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Florida Statute 216.221 - Full Text and Legal Analysis
Florida Statute 216.221 | Lawyer Caselaw & Research
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The 2025 Florida Statutes

Title XIV
TAXATION AND FINANCE
Chapter 216
PLANNING AND BUDGETING
View Entire Chapter
216.221 Appropriations as maximum appropriations; adjustment of budgets to avoid or eliminate deficits.
(1) All appropriations shall be maximum appropriations, based upon the collection of sufficient revenues to meet and provide for such appropriations. It is the duty of the Governor, as chief budget officer, to ensure that revenues collected will be sufficient to meet the appropriations and that no deficit occurs in any state fund.
(2) The Legislature may annually provide direction in the General Appropriations Act regarding use of any state funds to offset General Revenue Fund deficits.
(3) For purposes of preventing a deficit in the General Revenue Fund, all branches and agencies of government shall participate in deficit reduction efforts. Absent specific legislative direction, when budget reductions are required in order to prevent a deficit under the provisions of subsection (7), each branch shall reduce its General Revenue Fund appropriations by a proportional amount.
(4) For purposes of preventing a deficit in the General Revenue Fund, appropriations to the legislative branch that are voluntarily placed in their reserve by the President of the Senate or the Speaker of the House of Representatives, or by both, may not be reduced, but may be included in any deficit reduction plan.
(5)(a) If, in the opinion of the Governor, after consultation with the Revenue Estimating Conference, a deficit will occur in the General Revenue Fund, he or she shall so certify to the commission and to the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court. No more than 30 days after certifying that a deficit will occur in the General Revenue Fund, the Governor shall develop for the executive branch, and the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court shall develop for the judicial branch, and provide to the commission and to the Legislature plans of action to eliminate the deficit.
(b) If, in the opinion of the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives, after consultation with the Revenue Estimating Conference, a deficit will occur in the General Revenue Fund and the Governor has not certified the deficit, the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives shall so certify. Within 30 days after such certification, the Governor shall develop for the executive branch and the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court shall develop for the judicial branch and provide to the commission and to the Legislature plans of action to eliminate the deficit.
(c) In developing a plan of action to prevent deficits in accordance with subsection (7), the Governor and Chief Justice shall, to the extent possible, preserve legislative policy and intent, and, absent any specific direction to the contrary in the General Appropriations Act, the Governor and Chief Justice shall comply with the following guidelines for reductions in the approved operating budgets of the executive branch and the judicial branch:
1. Education budgets should not be reduced more than provided for in s. 215.16(2).
2. The use of nonrecurring funds to solve recurring deficits should be minimized.
3. Newly created programs that are not fully implemented and programs with critical audits, evaluations, and reviews should receive first consideration for reductions.
4. No agencies or branches of government receiving appropriations should be exempt from reductions.
5. When reductions in positions are required, the focus should be initially on vacant positions.
6. Reductions that would cause substantial losses of federal funds should be minimized.
7. Reductions to statewide programs should occur only after review of programs that provide only local benefits.
8. Reductions in administrative and support functions should be considered before reductions in direct-support services.
9. Maximum reductions should be considered in budgets for expenses including travel and in budgets for equipment replacement, outside consultants, and contracts.
10. Reductions in salaries for elected state officials should be considered.
11. Reductions that adversely affect the public health, safety, and welfare should be minimized.
12. The Budget Stabilization Fund should not be reduced to a level that would impair the financial stability of this state.
13. Reductions in programs that are traditionally funded by the private sector and that may be assumed by private enterprise should be considered.
14. Reductions in programs that are duplicated among state agencies or branches of government should be considered.
(6) If the Revenue Estimating Conference projects a deficit in the General Revenue Fund in excess of 1.5 percent of the moneys appropriated from the General Revenue Fund during a fiscal year or when the cumulative total of a series of projected deficits in the General Revenue Fund exceeds 1.5 percent of the moneys appropriated from the General Revenue Fund, the deficit shall be resolved by the Legislature.
(7) Deficits in the General Revenue Fund that do not meet the amounts specified by subsection (6) shall be resolved by the Governor for the executive branch and the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court for the judicial branch. The Governor and Chief Justice shall implement any directions provided in the General Appropriations Act related to eliminating deficits and to reducing agency and judicial branch budgets, including the use of those legislative appropriations voluntarily placed in reserve. In addition, the Governor and Chief Justice shall implement any directions in the General Appropriations Act relating to the resolution of deficit situations. When reducing state agency or judicial branch budgets, the Governor or the Chief Justice, respectively, shall use the guidelines prescribed in subsection (5). The Executive Office of the Governor, and the Chief Justice for the judicial branch, shall implement the deficit reduction plans through amendments to the approved operating budgets in accordance with s. 216.181.
(8) The Chief Financial Officer also has the duty to ensure that revenues being collected will be sufficient to meet the appropriations and that no deficit occurs in any fund of the state.
(9) If, in the opinion of the Chief Financial Officer, after consultation with the Revenue Estimating Conference, a deficit will occur, he or she shall report his or her opinion to the Governor, the President of the Senate, and the Speaker of the House of Representatives in writing. In the event the Governor does not certify a deficit, or the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives do not certify a deficit within 10 days after the Chief Financial Officer’s report, the Chief Financial Officer shall report his or her findings and opinion to the commission and the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court.
(10) When advised by the Revenue Estimating Conference, the Chief Financial Officer, or any agency responsible for a trust fund that a deficit will occur with respect to the appropriations from a specific trust fund in the current fiscal year, the Governor for the executive branch, or the Chief Justice for the judicial branch, shall develop a plan of action to eliminate the deficit. Before implementing the plan of action, the Governor or the Chief Justice must comply with the provisions of s. 216.177(2), and actions to resolve deficits in excess of $1 million must be approved by the Legislative Budget Commission. In developing the plan of action, the Governor or the Chief Justice shall, to the extent possible, preserve legislative policy and intent.
(11) Once a deficit is determined to have occurred and action is taken to reduce approved operating budgets and release authority, no action may be taken to restore the reductions, either directly or indirectly.
History.s. 31, ch. 69-106; s. 14, ch. 71-354; s. 18, ch. 83-49; s. 21, ch. 91-109; s. 64, ch. 92-142; s. 1170, ch. 95-147; s. 13, ch. 98-73; s. 30, ch. 2000-371; s. 12, ch. 2001-56; s. 242, ch. 2003-261; s. 32, ch. 2005-152.

