Florida/Georgia Personal Injury & Workers Compensation

...The Prudential policy is in the amount of $250,000 and names Lee Johnson as the beneficiary. Following Johnson's conviction, the probate court ordered Prudential to pay the proceeds of the policy to the personal representatives of Gail Johnson's estate. Prudential appeals this order. Under section 732.802(3), Florida Statutes (1983), a named beneficiary of a life insurance policy who unlawfully and intentionally kills the insured is not entitled to any benefits under the policy....

...In this regard, the statute essentially codifies the supreme court's holding in Carter v. Carter, 88 So.2d 153 (Fla. 1956). Although in the absence of a conviction of murder, the court may determine whether the killing was "unlawful and intentional" by the "greater weight of the evidence," § 732.802(5), the record in the present case does *142 not indicate the court made any such determination. The court, therefore, must have relied upon the statutory provision in section 732.802(5) that: A final judgment of conviction of murder in any degree is conclusive for purposes of this section....

...State, 56 So.2d 536 (Fla. 1952) (where the supreme court quoted legislative language to the effect that it is a "final judgment of conviction" from which a defendant has a right to appeal ). (emphasis added). In determining the legislative intent behind section 732.802, it is extremely helpful to compare the present statute with its predecessor. The prior statute stated that "[a] person convicted of the murder of a decedent shall not be entitled to inherit from the decedent or to take any part of his estate as a devisee." § 732.802, Fla....

...[1] That statute applied only to property that would pass by intestacy or through the decedent's will. Carter. In 1982, the legislature expanded the scope of the section to prevent a killer from receiving property passing outside the decedent's estate. See § 732.802(2) (concerning survivorship interests in property held in joint tenancy or tenancy by the entirety or in any other form of co-ownership); [2] § 732.802(3) (concerning interests created by contractual arrangements, such as insurance policies and bonds); [3] § 732.802(4) (catchall provision concerning any other acquisition of property or interest by the killer)....

...ion). The present statute, on the other hand, does not require a conviction of murder. In the absence of such a conviction, it specifically provides for a civil homicide proceeding where the standard of proof is "the greater weight of the evidence." § 732.802(5)....

...ven effect even though it may contradict the strict letter of the statute"). We hold that the legislature intended that "final judgment of conviction" mean an adjudication of guilt by the trial court and that such would be conclusive for purposes of section 732.802....

...Lee Johnson was tried, convicted and adjudicated guilty of the first degree murder of his wife. This was conclusive for purposes of determining his interest in the insurance proceeds as the named beneficiary in the policy covering his wife's life. § 732.802(5). Pursuant to the statute, Lee Johnson was entitled to no benefits under the policy, and the policy became payable as though he had predeceased his wife. § 732.802(3)....

...The court's opinion indicates that it does not consider Joyner dispositive of the meaning of the term "conviction" outside the context of the habitual offender statute. In Prudential Insurance Company of America, Inc. v. Baitinger, 452 So.2d 140 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984), the court found that a "final judgment of conviction" under section 732.802, which precludes a convicted murderer from receiving insurance benefits when the victim was the insured, means an adjudication of guilt by the trial court, notwithstanding a pending appeal, citing DePaulis v....

...NOTES [1] We have concluded that this cause of action is severable from the other causes of action which remain pending in the trial court so as to permit an appeal at the present time. See Mendez v. West Flagler Family Ass'n, 303 So.2d 1 (Fla. 1974). [2] Although subsections (3) and (5) of section 732.802, Florida Statutes (Supp....

...As a matter of law, the court concluded that division of the proceeds of the settlement was controlled not by the wrongful death statute, but by the application of the probate code to "apportion the benefits among the survivors." The court reasoned that under the probate code, only section 732.802(1), Florida Statutes (1999), provides "any basis for denying benefits to a survivor"; the court ruled that that statute was inapplicable to a case involving an unintentional killing or death caused by negligence....

...The only issue raised on appeal is whether appellant is entitled to the one-half interest awarded to the collateral heirs. We agree with the trial court that he is not. The Florida Probate Code provides that the convicted murderer of a decedent shall not inherit from the decedent. Section 732.802, Florida Statutes....

