care professional degree from a university or college and who meets the requirements of an expert witness as set forth in s. 766.102.” § 766.202(6), Fla....

...Contextually, section 766.102(5)’s reference to “the same specialty” is part of a set of qualifications necessary before an expert witness can testify about the prevailing professional standard of care in medical malpractice actions. See §§ 766.202(6), 766.203(2)....

...We are not so persuaded. Section 766.203, Florida Statutes (2022), governs the presuit investigation of medical negligence claims. Subsection (2) requires corroboration of reasonable grounds to support a claim “from a medical expert as defined in s. 766.202(6).” § 766.203(2), Fla. Stat. Section 766.202(6), Florida Statutes (2022), in turn, defines such an expert as one who qualifies under section 766.102, Florida Statutes (2022)....

...appears to be evidence of medical negligence.” Id. The investigation requires that counsel review the case “against each and every potential defendant and has consulted with a medical expert and has obtained a written opinion from said expert.” Id. at § 766.202(5). Dial 4 Care’s motion to dismiss required the trial court to determine whether Brinson had complied with the presuit requirements in chapter 766. Specifically, based on the allegations in the motion, the trial court was requ...

was not a qualified medical expert under section 766.202(5), Florida Statutes (1993). Because the statute

was not from a medical expert as defined by section 766.202(5) Florida Statutes. We deny certio-rari because

...ial court's order dismissing her complaint against Dr. Butler, an Alabama-licensed physician, for failure to comply with the presuit provisions of chapter 766, Florida Statutes (2003). Because Dr. Butler is not a "health care provider" as defined in section 766.202(4), Florida Statutes, we find that he was not entitled to presuit notice under the Medical Malpractice Reform Act (the Act)....

...Accordingly, "[t]he prospective defendants that are entitled to notice under this section are the health care providers listed in section 768.50(2)(b), Florida Statutes." [1] Goldfarb v. Urciuoli, 858 So.2d 397, 398 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003). The term "health care provider" is defined in section 766.202(4), Florida Statutes (2003) as any hospital, ambulatory surgical center, or mobile surgical facility as defined and licensed under chapter 395; a birth center licensed under chapter 383; any person licensed under chapter 458, chapter...

...e or territory or foreign country." Had the legislature intended to broaden the scope *391 of "health care provider" in chapter 766, to apply to out-of-state physicians, it could have used such language. It did not. Given the unambiguous language of section 766.202(4), Florida Statutes, and Florida courts' strict construction of limitations on access to courts, we hold that out-of-state physicians are not health care providers entitled to presuit notice under chapter 766....

...is incorporated by reference into section 766.102(1), Florida Statutes (1991). Weinstock v. Groth, 629 So.2d 835, 836 n. 1 837 (Fla. 1993). In 2003, section 766.102(1) was updated to reference the newly-added definition of "health care provider" in section 766.202(4)....

...treatment. While NDA concedes that it is not a healthcare provider, it argues that Chapter 766 applies because NDA would be held vicariously liable since the employees who administered the TACT protective hold on Perry are healthcare providers under section 766.202(4), Florida Statutes (2008). This Court’s decisions in Joseph, 71 So....

...ury to the claimant. Corroboration of reasonable grounds to initiate medical negligence litigation shall be provided by the claimant’s submission of a verified written medical expert opinion from a medical expert as defined in s. 766.202(6) . . . . § 766.203(2), Fla. Stat. (2016) (emphasis added). Section 766.202(6) defines a medical expert as “a person duly and regularly engaged in the practice of his or her profession . . . and who meets -4- the requirements of an expert witness as set forth in s. 766.102.” § 766.202(6), Fla....

...the reasonable investigation requirements of ss. 766.201-766.212, including a review of the claim and a verified written medical expert opinion by an expert witness as 3  defined in s. 766.202, or that the authorization accompanying the notice of intent required under s....

...onally liable for all attorney’s fees and costs incurred during the investigation and evaluation of the claim, including the reasonable attorney’s fees and costs of the defendant or the defendant’s insurer. (emphasis added). Section 766.202(6) defines “medical expert” as “a person duly and regularly engaged in the practice of his or her profession who holds a health care professional degree from a university or college and who meets the requirements of an expert witness as set forth in s....

...(2000) (“Presuit investigation of medical negligence claims and defenses ... shall apply to all medical negligence ... claims and defenses.”). “Medical negligence” is defined as “medical malpractice, whether grounded in tort or in contract.” See § 766.202(6), Fla....