F.S. 216.221 on Google Scholar

F.S. 216.221 on CourtListener

Amendments to 216.221


Annotations, Discussions, Cases:

Cases Citing Statute 216.221

Total Results: 9  |  Sort by: Relevance  |  Newest First

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Chiles v. Child. a, B, C, D, E, & F, 589 So. 2d 260 (Fla. 1991).

Cited 61 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 1991 WL 250980

...Mills, Gainesville, amicus curiae. Joseph W. Little, Gainesville, interested party. BARKETT, Justice. We have for review the order of the Eleventh Judicial Circuit, in and for Dade County, Florida, in which the court declared unconstitutional sections 216.011(1)( ll ) and 216.221, Florida Statutes (1989)....
...Comptroller, Treasurer, Commissioner of Agriculture, Commissioner of Education, and all as members of the Administration Commission (hereinafter "Commission"). [2] The trial court granted the children's request and held sections 216.011(1)( ll ) and 216.221, Florida Statutes (1989), unconstitutional and enjoined the Commission from attempting to restructure the 1991 Appropriations Act pursuant to the budget reduction procedure established in chapter 216....
...of Control, 62 So.2d 696 (Fla. 1952). We find the children have demonstrated the existence of present ascertainable facts which were sufficient to permit the trial court to afford declaratory relief. The central issue in this case is whether the legislature, in passing section 216.221, violated the doctrine of separation of powers by assigning to the executive branch the broad discretionary authority to reapportion the state budget. Section 216.221(2), Florida Statutes (1989), provides in relevant part: If, in the opinion of the Governor, after consultation with the revenue estimating conference, a deficit will occur in the General Revenue Fund, he shall so certify to the commission....
...delegate its lawmaking function to another branch notwithstanding policy considerations or the fiscal operations of other states which do not have Florida's constitutional prohibitions against the delegation of powers. Thus we must ascertain whether section 216.221(2) delegates the legislative responsibility to establish law....
...The Commission nevertheless argues that the ability to balance the budget through the reduction process of chapter 216 does not encompass a delegation of legislative power. Rather, it contends that reducing the budget is not the same as "appropriating." We construe the power granted in section 216.221(2) as precisely the power to appropriate....
...cate its lawmaking function and would enable another branch to amend the law without resort to the *266 constitutionally prescribed lawmaking process. This delegation strikes at the very core of the separation of powers doctrine, and for this reason section 216.221 must fail as unconstitutional....
...They left total discretion to executive branch officials. That is, the statutes did not indicate which land to designate as areas of critical state concern in Askew, or which position to cut in Orr, or which confidential information could be released in Lewis. Likewise, in this case, section 216.221 does not indicate which budgeting priorities to maintain or to cut from the original appropriation....
...e fiscal period. The Governor and Cabinet, sitting as the Administration Commission, however, may not be assigned the task of redrafting the appropriations bill once it has passed the legislature and has been approved by the Governor, an avenue that section 216.221 attempts to open for the Commission....
...ine and weigh the multitude of needs and fiscal priorities of the State of Florida. The legislature must carry out its constitutional duty to establish fiscal priorities in light of the financial resources it has provided. Consequently, we find that section 216.221 is an impermissible attempt by the legislature to abdicate a portion of its lawmaking *268 responsibility and to vest it in an executive entity....
