Florida/Georgia Personal Injury & Workers Compensation

...Jay Hershoff, of Hershoff, Smith, Berlinsky & Lieberman, Miami and Sheridan K. Weinstein, of Papy, Levy, Carruthers & Poole, Coral Gables, for intervenor. KARL, Justice. This cause is before us on direct appeal from a decision of the District Court of Appeal, Third District, upholding the constitutionality of Section 106.15(1), Florida *331 Statutes, thereby vesting jurisdiction in this court pursuant to Article V, Section 3(b)(1), Florida Constitution....

...cheduled adjournment of the 1976 regular session of the Florida Legislature. He was desirous of spending campaign treasury funds prior to the qualification date, including funds for media advertising and printing, but was prohibited from doing so by Section 106.15(1), Florida Statutes, which provides: "106.15 Certain expenditures prohibited (1) No person, candidate, political party, political committee, or person acting on behalf of another shall, prior to qualifying for office, directly or indirectly in furtherance of any candidacy make any use of...

...sion; (b) Advertising in newspapers, magazines, or periodicals; (c) Advertising on billboards, banners, or streamers; (d) Advertising on campaign literature or any other printing; or (e) A rented hall in which to address the public." Contending that Section 106.15(1), Florida Statutes, would abridge his constitutional right to speak on public issues of the day, including the activities of the Florida Legislature then in session, he filed a complaint for injunctive and declaratory relief seeking...

...declared unconstitutional the section of the statute which proscribed such activities. Ronald S. Lieberman, a candidate for the same elective office who was allowed to intervene in the trial court, contended that, in accordance with the dictates of Section 106.15(1), Florida Statutes, his campaign was geared to July commencement and that he would be substantially disadvantaged by the granting of Sadowski's request for preliminary relief....

...trial judge had not abused his discretion since granting of the requested relief would have caused substantial turmoil in the upcoming fall election and campaign. Finding it necessary to resolve the constitutional issue because it concluded that, if Section 106.15(1), Florida Statutes, is unconstitutional, then regardless of the above grounds, appellant's request for injunctive relief should have been granted, the district court held Section 106.15(1), Florida Statutes, constitutional as a reasonable restriction on First Amendment free speech rights to preserve the integrity of the electoral process and to insure free and fair elections. Although the questions raised in this cause have become moot with the passing of the qualifying time and the election, we feel constrained to retain jurisdiction and resolve the question as to the constitutionality vel non of Section 106.15(1), Florida Statutes, since this is a matter of great public importance in the administration of the law and is of general interest to the *332 public....

...integrity of that process and to insure free and fair elections. Treiman v. Malmquist et al., 342 So.2d 972, filed February 17, 1977, Danciu v. Glisson, 302 So.2d 131 (Fla. 1974), Bodner v. Gray, 129 So.2d 419 (Fla. 1961). We hold, however, that the Section 106.15(1) regulation of election activities is a restraint of free speech and a restriction on the quantity of a candidate's communication and diversity of political speech contrary to the dictates of the Supreme Court of the United States in Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 96 S.Ct. 612, 46 L.Ed.2d 659 (1976). It effectually constitutes a limitation on campaign spending. The Legislature intended 106.15(1) to limit campaign spending by confining certain major expenditures to a designated and limited time period....

...That intention is manifested in the placement of the section in the chapter of the statutes regulating campaign financing and by the legislative titles of the act as well as the specific section. [3] Berger v. Jackson, 156 Fla. 251, 768, 23 So.2d 265 (1945). The changes in Section 106.15(1) included in Chapter 74-200, Laws of Florida, [4] do not detract from the clear legislative intent nor do they transform the prohibition on campaign spending into a constitutionally acceptable act....

...opponent and their respective positions on the relevant political issues. The entire process is hampered if the information is restricted or unavailable. The public's "need to know" is most critical during an election campaign. Appellees posit that Section 106.15(1), Florida Statutes, advances an important governmental interest in protecting the public from frivolous or fraudulent candidacies and in avoiding deception and even frustration in the democratic process by limiting the use of campaign advertising to serious candidates....

