CopyCited 15 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 33 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 425, 2008 Fla. LEXIS 1112, 2008 WL 2520879
...ance. However, below, the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida ("the federal district court") appears to have based the entry of a summary judgment in favor of the Appellees upon an interpretation of sections
626.922 and
627.421, Florida Statutes (2003), that would alter our prior precedent in this area....
...ive Builders, and Jack Farji] filed motions for summary judgment in th[e] declaratory action. Essex contended that the terms of Lighthouse's policy preclude coverage. The defendants contended that Essex had violated Florida Statutes §§
626.922 and
627.421 by not delivering the policy to Lighthouse and, therefore, Essex was precluded from denying coverage....
...The [federal] district court agreed with the defendants' first contention and granted their motion for summary judgment, declaring that Essex was precluded from denying coverage because it had failed to deliver the policy to the insured, as required by Florida Statutes *1041 §§
626.922 and
627.421.[ [4] ] The defendants subsequently filed a motion for attorney's fees under Florida Statute §
627.428....
...as appealed both orders. Zota II,
466 F.3d at 982-83 (emphasis supplied). After probing the issues raised thus far in the Zota litigation, the Eleventh Circuit certified the following five questions to this Court: 1. Whether Fla. Stat. §
626.922 or §
627.421, or both, require delivery of evidence of insurance directly to the insured, so that delivery to the insured's agent is insufficient. 2. Whether, if the delivery requirement of Fla. Stat. §
626.922 or §
627.421, or both, was not met in this case the appropriate remedy is to preclude the insurer from asserting lack of coverage under the terms of the policy....
...nd underdeveloped factual questions. Therefore, we decline to address those questions in lieu of the federal district court. We conclude by answering the first certified question in the negative and, in the process, we hold that sections
626.922 and
627.421, Florida Statutes (2003), have not abrogated the common-law agency analysis that this Court has previously applied in insurance-broker cases....
...See
511 So.2d at 969-71; ch. 88-166 Staff Analysis at 4. The correct interpretation is that the exclusionary provisions of section
627.021(2) apply only to the ratings laws found in part I of chapter 627. When applied here, this holding mandates that both section
627.421 and section
627.428 apply to surplus-lines insurance because neither of those statutory sections appears in part I of chapter 627; rather, sections
627.421 and
627.428 appear in part II of that chapter. [8] See §§
627.421 ("Delivery of policy"),
627.428 ("Attorney's fees"), Fla....
...(2003); see also Chacin v. Generali Assicurazioni Generali Spa,
655 So.2d 1162, 1162-63 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995) (holding that attorney's fees are awardable against surplus-lines insurers under section
627.428). B. The Significance of Sections
626.922 and
627.421 Having reaffirmed Manaure V and its explanation of the scope of section
627.021, Florida Statutes, we now address the first certified question, which we rephrase as follows: Whether section
626.922 or section
627.421, Florida Statutes (2003), or both, require delivery of evidence of insurance directly to the insured, so that delivery to the insured's representativeacting as an independent insurance broker in the transactionis insufficient....
...ex CGL policy. Therefore, under Almerico, Brandon's receipt of the Essex CGL policy constituted delivery to its principal, Lighthouse Intracoastal. See
716 So.2d at 776-82; see also 3 Russ & Segalla, supra §§ 45:5, 45:10. iii. Sections
626.922 and
627.421 Do Not Alter the Common-Law Rule It is a well-settled rule of Florida statutory construction that [s]tatutes in derogation of the common law are to be construed strictly....
...r the presumption is that no change in the common law is intended unless the statute is explicit in this regard. Carlile v. Game & Fresh Water Fish Comm'n,
354 So.2d 362, 364 (Fla.1977) (emphasis supplied). Accordingly, for either section
626.922 or section
627.421 to alter the common-law broker-agency presumption, those statutes were required to announce that intention in explicit, unequivocal terms....
...Thus, even after resorting to extrinsic legislative materials, it remains clear that section
626.922(1)'s policy-issuance nondelegation rule has nothing to do with policy "delivery," and, therefore, the common-law broker-agency presumption emerges unscathed. Section
627.421, Florida Statutes (2003), also does not alter the common-law broker-agency presumption....
...That statute states in relevant part that "[s]ubject to the insurer's requirement as to payment of premium, every policy shall be mailed or delivered to the insured or to the person entitled thereto not later than 60 days after the effectuation of coverage." § 627.421(1), Fla. Stat. (2003) (emphasis supplied). Section 627.421 does not state that the phrase "to the insured or to the person entitled thereto," excludes authorized insurance representative-brokers of the principal-insured....