...Two weeks later, appellant as beneficiary submitted a claim to The Prudential Insurance Company of America [insurer] for the benefits under a life insurance policy. Not long after that, she was identified by police as a suspect in the death of the insured. The insurer denied the claim, pointing to section 732.802, Florida Statutes (1985)....

...lated. He is not immunized from prejudicial consequences which attach to his refusal to show the existence of a material fact at issue. In this case, the consequence of Zabrani's silence is our affirmance of the summary judgment. Affirmed. NOTES [1] Section 732.802(3), Florida Statutes (1983), provides that, if a named beneficiary of a life insurance policy intentionally kills the person upon whom the policy is issued, the beneficiary is not entitled to recover....

...(1985). It was not disputed that Steven Benson, as the murderer of his mother and brother, was precluded from participating as a beneficiary of either his mother's will or his brother's intestate estate by reason of Florida's so-called "Slayer Statute," section 732.802(1), Florida Statutes (1985)....

...We find the statutory language clear and unambiguous. If there is to be declared in Florida such a public policy as appellant urges, it must be accomplished by a legislative amendment to the Slayer Statute and not by a pronouncement of this court. The pertinent part of our Slayer Statute, section 732.802(1), provides as follows: A surviving person who unlawfully and intentionally kills or participates in procuring the death of the decedent is not entitled to any benefits under the will or under the Florida Probate Code, and the estate of the decedent passes as if the killer had predeceased the decedent....

...Bodiford of Hutto and Bodiford, Panama City, for Appellee. BENTON, Judge. As guardian of Coleman C. Smith, Iris Smith Congleton appeals a final judgment excluding her ward as a beneficiary of the estate of Vera I. Smith, whose death left Mr. Smith a widower. The judgment invokes section 732.802, Florida Statutes (1991), the so-called "slayer statute," which renders a person who unlawfully and intentionally kills another person ineligible to receive property on account of the death....

...ecause Mr. Smith was never tried criminally. Although a predecessor statute did require conviction for disqualification, see Hill v. Morris, 85 So.2d 847 (Fla. 1956), since enactment of chapter 82-71, at 186, Laws of Florida (1982) on April 2, 1982, section 732.802(5), Florida Statutes, has provided: A final judgment of conviction of murder in any degree is conclusive for purposes of this section....

...(Emphasis added.) The current statute plainly contemplates the "absence of a conviction of murder," and authorizes a court, in that event, to proceed independently, as the court did here, to "determine by the greater weight of the evidence whether the killing was unlawful and intentional." § 732.802(5), Fla....

...The evidence would support findings that Mr. Smith was under no misapprehension about what he was doing when he choked his wife, and that he did not throttle her unintentionally. The trial court found: On the issue of civil homicide as outlined in Florida Statute 732.802, the Florida Slayer statute, by the greater weight of the evidence, based upon the factual evidence submitted at the probate trial, including the testimony of the mental health professionals, Coleman C....

...The only issue raised on appeal is whether or not the trial court "erred in excluding Eugene Nable from inheriting under his wife's estate." The issue in regard to the jointly-held property determined by paragraph C of the order is not raised on appeal and, therefore, we do not consider it. Section 732.802, Florida Statutes (1979) states: A person convicted of the murder of a decedent shall not be entitled to inherit from the decedent or take any part of his estate as a devisee. The part of the decedent's estate to which the murderer would otherwise be entitled should pass to persons entitled to it as though the murderer had died during the life time of the decedent. [Emphasis added]. The wording of Section 732.802 is plain, concise, and unambiguous....

...Carter, 88 So.2d 153 (Fla. 1956), dealt specifically with properties transferred outside testate or intestate succession, such as estates held by the entirety or the proceeds of a life insurance policy. Those cases, therefore, were not governed by section 732.802, Florida Statutes. In Peeples v. Corbett, 117 Fla. 213, 157 So. 510 (1934), the Supreme Court held that a complainant seeking to work a forfeiture under then section 731.31, Florida Statutes, currently section 732.802, failed to state a cause of action where it did not allege a conviction of murder....

