CopyCited 9 times | Published | Florida 3rd District Court of Appeal | 1981 Fla. App. LEXIS 19293
...[1] After a nonjury trial, judgment was entered *981 for the City of Miami on a finding that the property had not been abandoned and that the City was vested with complete fee simple title. We affirm. By this appeal Vereen claims under two theories: (1) common law abandonment and (2) the statutory provisions of Sections
255.22 and
255.25, Florida Statutes (1975)....
...back taxes in accordance with § 195.106 Florida Statutes. By the same principle, Vereen is also entitled to reimbursement from the City for costs and repairs to the sidewalks on the dedicated land. We consider next Vereen's agreement under Sections 255.22 and 255.23, Florida Statutes (1975). Vereen is entitled to reconveyance under Section 255.22 only if he proves (a) he conveyed the land to the City without receipt of valuable consideration, (b) the city failed to use such property for the specific purpose dedicated for a period of sixty consecutive months, and (c) he is owner of land adjoining such property or at least one side....
...1st DCA 1958) (ordinance arbitrarily imposed denied to property owners just compensation when property taken for public use). See also, R. Henderson, American Law of Zoning 2d § 18.04 (1976). We find no reason why the requested zoning variance should not constitute valuable consideration for purposes of Section 255.22....
...om date of execution. [4] Because the deed conveying Vereen's interest to the City was executed in 1953, Vereen's right to possibility of reverter expired in 1974. For the reasons set forth above, we find Vereen is not entitled to reconveyance under Section 255.22 and 255.23, Florida Statutes (1975), affirm that part of the judgment finding no abandonment under common law and that the City of Miami is vested with complete fee simple title in the property, and remand for equitable reimbursement proceedings....
CopyPublished | District Court of Appeal of Florida | 1996 Fla. App. LEXIS 11637, 1996 WL 637655
PER CURIAM. We affirm the declaratory judgment requiring the City of Fort Lauderdale to reeonvey the easement at issue to McDonald’s Corporation pursuant to section 255.22, Florida Statutes (Supp.1994). Even though McDonald’s is not the “grantor’s successor” within the meaning of section 255.22(5), it is still entitled to rely on subsection (3), which is made applicable by the last sentence of subsection (5)....
CopyPublished | District Court of Appeal of Florida | 11 Fla. L. Weekly 33, 1985 Fla. App. LEXIS 16949
...Judge. Appellants, the County Commissioners of Seminole County, appeal from a final judgment requiring them to reconvey a parcel of land to appellees, the Donaldsons. At trial, the Donaldsons successfully contended they were entitled, under sections 255.22 and 255.23, Florida Statutes (1983), 1 to re- *938 conveyance of land which had been conveyed to the county by deed in August, 1963....
...Since 1963, the county has constructed and maintained a road on one side of the “L”, but has not made any improvements on the other strip. In 1983, the Donaldsons commenced an action against the county to compel the reconveyance of the unimproved strip. Relying on sections 255.22 and 255.23, the court below concluded that the 1963 deed, while it was a single document, was divisible in regards to the two strips and the unimproved portion was conclusively presumed to have been abandoned....
...We conclude that the action was improperly maintained under sections 255.-22 and 255.23. The conveyance to the county in 1963 consisted of a permanent easement for public road purposes. There was no conveyance of the fee. While an easement is a property interest subject to transfer by deed, section 255.22 did not contemplate the conveyance of an easement for “public road purposes” because such a reconveyance would have no effect....
...from the county to a private party would give them the exclusive right to use the land for road purposes. However, an easement for a use of land by the “public ” is necessarily the antithesis of an “exclusive” easement. A reconveyance under section 255.22 could not vest the fee title with the Donaldsons but, at most, would give them an easement for public road purposes....
...If the purpose of the easement no longer is necessary, it may be extinguished. Canal Authority of State v. Mainer,
440 So.2d 1304 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983). However, under the existing circumstances, title to the fee could not devolve to the Donaldsons by operation of law under section
255.22. Having resolved this case on these grounds, we decline to address the other issues raised on appeal. REVERSED and REMANDED for entry of judgment for appellants. COBB, C.J., and COWART, J., concur. . Section
255.22, Florida Statutes (1983), states as follows: Reconveyance of lands not used for purpose specified....