...tion; (2) the insured disputes that it received a copy of the policy; and (3) the insured fails to present any evidence that its independent insurance representative-broker was actually acting as an agent of the insurer, the insured may not point to section 627.421 as mandating that the insurer was required to deliver a copy of the policy directly to the insured. In these types of situations, a surplus-lines insurer or its direct surplus-lines agent complies with section 627.421's command to deliver a copy of the policy "to the insured or to the person entitled thereto," by delivering a copy of the policy to the insured's undisputed, independent representative-broker (e.g., R.A. Brandon & Company in this case). See § 627.421(1), Fla....
...agent of the insurer. See
716 So.2d at 782-83; see also 3 Russ & Segalla, supra §§ 45:5, 45:10. However, the Appellees have not done so in this case. Accordingly, we answer the first certified question in the negative: neither section
626.922 nor section
627.421, Florida Statutes (2003), requires delivery of evidence of insurance directly to the insured, so that delivery to the insured's independent representative-broker is insufficient. In situations such as this, delivery of a surplus-lines policy to the insured's undisputed, independent representative-broker constitutes delivery to the insured; nothing in sections
626.922 and
627.421 alters this result....
...ion, we decline to address all but one of the five certified questions. Based on the rule from Almerico and the common-law broker-agency presumption, we answer the first certified question in the negative: no language present in sections
626.922 and
627.421, Florida Statutes (2003), precludes a surplus-lines insurer or its direct surplus-lines agent from delivering a copy of the coverage documents to the insured's independent representative-broker instead of directly to the insured....
CopyCited 9 times | Published | Florida 4th District Court of Appeal | 2003 WL 21076668
...Ass'n,
736 So.2d 58, 60-61 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999)). We conclude that the general statement in the rental agreement that SLI coverage is subject to other specific exclusions, which are summarized in a separate document available on request, does not satisfy the requirements of section
627.421, Florida Statutes (2002). Section
627.421 requires delivery of every insurance policy to the insured "or to the person entitled thereto" no more than sixty days after the effectuation of coverage. §
627.421(1)....
...The very language of the rental agreement stating that the other specific exclusions to SLI coverage are "summarized on the separate SLI brochure" is a clear indication that the insurer did not intend the rental agreement to be the "summary" mandated by section 627.421....
...Instead, contrary to the statutory requirement, the onus is placed on the customer to ferret out the "summary." We conclude that this instruction to the customer does not constitute delivery within the meaning of the statute. Id. *551 Judge Warner's thoughtful dissent observes that section 627.421 grants sixty days to provide a copy of the policy to insureds like Annis Brooks....
...e supplemental insurance and whether it covers family members. As the majority opinion points out, the rental document simply was silent on the point, only directing the renter to the brochure for more details regarding coverage. I do not think that section 627.421, Florida Statutes (1999), forms a basis for creating coverage, nor do I think it was violated in any event. It does not appear to me that section 627.421 was intended to apply to car rental agreements in which the renters purchased supplemental insurance because the rental agreement is not the policy....
CopyCited 5 times | Published | Florida 5th District Court of Appeal | 2005 Fla. App. LEXIS 5542, 2005 WL 924316
...he accident, thereby violating the terms of the rental agreement and voiding the SLI coverage. T.H.E. sought declaratory relief, as did McGrath by counterclaim. The trial court granted summary judgment in which it found coverage for two reasons: (1) section 627.421, Florida Statutes (2004), required T.H.E....
...failed to make the required delivery because the rental agreement did not constitute "terms of insurance;" and (2) the exclusion of coverage for driving while intoxicated violates public policy as established in P & H Vehicle Rental and Leasing Corp. v. Garner,
416 So.2d 503 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982). Section
627.421 (1) Delivery of Copy of Policy We disagree with the trial court that T.H.E.'s failure to deliver a copy of the SLI policy to McGrath invalidated the exclusion for intoxicated drivers....
...with no description of a specific exclusion and directing a renter to a brochure located on a counter is not comparable to the statement in the instant case that provides notice of a specific exclusion in large print and in plain language. Although section 627.421 requires delivery of a copy of an automobile policy within sixty days after the effectual date, no sanction or penalty for noncompliance is prescribed....
...of the rental term, and in view of the occurrence of the accident weeks before delivery of the policy was mandated. Prejudice to the insured should be considered when imposing any sanction for failure to deliver a policy of insurance as required by section 627.421....
