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Florida Statute 202.19 | Lawyer Caselaw & Research
F.S. 202.19 Case Law from Google Scholar
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The 2023 Florida Statutes (including Special Session C)

Title XIV
TAXATION AND FINANCE
Chapter 202
COMMUNICATIONS SERVICES TAX SIMPLIFICATION LAW
View Entire Chapter
F.S. 202.19
202.19 Authorization to impose local communications services tax.
(1) The governing authority of each county and municipality may, by ordinance, levy a local communications services tax as provided in this section.
(2)(a) Charter counties and municipalities may levy the tax authorized by subsection (1) at a rate of up to 5.1 percent for municipalities and charter counties that have not chosen to levy permit fees, and at a rate of up to 4.98 percent for municipalities and charter counties that have chosen to levy permit fees.
(b) Noncharter counties may levy the tax authorized by subsection (1) at a rate of up to 1.6 percent.
(c) The maximum rates authorized by paragraphs (a) and (b) do not include the add-ons of up to 0.12 percent for municipalities and charter counties or of up to 0.24 percent for noncharter counties authorized pursuant to s. 337.401, nor do they supersede conversion or emergency rates authorized by s. 202.20 which are in excess of these maximum rates.
(d) The local communications services tax rate in effect on January 1, 2023, may not be increased before January 1, 2026.
(3)(a) The tax authorized under this section includes and is in lieu of any fee or other consideration, including, but not limited to, application fees, transfer fees, renewal fees, or claims for related costs, to which the municipality or county is otherwise entitled for granting permission to dealers of communications services, including, but not limited to, providers of cable television services, as authorized in 47 U.S.C. s. 542, to use or occupy its roads or rights-of-way for the placement, construction, and maintenance of poles, wires, and other fixtures used in the provision of communications services.
(b) This subsection does not supersede or impair the right, if any, of a municipality or county to require the payment of consideration or to require the payment of regulatory fees or assessments by persons using or occupying its roads or rights-of-way in a capacity other than that of a dealer of communications services.
(4)(a)1. Except as otherwise provided in this section, the tax imposed by any municipality shall be on all communications services subject to tax under s. 202.12 which:
a. Originate or terminate in this state; and
b. Are charged to a service address in the municipality.
2. With respect to private communications services, the tax shall be on the sales price of such services provided within the municipality, which shall be determined in accordance with the following provisions:
a. Any charge with respect to a channel termination point located within such municipality;
b. Any charge for the use of a channel between two channel termination points located in such municipality; and
c. Where channel termination points are located both within and outside of the municipality:
(I) If any segment between two such channel termination points is separately billed, 50 percent of such charge; and
(II) If any segment of the circuit is not separately billed, an amount equal to the total charge for such circuit multiplied by a fraction, the numerator of which is the number of channel termination points within such municipality and the denominator of which is the total number of channel termination points of the circuit.
(b)1. Except as otherwise provided in this section, the tax imposed by any county under subsection (1) shall be on all communications services subject to tax under s. 202.12 which:
a. Originate or terminate in this state; and
b. Are charged to a service address in the unincorporated area of the county.
2. With respect to private communications services, the tax shall be on the sales price of such services provided within the unincorporated area of the county, which shall be determined in accordance with the following provisions:
a. Any charge with respect to a channel termination point located within the unincorporated area of such county;
b. Any charge for the use of a channel between two channel termination points located in the unincorporated area of such county; and
c. Where channel termination points are located both within and outside of the unincorporated area of such county:
(I) If any segment between two such channel termination points is separately billed, 50 percent of such charge; and
(II) If any segment of the circuit is not separately billed, an amount equal to the total charge for such circuit multiplied by a fraction, the numerator of which is the number of channel termination points within the unincorporated area of such county and the denominator of which is the total number of channel termination points of the circuit.
(5) In addition to the communications services taxes authorized by subsection (1), a discretionary sales surtax that a county or school board has levied under s. 212.055 is imposed as a local communications services tax under this section, and the rate shall be determined in accordance with s. 202.20(3). However, any increase to the discretionary sales surtax levied under s. 212.055 on or after January 1, 2023, may not be added to the local communications services tax under this section before January 1, 2026.
