Florida/Georgia Personal Injury & Workers Compensation

...Certain conditions must be met for a claimant to obtain restitution from the Recovery Fund. One such condition is the claimant must have obtained a final judgment in a court of competent jurisdiction, an arbitration award, or a final order from the Board directing the licensee to pay restitution to the claimant. § 489.141(l)(a), Fla....

...have been unable to collect the judgment despite diligent efforts to do so.” Chappell v. Constr. Indus. Recovery Fund, 835 So.2d 339, 340 (Fla. 3d DCA 2003). 2 To be eligible for an award from the Fund, a homeowner must satisfy several conditions. Section 489.141, “Conditions for recovery; eligibility,” states in relevant part: (1) Any claimant is eligible to seek recovery from the recovery fund after having made a claim and exhausting the limits of any available bond, cash bond, surety, g...

...specifies the actual damages suffered as a consequence of such violation. (e) The contract was executed and the violation occurred on or after July 1, 1993.... (f) A claim for recovery is made within 1 year after the conclusion of any civil, criminal, or administrative action or award in arbitration based on the act. § 489.141(1)(a)-(f), Fla....

...s the homeowners’ circuit court action against the contractor. We disagree. The applicable law in this case indicates that claimants must exhaust all efforts to recover their damages in order to be eligible to seek a claim under the Recovery Fund. § 489.141(1) (e). The homeowners’ participation in the bankruptcy action was consistent with that purpose. Section 489.141(f) emphatically states the Recovery Fund claim must be made within one year after the conclusion of “any civil, criminal, or administrative action or award in arbitration based on the act.” Given the evident purpose of the Recover...

...It was not until the contractor’s bankruptcy case was discharged that the Guzzettas “exhaust[ed] the limits of any available” source of compensation from the contractor, including “any available bond, cash bond, surety guarantee, warranty, letter of credit or policy of insurance.” § 489.141(1)....

...See DeMaria, 386 So. 3d at 211. "The Legislature makes perfectly clear that a key criterion for recovery from the fund is that the amount of the claimant's damages has already been reduced to a civil judgment, arbitration award, or restitution order." Id. (citing § 489.141(1)(a), (d)). Section 489.141(1)(a)2 contains an exception for cases involving bankruptcy proceedings, but that exception does not apply in this case. When a claimant is prevented from removing assets from the bankruptcy proceeding and "the claimant is precluded b...

...und claim is “fraudulent” and the result of an ongoing conspiracy against Appellant between Smith, the Board, the Department of Business and Professional Regulation, and local building officials is beyond the proper scope of this proceeding. See § 489.141, Fla....

the two-year limitations period contained in section 489.141(l)(e), Florida Statutes (1995). We agree and

...nd [the Fund], which is established in section 489.140, Florida Statutes (2000). On appeal, the Shapiros argue that the Board’s determination that they are ineligible to receive reimbursement is error because the Board’s narrow interpretation of section 489.141(2)(e): (1) defeats the legislative intent for establishing the Fund; (2) ignores the plain meaning of the words “was acting” as provided therein; and (3) ignores other provisions of section 489.141 which strongly indicate that the “ownership” term referenced in the Fund is the date on which the violations occur; not the date the construction contract is executed. Section 489.141 provides in pertinent part: A person is not qualified to make a claim for recovery from the Construction Industries Recovery Fund, if: (c) Such person’s claim is based upon a construction contract in which the licensee was acting with respect to the property owned or controlled by the licensee. (Emphasis added). § 489.141(2)(e), Fla....

...However, in April 2000, subsequent to a public hearing on the matter, the Fund Committee and the Board denied the Shapiros’ claim with prejudice. The stated reason for the denial was that the Shapiros were “not qualified to make a claim pursuant to Section 489.141(2)(c), Florida Statutes, since [Centron] had control or ownership of the property related to the construction contract.” The Shapiros then filed their request for formal hearing pursuant to section 120.57(1), Florida Statutes. In their request, the Shapiros argued that the Board, in construing the exclusion set forth in section 489.141(2)(c), should look to the party that owned or controlled the property at the time the contractor actually performed the construction, rather than to which party owned or controlled the property at the time the construction contract was executed....

...After consideration of the matter, the Board issued a final order upholding its earlier decision. The Board’s denial stemmed from the fact that: At the time the contract was executed, [Centron] was acting with respect to property, which [it] either owned or controlled. Section 489.141(2)(c), Florida Statutes, disqualifies a claim based upon a construction contract where the licensee was acting with respect to the property owned or controlled by the licensee. The instant appeal ensued. We reverse because the Board’s decision was unreasonable. As we read the provisions of section 489.141(2)(c) quoted above, the reference to the licensee (ie., the contractor) “acting with respect to the property” refers to the work being done (or not done) by the contractor on the property — not to the time of transfer of the title....

appellant relies, refers to licensees described in section 489.141(1), and that provision describes a person eligible

...(codified as §§ 489.140-.142, Fla. Stat. (1993)). It is intended to provide reimbursement to individuals who, among other things, have recovered a judgment based on a construction contract, but have been unable to collect the judgment despite diligent efforts to do so. See § 489.141, Fla....

...The money for the Fund is obtained by a surcharge levied on building permits. § 489.140(2), Fla. Stat. (2002). The question before us is whether the homeowners’ contract is covered by the Fund. The Fund will provide reimbursement “where the contract was executed and the violation occurred on or after July 1,1993.Id. § 489.141(1)(a)....

...lawsuit. We understand the Department to agree with the homeowners’ position on this point. It follows that the homeowners are entitled to reimbursement from the Fund. The homeowners argue that we should interpret the right to reimbursement under section 489.141 as including a right of the homeowners to be reimbursed for the attorney’s fees incurred in making the claim against the Fund, and on this appeal....