Florida/Georgia Personal Injury & Workers Compensation

...KUA and FMPA argued that the indemnity provision is void and unenforceable because KUA could not waive its sovereign immunity beyond that authorized by section 768.28, Florida Statutes (1997), absent specific legislative authority, and because under section 725.06, Florida Statutes (1997), the terms of the provision failed to meet the requirements for such provisions when contained in construction contracts....

...nify and save harmless UPS ... against any and all claims, liabilities, loss and expenses... . Such indemnity shall include the defense of all claims made against UPS... ." Jemco contends that this indemnity provision is void and unenforceable under Section 725.06, Florida Statutes (1975)....

...Insurance Company and Liberty Mutual Insurance Company, parties to this appeal. [3] Our holding affirming the entire indemnity award based on contractual indemnity makes it unnecessary to decide the validity of UPS's common law indemnity claim. [4] Section 725.06, Florida Statutes (1975), provides: "Construction contracts; limitation on indemnification....

...t to be made during regular business hours, law of place of performance is looked to to determine what are regular business hours). [7] The trial court incorrectly ruled that Florida law applied, but held that the monetary limitation requirements of Section 725.06, Florida Statutes (1975), were satisfied by the minimum insurance called for by the contract....

...ork.... The summary final judgment presently on appeal is the second judgment rendered in favor of Howard and INA and against CDM. Earlier in the proceedings, the trial court had granted summary judgment in favor of Howard and INA on the ground that section 725.06, Florida Statutes (1983), precluded CDM's claim absent specific consideration from CDM; that there was no special relationship by which CDM was vicariously liable for the negligence of Howard or its subcontractors; and that the exclusi...

...aw indemnity in any of the four cases; (b) appellee was negligent in administering the contract or discharging its supervisory duties, thus precluding any recovery under contractual or common law indemnity; and (c) the contract failed to comply with section 725.06, Florida Statutes (1981), which imposes certain restrictions on indemnification provisions in construction contracts....

...e: (a) under Florida law, a general indemnification clause in a contract will not protect the indemnitee from liability arising out of its own negligence unless the provision contains specific language expressly evidencing such intent; and (b) under section 725.06, a provision in a construction contract which purports to indemnify a party against liability for its own conduct is unenforceable unless the contract contains a monetary limitation on the extent of the indemnification, and the party indemnified gives a specific consideration to the indemnitor for that protection....

...The trial court entered a final judgment against appellant, awarding appellee a total of $183,638.22 in damages and attorney's fees. Appellant raises four points on appeal: *855 I. WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT FOR APPELLEE ON ITS CLAIM FOR BREACH OF CONTRACT? II. WHETHER SECTION 725.06, FLORIDA STATUTES (1983) IS IRRELEVANT TO THIS CASE BECAUSE APPELLEE WAS AWARDED SUMMARY JUDGMENT BASED ON BREACH OF CONTRACT, NOT INDEMNIFICATION? III....

...e policies that not only insured appellant for any liabilities it might have to appellee, but provided that appellee would also be insured to protect it "from all claims, suits or liabilities." In regard to appellant's second point, we conclude that section 725.06, Florida Statutes (1977), which was the statute which would be applicable to a contract *856 entered into in 1977, is clearly a limitation upon indemnification and has no applicability to a contract provision relating to insurance for liabilities arising out of the performance of construction contracts. Since appellee's cause of action grew out of a breach of such a contract providing for insurance, section 725.06 is not applicable....

...hereunder bears a reasonable commercial relationship to this Subcontract Agreement and is equal to the limits of aggregate insurance provided by [CPM] under this Subcontract Agreement or $1 million, whichever is greater, and that the requirements of §725.06, Fla....

...Stat. (2001) (certain activities at mobile home parks); 627.728, Fla. Stat. (2001) (duty owed by insurance companies that disclose false information in cancellation letter); § 713.31(2)(a), Fla. Stat. (2001) (liability for improper construction lien); § 725.06(1)(c), Fla....

