Florida/Georgia Personal Injury & Workers Compensation

...They assert that the legal consequence of a statutory dedication would be that the landowners abutting those streets held reversionary interests in the land underneath the streets extending to their centerlines that would vest—granting them title to the land—if the land was vacated by Sarasota County.8 See § 177.085, Fla....

...4th DCA 2008), but we do note that disputes over the County's claims to Gulf Avenue have occurred over the years and were resolved when the County vacated its claims to that roadway in 1983. Accordingly, even if original, vested adjacent-land title did not pass at the times those adjacent lands were conveyed, section 177.085, and its predecessor—section 341.66— would still mandate that the title to the land under Gulf Avenue be conveyed to the abutting property owners by way of the reversionary interest that vested following that vacation unless a com...

...See, e.g., § 95.361, Fla. Stat. (2018); § 341.51, Fla. Stat. (1935); Pelican Creek, 243 So. 3d at 471. If that is true, then a reversionary interest that vested following the vacation of Gulf Avenue by the county would require consideration. See § 177.085, Fla....

...To the extent such a reversionary interest existed, nothing in our record shows that the Boyds expressly reserved it when they conveyed title to the Thomases in 1946, and absent more, that means the reversionary interest vested with the abutting-land titleholder to the west in 1983. See § 177.085. None of the deeds passing title after that point otherwise exclude such a reversionary interest, see § 177.085(1), nor has the Association shown that it sought to establish such a right after the 1983 vacation of Gulf Avenue pursuant to section 177.085(2). The same reasoning also applies to the eastern side of part 1 for the Ingalls chain of title....

...7 See Pelican Creek Homeowners, LLC v. Pulverenti, 243 So. 3d 467, 470–71 (Fla. 5th DCA 2018); Lehmann v. Cocoanut Bayou Ass’n, 269 So. 3d 599, 608–10 (Fla. 2d DCA 2019). We reject, without further discussion, the City’s and the Van Dykes’ argument that section 177.085(2), Florida Statutes (1972), undermines Marlowe’s theory as to Toll Bridge Company’s ownership of the easternmost portion of the subject platted property....

...See Pelican Creek Homeowners, LLC v. Pulverenti, 243 So. 3d 467, 470–71 (Fla. 5th DCA 2018); Lehmann v. Cocoanut Bayou Ass’n, 269 So. 3d 599, 608–10 (Fla. 2d DCA 2019). We reject, without further discussion, the City’s and the Van Dykes’ argument that section 177.085(2), Florida Statutes (1972), undermines Marlowe’s theory as to Toll Bridge Company’s ownership of the easternmost portion of the subject platted property....

...1932) ("[I]n the absence of evidence to the contrary, an abutting lot owner is presumed to own the same to the center of the street."); Travis Co. v. City of Coral Gables, 153 So. 2d 750, 751 (Fla. 3d DCA 1963) (applying the same rule to canals). Additionally, section 177.085, Florida Statutes (2016), which codified the common law rule in 1972, provides: When any owner of land subdivides the land and dedicates streets, other roadways, alleys or similar strips on the map or...

...as canal one. Under the facts of this case, however, we need not determine if the statute would also apply to canal one. 6 (emphasis added). Further, dedicators had one year after the implementation of section 177.085 to expressly reserve title to the dedicated land or be forever barred. Id. Here, the conveyances to Appellants and their predecessors did not contain a reservation of the land subject to the public dedication. There is also no record evidence that Pelican Developers asserted a claim after enactment of section 177.085....

...and ensure access to the drainage area for future maintenance of the canal. We reject Appellees' contention that Appellants have no standing to seek injunctive relief because their interest in the disputed property is merely reversionary in accordance with section 177.085. While section 177.085 refers to the interest of abutting property owners as reversionary, case law has long held that, in the context of a common law dedication, the abutting owners have fee simple subject to the dedication....