The 2023 Florida Statutes (including Special Session C)
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. . . See Appropriations Act of 1899, ch. 424, 30 Stat. 1095; 36 CFR §§ 241.2, 241.3 (Supp. 1941); § 261.10 . . .
. . . violation notices against him for infringing certain National Forest System regulations listed in 36 C.F.R. 261.10 . . . of El Yunque without obtaining a special use authorization as required under 36 C.F.R. §§ 251.50(a), 261.10 . . .
. . . . § 261.10(1). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm. . . . See 36 C.F.R. § 261.10(1); United States v. . . .
. . . . § 261.10(a). We affirm. 1. To the degree that Defendant claims that 36 C.F.R. . . .
. . . . § 261.10(a) for constructing and maintaining a structure without authorization; and 5) the revocation . . .
. . . . § 261.10(b) (unauthorized residency on Forest System lands) and 36 C.F.R. § 261.11(d) (improper removal . . . The court then concluded that the same regulation at issue in this case — 36 C.F.R. § 261.10(b) — is . . . See 36 C.F.R. § 251.50 (requiring authorization for most uses of Forest System lands); id. § 261.10(b . . . The district court therefore did not err in holding that Wasson had violated 36 C.F.R. § 261.10(b). . . .
. . . . § 261.10(a). Id. . . . Count k In Count 4, Defendant is alleged to have violated 36 C.F.R. § 261.10, which prohibits “constructing . . . authorization, contract, or approved operating plan when such authorization is required.” 36 C.F.R. § 261.10 . . . , and he failed to obtain an approved plan of operations, this work was in violation of 36 C.F.R. § 261.10 . . .
. . . . § 261.10. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and we affirm. . . . Oberdorfer first argues that his criminal prosecution for violating § 261.10 violates the Double Jeopardy . . .
. . . . § 261.10(b); using or occupying national forest lands without an approved operating plan, in violation . . . of 36 C.F.R. § 261.10(p); and cutting timber without authorization, in violation of 36 C.F.R. § 261.6 . . . correcting the amended judgment to reflect that Everist was convicted in Count Two of violating 36 C.F.R. § 261.10 . . .
. . . . § 261.10(b), contending that the Forest Service acted arbitrarily and capriciously or contrary to law . . .
. . . . § 261.10(c), and one misdemeanor count of threatening, resisting, intimidating, or interfering with . . . activities or services not authorized by federal law, regulation, or special-use authorization. 36 C.F.R. § 261.10 . . . Section 261.10(c) prohibits, in relevant part and as charged in Count 5, (1) “conducting any kind of . . . ”; (2) on lands encompassed by the regulation; (3) without a special use authorization. 36 C.F.R. § 261.10 . . .
. . . . § 261.10(c) by filming a bighorn sheep hunt for profit without a required special use permit for engaging . . . lawful authority to conduct such business activity on National Forest lands in violation of 36 C.F.R. § 261.10 . . .
. . . . § 261.10(b).”: To be clear, we do not hold that proving the correctness or even the existence of the . . . Backlund pled guilty to violating 36 C.F.R. § 261.10(b), pursuant to a plea agreement. . . . After a bench trial, the district court found Everist guilty of violating § 261.10(b). . . . Section 261.10(b) therefore is not unconstitutionally vague. . . . Section 261.10(b) is not ambiguous. . . .
. . . . § 261.10(b), which prohibits “[cjonstruction, reconstructing, improving, maintaining, occupying or . . . Backlund pled guilty to violating 36 C.F.R. § 261.10(b), pursuant to a plea agreement. . . . After a bench trial, the district court found Everist guilty of violating § 261.10(b). . . . Section 261.10(b) therefore is not unconstitutionally vague. . . . Section 261.10(b) is not ambiguous. . . .
. . . . § 261.10(b). We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm. 1. . . . Section 261.10(b) is consistent with the mining laws and not unconstitutionally vague. . . . The evidence was sufficient to convict Ames and Fournier of violating 36 C.F.R. § 261.10(b). . . .
