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Florida Statute 202.18 | Lawyer Caselaw & Research
F.S. 202.18 Case Law from Google Scholar
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The 2023 Florida Statutes (including Special Session C)

Title XIV
TAXATION AND FINANCE
Chapter 202
COMMUNICATIONS SERVICES TAX SIMPLIFICATION LAW
View Entire Chapter
F.S. 202.18
202.18 Allocation and disposition of tax proceeds.The proceeds of the communications services taxes remitted under this chapter shall be treated as follows:
(1) The proceeds of the taxes remitted under s. 202.12(1)(a) shall be divided as follows:
(a) The portion of such proceeds which constitutes gross receipts taxes, imposed at the rate prescribed in chapter 203, shall be deposited as provided by law and in accordance with s. 9, Art. XII of the State Constitution.
(b) The remaining portion shall be distributed according to s. 212.20(6).
(2) The proceeds of the taxes remitted under s. 202.12(1)(b) shall be allocated as follows:
(a) The portion of the proceeds which constitutes gross receipts taxes, imposed at the rate prescribed in chapter 203, shall be deposited as provided by law and in accordance with s. 9, Art. XII of the State Constitution.
(b) Fifty-five and nine-tenths percent of the remainder shall be allocated to the state and distributed pursuant to s. 212.20(6), except that the proceeds allocated pursuant to s. 212.20(6)(d)2. shall be prorated to the participating counties in the same proportion as that month’s collection of the taxes and fees imposed pursuant to chapter 212 and paragraph (1)(b).
(c)1. During each calendar year, the remaining portion of the proceeds shall be transferred to the Local Government Half-cent Sales Tax Clearing Trust Fund. Seventy percent of such proceeds shall be allocated in the same proportion as the allocation of total receipts of the half-cent sales tax under s. 218.61 and the emergency distribution under s. 218.65 in the prior state fiscal year. Thirty percent of such proceeds shall be distributed pursuant to s. 218.67.
2. The proportion of the proceeds allocated based on the emergency distribution under s. 218.65 shall be distributed pursuant to s. 218.65.
3. In each calendar year, the proportion of the proceeds allocated based on the half-cent sales tax under s. 218.61 shall be allocated to each county in the same proportion as the county’s percentage of total sales tax allocation for the prior state fiscal year and distributed pursuant to s. 218.62.
4. The department shall distribute the appropriate amount to each municipality and county each month at the same time that local communications services taxes are distributed pursuant to subsection (3).
(3)(a) Notwithstanding any law to the contrary, the proceeds of each local communications services tax levied by a municipality or county pursuant to s. 202.19(1) or s. 202.20(1), less the department’s costs of administration, shall be transferred to the Local Communications Services Tax Clearing Trust Fund and held there to be distributed to such municipality or county. However, the proceeds of any communications services tax imposed pursuant to s. 202.19(5) shall be deposited and disbursed in accordance with ss. 212.054 and 212.055. For purposes of this section, the proceeds of any tax levied by a municipality, county, or school board under s. 202.19(1) or s. 202.20(1) are all funds collected and received by the department pursuant to a specific levy authorized by such sections, including any interest and penalties attributable to the tax levy.
(b) The amount deducted for the costs of administration may not exceed 1 percent of the total revenue generated for all municipalities, counties, and school boards levying a tax pursuant to s. 202.19. The amount deducted for the costs of administration shall be used only for those costs that are attributable to the taxes imposed pursuant to s. 202.19. The total cost of administration shall be prorated among those jurisdictions levying the tax on the basis of the amount collected for a particular jurisdiction to the total amount collected for all such jurisdictions.
(c)1. Except as otherwise provided in this paragraph, proceeds of the taxes levied pursuant to s. 202.19, less amounts deducted for costs of administration in accordance with paragraph (b), shall be distributed monthly to the appropriate jurisdictions. The proceeds of taxes imposed pursuant to s. 202.19(5) shall be distributed in the same manner as discretionary surtaxes are distributed, in accordance with ss. 212.054 and 212.055.
2. The department shall make any adjustments to the distributions pursuant to this section which are necessary to reflect the proper amounts due to individual jurisdictions or trust funds. In the event that the department adjusts amounts due to reflect a correction in the situsing of a customer, such adjustment shall be limited to the amount of tax actually collected from such customer by the dealer of communication services.
3.a. Adjustments in distributions which are necessary to correct misallocations between jurisdictions shall be governed by this subparagraph. If the department determines that misallocations between jurisdictions occurred, it shall provide written notice of such determination to all affected jurisdictions. The notice shall include the amount of the misallocations, the basis upon which the determination was made, data supporting the determination, and the identity of each affected jurisdiction. The notice shall also inform all affected jurisdictions of their authority to enter into a written agreement establishing a method of adjustment as described in sub-subparagraph c.
b. An adjustment affecting a distribution to a jurisdiction which is less than 90 percent of the average monthly distribution to that jurisdiction for the 6 months immediately preceding the department’s determination, as reported by all communications services dealers, shall be made in the month immediately following the department’s determination that misallocations occurred.
c. If an adjustment affecting a distribution to a jurisdiction equals or exceeds 90 percent of the average monthly distribution to that jurisdiction for the 6 months immediately preceding the department’s determination, as reported by all communications services dealers, the affected jurisdictions may enter into a written agreement establishing a method of adjustment. If the agreement establishing a method of adjustment provides for payments of local communications services tax monthly distributions, the amount of any such payment agreed to may not exceed the local communications services tax monthly distributions available to the jurisdiction that was allocated amounts in excess of those to which it was entitled. If affected jurisdictions execute a written agreement specifying a method of adjustment, a copy of the written agreement shall be provided to the department no later than the first day of the month following 90 days after the date the department transmits notice of the misallocation. If the department does not receive a copy of the written agreement within the specified time period, an adjustment affecting a distribution to a jurisdiction made pursuant to this sub-subparagraph shall be prorated over a time period that equals the time period over which the misallocations occurred.
History.ss. 10, 58, ch. 2000-260; ss. 8, 38, ch. 2001-140; s. 30, ch. 2002-1; s. 5, ch. 2005-187; s. 1, ch. 2006-229; s. 11, ch. 2007-106; s. 6, ch. 2009-68; s. 5, ch. 2012-70; s. 4, ch. 2015-221.