...COWART, J., concurs specially. COWART, Judge, concurring specially: The common law principle that one should not benefit from his own wrongdoing was applied to prevent one who wrongfully caused another's death from receiving any benefit from such death long before Section 732.802, Florida Statutes (1979), or its predecessor statutes, ever existed....

...1st DCA 1971); and to prevent a child who murdered his parents from taking any interest in U.S. Savings Bonds owned jointly with the parents, notwithstanding a will provision in the child's favor. In Re Estate of Yanowsky, 384 So.2d 1297 (Fla.2d DCA 1980). In the absence of section 732.802, Florida Statutes (1979), the courts could use the same principle to deny an inheritance to one who is blameworthy for his ancestor's death....

...3d DCA) (rehearing en banc), appeal dismissed, 419 So.2d 1198 (Fla. 1982). The division of the wife's property should be the subject of a separate probate action brought by a substituted party. For the same reason the dissolution action was dismissed this appeal is also DISMISSED. NOTES [1] Appellant relies on section 732.802(2), Florida Statutes (1983) which provides that a tenant by the entirety who unlawfully and intentionally kills or procures the death of another tenant by the entirety effects a severance of the interest of the decedent so that the share of the decedent passes as the decedent's property and the killer has no rights by survivorship. Appellant also relies on section 732.802(5) for her contention that even in the absence of a conviction of murder, section 732.802(2) will apply so long as the killing is proved, by the greater weight of the evidence in a civil action, to be unlawful and intentional. Ashwood v. Patterson, 49 So.2d 848 (Fla. 1951), also relied upon by appellant, states the common law principle codified by section 732.802(2).

...As a factual matter, however, the record is clear that appellee was not even considered to be a suspect in her husband's death, and, therefore, obviously was not charged with nor convicted of, his murder. This fact is relevant because at the time of the decedent's murder, the statute dealing with forfeiture, section 732.802, Florida Statutes (1981), stated in relevant part: "A person convicted of the murder of a decedent shall not be entitled to inherit from the decedent or to take any part of his estate as a devisee." (e.s.). Some months after the decedent's murder, section 732.802 was amended substantially and added, inter alia, subsection 5: A final judgment of conviction of murder in any degree is conclusive for purposes of this section. In the absence of a conviction of murder in any degree, the court may determine by the greater weight of the evidence whether the killing was unlawful and intentional for purposes of this section. § 732.802(5), Fla. Stat. (Supp. 1982). Appellant argues strenuously that the newly amended section 732.802 can be applied retroactively to the date of the decedent's murder because: 1....

...*1285 In her motion to withdraw funds from these accounts, appellant argues that she was entitled to at least half of the funds in the accounts even if, as the Estate alleges, appellant is not entitled to all of the funds pursuant to Florida's Slayer Statute, section 732.802(2), Florida Statutes (2006)....

...For purposes of ruling on appellant's motion, the Slayer Statute was assumed to apply. There has yet to be an evidentiary hearing or any fact-finding determination that appellant unlawfully and intentionally killed the decedent. Reversed and Remanded. SHAHOOD, C.J., HAZOURI and DAMOORGIAN, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] Section 732.802(2), Florida Statutes (2005), provides: (2) Any joint tenant who unlawfully and intentionally kills another joint tenant thereby effects a severance of the interest of the decedent so that the share of the decedent passes as the decedent's property and the killer has no rights of survivorship....

...my house at 3420 SW 2nd Street, Miami, Florida. If and when the house is sold by my son, he will divide the proceeds equally among my children. My son is not to be forced to sell the house against his will." Linda and Susan challenged the will's validity, alleging undue influence, and that section 732.802, Florida Statutes (2004) (the "Slayer Statute"), precludes Deborah and Frank from benefiting because they assisted in the decedent's suicide....

...d agreeing the court could proceed to determine the controversy on written memoranda of law and oral argument. Thereafter the trial court entered a judgment finding that Roland was entitled to the probate assets of the estate under the provisions of section 732.802, Florida Statutes (1979)....

...The latter aspect of the judgment pertaining to the nonprobate assets is the subject of this appeal. In the circuit court and here, the appellees took the position that Roland was not entitled to the nonprobate assets because those assets do not fall within the purview of section 732.802, Florida Statutes (1979), which only precludes one from inheriting when he has been convicted of murdering the decedent....