. . . . § 261.10(b). We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm. 1. . . . Needles’ conviction under § 261.10(b) did not violate his due process rights due to lack of notice that . . . Needles’ contention that § 261.10(b) is unconstitutionally vague fails for the reasons discussed in a . . . Section 261.10(b) was not applied to punish conduct predating its enactment. . . . §§ 228.1-228.15 (2003) (regulating mining operations in the national forests); 36 C.F.R. §§ 261.1b, 261.10 . . .
. . . . §§ 261.10(a); 261.1(a) (1977); see also 261.12(e) (1977). . . .
. . . . § 261.10(d)(4), or any other official source. . . .
. . . . § 261.10(d)(4), or any other official source. . . .
. . . . § 261.10(a), and damaging a natural feature or property of the United States, in violation of 36 C.F.R . . .
. . . .;” § 261.10(a) in Counts V through VIII, “constructing, placing, or maintaining any kind of road ... . . . The court finds the defendants Ganoe and McKay guilty of violating § 261.10(a) as to Counts V and VII . . . does find that McKay and Ganoe were involved in such activity and finds them guilty of violating § 261.10 . . . The court finds defendants Ganoe and McKay guilty of violating § 261.10(a), and as to defendant McFarlin . . . (16 U.S.C. 620, et seq.), or its implementing regulations at 36 CFR 223.185-223.203. . 36 C.F.R. § 261.10 . . .
. . . . §§ 261.10(p) and 228.4(a)(3) (forbidding mining activities without approved plan of operation). . . .
. . . . § 261.10(d)(4), or any other official source. . . .
. . . . § 261.10(d)(4), or any other official source. . . .
. . . The 522,200 McData shares contributed on that date had a total cost basis of $261.10. {Id.). . . .
. . . . § 261.10(10). . . .
. . . Apparently, there was a prepetition modification agreement reducing the monthly loan payments to $261.10 . . .
. . . . § 261.10(m). . . . The evidence supporting Scotford’s conviction for violating 36 CFR § 261.10(m) also supports his conviction . . .
. . . . §§ 261.10(b) and (k)? . . . a special-use authorization, or as otherwise authorized by Federal law or regulation.” 36 C.F.R. § 261.10 . . . Section 261.10(k) similarly prohibits the “[u]se or occupancy of National Forest System land or facilities . . . A Sections 261.10(b) and (k) do not explicitly allocate the burden of proof. . . . . § 261.10(b). . . .
. . . . §§ 261.10(b), 228.4; see also United States v. . . .
. . . . § 261.10(k), and construction and maintenance of improvements on National Forest Lands, 16 U.S.C. § . . . 551; 36 C.F.R. § 261.10(a). . . . See 36 C.F.R. § 261.10; 16 U.S.C. § 551. . . .
. . . . § 261.10(1), and his sentence. We affirm. . . . Under 36 C.F.R. § 261.10(1), it was necessary to show that Stubbs had violated the terms of the permit . . .
. . . . § 261.10(a), which prohibits Constructing, placing, or maintaining any kind of road, trail, structure . . .
. . . On September 1, 2004, the Defendant was charge with violating 36 C.F.R. 261.10(k) which prohibits use . . . which specifically does not require “special-use authorization” that he cannot be convicted under § 261.10 . . . The Government argues that the term “special-use authorization” as used in § 261.10(k) broadly includes . . . Under Part 261, a miner can be charged with violating a "Plan of Operation," [Doremus & § 261.10(1)], . . . Here, however, § 261.10(k) is not an appropriate vehicle. . . .
. . . . §§ 251.50(a), 261.10(k), and 261.1b. . . . one count of violating the rules and regulations of the National Forest, in violation of 36 C.F.R. § 261.10 . . . . § 261.10(k) as specified in the majority opinion, but raised a defense that, because he is not an official . . .
. . . . § 261.10(k). His misdemeanor conviction was affirmed by the district court. . . . or facilities “without special-use authorization when such authorization is required.” 36 C.F.R. § 261.10 . . . Specifically, the court stated: Not one court considering the application of 36 C.F.R. § 261.10(b) has . . . There, the court clarified that proof of a violation of section 261.10(k) requires the government to . . . sufficient to prove that Adams engaged in prohibited use of National Forest System land under 36 C.F.R. § 261.10 . . .
. . . . § 261.10(a). . . .