...tion. It would indeed be easier and more practical to permit the Commission to rewrite the appropriations bill. We are prohibited by our constitution from doing so. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's order holding sections 216.011(1)( ll ) and 216.221, Florida Statutes (1989), unconstitutional as a violation of the doctrine of separation of powers....
...SHAW, C.J., and GRIMES, KOGAN and HARDING, JJ., concur. OVERTON, J., concurs with an opinion. McDONALD, J., dissents with an opinion. NO MOTION FOR REHEARING WILL BE ALLOWED. OVERTON, Justice, concurring. I fully concur in the majority opinion. I write only to emphasize that the reason section 216.221(2), Florida Statutes (1989), is unconstitutional is because it grants the Governor and Cabinet unlimited legislative policy-making discretion. Other states apparently have addressed the issue of budget adjustments in a constitutional manner without requiring a special legislative session. The extent of the Governor's and Cabinet's legislative policy-making authority granted by section 216.221(2) is illustrated by the total elimination of funds appropriated by the legislature for emergency housing for homeless families with children, as well as the elimination of a special appropriation for additional aid to dependent children....
...ference of State Legislatures study relating to *270 legislative budget procedures in the fifty states, [12] noted that other states have addressed this problem in more restrictive ways without having to call the legislative body into session. While section 216.221(2) is unconstitutional, it does not mean that the legislature must reconvene every time there is a need for budget adjustments. I believe the legislature can establish a process with specific guidelines for making budget adjustments that is constitutional. McDONALD, Justice, dissenting. Section 216.221, Florida Statutes (1989), involves a statutory scheme which permits the reasonable exercise of appropriately shared authority between the executive and legislative branches. The need to maintain a balanced budget is one which is strongly ensconced in Florida's history; it is a protection for the public, and particularly for future generations, which must be guaranteed to the greatest extent possible. Section 216.221 provides the framework for such protection and I believe it is constitutional....
...e relieved of the constitutional obligation to employ the supreme executive power of the state to assure the budget was balanced. The mandates of the Constitution prevail over both the legislative and executive branches of government. In that regard section 216.221(1) is declarative of the constitutional power and responsibility reposed in the Governor....
...appropriation which by law is a maximum appropriation. There must be a guard standing at the door to prevent the expenditure of funds which are not on hand and are not forthcoming. The legislation under attack recognizes this. My colleagues declare section 216.221 unconstitutional because they perceive the Commission as performing a legislative function or doing so with inadequate guidance....
...tutional obligation to preclude the expenditure of funds *271 in excess of revenue. Should the statute fall, he still has this constitutional mandate to assure that no more money is spent than is taken in. Thus, I see little to gain by striking down section 216.221....
...Horne, 269 So.2d 659 (Fla. 1972); see Rosenhouse v. 1950 Spring Term Grand Jury, 56 So.2d 445 (Fla. 1952); Yon v. Orange County, 43 So.2d 177 (Fla. 1949); State ex rel. Hill v. Cone, 140 Fla. 1, 191 So. 50 (1939). The budget reductions ordered pursuant to section 216.221, Florida Statutes (1989), go to the very heart of the legislature's taxing and spending power, and thus the children have standing to invoke this constitutional challenge....
...For example, the Emergency Financial Assistance for Housing Programs mandated by the legislature to address this state's housing needs would be completely abolished. [8] The Board of Commissioners of State Institutions was the delegatee in that case. [9] We reject the Commission's assertion that section 216.221 contains sufficient guidelines....
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Chiles v. United Fac. of Florida, 615 So. 2d 671 (Fla. 1993).