...intent to indemnify the third party plaintiffs for their wrongful acts in clear and unambiguous terms. In addition, it is highly questionable whether said third party plaintiffs are third party beneficiaries of said contractual provision in view of Section 725.06, Florida Statutes (1975)....

...BE & K answered the third-party complaint, denying liability and alleging several affirmative defenses, including (1) allegations that Seminole Kraft was not entitled to indemnification because the contractual provision on which it relied failed to comply with section 725.06, Florida Statutes, and (2) that Bricker's injury was caused by Seminole's sole negligence....

...aft on the `main claim' by the plaintiff." BE & K contends it will be irreparably prejudiced by this premature entry of partial summary judgment "by precluding it from litigating the issues of whether the indemnity agreement complied with Fla. Stat. § 725.06 and whether the plaintiff's injuries, in the language of the indemnity agreement, resulted from or arose out of BE & K's performance of its construction contract with Seminole Kraft." Addressing first jurisdiction under rule 9.130(a)(3)(C)(...

...determination on final judgment of the existence and scope of Seminole Kraft's liability to the Brickers. The only prejudice argued by BE & K is that it will be wrongfully deprived of the right to raise whether the indemnity agreement complies with section 725.06, a defensive issue that presumably was considered by the trial court before it entered the partial summary judgment....

...er for Linpro's own negligence. We agree with Meisner that, if the intention of the drafter was to allow Linpro to collect for its own negligence from the contractor, then the provision is unenforceable to that extent because it does not comply with section 725.06, Florida Statutes (1991)....

...On motion for summary judgment, the trial court determined the agreement was unenforceable. The court held that the agreement did not obligate Turnberry to indemnify Westinghouse for Westinghouse's own wrongdoing and further that it failed to meet the requirements of Section 725.06, Florida Statutes (1979). Summary judgment was entered in favor of Turnberry on the third party action. Section 725.06, Florida Statutes (1979), sets out the requirements for indemnity agreements in construction contracts. The statute reads as follows: 725.06 Construction contracts; limitation on indemnification....

...*409 Furthermore, indemnity contracts are generally unenforceable unless they specifically set out in clear, unequivocal terms an intent to indemnify the indemnitee for his own wrongdoing. Charles Poe Masonry, Inc. v. Spring Lock Scaffolding Rental Equipment Company, 374 So.2d 487 (Fla. 1979). Only one of the sub-sections of Section 725.06 need be satisfied since the statute reads in the disjunctive....

...The trial court dismissed both counts of the complaint, finding Humana was not a party to the relevant contract. In the alternative, and assuming Humana's status as a party to the contract, the trial court found, as to Count I, the contractual indemnification clause unenforceable due to Kone's failure to comply with section 725.06, Florida Statutes (1999). As to Count II, the court ruled Kone could not recover contract damages in "an essentially tort action." We reverse the dismissal of Count I and remand the case for further proceedings, because section 725.06 does not control....

...Kone brought a third-party complaint against Humana for breach of contract and indemnity arising out of the indemnification provision in the agreement. Humana moved to dismiss the third party complaint on two grounds: (1) the indemnity provision failed to comply with section 725.06, Florida Statutes (1999); and (2) Humana lacked status as a party to the contract. At the hearing on the motion, and on appeal, Humana stipulated it was a party to the contract, dropping the argument made in the motion to dismiss. The hearing focused upon whether section 725.06, Florida Statutes (1999), applied to the maintenance agreement....

...the burden of indemnification upon Humana. Even if Humana were a party to the contract Kone seeks to enforce against Humana moreover, the contract is unenforceable due to Kone's failure to comply with statutory requirements for indemnification. See § 725.06, Fla....

...4th DCA 1981) (quoting Gunn in finding a stipulation binding on a court). Appropriately, Humana does not contest the point on appeal. The trial court erred when it found Humana was not a party to the contract. We next consider whether the trial court erred in finding section 725.06, Florida Statutes (1999), applies to this maintenance agreement....