. . . . § 607 and 45 CFR § 261.10, a Choices individual is deemed to be engaged in work by cooperating with . . . restrictions regarding TANF core and TANF non-core activities as set forth in 45 U.S.C. § 607, 45 C.F.R. §§ 261.10 . . .
. . . . § 607 and 45 CFR § 261.10, a Choices individual is deemed to be engaged in work by cooperating with . . . restrictions regarding TANF core and TANF non-core activities as set forth in 45 U.S.C. § 607, 45 C.F.R. §§ 261.10 . . .
. . . . §§ 261.10(a), (k) (1997). He was fined fifty dollars for each conviction. See United States v. . . . land or facilities without special-use authorization when such authorization is required.” 36 C.F.R. § 261.10 . . . See 36 C.F.R. §§ 251.50(c), 251.54(h)(l)(viii), 251.61, 261.10(k) (1997). We disagree. . . .
. . . without a special-use authorization, or as otherwise authorized by Federal law or regulation 36 C.F.R. 261.10 . . . See 36 C.F.R. § 261.10(b), supra. The first element is not in dispute. . . . The Determination that Appellants Were Not “Otherwise Authorized” to Occupy the Land 36 C.F.R. § 261.10 . . . Nonetheless, they could comply with section 261.10(b) if they were otherwise authorized to occupy the . . . appellants had not created a mining claim as of the time that they were cited for a violation of § 261.10 . . .
. . . . § 261.10(a). . . . Section 261.10(a), 36 C.F.R., prohibits any person from “[cjonstructing, placing, or maintaining any . . . Good is charged with a single count of violating § 261.10(a) by constructing, placing, or maintaining . . . Consequently, I find that violations of 36 C.F.R. §§ 261.9(a) and 261.10(a) are public welfare offenses . . .
. . . Kent, 945 F.2d 1441, 1446 & n. 9 (9th Cir.1991) (no mens rea element for § 261.10(b) (occupying National . . .
. . . . § 261.10, and that if he could not remove his materials by December 12, 1997, he should contact the . . . , or to obtain a Forest Service approved operating plan will place [him] in violation of 36 C.F.R § 261.10 . . .
. . . . §§ 251.50, 261.10(k), and 261.54(a). . . .
. . . S 261.10(k): “Use or occupancy of National Forest System land or facilities without special-use authorization . . . each with use of Forest Service land without special use authorization in violation of 36 C.F.R. § 261.10 . . . Not one court considering the application of 36 C.F.R. § 261.10(b) has hesitated to apply that section . . . There, the court clarified that proof of a violation of section 261.10(k) requires the government to . . . dismissed the information filed against Linick and other defendants alleging a violation of 36 C.F.R. § 261.10 . . .
. . . . § 261.10(1) with three counts of violating the terms and conditions of a Department of Agriculture . . . term or condition of a special-use authorization, contract or approved operating plan.” 36 C.F.R. § 261.10 . . . counts alleged violations of the special use permit in violation of 16 U.S.C. § 551 and 36 C.F.R. § 261.10 . . .
. . . . § 261.10(k): “Use or occupancy of National Forest lands without authorization when such authorization . . . The violation of 36 C.F.R. § 261.10(k) is the same charge which many defendants have faced in reported . . . the same language, except that the numbers and letters denoting this section are different. 36 CFR § 261.10 . . .
. . . . § 261.10(a) and 16 U.S.C. § 551 for maintaining a structure on National Forest system land without . . . IV Maintaining a Structure The district court held that the appellants violated 36 C.F.R. § 261.10(a) . . . argue that their conduct did not constitute “maintaining a structure” as required under 36 C.F.R. § 261.10 . . . The purpose of 36 C.F.R. § 261.10(a) is to prevent the impeding of Forest Service roads. . . . In Scranton, the district court held that the language of 36 C.F.R. § 261.10(a) was not ambiguous. . . .
. . . . § 261.10(a); and (2) impeding a USFS road in violation of 36 C.F.R. § 261.12(d). . . . II The district court held that appellants had violated 36 C.F.R. § 261.10(a). . . . . § 261.10(a) (emphasis added). . . . however, that their conduct did not constitute “maintaining a structure” as required under 36 C.F.R. § 261.10 . . . The purpose of 36 C.F.R § 261.10(a) is to prevent the hindrance of traffic on Forest Service roads and . . .