Cited 17 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 18 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 176, 1993 Fla. LEXIS 493, 143 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2806, 1993 WL 64606

...1991), in which we said that the reduction choices were solely within the exclusive authority of the legislature. As noted in my concurrence to that opinion: The extent of the Governor's and Cabinet's legislative policy-making authority granted by section 216.221(2) is illustrated by the total elimination of funds appropriated by the legislature for emergency housing for homeless families with children, as well as the elimination of a special appropriation for additional aid to dependent children....
...[3] Florida's Constitution requires that the state operate under a balanced budget. [4] "It is the duty of the Governor, as chief budget officer, to ensure that revenues collected will be sufficient to meet the appropriations *677 and that no deficit occurs in any state fund." § 216.221(1), Fla....
...447.309(2), Fla. Stat. (1989). [4] Article VII, section 1(d), Florida Constitution, states: "Provision shall be made by law for raising sufficient revenue to defray the expenses of the state for each fiscal period." [5] After this Court declared subsection 216.221(2), Florida Statutes (1989), unconstitutional in Chiles v. Children A, B, C, D, E, & F, 589 So.2d 260 (Fla. 1991), the legislature amended section 216.221....
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Florida Ass'n of Rehab. Facilities, Inc. v. Florida Dep't of Health & Rehabilitative Servs., 164 F.R.D. 257 (N.D. Fla. 1995).

Cited 4 times | Published | District Court, N.D. Florida | 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20462, 1995 WL 707365

924-926 (Fla.1978). Chiles held that Fla.Stat. § 216.221 (1989) violated the principle of separation of
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Hillhaven v. Dept. of Health & Rehab Serv., 625 So. 2d 1299 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993).