...“without proper regard for [decedent’s] medical needs.” Id. at 1290-91 (emphasis added). The trial court concluded that the presuit notice provisions of chapter 766 applied and dismissed the complaint. Id. at 1289 . This court noted that under section 766.202(6), it does not matter whether the plaintiffs’ claim is framed as an intentional tort or as negligence....

support the claim of medical negligence.” See § 766.202, Fla. Stat. (2018). In this context, a medical

...detail what the plaintiff must prove: (1) In any action for recovery of damages based on the death or personal injury of any person in which it is alleged that such death or injury resulted from the negligence of a health care provider as defined in s. 766.202(4), the claimant shall have the burden of proving by the greater weight of evidence that the alleged actions of the health care provider represented a breach of the prevailing professional standard of care for that health care provider....

...(2016) (defining "expert”)). Further, the statute defines "investigation” in this context to mean "that an attorney has reviewed the case against each and every potential defendant” and has consulted with and obtained a written opinion from a medical expert. Id. § 766.202(5)....

...resulted in injury. Further, the existence of reasonable grounds to support a claim of medical negligence must be corroborated by the claimant's submission of a verified written medical expert opinion from a medical expert as that term is defined in section 766.202(6)....

...2d DCA 2011). Here, St. Joseph's argued in its petition for writ of certiorari that the trial court departed from the essential requirements of law by determining that the allegations in Ms. Doe's complaint did not amount to medical negligence. Section 766.202(7) defines "medical negligence" as "medical malpractice, whether grounded in tort or in contract," and section 766.106(1)(a) defines a claim for medical malpractice as "a claim, arising out of the rendering of, or the failure to re...

...The standard for recovery in a medical negligence case is set forth in section 766.102(1): In any action for recovery of damages based on the death or personal injury of any person in which it is alleged that such death or injury resulted from the negligence of a health care provider as defined in - s. 766.202(4-), the claimant shall have the burden of proving by the greater weight of evidence that the alleged actions of the health care provider represented a breach of the prevailing professional standard of care for that health care provider. (Emphasis added.) Under section 766.202(4), a health care provider is any hospital, ambulatory surgical center, or mobile surgical facility as defined and licensed under chapter 395; a birth center licensed under chapter 383; any person licensed under chapter 458, chapter 4...

...t HCA is not a health care provider. In addition, it has not been alleged that the Pharmacists or HCA are vicariously liable in this case for the acts of a health care provider. Therefore, this argument fails. The language of sections 766.102(1) and 766.202(4) is unambiguous, and our conclusion regarding the Pharmacists is consistent with our obligation to narrowly construe statutes that restrict access to the courts....

...s injuries resulted in a 50-per-cent reduction in his capacity to enjoy life would warrant an award of not more than $125,000 in noneconomic damages. (c) Damages for future economic losses shall be awarded to be paid by periodic payments pursuant to s. 766.202(8) and shall be offset by future collateral source payments....

...ay for, or reimburse the costs of hospital, medical, dental, or other health care services. (d) Any contractual or voluntary wage continuation plan provided by employers or by any other system intended to provide wages during a period of disability. § 766.202(2), Fla. Stat. (1997). The plain language of section 766.207(7)(a) and (c) clearly provides that the only setoff available in a medical malpractice arbitration is for collateral sources as defined by section 766.202(2)....

...CONCLUSION Based on the foregoing, we conclude that a setoff is not appropriate in this case. We therefore answer the certified question in the negative, and quash the Fifth District’s decision. 5 It is so ordered. *110 ANSTEAD, C.J., WELLS, PARIENTE, and LEWIS, JJ., and SHAW and HARDING, Senior Justices, concur. . Section 766.202(3), Florida Statutes (1997), defines economic damages as: “Economic damages” means financial losses which would not have occurred but for the injury giving rise to the cause of action, including, but not limited to, past and future medical expenses and 80 percent of wage loss and loss of earning capacity. . Section 766.202(7), Florida Statutes (1997), defines noneconomic damages as: "Noneconomic damages” means nonfinan-cial losses which would not have occurred but for the injury giving rise to the cause of action, including pain and suffering, inconve...

...aimant; and (b), [s]uch negligence resulted in injury to the claimant.” § 766.203(2)(a),(b), Fla. Stat. (1999) (emphasis supplied). A claimant under the Act is defined as “any person who has a cause of action arising from medical negligence.” § 766.202(1), Fla....