. . . . § 261.10(c). Brown challenges the sufficiency of the evidence on each count. . . . See 36 C.F.R. § 261.10(c). . . . See 36 C.F.R. § 261.10(c). There is evidence of both offer by Brown and acceptance by Barlow. . . . Receipt of payment, however, is not a required element under § 261.10(c). . . . See 36 C.F.R. § 261.10(c). IV. . . .
. . . . § 261.10(k) — namely unauthorized special use of National Forest System land. . . . AFFIRMED in part and REVERSED in part. . 36 C.F.R. § 261.10(k) prohibits the use or occupation of “National . . . See 36 C.F.R. §§ 251.50(a) & 261.10(k). 36 C.F.R. § 251.56(a)(2) states that each "special use authorization . . .
. . . . § 261.10(k). . . .
. . . . §§ 261.10 & 261.11. . . .
. . . .§ 261.10 (1998) which prohibit occupancy or use of any national forest system lands by groups of 75 . . . land or facilities without special-use authorization when such authorization is required.” 36 C.F.R. § 261.10 . . .
. . . . §§ 251.50, 251.51, 251.54, 251.56, 251.60, and 261.10. . . . may result in a fine of up to $500 or imprisonment of up to 6 months or both. 36 C.F.R. §§ 261.1b, 261.10 . . .
. . . . § 261.10(b) which prohibits a person from residing on National Forest lands without authorization). . . .
. . . Code Regs. 1007-3 § 261.10. . . . Code Regs. 1007-3 § 261.10 (identical definition). . . . Code Regs. 1007-3 § 261.10. . . . Code Regs. 1007-3 § 261.10 and 40 C.F.R. § 260.10. (Stip-¶¶ 15-16.) . . . Code Regs. 1007-3 § 261.10. (Stip-¶ 14.) . . .
. . . . §§ 251.50, 251.51, 261.10(k). . . . At trial before the Magistrate Judge, Defendants were found guilty of violating 36 C.F.R. § 261.10(k) . . . Kent, 945 F.2d 1441 (9th Cir.1991), a Native American defendant argued that 26 C.F.R. § 261.10(b), which . . . This is further confirmed by the minor penalties imposed for violating 36 C.F.R. § 261.10(k), which can . . . As noted above, the combined effect of 36 C.F.R. §§ 251.50, 251.51 and 261.10 is to require a special . . .
. . . . § 261.10(a), and in count two with blocking, restricting or otherwise interfering with the use of Forest . . .
. . . . § 261.10(a). . . .
. . . . § 261.10(c), by knowingly participating in a commercial operation without a permit. . . .
. . . . § 261.10. . . .
. . . . § 261.10(c), which prohibits commercial activity on National Forest lands without special use authorization . . . In March, 1993, Strong was charged with violating 36 C.F.R. § 261.10(e), which prohibits the “[s]elling . . . DISCUSSION The magistrate concluded that to find Strong guilty of violating 36 C.F.R. § 261.10(c), the . . . We agree that 36 C.F.R. § 261.10(c) prohibits the specified activities only when they are engaged in . . . USFS Special Uses Handbook 2079.11 Section 41.53b also supports our conclusion that 36 C.F.R. § 261.10 . . .
. . . . § 261.10(a). . . . National Forest system land” without a permit, is a criminal offense. 36 C.F.R. §§ 261.1b, 261.9(a), 261.10 . . .
. . . . § 261.10(c). This regulation was promulgated pursuant to 16 U.S.C. § 551. . . . The regulation in question, 36 CFR § 261.10(c) (regulation), has been examined by other courts in the . . . prosecution has established beyond a reasonable doubt that Defendant is guilty of a violation of 36 C.F.R. § 261.10 . . . IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that a finding of guilty as to a violation of 36 C.F.R. § 261.10(c) is entered against . . .
. . . . § 261.10(a) (1993). . . .
. . . . §§ 251.50(a) and 261.10(c) by engaging in a commercial service, outfitting and filming motion pictures . . . grazing of livestock are designated special uses and must be approved by any authorized officer. § 261.10 . . . Although Patzer was charged with violating §§ 251.50 and 261.10(c), his contention that the ten counts . . . motion pictures on NFSS lands without a special use authorization in violation of §§ 251.50(a) and 261.10 . . . service, to wit: outfitting, without a special-use authorization; In violation of 36 C.F.R. §§ 251.50(a), 261.10 . . .