F.S. 202.18 on Google Scholar

F.S. 202.18 on Casetext

Amendments to 202.18


Arrestable Offenses / Crimes under Fla. Stat. 202.18
Level: Degree
Misdemeanor/Felony: First/Second/Third

Current data shows no reason an arrest or criminal charge should have occurred directly under Florida Statute 202.18.



Annotations, Discussions, Cases:

Cases from cite.case.law:

AMIR, v. COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,, 705 F. App'x 443 (6th Cir. 2017)

. . . Here, the ALJ found that grid Rule 202.18 most closely matched Amir’s disability profile. . . . Rule 202.18 provides that a younger individual (age 45-49) is not disabled if he is limited to light . . . Pt 404, Subpt P, App 2, § 202.18. . . . To the extent that Amir also possessed non-exertional limitations that were unaddressed by Rule 202.18 . . .

PAYNE, v. W. COLVIN,, 216 F. Supp. 3d 876 (N.D. Ill. 2016)

. . . 221, 306, 332; supra note 5, the Administrative Law Judge should have applied Medical Vocational Rule 202.18 . . .

SUAREZ, v. W. COLVIN,, 102 F. Supp. 3d 552 (S.D.N.Y. 2015)

. . . full range of light work, a finding of ‘not disabled’ would be directed by Medical-Vocational Rule 202.18 . . .

L. COOKSEY, v. W. COLVIN,, 605 F. App'x 735 (10th Cir. 2015)

. . . . § 202.18. . . .

PETERSON, v. COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,, 552 F. App'x 533 (6th Cir. 2014)

. . . Relying on VE testimony and looking to Medical-Vocational Guideline Rule 202.18, ALJ Zuber found that . . .

In LIBERATORE, A. v., 503 B.R. 23 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2013)

. . . $67.49; and (6) a 50% interest with a non-relative in a VIST Bank checking account with a balance of $202.18 . . .

WATKINS, v. J. ASTRUE,, 925 F. Supp. 2d 1257 (N.D. Ala. 2013)

. . . Given these facts, the ALJ found that Medical-Vocational Rule 202.18 directed him to consider Mr. . . . to acknowledge his pain as a severe impairment; (2) the ALJ’s application of Medical-Vocational Rule 202.18 . . .

A. BOYLAN, v. J. ASTRUE,, 32 F. Supp. 3d 238 (N.D.N.Y. 2012)

. . . concluded that a finding of “not disabled” was warranted under the framework of Medical-Vocational Rule 202.18 . . .

