Florida/Georgia Personal Injury & Workers Compensation

...V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const. For the reasons expressed in our analysis, we reverse the Fourth District with regard to the constitutional issue but hold that Workers Temporary Staffing, Inc. ("WTS") is not liable to Larry Liner concerning its alleged violation of section 448.24(1)(b), Florida Statutes (2004)....

...his Broward County labor hall to any of the worksites it serviced in the Palm Beach, Broward, and Dade County area ("tri-county area"). See id. On May 3, 2004, Liner filed an original class-action complaint against WTS, alleging that it had violated section 448.24(1)(b), Florida Statutes (2004), by overcharging Liner and other day laborers for transportation to various worksites from its Broward County labor hall and other workers for transportation from various labor halls located throughout th...

...ction existed under the Act before the court would proceed to class-related matters. On February 2, 2005, WTS filed a counterclaim for declaratory relief. Specifically, WTS sought a judicial declaration that (1) it had complied with the Act; [2] (2) section 448.24(1)(b) is unconstitutionally vague; and (3) the statutory-damages provision of section 448.25(1) is unconstitutionally excessive....

...On June 1, 2005, Liner filed a second amended class-action complaint. In this complaint, Liner limited the claim to those day laborers overcharged by WTS for transportation from the Broward County labor hall to Broward County worksites. Liner asserted that WTS overcharged in violation of section 448.24(1)(b) because the cost of one-way bus travel on the Broward *476 County Transit system at that time was $1.00, while, in contrast, WTS charged $1.50 each way for its site-to-site transportation....

...rtation to a random sample of these job assignments was $32.00. [4] After the evidence was presented, the parties stipulated that the trial court should consider the evidentiary hearing as a bench trial on the issue of WTS's liability to Liner under section 448.24(1)(b). Thus, the parties contemplated that any order of the trial court would constitute a judgment on liability only, not damages. The trial court subsequently ruled that (1) WTS had complied with the Act; (2) section 448.24(1)(b) is unconstitutionally vague; and (3) the statutory-damages provision of section 448.25(1) is unconstitutionally excessive. On appeal, the Fourth District only affirmed the ruling of the trial court that section 448.24(1)(b), Florida Statutes (2004), violates the Due Process Clauses of both the United States and Florida Constitutions. See Liner, 962 So.2d at 346-48. [5] The district court reasoned that section 448.24(1)(b) is unconstitutionally vague. See id. On August 3, 2007, Liner filed a notice of appeal with this Court. II. ANALYSIS A. WTS's Liability to Liner Under the Act i. Introduction Liner asserts that WTS violated section 448.24(1)(b), Florida Statutes (2004), by overcharging him for transportation from the labor hall in Broward County to various worksites within that county. The trial court ruled that WTS is not liable to Liner under section 448.24(1)(b)....

...At the outset, we emphasize that our statutory analysis applies exclusively to the version of the Florida Labor Pool Act *477 that applied when WTS allegedly overcharged day laborers for transportation to and from its Broward County worksites between December 2002 and March 2004. At that time, section 448.24(1)(b) read: (1) No labor pool shall charge a day laborer: . . . . (b) More than a reasonable amount to transport a worker to or from the designated worksite, but in no event shall the amount exceed the prevailing rate for public transportation in the geographic area ... § 448.24(1)(b), Fla. Stat. (2004). This version of section 448.24(1)(b) was in effect from 1995—when the Act was enacted— until 2006. See ch. 95-332, § 1, at 2932, Laws of Fla. In 2006, the Legislature amended section 448.24(1)(b) by making the following changes: (1) No labor pool shall charge a day laborer: ....

...(b) More than a reasonable amount to transport a worker to or from the designated worksite, but in no event shall the amount exceed $1.50 each way the prevailing rate for public transportation in the geographic area.... Ch. 2006-10, § 1, at 198, Laws of Fla; § 448.24(1)(b), Fla....

...actice for labor pools in the state, and this part shall be carried out in accordance with this purpose. § 448.21, Fla. Stat. (2004) (entitled "Legislative intent"). While the Act is designed to remedy a specific evil, we nevertheless conclude that section 448.24(1)(b) is a civil statute that is penal in nature because of the potentially extreme punitive damages provided by section 448.25(1)....