...bid documents, if any. We review a trial court's construction of a statute de novo. See B.Y. v. Dep't of Children & Families, 887 So.2d 1253, 1255 (Fla.2004). Examining the statute's language, we have failed to discern a legislative intent to apply section 725.06, Florida Statutes (1999), to non-construction contracts such as the one involved in this case....

...vements to property."), quashed in part on other grounds, 591 So.2d 627 (Fla.1992). To fall within the statute, a party must be an owner of real property, architect, engineer, general contractor, subcontractor, sub-subcontractor, or materialman. See § 725.06, Fla....

...Burnes v. Pemco Aeroplex, Inc., 291 F.3d 1282, 1284 (11th Cir. 2002). First, KUA and FMPA argued that the indemnification provision in the Crossing Agreement is invalid because its terms do not satisfy the requirements in F LA. S TAT. ch. 725.06....

...which the appurtenance is constructed must contain: (1) a monetary limitation on 13 the extent of the indemnification; or (2) specific consideration given by the indemnified party to the indemnitor. See F LA. S TAT. ch. 725.06 (1993)....

...not second-guess a State’s application of its own law.” Id. at 450 n.6. Thus, although we did not certify to the Florida Supreme Court a question about the validity of the Crossing Agreement’s indemnity provision vis-a-vis F LA. S TAT. ch. 725.06, we decline to second-guess the court’s determination that KUA received consideration for its agreement to indemnify CSX and that the Crossing Agreement is enforceable....

...those in direct response to certified questions should be carefully considered by certifying court). Moreover, this conclusion coincides with our own review of Florida state law. As one Florida court noted, “[t]he ‘specific consideration’ required by section 725.06(2) need not be a dollar amount.” Peoples Gas System, Inc....

...Accordingly, although the Crossing Agreement did not specify a dollar amount as consideration, CSX’s grant of a license to use the crossing to access the Plant and the allowance of increased risk attendant to such use constituted consideration necessary to satisfy F LA. S TAT. ch. 725.06....

...hiring Burnup and Sims, an experienced cable company. 3) The contractual indemnity language relied upon by Gulf Power is invalid and unenforceable under Florida law because it was not specific enough to indemnify Gulf against its own negligence. 4) Section 725.06, Florida Statutes, precludes utilization of the indemnification clause in the instant case....

...There were still factual issues to be resolved concerning whether Gulf and Cox were, in fact, joint tort-feasors. The trial court, therefore, erred in determining that the indemnification clause was invalid and unenforceable under Florida law. See United Parcel Service of America, Inc. III. Whether section 725.06, Florida Statutes, precludes Gulf from maintaining an action for indemnification against Cox. Section 725.06, Florida Statutes, provides: Construction contracts; limitation on indemnification....

...This statutory provision expressly applies in situations when an owner of real property contracts for improvements to property. In the instant case, however, Gulf was not seeking to have improvements made, but rather Cox was seeking a license to utilize the property of Gulf. Section 725.06, Florida Statutes, therefore, does not apply in this situation and would not preclude Gulf from seeking indemnification....

...ual indemnity provision given by RSH. The trial court ruled that no specific consideration was given by Peoples to RSH for the contractual indemnification agreement and as a result the indemnification provision was void and unenforceable pursuant to section 725.06(2), Florida Statutes (1987). We conclude that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment on this issue. Section 725.06 provides: Any portion of any agreement or contract for, or in connection with, any construction, alteration, repair, or demolition of a building, structure, appurtenance, or appliance, including moving and excavating connected with it,...

...Consideration by payment of a percentage of a defined amount is valid under Florida law. See e.g. Pacific Nat. Equity Co. v. Montgomery, 367 So.2d 729 (Fla. 4th DCA 1979); MacIntyre v. Green's Pool Service, Inc., 347 So.2d 1081 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977). The "specific consideration" required by section 725.06(2) need not be a dollar amount. In a fourth district case interpreting 725.06(2), Westinghouse Electric Corporation v....