L. KEYES- ZACHARY, v. J. ASTRUE,, 695 F.3d 1156 (10th Cir. 2012)

. . . P, App. 2, rule 202.18 as a framework, the ALJ concluded that Ms. . . .

BYES, v. J. ASTRUE,, 687 F.3d 913 (8th Cir. 2012)

. . . considering Byes’s age, education, work experience, and residual functional capacity, Medical-Vocational Rule 202.18 . . . The district court found that the ALJ had applied the incorrect grid rule, using rule 202.18 in order . . . P, App. 2, Table 2, Rule 202.18. . . . Nevertheless, it found that the ALJ’s application of 202.18 was harmless error because, even if Byes . . .

SWETT, v. COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,, 886 F. Supp. 2d 656 (S.D. Ohio 2012)

. . . capacity for light work, and the claimant’s age, education, and work experience, section 404.1569 and Rule 202.18 . . .

VAN VEEN, v. EQUIFAX INFORMATION, 844 F. Supp. 2d 599 (E.D. Pa. 2012)

. . . In late-June 2007, Plaintiff received a second bill from Defendant for $202.18—the prior bills plus charges . . .

R. DILLARD, v. J. ASTRUE,, 834 F. Supp. 2d 1325 (S.D. Ala. 2011)

. . . full range of light work, a finding of “not disabled” would be directed by Medical-Vocational Rule 202.18 . . .

FRANKLIN, v. J. ASTRUE,, 450 F. App'x 782 (10th Cir. 2011)

. . . P, App. 2, rule 202.18 (the grids) as a framework, and considering the testimony of a vocational expert . . .

T. JOHNSON, v. J. ASTRUE,, 816 F. Supp. 2d 752 (W.D. Mo. 2011)

. . . limited to a wide range of light work with the Plaintiffs vocational profile, the Medical-Vocational Rule 202.18 . . .

MEJIA, v. J. ASTRUE,, 719 F. Supp. 2d 328 (S.D.N.Y. 2010)

. . . P, App. 2, §§ 201.18-19, 202.18-19. . . .

ROSS, v. J. ASTRUE,, 636 F. Supp. 2d 127 (D.D.C. 2009)

. . . Def.’s Mem. at 11; see also 20 C.F.R., Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 2 §§ 201.19, 202.18 (indicating . . .

HUIZAR, v. J. ASTRUE,, 642 F. Supp. 2d 614 (W.D. Tex. 2009)

. . . full range of light work, a finding of “not disabled” would be directed by Medical-Vocational Rules 202.18 . . .

A. GUINN, v. COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,, 555 F. Supp. 2d 913 (S.D. Ohio 2008)

. . . of “not disabled” is therefore reached within the framework of Medical-Vocational Rules 201.19 and 202.18 . . .

M. FERGUSON, v. J. ASTRUE,, 541 F. Supp. 2d 1036 (E.D. Wis. 2008)

. . . Using Medical-Vocational Rules 202.18 and 201.25 as a framework for decision-making, the ALJ also concluded . . .

L. LUTEYN, v. COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,, 528 F. Supp. 2d 739 (W.D. Mich. 2007)

. . . Using Rule 202.18 of the Medical-Vocational Guidelines as a framework, the ALJ found that plaintiff was . . .

MIRANDA- MONSERRATE, v. Jo B. BARNHART,, 520 F. Supp. 2d 318 (D.P.R. 2007)

. . . capacity for light work and the claimant’s age, education, work experience, Section 404.1569 and Rule 202.18 . . .

CORDER, v. Jo BARNHART,, 504 F. Supp. 2d 351 (N.D. Ill. 2007)

. . . is capable of performing other jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national economy (rule 202.18 . . .

D. COLLINS, Jr. v. J. ASTRUE,, 493 F. Supp. 2d 858 (S.D. Tex. 2007)

. . . Based on the testimony of the vocational expert, and using Rule 202.18, Appendix 2, Subpart P, Regulations . . .

SEABOLT, v. Jo B. BARNHART,, 481 F. Supp. 2d 538 (D.S.C. 2007)

. . . do not allow him to perform the full range of light work, using Medical-Vocational Rules 202.17 and 202.18 . . .

SANDOVAL, Jr. v. Jo B. BARNHART,, 197 F. App'x 801 (10th Cir. 2006)

. . . P, App. 2, rule 202.18 (the grids), the ALJ concluded that Mr. . . .