...Therefore, we must construe any ambiguity present in the Act in favor of WTS. The statutory language present in section 448.21 is not dispositive. Instead, the determinative factor is the nature of the provision for damages imposed for violations of the Act: (1) Any worker aggrieved by a violation of s. 448.24 shall have the right to bring a civil action in a court of competent jurisdiction against the labor pool responsible for such violation....

...al and consequential damages, or $1,000, whichever is greater, for each violation of this part, and costs. § 448.25(1), Fla. Stat. (2004) (entitled "Remedies; damages; costs") (emphasis *478 supplied). Due to the nature of a claim filed pursuant to section 448.24(1)(b), the actual damages suffered by a complainant will usually be significantly less than the statutory damages ($1000 per violation) afforded by section 448.25(1). Here, Liner claimed that WTS violated section 448.24(1)(b) when it overcharged him 50 cents for each instance of transportation to a Broward County worksite on 177 separate occasions, which produced only $265.50 in actual damages....

...As reflected in the plain language of section 448.25(1), the Legislature contemplated that the statutory-damages provision of $1000 per violation would virtually always yield an amount that would significantly exceed any actual damages produced by a violation of section 448.24(1)(b). Thus, section 448.24(1)(b), interpreted in light of section 448.25(1), is a civil statute of a penal nature....

...-faith action. See id. at 61. Section 627.727(10) enabled a first-party insured to collect excess damages caused by an insurer's bad faith even though that bad faith only injured the third-party victim. See id. at 60. Similar to section 627.727(10), section 448.24(1)(b) enables the aggrieved party to collect a significantly greater amount of damages than the actual damages inflicted upon that party....

...tion statutory-damages provision to deter labor pool companies from exploiting—albeit through a transportation charge that may only slightly exceed the cost of other inexpensive forms of mass transportation—the day laborers that they employ. Thus, section 448.24(1)(b), interpreted in pari materia with section 448.25(1), is penal in nature, and any ambiguities must be construed in favor of WTS....

...3 (holding that section 106.37 of the Campaign Financing Law—a violation of which can result in a maximum fine of $1000 per count and would necessarily have a "ruinous effect" on the candidate's reputation—is a civil statute of a penal nature). iii. General Framework for Section 448.24(1)(b) Liner asserts that section 448.24(1)(b) has both a subjective standard—i.e., the first clause which states that a labor hall shall not charge "[m]ore than a reasonable amount to transport a worker to or from the designated worksite"—and a separate objective standard— *479 i.e., the second clause which states "but in no event shall the amount exceed the prevailing rate for public transportation in the geographic area." We disagree. Instead, we conclude that the Legislature intended for section 448.24(1)(b) to constitute a single standard for evaluating the transportation fee charged by a labor hall owner. The plain language of the legislation supports an interpretation that the term "reasonable amount" is the centerpiece of section 448.24(1)(b). The other language contained within this statute is designed to provide meaning and a parameter for this term. Specifically, the phrase "to or from the designated worksite," which follows the term "reasonable amount," in the first clause of section 448.24(1)(b), is intended to modify this term....

...Additionally, the second clause— i.e., "but in no event shall the amount exceed the prevailing rate for public transportation in the geographic area"—was included to provide further meaning or a ceiling on that which may constitute a "reasonable amount." Finally, we conclude that the plain language of section 448.24(1)(b) establishes that the Legislature intended for the highly specific phrase "to or from the designated worksite," which is contained within the first clause, to modify the entire second clause, which includes the more general term "geographic area." See Eicoff v....

...ord, the general word will usually be construed to refer to things of the same kind or species as those specifically enumerated." (quoting Jacobo v. Bd. of Trustees of Miami Police, 788 So.2d 362, 364 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001))). The legislative history of section 448.24(1)(b) also supports this interpretation....

...In 1995, the Legislature initially attempted to enact a provision (with regard to the transportation fee that day laborers could be charged) that consisted of a single clause, made no mention of "reasonable amount," and capped the permissible transportation charge at $1.00. [8] However, the Legislature ultimately enacted section 448.24(1)(b), which included two clauses that surround the central concept and term "reasonable amount." This history demonstrates that the Legislature intended to provide greater flexibility for transportation charges that could be assessed, while maintaining the framework of a single standard of reasonableness. Tellingly, a staff analysis summarized the effect of the proposed language, which was ultimately enacted in identical form as section 448.24(1)(b): s. 448.24, F.S....