...tutes. Explaining its result, the court discussed who was a claimant under the medical malpractice act: For the purpose of this statute, “claimant” is clearly defined as “any person who has a cause of action arising from medical negligence.” § 766.202(1), Fla....

...$250,000 for non-economic damages, which was awarded. The arbitration provision requires that economic damages be offset by all collateral source payments. The Halifax settlement does not meet the definition of collateral source payments set out in section 766.202(2), Fla.Stat....

“health care provider” covered by chapter 766. § 766.202(4), Fla. Stat. (2021) (defining a “health care

...arising out of the rendering of, or the failure to render, medical care or services.” § 766.106(l)(a). As used in sections 766.201 through 766.212, " '[m]edical negligence’ means medical malpractice, whether grounded in tort or in contract.” § 766.202(7)....

...The Medical Center argues that social security benefits (of whatever nature) ought not be considered in computing economic damages, except as collateral sources which offset net economic damages, in accordance with section 766.207(7)(a), Florida Statutes (2001). But section 766.202(2)(a), Florida Statutes (2001), defines collateral sources to include any payments made to the claimant, or made on his or her behalf, by or pursuant to: (a) The United States Social Security Act; any federal, state, or local income d...

...Lee's affidavit, and fully complied with the spirit *1128 and specific provisions of section 766.203. Dr. Morillo counters that the trial court properly granted final summary judgment because Dr. Lee's affidavit did not corroborate any negligence by Dr. Morillo and failed to name him despite section 766.202(5)'s requirement that an attorney review the case against "each and every potential defendant" and consult with a medical expert to obtain the expert's written opinion....

...Construing all facts and inferences in favor of the nonmoving party, Lawrence v. Pep Boys Manny Moe & Jack, Inc., 842 So.2d 303, 305 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003), summary judgment is proper if there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Aberdeen, 760 So.2d at 130. Section 766.202(5) provides that "`[i]nvestigation' means that an attorney has reviewed the case against each and every potential defendant and has consulted with a medical expert and has obtained a written opinion from said expert." If the court fin...

...claimants or were otherwise legally authorized to receive Freeman’s records before producing them. A claimant is defined as “any person who has a cause of action for damages based on personal injury or wrongful death arising from medical negligence.” § 766.202(1), Fla....

...question of the proper application of the statute, which we review de novo. § 120.68(7)(d), Fla. Stat. The Florida Legislature amended the Medical Malpractice Act in 2003 to limit the damages recoverable in medical negligence wrongful death arbitration. § 766.207(7)(b), Fla. Stat. Section 766.202(3) and (8), Florida Statutes (2014), define economic and non-economic damages as follows: (3) “Economic damages” means financial losses that would not have occurred but for the injury giving rise to the cause of...

...aimant and whether such negligence re- *350 suited in injury to the claimant. § 766.203(2), Fla. Stat. A medical expert must corroborate such findings in. a verified written opinion. Id. The expert must meet the qualifications set forth in sections 766.202(6) and 766.102(5)....

...rted.” § 766.205(2),. Florida Statutes. Likewise, section 766.206(2) requires dismissal of the claim where the court finds that the notice of intent does not contain a verified .written medical expert opinion by an expert witness as defined under section 766.202, Florida Statutes....

...Long insists that Chapter 766, which governs medical malpractice cases, supports the proposition that a qualified health care provider who is not a medical doctor is permitted to testify as an expert regarding future damages. We are not persuaded by this argument. Section 766.202(6), Florida Statutes (2013), defines "medical expert" as "a person duly and regularly engaged in the practice of his or her profession who holds a health care professional degree from a university or college and who meets the requirements of an expert witness as set forth in s....

...In his petition, appellant raised medical malpractice claims and Eighth Amendment violations against the various defendants. The trial court entered a Final Judgment of Dismissal with prejudice on the grounds that appellant failed to produce a verifiable, corroborating medical expert opinion under section 766.202(5), Florida Statutes, in order to substantiate his medical malpractice claims. We affirm in part and reverse and remand in part with directions. We affirm the trial court’s dismissal of appellant’s petition based on his failure to produce a verifiable, corroborating medical expert opinion as defined in section 766.202(5), Florida Statutes, in order to comply with presuit requirements for initiating a medical malpractice action....