Florida/Georgia Personal Injury & Workers Compensation

...The question is whether the Alabama Judgment is a de facto charging order under Florida law, such that its entry by the Alabama court before entry of the competing charging order of Capstone Bank grants it priority. We start by noting that under Florida law-a charging order requires application to a court for its issuance. Section 605.0503(1), Florida Statutes (2014)r provides: “On application to a court of competent jurisdiction -by a judgment creditor of a member or a transferee, the court may enter a charging order against the transferable interest of the member o...

...a member or member’s transferee may satisfy a judgment from the judgment debt- or’s interest in a limited liability company or rights to distributions from the limited liability company” for multiple-member LLCs, the so-called Olmstead patch. § 605.0503(3), Fla....

...uance. • As such, Christy Richards would need to apply for a charging order against the membership interest in Perry-Clifton Enterprises, LLC, which is the “sole and exclusive remedy” available against a limited liability company of this type. § 605.0503(3), Fla....

...that the Alabama Judgment had priority over Capstone Bank’s charging order. REVERSED. WOLF, RAY, and MAKAR, JJ., CONCUR. . "In response to Olmstead [v. F.T.C., 44 So.3d 76 (Fla. 2010) .the Legislature amended Sec, 608.433, Fla. Stat. [replaced by § 605.0503) to clarify the exclusive remedies available to a judgment creditor as to a judg,ment debtor’s interest in an LLC: a charging order, or a charging order followed by a foreclosure sale.” Regions Bank v. Hyman, No. 8:09-CV-1841-T-17MAP, 2015-WL 1912251, at *1, *7 (M.D. Fla. April 27, 2015), Section 608.433 was repealed in 2015 and became section 605.0503....

...§ 303 (b). Id. .The parties stipulated that SEPH's claim, being based on a final judgment from which no appeal was taken, is not subject to a bona fide dispute as to validity or amount. . § 55.202(c)(2) & § 56.061 Fla. Stat. (2015). . § 56.061 & § 605.0503 Fla....

...Cs’ finances, acting as the de facto Chief Financial Officer, and authorized the receiver to make financial management decisions. Appellant takes issue with the portion of the trial court’s order appointing a receiver. She argues that section 605.0503, Florida Statutes (2015), permits a charging order as the sole exclusive remedy to attach a judgment debtor’s interest in a multi-member LLC and that there is no authority under that statute for the appointment of a receiver. On the other hand, Appellee counters that the receiver is necessary to give the charging order “teeth” and that the court was well within its jurisdiction to appoint a receiver pursuant to subsections 605.0503(7)(c) and (d)....

...We agree with the trial court in part and reverse in part. Appellee obtained a judgment against Appellant in Nevada in 2005. In 2008, Appellee domesticated the Nevada judgment in Florida and began proceedings to collect the amounts owed, which culminated in the order at issue. Section 605.0503 permits the court to enter a charging order against a judgment debtor’s transferrable interest and requires the LLC to pay over to the judgment creditor any distribution that would otherwise be paid to the judgment debtor....

...Subsection (3) dictates that “a charging order is the sole and exclusive remedy by which a judgment creditor . . . or member's transferee may satisfy a judgment from the judgment debtor’s interest in a limited liability company or rights to distributions from the limited liability company.” § 605.0503(3), Fla....

...equitable lien, or constructive trust or other equitable principles not inconsistent with this section. (d) the continuing jurisdiction of the court to enforce its charging order in a manner consistent with this section. §§ 605.0503(7)(c)-(d)....

...The charging order does not entitle the judgment creditor to accelerate any distributions or to otherwise interfere with the management and activities of the limited liability company. RULLCA § 503 cmt. Under RULLCA and section 605.0503, the charging order entered by the court should have only directed the LLCs to divert Appellant’s rights to the LLCs' profits and distributions to Appellee....

...Alternatively, Gorrin asserts that in the event the final summary judgment against Gorrin is upheld, a charging order against Gorrin’s membership interest in Lacross is Poker Run’s sole and exclusive remedy as Lacross is a multiple member LLC. See § 605.0503, Fla....

...s motion. See Williams v. Bank of America Corp., 927 So. 2d 1091, 1093 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006) (reversing the entry of summary judgment on a ground not raised with particularity, as required by Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.510(c), in the motion). 7 Section 605.0503(1) provides: “On application to a court of competent jurisdiction by a judgement creditor of a member or a transferee, the court may enter a charging order against the transferable interest of the member or transferee for payment of the unsatisfied amount of the judgment with interest....

...12 3d 76 (Fla. 2010), Gorrin contends that the lower court’s ruling which maintains the status quo as to all assets of Lacross is effectively a permanent injunction against Lacross and beyond that allowed by section 605.0503. We agree. In Abukasis v. MTM Finest, Ltd., 199 So. 3d 421 (Fla. 3d DCA 2016), Eliahu Abukasis appealed a post-judgment order, entered pursuant to sections 605.0503(7)(b), (c) and 726.108(1)(c)(3), Florida Statutes, transferring his membership interest in an LLC toward the satisfaction of a money judgment held against him by MTM Finest, Ltd....