CopyCited 2 times | Published | Florida 4th District Court of Appeal | 2009 Fla. App. LEXIS 20016, 2009 WL 4927917
...Milan's primary argument was that this estoppel arose because Lloyds and/or International Brokerage and Surplus Lines (IBSL), [1] the surplus lines agent through whom the insurance had been issued, had failed to comply with the notice and delivery requirements of Florida Statutes sections
627.421 and
626.922, and the insured had not otherwise been provided notice of the garaging warranty. Section
627.421 requires delivery of the insurance policy not more than sixty days after effectuation of coverage. See §
627.421(1), Fla....
...Lloyds also did not challenge in its written response Milan's claim that he was not otherwise provided notice of the garaging warranty. Instead, Lloyds *92 argued that it could not be estopped from relying upon the garaging warranty to deny the claim as a consequence of any failure to comply with sections
627.421 and
626.922 because Florida law expressly provides that the doctrines of estoppel and waiver may not be applied to create or extend insurance coverage....
...ate that, as a matter of law, the insurer was estopped from resorting to the garaging warranty to deny the claim. Provisions of Forfeiture versus Provisions of Coverage On appeal, Lloyds argues that, regardless of any failure to comply with sections
627.421 and
626.922, or the failure to provide the insured with the binder, the policy or other notice of the garaging warranty prior to the loss, the summary judgment was entered in error because Florida law holds that the doctrines of estoppel and waiver cannot be applied to create or extend insurance coverage....
CopyCited 1 times | Published | Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit | 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 25255, 2006 WL 2847811
...In the district court, both Essex and the defendants filed motions for
summary judgment in this declaratory action. Essex contended that the terms of
Lighthouse’s policy preclude coverage. The defendants contended that Essex had
violated Florida Statutes §§
626.922 and
627.421 by not delivering the policy to
Lighthouse and, therefore, Essex was precluded from denying coverage....
...The district court agreed with the defendants’ first
contention and granted their motion for summary judgment, declaring that Essex
was precluded from denying coverage because it had failed to deliver the policy to
the insured, as required by Florida Statutes §§
626.922 and
627.421.
The defendants subsequently filed a motion for attorney’s fees under Florida
Statute §
627.428....
...the producing agent issues or delivers. Any evidence of coverage
issued by a producing agent pursuant to this section must include the
name and address of the authorizing surplus lines agent.
Fla. Stat. §
626.922(1). Also relevant to the dispute is Florida Statute §
627.421,
which provides: “Subject to the insurer’s requirement as to payment of premium,
every policy shall be mailed or delivered to the insured or to the person entitled
thereto not later than 60 days after the effectuation of coverage.” Fla. Stat. §
627.421(1).
5
The district court interpreted these two statutory provisions to require
delivery of the policy directly to the insured....
...The district court found that the 1998 amendment, which
added the written delegation rule to §
626.922, superceded the rule from Florida
case law that delivery to the insured’s agent constitutes delivery to the insured.
The district court also found that §
627.421(1) applies to this case and
requires delivery to the insured....
...The parties dispute whether that provision, which
we have already quoted, applies to surplus lines insurers at all. Essex contends that
it is inapplicable but, argues that even if it does apply, the delivery requirement is
satisfied by the delivery of the policy to Lighthouse’s agent. The defendants argue
that §
627.421 does apply to surplus lines insurers and that, like §
626.922, it can
only be satisfied by delivery directly to the insured.
If there was a violation of §
626.922 or §
627.421, the next question is
whether the appropriate remedy is to preclude the insurer from asserting lack of
coverage under the terms of the policy....
...here, which would
have the effect of altering the terms of the insurance contract to create coverage
that is not provided for under the policy. See id.
Two Florida decisions have addressed whether the appropriate remedy for a
violation of § 627.421 is to prevent the insurer from denying coverage. In ZC Ins.
Co. v. Brooks, the Fourth District Court of Appeal of Florida found that the insurer
had failed to comply with § 627.421 because it had not provided the insured with
any information on the exclusion at issue....
...estoppel to create
coverage. Id. In the case before us no one contends that there was any fraud,
intentional or otherwise.
In another case, the Fifth District Court of Appeal refused to extend
coverage despite the insurer’s violation of § 627.421....
...acing the notice in large print, in plain
language, in the rental agreement.” Id. The court explained that “[p]rejudice to
the insured should be considered when imposing any sanction for failure to deliver
a policy of insurance as required by section 627.421.” Id....