...4th DCA 1982), the court held that early delivery of elevators, ahead of schedule, constituted "specific consideration" within the meaning of the statute. Since the early delivery of the elevators in Westinghouse constituted specific consideration under section 725.06(2), most assuredly the payment of a percentage amount pursuant to the agreement would satisfy the requirements of that section....

...consideration under the statute, but argued, consistent with the explicit ruling by the court below in the summary judgment, that the recited consideration was a mere empty recital that Peoples never intended to pay and is not sufficient to satisfy section 725.06(2)....

...Drawing all inferences in favor of appellant, the party against whom the motion for summary judgment was brought, it would be fair for the trier of fact to find that 1% of this amount represents specific consideration given to RSH within the meaning of section 725.06(2)....

...As to the active-passive theory against Serra, there is a total lack of a factual basis for a holding that Serra was actively negligent. The written indemnity agreement whereby *536 Serra expressly agreed to indemnify A-T-O against the consequences of A-T-O's own negligence is defeated by the terms of Section 725.06, Florida Statutes (1975)....

...the record; and "(b) the $1,000,000 punitive award is excessive because the record does not demonstrate the degree of maliciousness and/or outrageous disregard for the plaintiffs' rights required to sustain a $1,000,000 punitive damage award." [3] "§ 725.06 Construction contracts; limitation on indemnification "Any portion of any agreement or contract for, or in connection with, any construction, alteration, repair, or demolition of a building, structure, appurtenance, or appliance, including...

...CDM appeals contending the trial court erred in determining that its claim for indemnification was barred by Florida's Workers' Compensation Act, section 440.11(1), Florida Statutes (1983), and by Florida's statutory limitation on indemnification contracts, section 725.06, Florida Statutes (1983)....

...v. City of Clearwater, Florida, 478 So.2d 816 (Fla.1985). Accordingly, we reverse this ruling. The trial court also ruled that the indemnity agreement between CDM and Howard was void and therefore unenforceable, because CDM had failed to comply with section 725.06, Florida Statutes (1983), which provides, in relevant part: *1257 725.06 Construction contracts; limitation on indemnification.- Any portion of any agreement or contract for, or in connection with, any construction......

...nst [Howard] fails." REVERSED in part; AFFIRMED in part; REMANDED. GRIFFIN, C.J., and COBB, J., concur. NOTES [1] The parties do not dispute that the agreement in this case does not contain a monetary limitation on the extent of indemnification. See § 725.06(1), Fla....

...1973, 272 So.2d 507; Ivey Plants, Inc. v. FMC Corporation, Fla.App. 1973, 282 So.2d 205. We note that it clearly appears from the record that Maule paid an additional premium for the coverage provided in the indemnity agreement, thus meeting the requirement of § 725.06(2), Fla....

...against Griswold for contractual indemnity. The “additional costs” constitute the amount Pumpco paid to Appellee, Tony Reddick (“Reddick”), to settle his negligence claims. Because we determine the indemnity provision at issue is void under section 725.06, Florida Statutes (2007), we reverse the judgment and remand the cause for further proceedings....

...’s claims for $65,000, Pumpco sought indemnification from Griswold under the provision quoted above. In defending against Pumpeo’s motion for summary judgment, Griswold argued, among other things, that the indemnification provision is void under section 725.06 because it contains no monetary limitation....

...The trial court found the provision valid and enforceable, reasoning that the statute applies only to construction or construction-related contracts in which one party is the property owner. We conclude the court erred in its reading of the statute. Section 725.06(1) reads, in part: Any portion of any agreement or contract for or in connection with, or any guarantee of or in connection with, any construction, alteration, repair, or demolition of a building, structure, appurtenance, or appliance,...