...ed by this statute. Moreover, if the people are given the necessary information, they will fulfill their responsibility to sort the candidates and separate those who are serious from those who are engaged in political frivolity. Accordingly, we find Section 106.15(1), Florida Statutes, unconstitutionally violative of freedom of speech rights in that it is designed primarily to be a limitation on the quantity of political speech....

...NOTES [1] Section 106.011(1)(b), Florida Statutes. [2] Section 99.061(1), Florida Statutes. [3] Chapter 73-128, Laws of Florida, was entitled "AN ACT relating to elections; regulating campaign finances; ... ." Section 15, Chapter 73-128, Laws of Florida, was the predecessor of the present Section 106.15, and it was labeled by the Legislature "section 15. certain expenditures prohibited. —." Chapter 74-200, Section 9, amends Section 106.15(1). The chapter title is "AN ACT relating to elections; revising various subsections of the campaign financing chapter of the election code; . .," and the particular paragraph is, "Section 9. Subsection (1) of sec. 106.15, F.S., 1973, is amended to read: 106.15 Certain expenditures prohibited....

public performance of their work. See 17 U.S.C. § 106. 15. Copyright owners may, however, assign these rights

...been attacked by plaintiff and, consequently, this decision will not deal in any way with that portion of the statute. A violation of Section 106.16 exposes a corporation to a fine of $10,000 and forfeiture of its right to do business in the state. Section 106.15(3)....

...If the broadcaster or publisher is an individual, or an officer or employee of the corporation found to have violated the statute he shall be deemed to be guilty of a misdemeanor of the first degree and subject to imprisonment for one year or a fine up to $1,000 or both. § 106.15(4) and (5)....

...xcess of the lowest local rate available to advertisers otherwise qualifying for maximum frequency discounts, bulk discounts and advertising packages, including any cash discounts allowed. (2) Violations of this section are punishable as provided in § 106.15(3), (4), and (5) [F.S....

...Before HENDRY and NATHAN, JJ., and SACK, MARTIN, Associate Judge. SACK, MARTIN, Associate Judge. Plaintiff, William Sadowski, takes this interlocutory appeal to review an order denying his motion for preliminary injunction against the enforcement of § 106.15, Fla....

...mpaign funds. Being desirous of spending these funds for media advertising and printing while the legislature was still in session, plaintiff on May 11 filed a complaint for injunctive and declaratory relief seeking to have declared unconstitutional § 106.15, Fla. Stat., F.S.A. [1] which prohibits certain types of campaign advertising by candidates prior to qualifying for office (until 63 days before election). In addition, he filed a motion for a preliminary injunction against the enforcement of § 106.15, Fla....

...and any interference with the plaintiff's right to free speech and to seek elective office. Another candidate for the same office was permitted to intervene and he contended that his campaign is geared to a July commencement pursuant to the dictates of § 106.15, Fla....

...the upcoming fall election and the campaign would have been tossed into a state of confusion and great harm to the public and the candidates would have resulted. Thus, we find no abuse of discretion in the denial of the injunction. Nevertheless, if § 106.15, Fla....

...ions on political communication and association by persons, groups, candidates and political parties. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 96 S.Ct. 612, 46 L.Ed.2d 659 (1976). Turning to the case at bar in light of the above principles of law, we find that § 106.15, Fla....

...uch as this statute which applies to all candidates whether they are incumbents or not, regulates only the time and manner of political communication by the candidates and does not impose quantity restrictions on a candidate's communication. Clearly § 106.15, Fla....

...political processes. Thus, we conclude that this contention of the appellant is without merit. For the reasons stated hereinabove, the order denying the preliminary injunction is affirmed. It is so ordered. NOTES [1] which reads in pertinent part: "106.15 Certain expenditures prohibited "(1) No person, candidate, political party, political committee, or person acting on behalf of another shall, prior to qualifying for office, directly or indirectly in furtherance of any candidacy make any use o...