...on Commerce, CS/HB 595 (1995) Staff Analysis 3 (Apr. 19, 1995) (on file with the Florida State Archives) (emphasis supplied). This illustrates that the Legislature understood that the phrase "to or from the designated worksite," *480 which appears in the first clause of section 448.24(1)(b), modifies the additional language contained in both the first and second clauses. In sum, the relevant legislative history further supports our conclusion that section 448.24(1)(b) contains a single standard centered upon the concept and term "reasonable amount." iv. The Framework as Applied to These Circumstances The circumstances in each case must be applied within this general framework to determine the context-specific meaning of the various words included within this version of section 448.24(1)(b)....

...nable amount" under discrete circumstances. Here, we conclude that the trial court's interpretation of the terms "public transportation" and "geographic area" was reasonable under these circumstances. In ruling that WTS was not liable to Liner under section 448.24(1)(b), the trial court made the following findings with regard to the meaning of "public transportation" and "geographic area": 1....

...The concept of "public transportation" simply cannot be limited to bus travel in this area, and under the circumstances of the instant case, Liner cannot prevail. The Legislature intended for the phrase "to or from the designated worksite" to modify the entire second clause of section 448.24(1)(b)....

...nd are "characterized by their nonscheduled, nonfixed route nature." § 341.031(5)-(6), Fla. Stat. (2004) (emphasis supplied). We conclude that the Legislature similarly intended for the term "public transportation"—as enacted within the context of section 448.24(1)—to have a broad, general meaning to allow for flexible application under different, specific factual circumstances involving different, specific locations....

...ortation to the designated worksite. [11] Consequently, the term "public transportation" cannot be limited exclusively to the cost of bus travel under the circumstances of the instant case, and for that reason alone, WTS is not liable to Liner under section 448.24(1)(b). *482 B. Constitutionality of the Act WTS also asserts that both section 448.24(1)(b) and section 448.25(1), Florida Statutes (2004), violate the Due Process Clauses of the United States and Florida Constitutions....

...nstitutional); De Jong v. Pallotto, 239 So.2d 252, 253 (Fla.1970) (substantially similar); P.C. Lissenden Co. v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 116 So.2d 632, 633-36 (Fla.1959) (substantially similar). Thus, we do not address the constitutionality of either section 448.24(1)(b) or section 448.25(1) because, as previously discussed, the trial court properly applied the statute and determined that WTS is not liable to Liner under the Act. III. CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, we disapprove the reasoning and analysis of the Fourth District in Liner v. Workers Temporary Staffing, Inc., 962 So.2d 344 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007), with regard to the alleged unconstitutionality of section 448.24(1)(b), Florida Statutes (2004), and therefore reverse that decision. We approve the trial court's ruling that Liner has no claim of liability against WTS under section 448.24(1)(b) and remand to the Fourth District with directions to affirm the judgment of the trial court with regard to the non-liability of WTS....

...essary to our resolution of this case. [6] Amended statutory language appears in underlined text; deleted statutory language appears in strike-through text. [7] § 448.21, Fla. Stat. (2004). [8] The staff analysis prepared on March 10, 1995, stated: s. 448.24, F.S....

...the WTS transportation program. However, we choose not to measure the additional cost of taxi service between these distances because the cost of taxi service between the arrival bus stops and the worksites alone established that WTS did not violate section 448.24(1)(b).

...McKenna of Ford & Harrison, LLP, Orlando for amicus curiae Florida Management Attorneys, Inc. GROSS, J. This case concerns the constitutionality of a section of the Labor Pool Act, Sections 448.20-448.25, Florida Statutes (2003). We affirm the circuit court's finding that section 448.24(1)(b) is unconstitutionally vague. The purpose of the Act is to "provide for the health, safety, and well-being of day laborers throughout the state and to establish uniform standards of conduct and practice for labor pools in the state. . . ." § 448.21, Fla. Stat. (2003). Section 448.24(1)(b), [1] which is central to this appeal, limits the amount that a labor pool may charge a day laborer for transportation: (1) No labor pool shall charge a day laborer: *346 ....