JOLLY, v. Jo BARNHART,, 465 F. Supp. 2d 498 (D.S.C. 2006)

. . . Nonetheless, though the Rules did not dictate a certain decision, the ALJ used “Medical-Vocational Rule 202.18 . . . Rule 202.18 of the Guidelines specifies that a “younger individual” with limited education, skilled or . . . The ALJ erred in relying on Rule 202.18 as a framework for decision because, in reality, Plaintiff was . . .

J. McCLANAHAN, v. COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,, 474 F.3d 830 (6th Cir. 2006)

. . . . §§ 404.1569 and 416.969 and Medical-Vocational Guideline Rule 202.18 would direct a finding of “not . . .

J. McCLANAHAN, v. COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,, 193 F. App'x 422 (6th Cir. 2006)

. . . . §§ 404.1569 and 416.969 and Medical-Vocational Guideline Rule 202.18 would direct a finding of “not . . .

A. PADILLA, v. B. BARNHART,, 186 F. App'x 19 (1st Cir. 2006)

. . . decision that Padilla retained the residual functional capacity to perform “light work” under Rule 202.18 . . .

A. GARCIA, v. Jo B. BARNHART,, 188 F. App'x 760 (10th Cir. 2006)

. . . P, app. 2, Rule 202.18. See App. II at 15-16. . . .

CLAIBORNE, v. COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, 156 F. App'x 525 (3d Cir. 2005)

. . . Relying upon Medical-Vocational Rule 202.18, set forth at 20 C.F.R., Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 2, . . .

H. REDFIELD, v. COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,, 366 F. Supp. 2d 489 (E.D. Mich. 2005)

. . . P, App. 2, Sections 202.11 and 202.18 as a framework, the ALJ concluded that the plaintiff was not disabled . . .

L. ACOSTA, v. Jo BARNHART,, 114 F. App'x 7 (1st Cir. 2004)

. . . The Commissioner found that claimant was not disabled based on section 202.18 of the Grid, involving . . .

HILKEMEYER, v. Jo B. BARNHART,, 380 F.3d 441 (8th Cir. 2004)

. . . P, app. 2, R. 202.18 & 203.25. . . .

DELGADO, v. Jo B. BARNHART,, 305 F. Supp. 2d 704 (S.D. Tex. 2004)

. . . finding of ‘not disabled’ is therefore reached within the framework of Medical-Vocational Rule[s] 202.17, 202.18 . . . do not allow his to perform the full range of light work, using Medical-Vocational Rule[s] 202.17, 202.18 . . .

BROWN, v. Jo BARNHART,, 298 F. Supp. 2d 773 (E.D. Wis. 2004)

. . . However, relying on the testimony of the VE and using Grid Rules 202.18 and 202.29 as a framework for . . .

ISHMAEL, v. Jo B. BARNHART,, 212 F. Supp. 2d 865 (N.D. Ill. 2002)

. . . burden shifted to the Commissioner at step five, the ALJ looked to Medical-Vocational Rules 202.17 and 202.18 . . . of Table No. 2 and 202.18 and 202.19 of Table No. 1, Appendix 2, Subpart P, Regulations No. 4 in conjunction . . .

RODRIGUEZ, v. Jo B. BARNHART,, 212 F. Supp. 2d 134 (W.D.N.Y. 2002)

. . . education and work experience, a finding of ‘not disabled’ is directed by medical vocational rules 202.18 . . .

In C. McKNEW, KMK L. L. C. L. P. v. C., 270 B.R. 593 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2001)

. . . 11,480.87 (29.60) 11,451.27 August, 1997 6,000.00 (141.03) 914.62 6.773.59 September, 1997 4,250.00 (202.18 . . .

THOMAS, v. S. CHATER,, 933 F. Supp. 1271 (D.V.I. 1996)

. . . capacity for light work, and the claimant’s age, education, and work experience, section 404.1569 and Rule 202.18 . . .

W. CALDWELL v. SECRETARY OF HHS, 891 F. Supp. 367 (E.D. Tex. 1995)

. . . . §§ 404.1569, 416.969, and Rule 202.18, Table No. 2, of Appendix 2, Subpart P, Regulation No. 4. . . .

A. MERICLE v. SECRETARY OF HHS, 892 F. Supp. 843 (E.D. Tex. 1995)

. . . . §§ 404.1569, 416.969, and Part 404 Rule 202.18, Table No. 2, of Appendix 2, Subpart P, Regulation No . . .

CRUSE, v. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH HUMAN SERVICES,, 49 F.3d 614 (10th Cir. 1995)

. . . P, App. 2, Rules 202.18 and 19, would direct a finding of not disabled. . . .