(a) Except as otherwise provided in this subsection, each such tax rate shall be applied, in addition to the other tax rates applied under this chapter, to communications services subject to tax under s. 202.12 which:
1. Originate or terminate in this state; and
2. Are charged to a service address in the county.
(b) With respect to private communications services, the tax shall be on the sales price of such services provided within the county, which shall be determined in accordance with the following provisions:
1. Any charge with respect to a channel termination point located within such county;
2. Any charge for the use of a channel between two channel termination points located in such county; and
3. Where channel termination points are located both within and outside of such county:
a. If any segment between two such channel termination points is separately billed, 50 percent of such charge; and
b. If any segment of the circuit is not separately billed, an amount equal to the total charge for such circuit multiplied by a fraction, the numerator of which is the number of channel termination points within such county and the denominator of which is the total number of channel termination points of the circuit.
(6) Notwithstanding any other provision of this section, a tax imposed under this section does not apply to any direct-to-home satellite service.
(7) Notwithstanding any law to the contrary, a tax imposed under this section shall not exceed $25,000 per calendar year on communications services charges billed to a service address located in a municipality or county imposing a local communications services tax for interstate communications services that originate outside this state and terminate within this state. This subsection applies only to holders of a direct-pay permit issued under s. 202.12(3). A person who does not qualify for a direct-pay permit under s. 202.12(3) does not qualify for a direct-pay permit under this subsection. A refund may not be given for taxes paid before receiving a direct-pay permit. Upon application, the department shall identify the service addresses qualifying for the limitation provided by this subsection on the direct-pay permit issued under s. 202.12(3) and authorize such purchaser to pay the local communications tax on such interstate services directly to the department if the application indicates that the majority of such services used by such person and billed to a service address are for communications originating outside of this state and terminating in this state. The direct-pay permit shall also indicate the counties or municipalities to which it applies. Any dealer of communications services furnishing communications services to the holder of a valid direct-pay permit is relieved of the obligation to collect and remit the tax on such services. Tax payments and returns pursuant to a direct-pay permit shall be monthly. As used in this subsection, “person” means a single legal entity and does not mean a group or combination of affiliated entities or entities controlled by one person or group of persons.
(8) The revenues raised by any tax imposed under subsection (1) or s. 202.20(1), or distributed to a local government pursuant to s. 202.18, may be used by a municipality or county for any public purpose, including, but not limited to, pledging such revenues for the repayment of current or future bonded indebtedness. Revenues raised by a tax imposed under subsection (5) shall be used for the same purposes as the underlying discretionary sales surtax imposed by the county or school board under s. 212.055.
(9) Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary, the exemption set forth in s. 202.125(1) shall not apply to a tax imposed by a municipality, school board, or county pursuant to subsection (4) or subsection (5).
(10) To the extent that a provider of communications services is required to pay to a local taxing jurisdiction a tax, charge, or other fee under any franchise agreement or ordinance with respect to the services or revenues that are also subject to the tax imposed by this section, such provider is entitled to a credit against the amount payable to the state pursuant to this section in the amount of such tax, charge, or fee with respect to such services or revenues. The amount of such credit shall be deducted from the amount that such local taxing jurisdiction is entitled to receive under s. 202.18(3).
(11) Notwithstanding any other provision of this section, with respect to mobile communications services, the rate of a local communications services tax levied under this section shall be applied to the sales price of all mobile communications services deemed to be provided to a customer by a home service provider pursuant to s. 117(a) of the Mobile Telecommunications Sourcing Act, Pub. L. No. 106-252, if such customer’s service address is located within the municipality levying the tax or within the unincorporated area of the county levying the tax, as the case may be.
History.ss. 11, 58, ch. 2000-260; ss. 9, 10, 11, 38, ch. 2001-140; s. 9, ch. 2005-132; s. 6, ch. 2005-187; s. 17, ch. 2023-157.