...WTS charged day laborers $1.50 for a one way trip and $3.00 round trip for transportation to job sites in the Palm Beach, Broward, and Dade County area. Liner filed a class action complaint against WTS alleging that the labor pool company had violated section 448.24(1)(b) by overcharging day laborers for transportation between WTS labor halls and worksites in southeast Florida. WTS counterclaimed for declaratory relief, contending that section 448.24(1)(b) was unconstitutional....

...Pursuant to a case management order, the trial court heard testimony on Liner's individual claim and WTS's declaratory judgment counterclaim. Much of the evidence went to the difficult issue of how to define the terms "reasonable amount," "prevailing rate," and "geographic area" contained in section 448.24(1)(b)....

...Because we hold that the statute is unconstitutional, we do not address the circuit court's rulings on these issues. Liner contended that he was overcharged 50 cents for each trip and that he incurred $265 in actual damages; Liner sought statutory damages of $177,000 under section 448.25(1). The circuit court held that section 448.24(1)(b) [2] was unconstitutional under the Due Process Clause of the Federal and Florida Constitutions because the statute failed "to give persons of common intelligence and understanding adequate warning or fair notice of the proscribed conduct." We agree with the analysis of the circuit court....

...1st DCA 1996) (holding section 626.621(6), Florida Statutes, to be unconstitutionally vague because the phrase "`detrimental to the public interest' is subject to many interpretations" and the phrase "`public interest' is left to the fancy of the enforcing agency"). Three terms in section 448.24(1)(b) have the same constitutional deficiency as the phrase "public housing facility" in Brown....

...County boundaries? A win for Mr. Liner. Once again, a wrong guess and WTS is liable for $177,000 in civil penalties plus costs . . . to Mr. Liner alone. For these reasons, we affirm the order of the circuit court. WARNER and TAYLOR, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] Section 448.24(1)(b) was amended in 2006 to state: (1) No labor pool shall charge a day laborer: ....

...of Crabtree and Associates, Key Biscayne, FL, for Appellant. Frank E. Brown of MacFarlane, Ferguson and McMullen, Tampa, FL, for Appellee. PER CURIAM. We have for review K.C. Cromwell, Inc. v. Pollard, 974 So.2d 420 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007), in which the Second District Court of Appeal declared that section 448.24(1)(b), Florida Statutes (2000-2003), was unconstitutionally vague....

...Davidson of Lerach Coughlin Stoia Geller Rudman & Robbins, LLP, Boca Raton, for Appellee/Cross-Appellant. SALCINES, Judge. K.C. Cromwell, Inc., d/b/a Workforce, U.S.A. ("Workforce"), appeals the final judgment for $160,000 in damages awarded to Michael Pollard based on the circuit court's determination that it violated section 448.24(1)(b), Florida Statutes (2000-2003)....

...e County. [2] Workforce charged Mr. Pollard a fee for the transportation service and was paid by payroll deduction. The fee charged by Workforce ranged from $1 to $1.50 per one-way trip. Mr. Pollard brought an action alleging that Workforce violated section 448.24(1)(b) which outlines the duties and rights of the labor pool and day laborer with regard to charges for transportation....

...phic area." [3] *422 The trial court held that the Manatee County Area Transit System rate of $1 for each one-way trip was the prevailing rate for public transportation in the Manatee County geographic area. It concluded that in order to comply with section 448.24(1)(b), $1 was the maximum amount Workforce could have deducted from Mr....

...Pollard's pay and found that Workforce violated the statute on IN occasions. In accordance with section 448.25, the trial court awarded Mr. Pollard damages in the amount of $1000 for each violation. On appeal, Workforce asserts that the final judgment should be reversed because the version of section 448.24(1)(b) in effect in 2000 through 2003 is unconstitutionally vague. On markedly similar facts, the Fourth District Court of Appeal recently addressed the constitutionality of section 448.24(1)(b) in Liner v....