...A non-jury trial was conducted on August 22, 1991. The trial court found there was a contract between Chatman and his wife to ‘cross-designate’ each other as beneficiaries, and Chatman violated the terms of the contract by murdering his wife. The trial court further found that according to section 732.802(4), Florida Statutes, the insurance proceeds should not be paid to Chatman’s son—the contingent beneficiary. Chatman’s son posted a su-persedeas bond and filed a notice of appeal. Section 732.802, Florida Statutes (1991), states in part: (3) A named beneficiary of a bond, life insurance policy, or other contractual arrangement who unlawfully and intentionally kills the principal obligee or the person upon whose life the policy...

...killer had predeceased the decedent. (4) Any other acquisition of property or interest by the killer, including a life estate in homestead property, shall be treated in accordance with the principles of this section. We hold as a matter of law that section 732.802 does not apply to an innocent contingent beneficiary’s entitlement to life insurance benefits resulting from the killing of the primary beneficiary by the insured who then commits suicide. Subsection 732.802(3) applies to a “named beneficiary of a ... life insurance policy ... who unlawfully and intentionally kills ... the person upon whose life the policy is issued_” Subsection 732.802(3) does not divest Chatman’s son, as an innocent person, from his entitlement to benefits under the insurance policy on Chat-man’s life. Cf., In re Estate of Benson, 548 So.2d 775 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989) (section 732.802 did not prevent children of a man who killed his mother and brother from inheriting their father’s share under his mother’s will or their father's share of his brother’s intestate estate). Subsection 732.802(4) states that “[a]ny other acquisition of [an] interest by the killer ......

...as not intended to apply to an insured’s suicide and the resultant entitlement of an innocent beneficiary. Appellee argues that Chatman temporarily acquired an interest between the time of his wife’s death and Chatman’s death, and therefore subsection 732.802(4) is applicable....

...Since a breach is the failure to perform the whole or part of a contract, one cannot breach a wholly executed contract. In sum, we reverse the trial court’s failure to award the proceeds of Chatman’s life insurance policy to the appellant, Chat-man’s son — the contingent beneficiary. Section 732.802 is inapplicable under the facts of this case, and there was no breach of contract....

...eimbursement of funeral expenses. 9. On December 18, 1990, Prudential commenced this statutory interpleader action, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1335, asking the undersigned to determine the recipient of the policy's proceeds in light of Florida Statute § 732.802(3). 10. Florida Statute § 732.802(3) prohibits the beneficiary of a life insurance policy from recovering any benefit if they unlawfully and intentionally killed the person whose life the policy is issued....

...It essentially codifies the Florida Supreme Court's holding in Carter v. Carter, 88 So.2d 153 (Fla.1956) in that it intends to make it difficult for a killer to receive any beneficial interest as a result of their wrongdoing. Prudential Ins. Co. v. Baitinger, 452 So.2d 140, 143 (Fla.App. 3d Dist.1984). 11. Section § 732.802(3) provides: A named beneficiary of a bond, life insurance policy, or other contractual arrangement who unlawfully and intentionally kills the principle obligee or the person upon whose life the policy is issued is not entitled to any bene...

...to strike the residual beneficiary, who was convicted for the murder of the testator, as an interested person, since the said residuary beneficiary, Joyce Cohen, no longer had any legal interest in the testator's estate pursuant to the provisions of Section 732.802(1), Florida Statutes (1989)....

...There is no factual basis in the record of this case, nor any law which could be applied to the facts which are contained in the record of this case, which *1017 could support a finding that Joyce Cohen would be irreparably harmed if the Probate Court Judge were to proceed in a manner consistent with Section 732.802, Florida Statutes (1989), based upon the criminal conviction obtained against Joyce Cohen....

...But the Florida statute [§ 689.21(5) ] does not even mention the word “vest.” Instead, it uses the language “indefeasibly fixed both in quality and quantity.” Therefore, the fact that vesting occurred at Stacey Barker’s death (subject to divesting if Section 732.802(3), Florida Statutes, which prohibits a killer from receiving the victim’s life insurance benefits, applies) is of no real consequence in construing the Florida statute....