R. ROBINSON, v. W. SULLIVAN,, 956 F.2d 836 (8th Cir. 1992)

. . . P, App. 2, Table No. 2, Rule No. 202.18 (1991). II. . . .

F. KNIGHT, Jr. S. T. D. S. S. Jr. L. Dr. W. Y. N. S. Dr. Jr. v. STATE ALABAMA M. Jr. S. Jr. B. H. J. P. Dr. D. III, F. A. A. Sr. A. G. A M W. Dr. A M Jr. W. M. H. B. L. A. R. C. Dr. V. Dr. E. B. F. W. Jr. W. T. Jr. R. R. E. W. A. C. J. D. Jr. T. B. Jr. O. H. Jr. T. Jr. E. G. Jr. S. H. Jr. B. Dr. A. UNITED STATES v. STATE OF ALABAMA A M a a a a a a a a a a, 787 F. Supp. 1030 (N.D. Ala. 1991)

. . . Rutledge (2/20/91) 32; STX 202.18. 998. . . . STX 202.18; STX 112, p. C-2. 1002. . . . Id. at 40-41; STX 202.18. 1003. . . .

E. FORSYTHE, v. SULLIVAN,, 926 F.2d 774 (8th Cir. 1991)

. . . In applying the guidelines, the AU concluded that Rule 202.18 directed a finding that Forsythe was not . . . In his findings the ALJ correctly referred to Rule 202.18 which applies to claimants with residual functional . . .

GONZALEZ, v. SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES,, 757 F. Supp. 130 (D.P.R. 1991)

. . . The same criteria, if placed on Table 1, the sedentary work chart, would fall into Rule 202.18, again . . .

CARPENTIER, v. M. SULLIVAN, M. D., 755 F. Supp. 816 (C.D. Ill. 1990)

. . . The AU applied grid rules 202.17 and 202.18 in this case. . . .

L. GORDILS, v. SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES,, 921 F.2d 327 (1st Cir. 1990)

. . . Accordingly, the AU applied Rule 202.18 of the Medical-Vocational Guidelines, 20 C.F.R. . . . The Secretary found that claimant was not disabled based on section 202.18 of the grid, which involved . . .

M. ORTIZ, v. SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES,, 890 F.2d 520 (1st Cir. 1989)

. . . age (“younger”), education (“limited or less”), and previous work experience (“semiskilled”), Rule 202.18 . . . See Grid Rule 202.18. The record contains ample support for this finding. . . . full range of light work-a determination that would yield a finding of not disabled under Grid Rule 202.18 . . . The AU for unexplained reasons invoked as a framework Rule 202.18, which involves skilled or semiskilled . . .

WILLIAMS, v. SULLIVAN,, 717 F. Supp. 639 (N.D. Ill. 1989)

. . . section 416.969 of Regulations No. 16, and Rules 201.19, 201.20, 201.24 and 201.25, and 202.17 and 202.18 . . .

M. PEARSON, v. R. BOWEN, M. D., 866 F.2d 809 (5th Cir. 1989)

. . . P, App. 2, Rule 202.18, the AU concluded that based on an exertional capacity for light work and her . . . Accordingly, the AU erred in using Rule 202.18 in deciding Pearson’s disability status. . . .

J. LONG, v. R. BOWEN, M. D., 866 F.2d 1066 (8th Cir. 1989)

. . . .-11, 202.12, 202.18, and 202.19 of the grid (Table No. 2 in Appendix 2, 20 C.F.R. . . .

R. KELLAR, v. R. BOWEN,, 848 F.2d 121 (9th Cir. 1988)

. . . perform light work and thus was not disabled under the medical-vocational guidelines (“grids”), Rule 202.18 . . . Rule 202.18, applied by the AU, identifies claimants who, like Kellar, are younger (18-49 years), have . . .

FIGUEROA- RODRIGUEZ, v. SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES,, 845 F.2d 370 (1st Cir. 1988)

. . . The Council applied grid rules 202.18 (younger — under 50 — individual, limited or less education, no . . .

N. RAY, v. R. BOWEN,, 843 F.2d 998 (7th Cir. 1988)

. . . Section 404.1569 of Regulations No. 4 and Rules 202.17 and 202.18, Table No. 2 of Appendix 2, Subpart . . .