...Workers Temporary Staffing, Inc., 962 So.2d 344 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007). The Fourth District upheld the circuit court's determination that the 2003 version of the statute is unconstitutionally vague. We agree, adopt the rationale of the Fourth District as stated in Liner, and declare that the version of section 448.24(1)(b) in effect in 2000 through 2003 is unconstitutionally vague....

...Pollard's cross-appeal. [2] Mr. Pollard also was employed to work at jpbsites located in Sarasota, Hillsborough, and Pinellas counties, but he restricted the allegations in, his complaint to relate only to his employment in Manatee County. [3] The language of section 448.24(b)(1) remained unchanged from 2000 until it was amended in 2006....

...Workers Temporary Staffing, Inc., 990 So.2d 473 (Fla.2008) ( Liner II ). See Pollard v. K.C. Cromwell, Inc., 18 So.3d 975 (Fla.2009). K.C. Cromwell, Inc., d/b/a Workforce, U.S.A. (Workforce), appealed a final judgment awarding Michael Pollard $160,000 in statutory damages for violations of section 448.24(1)(b), Florida Statutes (2000-2003)....

...natee County. Workforce charged Mr. Pollard a fee for the transportation service and was paid by payroll deduction. The fee charged by Workforce ranged from $1 to $1.50 per one-way trip. Mr. Pollard brought an action alleging that Workforce violated section 448.24(1)(b) which outlines the duties and rights of the labor pool and day laborer with regard to charges for transportation....

...he geographic area." The trial court held that the Manatee County Area Transit System rate of $1 for each one-way trip was the prevailing rate for public transportation in the Manatee County geographic area. It concluded that in order to comply with section 448.24(1)(b), $1 was the maximum amount Workforce could have deducted from Mr....

...Pollard, 974 So.2d 420, 421-22 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007) (internal footnotes omitted). [2] We reversed the trial court's decision, adopting the Fourth District's rationale in Liner v. Workers Temporary Staffing, Inc., 962 So.2d 344 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007) ( Liner I ), and held that section 448.24(1)(b), Florida Statutes (2000-2003) was unconstitutionally vague. Subsequently, the supreme court reversed Liner I, holding that section 448.24(1)(b) provided a single standard of "reasonable amount" for evaluating labor pool transportation fees and, thus, was not unconstitutionally vague. Liner II, 990 So.2d at 478-79. Accordingly, we now affirm the trial court's ruling that section 448.24(1)(b) is constitutional....

...ksite plus taxi fare from there to the worksite. Id. The supreme court concluded that the labor pool company's uniform price of $1.50 each way to worksites did not exceed the prevailing public transportation rate, was reasonable, and did not violate section 448.24(1)(b)....

...[3] MCAT Vanpool program's lowest "daily cost per rider" was $3.02, plus sales tax, fuel, tolls, parking, and vehicle cleaning. Workforce's $1.50 one-way trip charge thus did not exceed the prevailing public transportation rate, was reasonable, and did not violate section 448.24(1)(b)....

...This determination renders moot the other issues raised on appeal and on cross-appeal. Affirmed in part and reversed in part. WHATLEY and SILBERMAN, [4] JJ., Concur. NOTES [1] Judge LaRose has been substituted for Judge Salcines, who was on the original Cromwell panel. [2] Section 448.24(1)(b) remained unchanged from 2000 until amended in chapter 2006-10, section 1, Laws of Florida (effective July 1, 2006), as follows, with amended language underlined and deleted language in strike-through text: (1) No labor pool shall charge a day laborer: ....

...duciary for the class members. We disagree as to both points and affirm the order on these grounds. The plaintiff, Robert Hartigan, filed a complaint, alleging that appellant, a labor pool company, violated a provision of Florida’s Labor Pool Act, section 448.24(1)(b), Florida Statutes (2003), by charging its workers in Broward County more than the prevailing rate for public transportation to and from its hiring halls and work sites....

...After reviewing the record in this case, we can find no clear abuse of the court’s discretion in finding Hartigan suitable to serve as the class representative. Affirmed. WARNER and STEVENSON, JJ., concur. . Recently, in Liner v. Workers Temporary Staffing, Inc., 962 So.2d 344 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007), we determined that section 448.24(1)(b), Florida Statutes, is void for vagueness and therefore unconstitutional under the Due Process Clause of the Federal and Florida Constitutions....