...y transferring an interest in a property to a judgment creditor in partial or full satisfaction of a money judgment.” Abukasis, 199 So. 3d at 422. In so doing, this Court cited to Regions Bank v. Hyman, which explained that amendments to former section 605.0503, previously numbered 608.433, were brought on by Olmstead, 44 So....

...s, the fraudulent transfer statute, is similarly flawed.” Abukasis, 199 So. 3d at 423. Therefore, the trial 13 court’s order freezing the assets of Lacross exceeded the scope of that allowed under section 605.0503. CONCLUSION Because there are genuine issues of material fact as to whether Gorrin’s transfer of his 95% interest in Lacross to the Trust was fraudulent and because the freezing of the a...

...appellee, the judgment creditor below, Mississippi Real Estate Dispositions, LLC (“Mississippi”), for Ramos’s membership units in a Florida limited liability company. We reverse because the Order provides Mississippi with a remedy not authorized by section 605.0503 of the Florida Statutes. I....

...Both Ramos and Sunstate timely appealed the Order. II. Analysis 5 Ramos and Sunstate argue that, in fashioning its remedy benefiting judgment creditor Mississippi under the auspices of section 56.29, the trial court contravened the express limitations set forth in section 605.0503, which governs a judgment creditor’s rights with respect to a judgment debtor’s membership interest in a limited liability company....

...sufficient authority for the trial court to fashion the remedy prescribed in the Order. Given the facts of this case, we agree with Ramos and Sunstate that the trial court’s equitable powers to fashion remedies in proceedings supplementary are limited by the specific provisions of section 605.0503....

...der might have affected the collateral securing the Yepez loan – a loan made before Poker Run’s judgment – because of our reversal of the Order on other grounds, we need not, and therefore do 7  Section 605.0503 provides, in relevant part, as follows: “On application to a court of competent jurisdiction by a judgment creditor of a member ....

...for payment of the unsatisfied amount of the judgment with interest . . . . [A] charging order constitutes a lien upon a judgment debtor’s transferable interest and requires the limited liability company to pay over to the judgment creditor a distribution that would otherwise be paid to the judgment debtor.” § 605.0503(1), Fla. Stat. (2019). Critically, subsection 605.0503(3) further provides that the charging order authorized by subsection 605.0503(1): “…is the sole and exclusive remedy by which a judgment creditor . . . may satisfy a judgment from the judgment debtor’s interest in a limited liability company or rights to distribution from the limited liability company.” § 605.0503(3), Fla. Stat. (2019) (emphasis supplied).7 Florida’s courts have concluded that section 605.0503(3)’s “sole and exclusive remedy” language restricts courts from providing a remedy beyond the narrow scope of the permissible charging order authorized in section 605.0503(1). not, reach the issue as to whether the trial court’s lack of personal jurisdiction over Yepez and Santos provides an additional basis for reversal of the Order. 7 Sections 605.0503(4) and (5) provide broader remedies to a creditor of a debtor who is a member of a limited liability company with only one member, but these sections are inapplicable because International Bankshares LLC is a multi-member LLC....

...argued, amounted to an unauthorized permanent injunction against the LLC. Id. This Court, emphasizing the limited remedy provided by the statute, held that the portion of the order freezing the assets of the LLC “exceeded the scope of that allowed under section 605.0503.” Id....

...control of the LLCs’ finances); Young v. Levy, 140 So. 3d 1109, 1112 (Fla. 4th DCA 2014) (reversing the trial court’s garnishment order that required a multi- member LLC to disburse the LLC’s profits to a creditor, based on the “sole and exclusive remedy” provision of section 605.0503’s predecessor statute); see also 9 Abukasis v....

...3d DCA 2016) (reversing a post-judgment order that transferred the judgment debtor’s membership units in an LLC to the judgment debtor). Like the lower court orders reversed by the appellate courts in those cases, the Order in this case went beyond what section 605.0503(1) permits – that is, a charging order merely restricting Ramos’s alienability of the Membership Units and requiring that Mississippi be paid distributions otherwise payable to Ramos....

...and practical result in this difficult case, it is well settled that a trial court may not exercise its equitable powers to contravene statutory law. See State v. Hernandez, 278 So. 3d 845, 849 (Fla. 3d DCA 2019). III. Conclusion Section 605.0503(3) plainly states that the charging lien provided for in section 605.0503(1) is a judgment creditor’s “sole and exclusive remedy” regarding a judgment debtor’s membership interest in a multi-member limited liability company....