...,000, and the residue of the estate would be held in trust for Narcy’s two grandsons. After Narcy sought probate of the will, the court appointed appellee Douglas Hoffman as personal representative. Ultimately, the court determined that based upon section 732.802, Florida Statutes (2012), the Slayer Statute, Narcy was not entitled to participate in the estate, and the statute required the court to treat Narcy as having predeceased Ben....

...nce, the devises to the remaining beneficiaries who did not participate in the procurement remain valid.” As to the Slayer Statute, the court determined that the Slayer Statute did not prohibit the children of the murderer from inheriting, ruling: Section 732.802 is clear and unambiguous and does not extend the prohibition of receipt of property or other benefits to anyone other than the killer of the decedent....

...Courts interpreted this statute as not barring inheritance in cases of, for example, a conviction for manslaughter. Nable v. Godfrey’s Estate, 403 So.2d 1038, 1040-41 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981). Disagreeing with this outcome, the Legislature later expanded the statute by enacting section 732.802, Florida Statutes, which now provides: (1) A surviving person who unlawfully and intentionally kills or participates in procuring the death of the decedent is not entitled to any benefits under the will or under the Florida Probate Code, and the estate of the decedent passes as if the killer had predeceased the decedent. Property appointed by the will of the decedent to or for the benefit of the killer passes as if the killer had predeceased the decedent. § 732.802(1), Fla....

...The First and Third Districts have relied on Benson in construing the other subsections of the Slayer Statute dealing with life insurance benefits and joint tenancies. See Chatman v. Currie, 606 So.2d 454, 456 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992) (“We hold as a matter of law that section 732.802 does not apply to an innocent contingent beneficiary’s entitlement to life insurance benefits resulting from the killing of the primary beneficiary by the insured who then commits suicide.”); Lopez v....

The trial court found that by operation of section 732.802, Florida Statutes (1981), the decedent’s entire

...The sole issue presented for our review on this appeal is whether the probate court erred in striking appellant's demand for a jury trial in a probate adversary proceeding arising out of a petition to determine beneficiaries which sought to disqualify a murdering spouse under Section 732.802, Florida Statutes (1985)....

...standing her acquittal in the criminal prosecution, Peggy Howard had in fact stabbed her husband to death. The petition sought an order determining whether Peggy Howard had unlawfully and intentionally killed her husband thus disqualifying her under Section 732.802, Florida Statutes, from benefiting from his death. Section 732.802, Florida Statutes (1985) provides in relevant part: (1) A surviving person who unlawfully and intentionally kills or participates in procuring the death of the decedent is not entitled to any benefits under the will or under the Flori...

...Following a bench trial, the trial court entered final judgment in favor of the personal representative, concluding that clear and convincing evidence established that Mrs. Howard had unlawfully and intentionally killed her husband. Accordingly, the court held that Mrs. Howard was barred by Section 732.802 from receiving any benefits under the will or Florida Probate Code; had no rights of survivorship in properties owned as tenants by the entireties by decedent and widow; could not claim the marital home pursuant to the terms of a trus...

...Contrary to appellant's assertions, the probate court did not err in striking Mrs. Howard's demand for a jury trial in the probate adversary proceeding below. There exists no constitutional right to a jury trial in a probate adversary proceeding brought pursuant to Section 732.802, Florida Statutes. Section 732.802, commonly known as the "Probate Murder Statute" originated in the 1933 Florida Probate Code....

...s not sufficient to displace a preexisting right to jury trial; it is the nature of the issue that matters and not whether the issue arises in a proceeding which may be considered "equitable." Appellant first maintains that the principle embraced by Section 732.802 — that a wrongdoer should not profit by his wrongdoing — is a legal principle of the common law. As such, it can be assimilated into two categories of cases which were jury-demandable at common law, namely, forfeiture and an implied condition of the insurance contract. Contrary to appellant's assertions, however, the principle embraced by Section 732.802 is a principle of equity....

...ken the proceedings below to a hypothetical suit "at law" for money damages, filed by a beneficiary against an insurance company on a contract, in which the insurance company has raised an equitable affirmative defense. An adversary proceeding under Section 732.802 is not a damages action asserting breach of contract....