...at case because the
rental agreement itself gave him notice of the exclusion. Id.
If the district court erred in holding that Essex was precluded from asserting
lack of coverage because of its violation of Florida Statutes §§
626.922 and
627.421, then the Court must determine whether Essex was entitled to judgment
based on two relevant coverage exclusions in the policy....
...As we have explained, there are a number of unresolved issues of Florida
law in this case. The Florida Supreme Court is the only body that can definitively
decide them. Therefore, we certify the following questions to that Court:
1. Whether Fla. Stat. §
626.922 or §
627.421, or both, require delivery of
evidence of insurance directly to the insured, so that delivery to the insured’s
agent is insufficient.
2. Whether, if the delivery requirement of Fla. Stat. §
626.922 or §
627.421, or
both, was not met in this case the appropriate remedy is to preclude the
insurer from asserting lack of coverage under the terms of the policy.
3....
CopyCited 1 times | Published | District Court, S.D. Florida | 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29108, 2009 WL 959917
...The Court granted Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment and denied Plaintiffs Renewed Motion for Summary Final Judgement. ("District Court Order," DE 119). The Court found that Essex and its surplus lines agent failed to deliver the Policy and its exclusions to Lighthouse as required by Fla. Stat. §§
626.922(1) and
627.421....
...(Notice of Appeal, DE 150.) C. Zota I The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals in Zota I stated that if the district court erred in holding that Essex was precluded from asserting lack of coverage because of its violation of Florida Statutes §§
626.922 and
627.421, then the Court must determine whether Essex was entitled to judgment based on the two coverage exclusions....
...The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals did not resolve the issues on appeal. Rather, Zota I certified a number of questions to the Florida Supreme Court because they involved unresolved issues of Florida law. The certified questions include: 1. Whether Fla. Stat. §
626.922 or §
627.421, or both, require delivery of evidence of insurance directly to the insured, so that delivery to the insured's agent is insufficient. 2. Whether, if the delivery requirement of Fla. Stat. §
626.922 or §
627.421, or both, was not met in this case the appropriate remedy is to preclude the insurer from asserting lack of coverage under the terms of the policy....
...If Lighthouse is entitled to coverage, whether Fla. Stat. §
627.428 applies to surplus lines insurers. Id., at 990. D. Zota II The Florida Supreme Court determined that the answer to question one was "no." There was "no language present in section
626.922 and
627.421, Florida Statutes (2003), [that] precludes a surplus insurer or its direct surplus lines agent from delivering a copy of the coverage document to the insured's independent representative-broker instead of direct to the insured." Essex Ins....
CopyPublished | Florida 4th District Court of Appeal
...Argument in Opposition to Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment.
The Provider’s Arguments
On appeal, the Provider argues that: (1) State Farm’s Policy and renewal
notice violated the plain language of sections
627.413,
627.421, and
627.736(5)(a)5., Florida Statutes, “by not specifying the form numbers and
applicable endorsements,” “by not clearly identifying to the insured the
applicable ....
...ttached to a
policy. This requirement applies to life insurance policies and
health insurance policies only at the time of original issue.
5
§
627.413(1), Fla. Stat. (2012) (emphasis added).
Section
627.421, in turn, governs delivery of an insurance policy.
Subsection (3) states in pertinent part:
(3) Any automobile liability or physical damage policy shall
contain on the front page a summary of major coverages,
conditions, exclusions, and limitations contained in that
policy. Any such summary shall state that the issued policy
should be referred to for the actual contractual governing
provisions. The company may, in lieu of the summary,
provide a readable policy.
§
627.421(3), Fla....
...ates or numeric codes of all
endorsements to the Policy, including the Endorsement at issue here,
which was clearly labeled as the “6126LS Amendatory Endorsement” and
dated as the 2012 edition.
Second, State Farm did not violate anything in section 627.421. State
Farm complied with section 627.421(3) because, at a minimum, it provided
a “readable policy.” Moreover, section 627.421(4)(e) does not apply in this
case. 2
1This provision first appeared in the 2013 statutes, but the Legislature gave it
an effective date of July 1, 2012.
2 Effective July 1, 2013, the Legislature added subsection (4) to section 627.421,
which states in relevant part: “(4) ....
...For example, the Provider offered
no evidence that the Endorsement was not issued with the November 2012
renewal notice or that the insureds were not put on notice of the
added to the statute after the Policy in this case was issued. Thus, the Provider’s
reliance upon section 627.421(4)(e) is misplaced....