...Gary Anthony Siplin appeals his convictions for grand theft, in violation of section 812.014(2)(c)(2), Florida Statutes (a third degree felony), and for using the services of a state employee during working hours in furtherance of a political campaign, in violation of section 106.15(3), Florida Statutes (a first degree misdemeanor)....

...2211, 72 L.Ed.2d 652 (1982), we remand with directions that the trial court enter a judgment of acquittal as to this charge. Mr. Siplin cannot be re-tried on count 1. Id. Misdemeanor Conviction In count 2 of its information, the State charged Mr. Siplin with violating section 106.15(3), Florida Statutes (2004), by using the services of two state employees, Sarah Caraballo and Jose Bosque, during work hours, in furtherance of his candidacy for public office. Section 106.15(3) reads, "A candidate may not, in the furtherance of his or tier candidacy for nomination or election to public office in any election, use the services of any state, county, municipal, or district officer or employee during working hours." A violation of this statute constitutes a first degree misdemeanor. Before trial, Mr. Siplin filed a motion to dismiss this count, arguing that section 106.15(3) was unconstitutionally vague, overbroad and violative of substantive due process....

...ve a job unless he got re-elected. Obviously, Ms. Caraballo's testimony would be sufficient to support a guilty verdict on the misdemeanor charge, but for Mr. Siplin's legal challenge to the statute itself. As previously noted, Mr. Siplin challenges section 106.15(3) as vague, over-broad and violative of due process....

...l to the operation of his political campaign during her state working hours. Id. Accordingly, we find that Mr. Siplin lacks standing to raise a vagueness challenge. Id. Mr. Siplin's overbreadth and due process challenges both relate to the fact that section 106.15(3) does not expressly contain a guilty knowledge or mens rea requirement....

...Second, criminal statutes that fail to include a mens rea element usually raise due process concerns, and courts are "obligated to construe statutes in a manner that avoids . . . [holding a statute] unconstitutional." Id. at 518. Given this precedent, we believe that we must read section 106.15(3) as containing a mens rea requirement. [9] Although this *990 reading of the statute resolves Mr. Siplin's constitutional challenges to section 106.15(3), it does not cure the fact that the jury in Mr....

"political season" prescribed by the statute. Section 106.15(1), F.S. 1975, was repealed by omission by

advertising in furtherance of candidacy? SUMMARY: Section 106.15(1), F.S., which prohibits expenditures for

...Day ["Day"], formerly the Property Appraiser of Osceola County, appeals his convictions of two felony counts of grand theft and multiple misdemeanor counts of using the services of a state employee in the furtherance of his candidacy, in violation of section 106.15(3), *665 Florida Statutes (2000)....

...Counts XIV and XV charged petty thefts for the use of a county employee for other private and personal work. A judgment of acquittal was granted as to Count VII only. The jury returned a verdict of not guilty to counts XIV and XV and guilty to the remaining counts. Section 106.15(5) makes the use of the services of a state employee in furtherance of one's candidacy for public office a first-degree misdemeanor and specifies it is punishable "as provided in Section 775.082 or 775.083." These sections define the penalty: a maximum of one-year imprisonment and a fine of no more than $1,000. There is no reference in section 106.15 to section 775.15....

...c office or employment, or during any time permitted by any other part of this section, whichever time is greater. Thus, the question presented is whether the time limitation in section 106.28 or in section 775.15 applies to a charge of violation of section 106.15....

...such action." There is, therefore, no basis to conclude that section 106.28 only applies to civil violations created in chapter 106. We conclude, therefore, that both criminal and civil actions for violations of provisions of chapter 106, including section 106.15, are governed by a two-year statute of limitations, commencing on the date of the violation....

...The extension applies to "any offense based upon misconduct in office." The misdemeanor counts were based on Day's conduct as a candidate. Indeed, the information did not even allege that he was a public officer, only a candidate. The fact that he may have been in public office at the time is immaterial to a chapter 106.15 prosecution.