F.S. 202.19 on Google Scholar

F.S. 202.19 on Casetext

Amendments to 202.19


Arrestable Offenses / Crimes under Fla. Stat. 202.19
Level: Degree
Misdemeanor/Felony: First/Second/Third

Current data shows no reason an arrest or criminal charge should have occurred directly under Florida Statute 202.19.



Annotations, Discussions, Cases:

Cases from cite.case.law:

JOHNSON, v. J. ASTRUE,, 811 F. Supp. 2d 618 (E.D.N.Y. 2011)

. . . ninth grade education and a history of semiskilled work with no transferable skills [pursuant to] Rule 202.19 . . .

RUDNICKI, v. WPNA AM,, 580 F. Supp. 2d 690 (N.D. Ill. 2008)

. . . . § 202.19(c)(3). His argument confuses two separate concepts of copyright law. . . . See 37 C.F.R. § 202.19(a) (“The provisions of this section are not applicable to the deposit of copies . . . Plaintiff ignores the limiting language found in § 202.19(a) and, instead, argues that because in certain . . . In light of our interpretation of the exceptions found in 37 C.F.R. § 202.19, plaintiffs argument, based . . . upon the addresses exception found in § 202.19(c)(3), fails. . . .

INTERNATIONAL TECHNOLOGY CORPORATION, v. C. WINTER,, 523 F.3d 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2008)

. . . J.A. at R4 202.19. . . .

SALAZAR, Jr. v. Jo B. BARNHART,, 172 F. App'x 787 (10th Cir. 2006)

. . . P, App. 2, rule 202.19 (the grids) the ALJ concluded that appellant was not disabled within the meaning . . .

DELGADO, v. Jo B. BARNHART,, 305 F. Supp. 2d 704 (S.D. Tex. 2004)

. . . not disabled’ is therefore reached within the framework of Medical-Vocational Rule[s] 202.17, 202.18, 202.19 . . . allow his to perform the full range of light work, using Medical-Vocational Rule[s] 202.17, 202.18, 202.19 . . . were- appropriate with regard to the other two categories (i.e., age and education), Rules 202.12 and 202.19 . . .

A. SAMUEL, v. Jo BARNHART,, 295 F. Supp. 2d 926 (E.D. Wis. 2003)

. . . However, relying on the testimony of the VE and using Grid Rule 202.19 as a framework, the ALJ concluded . . .

STORK v. BELLSOUTH CORPORATION, a a a, 847 So. 2d 1098 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003)

. . . Effective that date, section 202.19, Florida Statutes, governs local imposition of communications service . . .

ISHMAEL, v. Jo B. BARNHART,, 212 F. Supp. 2d 865 (N.D. Ill. 2002)

. . . step five, the ALJ looked to Medical-Vocational Rules 202.17 and 202.18 of Table No. 2 and 202.18 and 202.19 . . .

LENON, v. S. APFEL,, 191 F. Supp. 2d 968 (W.D. Tenn. 2001)

. . . experience, section 404.1569 of Regulations No. 4 and section 416.969 of Regulations No. 16 and Rule 202.19 . . .

DANIELS, v. S. APFEL,, 92 F. Supp. 2d 1269 (S.D. Ala. 2000)

. . . substantial numbers of jobs exist which Plaintiff could perform under the framework of Rules 201.18 and 202.19 . . . Rule 202.19 refers to a person with a residual functional capacity for light work. . . . .

MARTONE, v. S. APFEL,, 70 F. Supp. 2d 145 (N.D.N.Y. 1999)

. . . Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 2, Rule 202.17-202.19. . . .

W. WYRICK, v. S. APFEL,, 29 F. Supp. 2d 693 (M.D.N.C. 1998)

. . . Plaintiffs vocational profile and the testimony of the vocational expert, •the framework of Rules 201.10 and 202.19 . . .