...�s negligence. Id. at 535-36 . The scaffolding failed, the injured worker sued the lessor for negligence and won, and the lessor, in turn, sought indemnity from its lessee. The court held that the indemnity provision was “defeated by the terms of [section 725.06]” because it “did not contain a monetary limitation....” Id. at 536 . The indemnity provision at issue in this case does not contain a dollar limit to Griswold’s potential liability. For that reason, it is void and unenforceable as provided in section 725.06, and the trial court erred in ruling otherwise. Accordingly, we reverse the final judgment.on appeal and remand the cause for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. REVERSED and REMANDED. ROWE and SWANSON, JJ„ concur. . Pumpco asserts that section 725.06 evinces the Legislature’s intent to protect only property owners from unlimited indemnity liability. But the statute's language simply does not bear this out because it says: "Any portion of any agreement or contract ... wherein any party referred to herein promises to indemnify or hold harmless the other party....” (Emphasis added.) . Section 725.06, Florida Statutes (1975), read: Any portion of any agreement or contract for, or in connection with, any construction, alteration, repair, or demolition of a building, structure, appurtenance, or appliance, including moving and excavat...

...protective liability insurance.” On appeal, Mamba challenges the finding that JEA had not waived its right to sue Mamba for the failure to provide owner’s and contractor’s protective liability insurance. Mamba also challenges the finding that Section 725.06, Florida Statutes (1973), is not applicable to the indemnity agreement entered into between Mamba and JEA, arguing JEA is an owner of land for purposes of this statute....

...We affirm the trial court’s finding that JEA had not, as a matter of law, waived its right to sue Mamba for Mamba’s failure to provide “owner’s and contractor’s protective liability insurance.” We therefore do not reach the issue raised concerning the applicability of Section 725.06, Florida Statutes (1983)....

...LLC, contractual indemnity and a defense in a personal injury action, as well as awarding attorney’s fees. Blok contends that its subcontract with 1 Mastec, which required Blok to indemnify Mastec for its own negligence, did not comply with section 725.06, Florida Statutes (2008), and, thus, its contractual indemnification provisions were unenforceable....

...y act, omission, default or negligence (whether active or passive) of the Indemnitees, or any of them . . . . (emphasis added). Blok contended that the indemnification provisions were invalid because the contract did not comply with section 725.06, Florida Statutes (2008)....

...Such a contract is unenforceable unless it contains a monetary limitation on the extent of such liability. Blok contended that because there was no such limitation in the Blok/Mastec contract, the indemnification provision was void and unenforceable. Mastec and BellSouth argued that section 725.06 did not apply to this contract, and in any case, a monetary limitation was contained in the BellSouth/Mastec contract which, through an incorporation clause, applied to the Blok/Mastec contract. Both sides moved for summary judgment....

...Deutsche Lufthansa Aktiengesellschaft, Inc., 133 So. 3d 1108, 1110 (Fla. 3d DCA 2014). It also applies to the interpretation of a statute. See Toler v. Bank of America, Nat’l Ass’n, 78 So. 3d 699, 701-02 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012). 4  Blok argues that section 725.06, Florida Statutes, applies to its contract, and because the contract contains no monetary limitation on its obligation to indemnify Mastec for Mastec’s own negligence, the indemnification provision is unenforceable. Based upon the plain wording of the statute, however, we conclude that section 725.06 does not apply to this contract. Section 725.06(1) covers contracts for construction as follows: Any portion of any agreement or contract for or in connection with, or any guarantee of or in connection with, any construction, alteration, repair, or demoli...

...1st DCA 1968)). Blok contends that because it entered into a contract for excavation, the statute governs. Excavation, however, must be associated with the “construction, alteration, repair, or demolition of a building, structure, appurtenance, or appliance . . . .” § 725.06(1), Fla....

...ch pass as incident to the principal thing.” Chackal v. Staples, 991 So. 2d 949, 955 5 ordinary meaning, the statute does not govern the contractual provisions. Blok cites several cases in which section 725.06 has been applied, but all involve either the construction of a building or structure....

...3d 985, 986 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012), the statute was applied to a contract for a lease of a concrete pump truck, as the truck was being used in the laying of a foundation of a building, which type of contract is covered by the statute. Mastec suggests that section 725.06 does not apply to utility contracts, which are quasi-governmental....

