CopyCited 4 times | Published | Florida 5th District Court of Appeal | 2005 WL 1412065
...Rodriguez filed a motion to suppress arguing that Hopkins had no probable cause to believe that he was committing or about to commit a crime. He contended *596 that he did not commit a traffic violation and his driving did not justify the stop. The state argued that Rodriguez violated two Florida Statutes: Section
316.125(2), which requires a driver of a vehicle emerging from an alley, building, private road or driveway within a business or residential district to stop prior to entering a roadway, and section
316.081, which prohibits driving on the wrong side of the roadway....
...at 808,
116 S.Ct. 1769. We begin our analysis by focusing on Rodriguez' driving pattern, as perceived by the deputy. Rather than consider whether probable cause existed for the stop, the parties discussed the two traffic statutes at length at the hearing. Section
316.125 requires in subsection (1) that a vehicle entering the road from a private road or driveway yield to approaching road traffic, and in subsection (2) that a vehicle entering a road from a private road or driveway in a business or residential district stop before entering the road....
...He *597 also mentioned section
316.089(1), which provides that a vehicle being driven on a road divided into clearly marked lanes should not be moved out of the lane unless the driver has ascertained that it is safe to do so. The court ruled that Rodriguez had not violated section
316.125, because there was no evidence that the area where Rodriguez entered the road was a residential or business district. The trial court stated: [Section]
316.125 is not a model of clarity for the Courts....
...op Rodriguez because there was probable cause based upon objective evidence to believe Rodriguez violated several Florida traffic statutes. The trial court erred in ruling otherwise. REVERSED and REMANDED. PALMER and ORFINGER, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] 316.125....
CopyCited 2 times | Published | Florida 4th District Court of Appeal | 2008 WL 4568024
...Seltzer for only six-tenths of a second to 1.3 seconds, depending on her speed. She was thirty-four inches tall, while the vehicle's rear bumper was thirty-seven inches high. Thus, once she was behind the bumper, Mr. Seltzer could not see her. At the charge conference, the Rosenfelds requested the court to read section 316.125(2), Florida Statutes, regarding the duty of a motorist to stop when exiting a driveway along a sidewalk, and to read Florida Standard Jury Instruction (Civil) 4.12 which provides that a motorist must exercise care when aware of the presence of children....
CopyCited 1 times | Published | Florida 5th District Court of Appeal | 2015 Fla. App. LEXIS 6843, 2015 WL 2129237
SAWAYA, J. We have consolidated for decision three appeals that present a common issue of statutory interpretation. The statute at issue is section 316.125, Florida Statutes (2013), and it governs entry of vehicles onto adjacent highways from adjoining business locations and parking lots....
...A deputy observed Nelson get into his vehicle and drive directly from his parked position in the parking lot onto the highway without stopping. The deputy initiated a traffic stop of the vehicle based on Nelson’s failure to stop before crossing over the sidewalk or sidewalk area onto the highway in violation of section 316.125....
...Padgett was arrested and transported to jail. His motion to suppress presents arguments that are very similar to the arguments in the motions filed by the other two defendants. In granting the motions to suppress, the trial court explained its interpretation of section 316.125 by stating that “[i]n its entirety it’s a failure-to-yield statute, and in its particulars it’s a failure-to-yield statute.” The trial court further explained that “[tjhere has to be something that has to be failed to yield...
...These principles dictate that the validity of the consent to search provided by Sean Nelson and the searches incident to the canine alerts in the other two cases initially depend on whether the deputies properly stopped each vehicle for a violation of section
316.125. See State v. Kindle,
782 So.2d 971, 973 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001). Thus, the meaning of section
316.125 is determinative in each case. For purposes of clarity of discussion and completeness, we quote section
316.125 in its entirety: (1) The driver of a vehicle about to enter or cross a highway from an alley, building, private road or driveway shall yield the right-of-way to all vehicles approaching on the highway to be entered which are so close thereto as to constitute an immediate hazard....
...s the ... driveway.” Proper consideration of this statutory provision and the plain and ordinary meaning of the words used reveal with clarity that drivers must stop before traversing a sidewalk or sidewalk area to enter an adjacent highway. *1078 Section
316.125 does not define- sidewalk or sidewalk area, but definitions, of pertinent words and phrases used in the various sections of chapter 316, Florida Statutes, are found in section
316.003 and those words and phrases “shall have the mean...
...(2013). The word “sidewalk” is defined as “[tjhat portion of a street between the curbline, or the lateral line, of a roadway and the adjacent property lines, intended for use by pedestrians.” §
316.003(47), Fla. Stat. (2013). We note that section
316.125(2) recognizes that sidewalks or sidewalk areas may extend over driveways because it specifically provides that the driver is to stop “prior to driving onto a sidewalk or onto the sidewalk area extending across the ... driveway.” §
316.125(2), Fla....
...s can walk from one end df the street to the other! The trial court never addressed the factual issue of whether a sidewalk or sidewalk area extends over the driveways at each location. It appears that the trial court’s erroneous interpretation of section 316.125 got in the way, and so it did not....
...They further assert that because they did not see any pedestrian or vehicular traffic, it was- permissible for the vehicles to depart from the parked locations (one a gas pump, and the other at the North part of the lot) and travel through the driveway and onto the highway without stopping. They rely on that part of section 316.125(2), which provides that in the event there is no sidewalk area, the vehicles “shall stop at the point nearést the street to be entered where the driver has a view of approaching traffic thereon and shall yield to all vehicles and pedestrians which are so.close thereto as to constitute an immediate hazard.” § 316.125(2), Fla....
CopyPublished | Florida 3rd District Court of Appeal | 2002 Fla. App. LEXIS 13152, 2002 WL 31015531
...The jury was asked: “Was there negligence on the part of James and Sharon Cosmides which was a legal cause of the loss, injury or damage to Michael Beeman?” The jury answered no, and final judgment was entered pursuant to the verdict. Beeman maintains that section 316.125, Florida Statutes (2001), 2 required Mrs....
...However, because there was at least some record evidence that Mrs. Cosmides had stopped as she exited her driveway, we find no error in the trial judge’s decision not to grant a directed verdict. Beeman also argues that the trial judge should have granted his request to *513 have section
316.125 as well as section
316.1925, Florida Statutes(2001), 3 the careless driving section, submitted to the jury....
...4 Accordingly, the order under review is reversed and remanded. . The jury returned a finding of no negligence on the part of both the Cosmides and Mr. Gomez. Initially, Mr. Gomez was named in this appeal, however, the appeal as to Mr. Gomez has since been dismissed. . Section 316.125 provides, in part: (2) The driver of a vehicle emerging from an alley, building, private road or driveway within a business or residence district shall stop the vehicle immediately prior to driving onto a sidewalk or onto the sidewalk...