SPRADLIN, v. SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES,, 857 F. Supp. 1215 (S.D. Ohio 1993)

. . . Judge Shearer then applied section 202.19 of the Grid and concluded that Plaintiff was not disabled and . . .

F. KNIGHT, Jr. S. T. D. S. S. Jr. L. Dr. W. Y. N. S. Dr. Jr. v. STATE ALABAMA M. Jr. S. Jr. B. H. J. P. Dr. D. III, F. A. A. Sr. A. G. A M W. Dr. A M Jr. W. M. H. B. L. A. R. C. Dr. V. Dr. E. B. F. W. Jr. W. T. Jr. R. R. E. W. A. C. J. D. Jr. T. B. Jr. O. H. Jr. T. Jr. E. G. Jr. S. H. Jr. B. Dr. A. UNITED STATES v. STATE OF ALABAMA A M a a a a a a a a a a, 787 F. Supp. 1030 (N.D. Ala. 1991)

. . . Rutledge (2/20/91) 29-30; STX 202.19. 995. . . .

J. LONG, v. R. BOWEN, M. D., 866 F.2d 1066 (8th Cir. 1989)

. . . .-11, 202.12, 202.18, and 202.19 of the grid (Table No. 2 in Appendix 2, 20 C.F.R. . . .

A. SNYDER, v. R. BOWEN, M. D., 694 F. Supp. 90 (M.D. Pa. 1988)

. . . Pursuant to Section 404.1520(f), and Rules 202.16-202.19 of Appendix 2, Subpart P, Regulations No. 4, . . .

RELIGIOUS TECHNOLOGY CENTER, v. SCOTT, RELIGIOUS TECHNOLOGY CENTER, v. WOLLERSHEIM,, 660 F. Supp. 515 (C.D. Cal. 1987)

. . . Ch. 11 § 202.19. . . .

SHIDLER, v. R. BOWEN,, 651 F. Supp. 1291 (N.D. Ind. 1987)

. . . .-1569 and Rules 202.18 and 202.19, Table No. 2, Appendix 2, Subpart P., Regulations No. 4 would direct . . . residual functional capacity for light work, the claimant falls within the framework of rules 202.18 and 202.19 . . .

UNITED STATES v. A. BRUCE A., 642 F. Supp. 120 (S.D. Tex. 1986)

. . . Thus, the Bruces were entitled to a refund of $202.19. 3. . . .

ROOT, v. M. HECKLER,, 618 F. Supp. 76 (D. Del. 1985)

. . . . § 404, subpart P, appendix 2, Rules 202.19, 202.11. . . .

GALLANT, v. M. HECKLER,, 753 F.2d 1450 (9th Cir. 1984)

. . . residual functional capacity to perform light and sedentary work and applied Medical-vocational Rule 202.19 . . . AU concluded mandated a finding of “not disabled.” 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpart P, app. 2, §§ 202.17, 202.19 . . .

N. SIMONSON, v. S. SCHWEIKER,, 699 F.2d 426 (8th Cir. 1983)

. . . The ALJ cites Rule 201.26 of Table No. 1 and Rule 202.19 of Table 2 in Appendix 2. . . . .

E. ROBERTS, v. S. SCHWEIKER,, 682 F.2d 743 (8th Cir. 1982)

. . . work capability, age, education and work experience, based on Regulation 404.1513 and considering Rule 202.19 . . .

CLUB GAONA, INC. a v. UNITED STATES, 167 F. Supp. 741 (S.D. Cal. 1958)

. . . follows: 1941, $195.63; 1942, $277.52; 1943, $2,889.09; 1944, $3,436.44; 1945, $4,594.36; 1946, $9,-202.19 . . .

WATERLOO, 29 F. Cas. 399 (S.D.N.Y. 1830)

. . . The ship and her cargo were sold for $39,-202.19. which sum was deposited in court. . . .