...BellSouth Telecomm., Inc., 936 So. 2d 40 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006), which involved a contract with a similar indemnity provision as in this case. The contract in question provided for the installation of utility poles, and the court enforced the indemnity provision but never addressed section 725.06. Mastec and BellSouth suggest that this is because it is a utility contract, and section 725.06 does not apply to utility contracts. Blok, however, has provided us the briefs of that case, and it appears from the argument that neither party argued the application of section 725.06. Thus, we do not decide this case on the basis that section 725.06 can never apply to a contract with a utility. As to BellSouth, we conclude that the court erred in determining that Blok owed a duty of indemnity and a duty to defend BellSouth....

...ment after a determination of the existence and scope of the property owner's liability to the plaintiffs: The only prejudice argued by BE & K is that it will be wrongfully deprived of the right to raise whether the indemnity agreement complies with section 725.06, a defensive issue that presumably was considered by the trial court before it entered summary judgment....

...subcontractors. During the litigation between Barton-Malow and the subcontractors, the subcontractors filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that the indemnity provision in Barton-Malow's subcontract agreement was void and unenforceable under section 725.06, Florida Statutes (1983)....

...Thus, the total award against the six subcontractors was $146,344.99, with each subcontractor being responsible for a portion of this total amount. In this appeal, Barton-Malow does not challenge the trial court's ruling that the indemnity provision in its subcontract agreements is unenforceable under section 725.06....

...om Volpe the defense costs and attorneys' fees it incurred in defending itself). Finally, Barton-Malow correctly points out that in Cone Brothers Contracting Co. v. Ashland-Warren, Inc., 458 So.2d 851, 855-56 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984), this court held that section 725.06 does not invalidate any contractual provision other than the indemnity provision....

...e because, absent specific legislative authority, KUA could not waive its sovereign immunity beyond what was authorized by Florida Statute § 768.28.29 They also contend that the indemnity provision is void and unenforceable under Florida Statute § 725.06 because its terms failed to meet the requirements for such provisions when contained in “construction” contracts....

PER CURIAM. We affirm the trial court’s order granting appellee’s renewed motion for directed verdict and entering final judgment. We agree with the trial court that the indemnification agreement did not meet the requirements of section 725.06(2), Florida Statutes (1999), since it did not give a “specific consideration” for the indemnification that was “provided for” in the contract....

...The contract was made in New York, and for that reason we hold that New York law, under which the indemnity agreement is valid and enforceable, see e. g., Levine v. Shell Oil Company, 28 N.Y.2d 205 , 269 N.E.2d 799 (1971), not the law of Florida, under which it is not, see § 725.06, Fla.Stat....

...Counts I, II, and IV, seeking contractual indemnity, were apparently dismissed in part on the ground that the indemnity contract between the general contractor and subcontractor did not contain either a monetary limitation on the extent of damages, or specific consideration for indemnity as required by Section 725.06, Florida Statutes (1972). That section reads as follows: 725.06 Construction contracts; limitation on indemnification....

...ified by the contract gives a specific consideration to the indemnitor for the indemnification that shall be provided for in this contract and section of the project specifications or bid documents, if any. Appellant argues, among other things, that Section 725.06 applies only to indemnification against one’s own negligence and thus does not have any application to the specific facts at bar. We agree. Specifically, Section 725.06 states in relevant part as applied to the factual scenario before us: “Any portion of any agreement or contract for, or in connection with, any construction, ......

...Under circumstances in which a party seeking indemnity is shown to be actively negligent, we consider that the legislature intended that before such party may be indemnified for its own negligence, it must satisfy either of the two above exceptions set forth in Section 725.06....

...Florida Power & Light Co., 162 So.2d 298 (Fla. 3rd DCA) cert. den. 166 So.2d 754 (Fla.1964). Moreover, in a very recent opinion, Cothron, Inc. v. Upper Keys Marine Construction, Inc., 480 So.2d 136 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1985), the Third District Court of Appeal determined that Section 725.06 only governs a situation wherein the general contractor/indemnitee seeks indemnification from the subcontractor for the general contractor’s negligence. Cf. Westinghouse Electric Corp. v. Turnberry Corp., 423 So.2d 407 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982) rev. den. 434 So.2d 889 (Fla.1983) (section 725.06 found applicable to an agreement that specifically stated in clear and unequivocable terms that the subcontractor was to be indemnified for its own wrongdoing); A-T-O, Inc....