. . . . §§ 261.10-.il). . . .
. . . . § 261.10(a), and also with camping within the National Forest for more than thirty days, in violation . . .
. . . Subparts B, C and D, §§ 261.10 et seq. . . .
. . . . § 261.10(a). . . .
. . . . § 261.10(a). . . . As a miner on Forest System land he was required by 36 C.F.R. § 261.10(a) to file for and obtain a special-use . . .
. . . Hall was cited by an employee of the Tahoe National Forest (the “Forest”) for a violation of 36 CFR § 261.10 . . . Resource Officer, Peggy Hernandez, visited the mine to tell Hall that he was not in compliance with § 261.10 . . . miner disagrees, and, if not complied with, may subject the miner to criminal liability under 36 CFR 261.10 . . . If Hall had been charged with a violation of § 261.10(k) (violating a term or condition of an approved . . .
. . . . § 261.10(a)). The court finds this case is also controlling. . . . Instead, the government bases its authority to remove the structures on Sections 228.4 and 261.10(a) . . . Title 36 C.F.R. § 261.10(a) (1989) prohibits the "[c]onstructing, placing, or maintaining any kind of . . .
. . . . § 261.10(b) (1988). United States v. Kent, 679 F.Supp. 985 (E.D.Cal.1987). . . . within a national forest, coupled with the language of the allotment statute, shows that 36 C.F.R. § 261.10 . . . The information charging Kent with violating 16 U.S.C. § 551 and 36 C.F.R. § 261.10(b) alleged that Kent . . . In supplemental briefing, the government argues that 36 C.F.R. § 261.10(b) sets forth a strict liability . . . The government bases its argument on the lack of an explicit mens rea requirement in section 261.10(b . . . . § 261.10(b). . . . decides two issues of law, upon which supplemental briefing was ordered: first, it decides that section 261.10 . . . The first issue, whether section 261.10 defines a strict liability offense, is the most difficult. . . . disagree more strongly with the majority’s ruling that Kent could not be convicted of violating section 261.10 . . .
. . . . § 261.10(b). . . . In supplemental briefing, the government argues that 36 C.F.R. § 261.10(b) sets forth a strict liability . . . The government bases its argument on the lack of an explicit mens rea requirement in section 261.10(b . . . II Even if section 261.10(b) is interpreted as a strict liability offense, I believe Kent’s conviction . . . Section 261.10(b) in clear language exempts anyone “otherwise authorized under Federal law” from the . . . . § 261.10(b) (1988). United States v. Kent, 679 F.Supp. 985 (E.D.Cal.1987). . . . Whether 36 C.F.R. § 261.10(b) Includes a Mens Rea Element There is one issue, however, that we address . . . We now hold that section 261.10(b) does not contain a mens rea element. . . . We do not see how section 261.10(b) can be distinguished from section 261.6(a) in regard to this issue . . . We conclude, therefore, that section 261.10 does not require violations to be “knowing” or “willful”; . . .
. . . . § 261.10(k) (1987)). . . . The references to operating plans in § 261.10 would be meaningless unless Part 261 were construed to . . . We agree with the district court that 36 C.F.R. § 261.10(k) is consistent with the mining laws. . . . A. 36 C.F.R. § 261.10(h) This regulation prohibits “[violating any term or condition of a special-use . . . We therefore hold that § 261.10(k) is not unconstitutionally vague as applied. . . .
. . . . § 261.10(b), (c).” . . .
. . . Id. at §§ 261.10-.il. . . .
. . . . §§ 261.10-.il (1987) (criteria for listing); id. at §§ 261.20-.24 (characteristics of hazardous wastes . . .
. . . . § 261.10.” Defendant’s Response to Plaintiff’s Request to Admit ¶ 11. . . . (2) of RCRA is constrained by the regulatory definition of “disposal facility” found at 40 C.F.R. § 261.10 . . . disposal facility” drawn from the regulatory definition of “disposal facility” found at 40 C.F.R. § 261.10 . . . fit into the four corners of the regulatory definition of “disposal facility” found at 40 C.F.R. § 261.10 . . .