...The probate court has not resolved any issue as to who in fact is entitled to receive insurance proceeds in the event a beneficiary is *399 disqualified, and in fact makes no effort to resolve issues between competing secondary beneficiaries. Rather, the sole issue in a Section 732.802 adversary proceeding is whether the statute applies because the heir or beneficiary has unlawfully and intentionally killed the decedent, and the alleged murdering party is disqualified thereunder....

...The single question to be answered is served by a probate proceeding adjudicating that question in light of a fundamental equitable principle, and is simply not a "contract action" or "action at law" in which the right to jury trial exists. Appellant further asserts that the "equitable" concept embraced by Section 732.802 became "legal" in nature and jury-demandable by virtue of its codification in the statute....

...We have examined the remaining arguments presented by appellant and find them to be without merit. Accordingly, we hold that there is no right to a jury trial in a probate adversary proceeding upon a petition to determine beneficiaries to disqualify a murdering spouse under Section 732.802, Florida Statutes....

...e Jean Capoccia, having been adjudicated guilty of the murder of Mr. Capoccia, had no interest in the property which could be lawfully encumbered after Mr. Capoccia's death. We reject the appellant's contention and affirm the trial court's judgment. Section 732.802(2), Florida Statutes (Supp....

...everal said to be designed to prevent a killer from receiving property passing outside a decedent's estate. Prudential Ins. Co. v. Baitinger, 452 So.2d 140 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984). As the court noted in Baitinger, the prior statute (now subsection (1) of Section 732.802) merely precluded the killer from receiving benefits "from the decedent or to take any part of his estate as a devisee." § 732.802, Fla....

...Martin, 52 So.2d 806 (Fla. 1951); Ashwood v. Patterson, 49 So.2d 848; In re Estate of Nunnelley, 343 So.2d 657 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977). This rule — expanded to cover all forms of ownership with survivorship incidents — was codified with the enactment of Section 732.802(2)....

...Notwithstanding that the Kowalskys were, without dispute, bona fide purchasers for value of the mortgage, they do not now claim that they are entitled to foreclose on more than Mrs. Capoccia's one-half interest and have not cross-appealed the lower court's judgment limiting their relief. See § 732.802(6), Fla....

...Silvia LoCascio died intestate, and the probate court appointed attorney Leon Sharpe as curator (and later as personal representative). 2 Ultimately the Son and his mother’s estate obtained three judgments against Edward S. LoCascio: (1) Under the “slayer statute,” section 732.802 Florida Statutes (2001), Edward S....

...The Son commenced two appeals to this Court. In case no. 3D08-1711, the Son argues that the marital residence (the decedent’s and murderer’s homestead) 5 passed in full to him as the mother’s sole heir. The Son bases this argument on the phrase in subsection 732.802(1), that “the estate of the decedent passes as if the killer had predeceased the decedent.” Had Edward S....

one-half as if the other had survived. . . . . Section 732.802, Florida Statutes (1977), provides: A person

CAMPBELL, Chief Judge. Appellant appeals the final judgment that denied her the right to collect, as the named beneficiary, on two insurance policies on her husband’s life. The trial court found, pursuant to the prohibitions of section 732.802, Florida Statutes (1987), that appellant was prohibited from collecting as beneficiary of the policies because she had unlawfully and intentionally killed her husband, Donald E....

15 F.L.W. D2518 [567 So.2d 1015 (1990)] and F.S. 732.802(1) BILLIE JEAN RAINS no longer has any legal

...The only issue raised on appeal is whether appellant is entitled to the one-half interest awarded to the collateral heirs. We agree with the trial court that he is not. The Florida Probate Code provides that the convicted murderer of a decedent shall not inherit from the decedent. Section 732.802, Florida Statutes....