...fy A-T-0 (manufacturer’s buyer) against the consequences of A-T-O’s own negligence). In cases, however, wherein the subcontractor enters into a contractual agreement to indemnify the general contractor for negligence caused by the subcontractor, Section 725.06 has no application....

...ute; that is whether the clauses provide indemnification to the indemnitee (general contractor-appellant) for its own negligence. We find that in two of the appellee’s indemnification agreements (Mid-South Glass Co. and Western Waterproofing Co.), Section 725.06 does not apply since the clauses do not absolve the indemnitee (appellant) for its own negligence....

...Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. ERVIN, JOANOS and BARFIELD, JJ., concur. . Although not controlling, California Civil Code Section 2782 which is strikenly similar to its Florida counterpart, Section 725.06, may provide analogous support....

...ions, LLC, contractual indemnity and a defense in a personal injury action, as well as an award of attorney’s fees. Blok contends that its subcontract with Mastec, which required Blok to indemnify Mastec for its own negligence, did not comply with section 725.06, Florida Statutes (2008), and, thus, its contractual indemnification provisions were unenforceable. The statute, however, does not apply to the contract in this case. Therefore, the trial court correctly determined that Blok owed Mastec a duty to indemnify and defend....

...concurrent or contributing) by any act, omission, default or negligence (whether active or passive) of the Indemnitees, or any of them . . . . (emphasis added). Blok contended that the indemnification provisions were invalid because the contract did not comply with section 725.06, Florida Statutes 3 (2008)....

...Such a contract is unenforceable unless it contains a monetary limitation on the extent of such liability. Blok contended that because there was no such limitation in the Blok/Mastec contract, the indemnification provision was void and unenforceable. Mastec and BellSouth argued that section 725.06 did not apply to this contract, and in any case, a monetary limitation was contained in the BellSouth/Mastec contract which, through an incorporation clause, applied to the Blok/Mastec contract. Both sides moved for summary judgment....

...Deutsche Lufthansa Aktiengesellschaft, Inc., 133 So. 3d 1108, 1110 (Fla. 3d DCA 2014). It also applies to the interpretation of a statute. See Toler v. Bank of America, Nat’l Ass’n, 78 So. 3d 699, 701-02 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012). Blok argues that section 725.06, Florida Statutes, applies to its contract, and because the contract contains no monetary limitation on its obligation to indemnify Mastec for Mastec’s own negligence, the indemnification provision is unenforceable. Based upon the plain wording of the statute, however, we conclude that section 725.06 does not apply to this contract. Section 725.06(1) covers contracts for construction as follows: Any portion of any agreement or contract for or in connection with, or any guarantee of or in connection with, any construction, alteration, repair, or demolition of a...

...1st DCA 1968)). Blok contends that because it entered into a contract for excavation, the statute governs. Excavation, however, must be associated with the “construction, alteration, repair or demolition of a building, structure, appurtenance, or appliance . . . .” § 725.06(1), Fla....

...the laying and maintenance of utility lines. The contract does not involve a building, structure, appurtenance, 1 or appliance. Therefore, given its plain and ordinary meaning, the statute does not govern the contractual provisions. Blok cites several cases in which section 725.06 has been applied, but all involve either the construction of a building or structure....

...3d 985, 986 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012), the statute was applied to a contract for a lease of a concrete pump truck, as the truck was being used in the laying of a foundation of a building, which type of contract is covered by the statute. Mastec suggests that section 725.06 does not apply to utility contracts, which are quasi-governmental....

...BellSouth Telecomm., Inc., 936 So. 2d 40 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006), which involved a contract with a similar indemnity provision as in this case. The contract in question provided for the installation of utility poles, and the court enforced the indemnity provision but never addressed section 725.06....