...Hence, notwithstanding the equitable powers vested in a trial court pursuant to section 56.29(6), we are compelled to reverse the Order because the relief provided therein to Mississippi exceeds the express scope of relief a trial court may afford a judgment creditor under section 605.0503(1). Reversed. 10 

...By way of background, Creditor obtained a judgment against Debtor in Ohio. After domesticating the foreign judgment, Creditor sought to satisfy his judgment by obtaining a charging order against Debtor’s interest and rights to distributions in a multi-member LLC pursuant to section 605.0503, Florida Statutes....

...on of earnings subject to working capital from the LLC. The court concluded that Creditor was entitled to a charging order against Debtor’s interest in the LLC but not to the right to distribution of earnings. This appeal follows.  Pursuant to section 605.0503(1), Florida Statutes, “a charging order constitutes a lien upon a judgment debtor’s transferable interest and requires the limited liability company to pay over to the judgment creditor a distribution that would otherwise be paid to the judgment debtor.” § 605.0503(1), Fla....

...rida Statutes, which states that “[a] transferee has the right to receive, in accordance with the transfer, distributions to which the transferor would otherwise be entitled.” § 605.0502(2), Fla. Stat. (2019). This Court has recognized that section 605.0503, Florida Statutes, authorizes the court to enter a charging order against a judgment debtor’s transferrable interest and requires an LLC to pay over to the judgment creditor any distribution that would otherwise be paid to the judgment debtor. See Panksy v. Barry S. Franklin & Assocs., P.A., 264 So. 3d 961, 962 (Fla. 4th DCA 2019). Our sister courts have also held the same. See McClandon v. Dakem & Assocs., LLC, 219 So. 3d 269, 271 (Fla. 5th DCA 2017) (“Under . . . section 605.0503, the charging order entered by the court should have only directed the LLCs to divert [the debtor’s] rights to the LLCs’ profits and distributions to [the creditor].”); Capstone Bank v. Perry-Clifton Enters., LLC, 230 So....

...charging order and transfer of his interest in Daniel Pansky, LLC in favor of his judgment creditor, the law firm of Barry S. Franklin & Associates, P.A. (“law firm”). Because we find the trial court exceeded its statutory authority pursuant to section 605.0503, Florida Statutes (2016), when it transferred Pansky’s “right, title, and interest” in the limited liability company, we reverse. The underlying facts show that the law firm had previously represented Pansky in a divorce proceeding....

...The court stated that it would reserve ruling on any additional relief beyond a charging order that the law firm requested. The trial court entered a written order granting the charging order, but also transferring Pansky’s “right, title, and interest” in the LLC. It is from this order that Pansky appeals. Section 605.0503(3), Florida Statutes, provides that “a charging order is the sole and exclusive remedy by which a judgment creditor of a member or member’s transferee may satisfy a judgment from the judgment debtor’s interest in a limited liab...

...limited liability company.” Id. (emphasis added). “[A] charging order constitutes a lien upon a debtor’s transferable interest and requires the [LLC] to pay over to the judgment creditor a distribution that would otherwise be paid to the judgment debtor.” § 605.0503(1), Fla. Stat. (alterations added). For single-member LLCs, a charging order is “not the sole and exclusive remedy by which the judgment creditor may satisfy the judgment. . . .” § 605.0503(4), Fla....

...transferring an interest in property to a judgment creditor in partial or full satisfaction of a money judgment.” Id. The Third District further stated that the trial court “failed to conform with even the most rudimentary requirements of section 605.0503[.]” Id. at 423; see also McClandon v....

...attributes of a final order. See In re Amendments to Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure, 183 So. 3d 245, 253 (Fla. 2014). 2  Plaintiff’s motion [sic] is granted and pursuant to Fla. Stat. 605.0503(7)(b) [and](c) and Fla....

...ished and existing limited liability company and Abukasis owns a membership interest in the company, the process employed by MTM to realize upon the Abukasis’ membership interest failed to conform with even the most rudimentary requirements of section 605.0503 of the Florida Statutes (2015)....

...See Olmstead v. 4 Fed. Trade Comm’n, 44 So. 3d 76 (Fla. 2010) (describing the application of charging orders to interests in limited liability corporations); Regions Bank v. Hyman, 2015 WL 1912251, *7 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 27, 2015) (discussing amendments to former section 605.0503 then numbered section 608.433, which were brought on by Olmstead and served “to clarify the exclusive remedies available to a judgment creditor as to a judgment debtor’s interest in an LLC: a charging order, or a charging order followed by a foreclosure sale”)....

...For the reasons explained in this opinion, the transfer is avoidable as an actually and constructively fraudulent transfer. Additionally, the Court finds that the entry of a judgment against McCuan LLC, under § 726.108 is the appropriate remedy, rather than the remedy provided by § 605.0503 of the Florida Statutes, because "no law ......