Cited 3 times | Published | Florida 1st District Court of Appeal

...Among the alternatives listed, HRS recommended amending the Medicaid plan to require a freeze in nursing-home Medicaid re-imbursement rates, beginning January 1, 1990, for an indefinite period. On November 21, 1989, the AC accepted the proposal and reduced HRS's budget accordingly, pursuant to Section 216.221(2), Florida Statutes (1989), which provides in part: "The commission may, by affirmative action, reduce all approved state agency budgets and releases by a sufficient amount to prevent a deficit in any fund." *1301 To comply with pert...
...of which are the subjects of this appeal. In their 120.56 rule challenges, appellants claimed that HRS's emergency and permanent rules were invalid under the decision of Chiles v. Children A, B, C, D, E, & F, 589 So.2d 260 (Fla. 1991), holding that section 216.221 was facially unconstitutional because it violated the doctrine of separation of powers....
...o amounts less than those established by the 1991 Appropriations Act. Six foster children affected by the reductions thereupon brought actions for declaratory and injunctive relief against the AC. The trial court granted the children's request, held section 216.221 unconstitutional, and enjoined the AC from implementing the budget reductions. On appeal, the supreme court held that section 216.221 was unconstitutional, because it delegated the power to reapportion the state budget to the executive branch of the government, whereas the Constitution only permits the legislature to appropriate state funds by duly enacted statutes. The court concluded as follows: Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's order holding sections 216.011(1)(11)[ [5] ] and 216.221, Florida Statutes (1989), unconstitutional as a violation of the doctrine of separation of powers....
...It clearly indicates that any reductions or elimination of programs made by an agency in response to the acts of the governor and AC were void. In our judgment, this paragraph should not be understood as broadly precluding consideration of any other legal challenges to executive actions taken pursuant to section 216.221....
...1967) (on rehearing); In re Forfeiture of the Following Described Property: 1985 Mercedes Serial No. WDB7AQ4C1FF070173, 596 So.2d 1261, 1264 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992) (and cases cited therein). Under this doctrine, this court is required to apply the Chiles decision to the issue at bar. The fact that Chiles held section 216.221 facially invalid, whereas the action at bar involves an attack on two rules implementing section 216.221 as an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority, does not render the Chiles rule inapplicable to the instant case....
...e payment for medical services to any [eligible] person[.] (Emphasis added.) The legislature appropriated sufficient funds to HRS for the fiscal year 1989-1990 for the purpose of reimbursing the providers at bar. Although HRS did not explicitly cite section 216.221 as one of the laws implemented by the emergency and permanent rules, the text of the notice of emergency rulemaking *1303 stated that the rule was being promulgated pursuant to the AC's decision to freeze the Medicaid rates. The parties specifically stipulated below that the budget-reduction procedure was authorized by section 216.221. The only authority given to the executive branch of government to reduce the state budget is derived from section 216.221....
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AA v. State, 605 So. 2d 106 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992).

Cited 1 times | Published | Florida 1st District Court of Appeal | 1992 WL 193018

...I suggest that it may be possible to apply a "bright line" test for the purpose of gauging the validity of a statute once a delegation challenge is raised. Such an analysis would follow that employed by the Florida Supreme Court in Chiles v. Children A, B, C, D, E, and F , wherein the court invalidated Section 216.221(2), Florida Statutes (1989), giving the governor and members of the cabinet, acting as the Administrative Commission, the power to reduce all state agency budgets by a sufficient amount in order to prevent a deficit....
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Ago (Fla. Att'y Gen. 1987).

Published | Florida Attorney General Reports

reduction in anticipated revenues. Question Two Section 216.221, F.S., permits the Administration Commission
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Hillhaven Corp. v. Dep't of Health & Rehabilitative Servs., 625 So. 2d 1299 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993).

Published | District Court of Appeal of Florida | 1993 Fla. App. LEXIS 11185

reduced HRS’s budget accordingly, pursuant to Section 216.221(2), Florida Statutes (1989), which provides
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Miami-dade Cnty. v. City of Miami (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2020).

Published | District Court of Appeal of Florida

Court was “whether the legislature, in passing section 216.221, violated the doctrine of separation of powers
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Interest of A.A. v. State, 605 So. 2d 106 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992).

Published | District Court of Appeal of Florida | 1992 Fla. App. LEXIS 8918

D, E, and F, wherein the court invalidated Section 216.221(2), Florida Statutes (1989), giving the governor

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