...nd which pass as incident to the principal thing.” Chackal v. Staples, 991 So. 2d 949, 955 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008) (quoting Trask v. Moore, 24 Cal. 2d 365, 368, 149 P.2d 854, 856 (1944)). 5 utility contract, and section 725.06 does not apply to utility contracts....

...red any loss because it has paid no damages. MasTec seeks indemnification under the agreement if Suncoast is found to be at fault and MasTec is required to pay damages. Furthermore, Suncoast concedes that the trial court applied the wrong version of section 725.06 when analyzing the contract's indemnity provision and concluding that the provision is legally unenforceable....

specifications or bid documents, if any. Fla. Stat. § 725.06(1) (emphasis added). Paragraph 3 of the Rental

contract was void and unenforceable because of section 725.06, Florida Statutes (1985), which provides as

clauses were void and unenforcable pursuant to section 725.06, Florida Statutes (2004), which provides in

clauses were void and unenforcable pursuant to section 725.06, Florida Statutes (2004), which provides in

PER CURIAM. We reverse the summary judgment entered by the trial court in favor of appellee, Upper Keys Marine Construction, Inc. [Upper Keys]. We find error in the trial court’s application of section 725.06, Florida Statutes (1977), as the ground for denying appellant Alonzo Cothron, Inc. [Coth-ron] indemnification from Upper Keys for attorney’s fees and costs advanced by Cothron in a wrongful death action against Upper Keys, Cothron, and others. Section 725.06 does not govern the circumstances of the case under consideration. Section 725.06 would apply if Coth- *137 ron sought indemnification from Upper Keys for Cothron’s negligence....

PER CURIAM. Affirmed. § 725.06, Fla.Stat....

...(Babe’s), in litigation initiated by New College against Pilot and Babe’s. 1 In moving for summary judgment, Babe’s argued that New College’s release of Babe’s in connection with their settlement barred Pilot’s claims against Babe’s. Babe’s also argued that Pilot’s indemnity claims were barred by section 725.06, Florida Statutes (2005)....

...Pilot also alleged that Babe’s failed to honor its written warranty for work it performed on the project. Babe’s moved for summary judgment, claiming that New College’s settlement with Babe’s included a release which covered any claims that Pilot could make against Babe’s and that section 725.06 barred Pilot’s claims of indemnity....

...the trial court erred in granting summary judgment against Pilot. There remain material issues of fact regarding whether Pilot’s responsibility to New College was based on Babe’s’ faulty work and, if so, whether Babe’s is liable to Pilot. C. Section 725.06 Babe’s’ motion for summary judgment also argued that Pilot’s claims were barred by section 725.06 because Pilot was seeking indemnification from Babe’s for Pilot’s own negligence. See Fed. Ins. Co. v. W. Waterproofing Co. of Am., 500 So.2d 162, 164 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986) (holding that section 725.06 operates to bar indemnification “in circumstances wherein a party by contract seeks to obtain indemnification from another party for its own active negligence ”). Pilot argues on appeal that section 725.06 “only applies to circumstances where the first party agreed to indemnify the second party for the second party’s negligence.” The 1997 version 2 of section 725.06 applicable to this case provides, in relevant part, that “[a]ny portion of any agreement or contract for ......

...This statute is inapplicable to the facts of this case as demonstrated in Alonzo Cothron, Inc. v. Upper Keys Marine Construction, Inc., 480 So.2d 136 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985). In that case, the Third District held that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment on the basis of section 725.06. 480 So.2d at 136 . The court held that “[sjection 725.06 would apply if Cothron sought indemnification from Upper Keys for Cothran’s negligence.......

...or negligence by Upper Keys in the performance of its construction contract with Cothron.” 480 So.2d at 136-37 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). The court held that the contractual provision providing for indemnification was valid. Id. at 137 . Section 725.06 would only bar Pilot’s claims for indemnification if Pilot’s claims were based on Pilot’s own negligence....