...But the Father was not and could not be prohibited from hiring and agreeing to pay an attorney to represent him. It follows that neither he nor his attorneys did anything inequitable in recording the amount owed Carlton Fields in a final judgment and lien. The orders subordinating judgment are therefore reversed. . § 732.802, Fla....

determination was legally wrong based upon Section 732.802, Florida Statutes (1979), Ashwood v. Patterson

..., and the residue of the estate would be held in trust for Narcy’s two grandsons. After Narcy sought probate of the will, the court appointed appellee Douglas Hoffman as personal representative. Ultimately, the court determined that based upon section 732.802, Florida Statutes (2012), the Slayer Statute, Narcy was not entitled to participate in the estate, and the statute required the court to treat Narcy as having predeceased Ben. Therefore, her daughter and grandsons were the sole benefi...

...the devises to the remaining beneficiaries who did not participate in the procurement remain valid.” As to the Slayer Statute, the court determined that the Slayer Statute did not prohibit the children of the murderer from inheriting, ruling: Section 732.802 is clear and unambiguous and does not extend the prohibition of receipt of property or other benefits to anyone other than the killer of the decedent....

...of, for example, a conviction for manslaughter. Nable v. Godfrey’s Estate, 403 So. 2d 1038, 1040-41 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981). Disagreeing with this outcome, 3 the Legislature later expanded the statute by enacting section 732.802, Florida Statutes, which now provides: (1) A surviving person who unlawfully and intentionally kills or participates in procuring the death of the decedent is not entitled to any benefits under the will or under...

...Probate Code, and the estate of the decedent passes as if the killer had predeceased the decedent. Property appointed by the will of the decedent to or for the benefit of the killer passes as if the killer had predeceased the decedent. § 732.802(1), Fla....

...The First and Third Districts have relied on Benson in construing the other subsections of the Slayer Statute dealing with life insurance benefits and joint tenancies. See Chatman v. Currie, 606 So. 2d 454, 456 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992) (“We hold as a matter of law that section 732.802 does not apply to an innocent contingent beneficiary’s entitlement to life insurance benefits resulting from the killing of the primary beneficiary by the insured who then commits suicide.”); Lopez v....

...guez to recover the funds and a claim against the bank to obtain damages for the wrongful release of the funds. 2 Carlos and the bank filed motions to dismiss the counts pertaining to the bank accounts; the trial court dismissed those counts. Citing section 732.802(2), Florida Statutes (1989), Lopez contends- that Clemente's act of killing Isabel revoked the trusts, entitling Isabel’s heirs to receive her 50% interest in the funds. We find no merit in the contention. Section 732.802(2) provides that a “joint tenant who unlawfully and intentionally kills another joint tenant effects a severance of the interest of the decedent so that the share of the decedent passes as the decedent’s property and the killer has no rights by survivorship.” The statute does not provide that the killing effects a revocation or disaffirmance of a Totten trust. Moreover, the rules of statutory construction preclude this court from rewriting section 732.802(2) to effect such a revocation....

...affirm the trust. Seymour; Serpa v. North Ridge Bank, 547 So.2d 199 (Fla. 4th DCA 1989). Accordingly, we conclude that Lopez does not state a cause of action to set aside the trust on that ground. Lopez also contends that the equitable principles of section 732.802 should preclude Carlos from receiving the trust proceeds....

...We decline to hold that the legislature intended the statute to deprive an innocent beneficiary of the trust proceeds. See In re Estate of Benson, 548 So.2d 775 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989) (public policy does not extend Florida Slayer Statute to disinherit killer’s heirs). Because section 732.802(2) is inapplicable to the circumstance before us, and the complaint does not set forth facts demonstrating that Isabel revoked the trust, we hold that the trial *251 court properly dismissed the claims against Carlos and the bank....

...action to include the estate of Robert Hawkins, for which Dodd is also the personal representative. In reaching that conclusion, we have rejected the various arguments made by appellant on this issue, including her assertion of the applicability of Section 732.802, Florida Statutes, to this case and her contention that the court erred in refusing to allow her, as a defendant, to amend AIG’s complaint for interpleader....

...agreeing the court could proceed to determine the controversy on written memoranda of "law and oral argument. Thereafter the trial court entered a judgment finding that Roland was entitled to the probate assets of the estate under the provisions of section 732.802, Florida Statutes (1979)....