. . . . §§ 212.8, 212.10, 251.53, 251.54, 251.57, 261.10. . . .
. . . . § 261.10(b). . . . Section 261.10(b) of these regulations prohibits “taking possession of, occupying, or otherwise using . . . a special-use authorization, or as otherwise authorized by Federal law or regulation.” 36 C.F.R. § 261.10 . . . CONCLUSION The court, therefore, finds defendant GUILTY of violating 36 C.F.R. § 261.10(b) and 16 U.S.C . . .
. . . . § 261.10(a) (1986). . . . District, Deer Lodge National Forest, without an approved operating plan, in violation of 36 CFR § 261.10 . . . structure, enclosure, or other improvement on National Forest land without an approved operatr ing plan. § 261.10 . . . guilty of maintaining structures and failing to submit a plan of operations in violation of 36 C.F.R. § 261.10 . . .
. . . Regulations provide specific rules for the proper disposal of PCB waste. 15 U.S.C. 2605(e); 40 CFR 261.10 . . .
. . . . § 261.10(k) by exceeding the terms of an approved operating plan for a mining claim by keeping more . . . Title 36 C.F.R. § 261.10(k) (1986) prohibits “[violating any term or condition of a special-use authorization . . . Title 36 C.F.R. § 261.10(h). . . . The trial court found that 36 C.F.R. § 261.10(k) was certainly clear on its face and as applied. . . . . § 261.10(k) prohibits violating a term or condition of an operating plan. . . .
. . . Total American Civil Liberties Union Foundation of Colorado (Holland & Hart) 1490.00 393.20 381.20 261.10 . . .
. . . . § 261.10(a), (b) and © (FSR 35). 9. . . . 13, 1985 decision regarding the removal order based on lack of authorization required by 36 C.F.R. 261.10 . . . obtained any authorization required to maintain the ANDERSON property on LANDS as required by 36 C.F.R. 261.10 . . . special-use authorization, contract or an approved operating plan permitting such use. 36 C.F.R. § 261.10 . . . jurisdiction when there is no authorization for such property to be maintained thereon. 36 C.F.R. § 261.10 . . .
. . . . § 261.10(c). . . . The two counts were outfitting without a permit in violation of 36 C.F.R. § 261.10(c) and giving false . . .
. . . . § 261.10(c), a regulation promulgated pursuant to 16 U.S.C. § 551 (1982) (rules protecting national . . .
. . . We reverse because § 261.10(c) is not applicable to a holdover tenant, who is prosecuted for conduct . . . Section 261.10(c) of 36 C.F.R. prohibits in federal forests: “Selling or offering for sale any merchandise . . . We conclude therefore that Esposito should not have been prosecuted under' 36 C.F.R. § 261.10(c). . . .
. . . See 36 C.F.R. 261.10(e) (1982). . . .
. . . . §§ 261.6(a) and 261.10(a) (1981). . . .
. . . . § 261.10(j). . . . forty-one different prohibited acts, including verbatim the above-set out paragraph (j) of 36 C.F.R. § 261.10 . . . can be characterized as an assembly, because such activities are specially exempted from the section 261.10 . . . He had no part in drafting section 261.10, and was basically unfamiliar with it. . . . . This lack of distinction is not accidental, for section 261.10(i) specifically mentions “developed recreation . . .
. . . and improvements of the lands without permit, the defendants are in continuing violation of 36 C.F.R. 261.10 . . . and no permit permitting construction or improvement on Forest Service land, as required by 36 C.F.R. 261.10 . . .
. . . . § 261.10(c) prohibits conducting any business activity within a National Forest or within the boundaries . . .
. . . of such a site on National Forest land without approval is a violation of the provisions of 36 CFR 261.10 . . . of this action from prosecuting either Downstate or its officers, employees or agents under 36 CFR 261.10 . . . prosecuting either Downstate Stone Company or any of its officers, employees or agents under 36 C.F.R. 261.10 . . . and statutes, the enforcement of which were enjoined, provide in pertinent part as follows: 36 C.F.R. 261.10 . . .
. . . section 261.9 prohibits generally the destroying, disturbing, and removing of any property; and section 261.10 . . .