SHIDLER, v. R. BOWEN,, 651 F. Supp. 1291 (N.D. Ind. 1987)

. . . .-1569 and Rules 202.18 and 202.19, Table No. 2, Appendix 2, Subpart P., Regulations No. 4 would direct . . . experience and residual functional capacity for light work, the claimant falls within the framework of rules 202.18 . . .

S. WEBBER, v. SECRETARY, HEALTH HUMAN SERVICES,, 784 F.2d 293 (8th Cir. 1986)

. . . residual functional capacity to perform at least light work, the Appeals Council applied Rules 202.17 and 202.18 . . .

L. JONES, v. M. HECKLER,, 760 F.2d 993 (9th Cir. 1985)

. . . He found her not disabled based on the testimony of a vocational expert and grid Rule 202.18, 20 C.F.R . . . Although the AU concluded that Jones could do light and sedentary work and applied grid 202.18, the Secretary . . .

CARRY, v. M. HECKLER,, 750 F.2d 479 (5th Cir. 1985)

. . . P, appendix 2, §§ 202.17, 202.18. . . . . P, appendix 2 §§ 202.01-202.22, the Secretary concluded that, whether § 202.17 or § 202.18 applied, the . . .

KELLER, v. SECRETARY OF DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES OF UNITED STATES,, 600 F. Supp. 66 (E.D.N.Y. 1984)

. . . The ALJ then applied the GRIDS under Rule 202.18 of the Medical-Vocational Regulations (20 C.F.R., Subpart . . . plaintiff retained a residual functional capacity to perform light work and, applying the GRIDS under Rule 202.18 . . .

D. LEE, v. M. HECKLER,, 737 F.2d 768 (8th Cir. 1984)

. . . Under Regulation 404.1569 and Rule 202.18 of Table 2, Subpart P, Regulation Number 4, Lee was held not . . .

BARRETT, v. SECRETARY OF DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION AND WELFARE OF UNITED STATES,, 581 F. Supp. 484 (S.D.N.Y. 1984)

. . . The Medical Vocational Guidelines of 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart P, Rule 202.18, Appendix 2, direct a finding . . .

J. DELLOLIO, v. M. HECKLER,, 705 F.2d 123 (5th Cir. 1983)

. . . The ALJ then applied Rule 202.18 of the Medical-Vocational Regulations (20 C.F.R. . . .

L. SIBURT, v. SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES,, 526 F. Supp. 1087 (N.D.W. Va. 1981)

. . . In the present case the Secretary applied Section 202.18 of the grid. . . .

JONES, v. S. SCHWEIKER,, 524 F. Supp. 739 (N.D. Ala. 1981)

. . . With the capacity to perform light work, Rule 202.18 in Appendix 2 directs a finding of not disabled. . . .

ZIMIGA, v. S. SCHWEIKER,, 651 F.2d 611 (8th Cir. 1981)

. . . . § 416.910 (1980), and accordingly held that Rules 202.17 and 202.18 in Table No. 2 of Subpart I’s Appendix . . .

CANNON, v. HARRIS,, 651 F.2d 513 (7th Cir. 1981)

. . . Accordingly, Rule 202.18, Table No. 2, of Appendix 2, Subparts P and I, Regulations No. 4 and 16 are . . . pointed out on review of the ALJ’s decision that, based on his findings, Rule 202.17 of Table 2, not Rule 202.18 . . .

NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD v. S. W. EVANS SON, 181 F.2d 427 (3d Cir. 1950)

. . . Relations Board Release (R-6118), November 28, 1945; Board’s brief, page 43. . 29 C.F.R., 1946 Supp., § 202.18 . . .

COLE v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, 173 F.2d 893 (6th Cir. 1949)

. . . deficiencies in his income tax for the years 1943, 1944, and 1945, in the respective amounts of $28,-202.18 . . .

LASATER S ESTATE v. SCOFIELD, 74 F. Supp. 458 (W.D. Tex. 1947)

. . . $6,706.19 Net income from other sources 1,617.44 8,323.63 Difference 37,008.74 Plus: Income tax for 1939 202.18 . . .

SAUCIER v. CRICHTON, 147 F.2d 430 (5th Cir. 1945)

. . . in Calcasieu Parish might have given Daigle the right to demand a deed describing specifically the 202.18 . . . That fact was recognized by Miller’s subsequent transfer of the 202.18 acres to Daigle by specific description . . .

Co. v., 6 B.T.A. 1360 (B.T.A. 1927)

. . . one with a net worth in 1906 of $7,250 to one having a net worth at the beginning of 1914 of $238,-202.18 . . .