...The latter aspect of the judgment pertaining to the nonprobate assets is the subject of this appeal. In the circuit court and here, the appel-lees took the position that Roland was not entitled to the nonprobate assets because those assets do not fall within the purview of section 732.802, Florida Statutes (1979), which only precludes one from inheriting when he has been convicted of murdering the decedent....

...child such as Cosman did not have a survivor's claim under the Wrongful Death Act, sections 768.16-.26, Florida Statutes (2009). Cosman countered that Rodriguez's act of murder precluded his claim to surviving spouse status by operation of the "slayer statute," section 732.802, Florida Statutes (2006), which prevents a wrongdoer from profiting by such a crime....

...Servs., Inc., 314 So. 2d 765, 767 (Fla. 1975). The circuit court ruled that Cosman could not recover because Rodriguez was Wanda's surviving spouse. See § 768.21(3). In reaching this conclusion, the circuit court failed to apply section 732.802, which states in pertinent part: (1) A surviving person who unlawfully and intentionally kills ....

...would thwart the purpose of the wrongful death statutes. Id. at 543. Against this backdrop, we easily conclude that the right to recover damages for the wrongful death of a decedent under Florida's wrongful death law is an "interest" that, pursuant to section 732.802(4), must be treated as if the killer predeceased the decedent....

...e. PER CURIAM. Appellant, Justin Barber, appeals a final judgment which orders the disbursement of insurance proceeds to Appellee. Because we agree that the trial court's adjudication of Appellant's guilt of first-degree murder was final pursuant to section 732.802(5), Florida Statutes (2003), we affirm....

...*893 The insurance company filed an interpleader complaint against Appellant and Appellee. Pursuant to a court order, the insurance company deposited the proceeds into a bank account pending the court's determination of whether Appellant should be denied entitlement to the proceeds under section 732.802(3), Florida Statutes (2003)....

...ionally kills the principal obligee or the person upon whose life the policy is issued is not entitled to any benefit under the bond, policy, or other contractual arrangement; and it becomes payable as though the killer had predeceased the decedent. § 732.802(3), Florida Statutes (2003). Thereafter on September 15, 2006, Appellant was adjudicated guilty of the first-degree murder of his wife and was sentenced to life imprisonment. Appellee moved for summary judgment pursuant to section 732.802(5), Florida Statutes (2003), which states that "[a] final judgment of conviction of murder in any degree is conclusive for the purposes of this section." The trial court found that Appellant's conviction was final for the purposes of...

...of the insured's estate. Id. The insurance company appealed the order arguing that the husband's conviction could not be considered final due to a pending appeal. Id. at 142. The Third District Court of Appeal examined the legislative intent behind section 732.802 and determined that amendments to the statute demonstrated the Legislature's intent to make it more difficult for a killer to receive a financial benefit for his wrongdoing....

...beneficiaries because she would be able to seek money damages from those beneficiaries). We agree with the reasoning of the Third District in its finding that the Legislature intended a trial court's adjudication of guilt to be final for purposes of section 732.802, even if appellate remedies have not been exhausted....

...tanding her acquittal in the criminal prosecution, Peggy Howard had in fact stabbed her husband to death. The petition sought an order determining whether Peggy Howard had unlawfully and intentionally killed her husband, thus disqualifying her under 732.802, Florida Statutes (1985), from benefiting from his death....

...The Howard children obtained counsel to represent them in the adversary proceedings on the petition. The Howard children took the position that Peggy had unlawfully and intentionally killed the decedent and that she was therefore disqualified under Section 732.802....

...The attorneys for the Howard children joined forces with the attorney for the personal representative in the effort to bar decedent’s widow from benefiting from the decedent’s death. The trial court found in its final order on the petition to determine beneficiaries that Section 732.802 should apply to preclude Mrs....

...In a related appeal before this court (Case No. 87-1090), the widow of the decedent appealed from the final order entered upon the personal representative’s petition to determine beneficiaries, in which order the probate court disqualified the widow as a murdering spouse under Section 732.802....

...Slayer Statute, which states: A surviving person who unlawfully and intentionally kills or participates in procuring the death of the decedent is not entitled to any benefits under the will or under the Florida Probate Code, and the estate of the decedent passes as if the killer had predeceased the decedent. § 732.802(1), Fla.Stat....