Florida/Georgia Personal Injury & Workers Compensation

...strict of Florida _________________________ (June 25, 2009) Before DUBINA, Chief Judge, EDMONDSON and HILL, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: This appeal is about voting. Florida Statute § 102.031(4) says that no person may solicit voters “within 100 feet of the entrance to any polling place . . . or early voting site,” and broadly defines “solicit” to include, among other things, “seeking or attempting to seek a signature on any petition[.]” Fla. Stat. §§ 102.031(4)(a)–(b).1 The Florida statute codifies the Florida legislature’s view that the right of Florida’s citizens to vote warrants substantial protection from commotion -- that is, bustle, stir, confusion -- around the voting place....

...xcept as specified in this paragraph; seeking or attempting to seek a signature on any petition; and selling or attempting to sell any item. The terms ‘solicit’ or ‘solicitation’ shall not be construed to prohibit exit polling.” Fla. Stat. § 102.031(4)(b). 2 When we refer to polling places in this opinion, we also mean early voting sites. 2  Plaintiff Citizens for Police Accountability Political Committee is a political action committee in the State of Florida....

...als, distribution of campaign materials, and solicitation of votes for or against any person or political party or position on a question[.]” Burson, 112 S. Ct. at 1848. Like the Florida statute, which saves exit polling from its grasp, Fla. Stat. § 102.031(4)(b), the Tennessee statute also did not restrict exit polling....

...rowly drawn to insure that there is no more infringement than is necessary. Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc. v. State, 408 So.2d 211 (Fla. 1981). In Florida Committee for Liability Reform v. McMillan, 682 F. Supp. 1536 (M.D. Fla. 1988), the court invalidated section 102.031(3), Florida Statutes (1987), which prohibited the solicitation of voters within 150 feet of any polling place....

office of County Solicitor of Dade County, under Section 102.31 Florida Statutes 1941, but avers that on February

...("ABC"), National Broadcasting Company, Inc. ("NBC") and Miami Daily News Inc. ("The Miami News") for a preliminary injunction enjoining the Defendants Secretary of State Jim Smith and David Leahy, Supervisor of Elections of Dade County, Florida from enforcing Fla.Stat. § 102.031(3)(a), (b), as amended....

...At issue is a provision of Florida law that provides that "[n]o person ... or other group or organization may solicit voters within 150 feet of any polling place, or polling room where the polling place is a shopping center or mall, on the day of any election." Fla.Stat. § 102.031(3)(a). To "solicit" is defined to include, among other things, "soliciting or attempting to solicit any ... opinion ... for any purpose." Fla. Stat. § 102.031(3)(b)....

...Because we have concluded that this statute's prohibitions are inconsistent with the commands of the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, we grant the preliminary relief sought by these Plaintiffs. On the record now before us, we hold that Fla.Stat. § 102.031(3)(a) impermissibly restricts Plaintiffs from gathering and reporting basic information about the political process to the general public on election day....

...As Supervisor of Elections, Leahy is charged by law with the duty to determine in each precinct the area within which soliciting of opinion is unlawful, and to take any reasonable action necessary to ensure order at the polling places throughout the county. Fla.Stat. § 102.031(3)(c). The class represented by Leahy consists of all supervisors of elections of the 67 counties throughout Florida. B. BACKGROUND OF FLA.STAT. § 102.031(3) 6. The statutory history leading to the passage of Fla.Stat. § 102.031(3) is instructive....

...1, 1985). The order held that the 100-yard prohibition would "destroy the validity of Plaintiff's `exit-polling' procedures and cause loss of vital electoral information permanently." Id. at 2. 9. Effective January 1, 1986, the Florida legislature amended section 102.031 permitting any person or group to solicit voters within 100 feet of a polling place so long as notice was given to the appropriate *798 supervisor of elections at least three days prior to the election....

...to 50 feet from the polling place. As a result, during the 1986 election, the media was permitted to engage in journalistic activities within 100 feet of polling places in the State of Florida. 10. In 1987, the Florida legislature once again amended section 102.031(3)(a) to create a new and expanded zone in which the solicitation of votes, opinions, or contributions was flatly prohibited....

...On February 26, 1988, the Honorable Howell W. Melton, United States District Judge, Middle District of Florida, entered a preliminary injunction enjoining the Sheriff of Duval County and the Supervisor of Elections from Duval County from enforcing or threatening to enforce Fla.Stat. § 102.031(3) against "the peaceful, orderly and nondisruptive solicitation of signatures for plaintiff's initiative petitions during the March 8, 1988, presidential preference primary near any polling place." Florida Committee for Liability Reform v....

...t there were available less restrictive means to achieve the governmental ends. 13. The parties to this lawsuit have agreed that Judge Melton's recent order, although relevant to the issues we now face, does not resolve the basic question of whether section 102.031(3)(a), (b) unconstitutionally prohibits the solicitation of voter opinion within 150 feet of the polling place....

..., or otherwise leaving increases markedly. Moreover, as the distance increases, it becomes more difficult *800 to discern the voters from the nonvoters. Mitofsky unequivocally testified that a 150-foot distance such as the one contained in Fla.Stat. § 102.031(3)(a) would destroy the ability effectively to conduct exit polls in Florida....

...the statute tends to increase the willingness of private owners to make their property available to the State for this purpose. 21. David Leahy, Supervisor of Elections for Dade County, testified at length as to the wisdom and efficacy of Fla.Stat. § 102.031....

...ctivity occurred on private property. He added that this was his personal interpretation of the statute, and that other supervisors might interpret the statute differently. 27. Leahy testified that he intends to enforce the prohibitions contained in section 102.031(3) against all exit polling and journalistic interviews within 150 feet of the polling place....

...The Defendant class is comprised of all county Supervisors of Elections, who are the local officials responsible for overseeing elections in each county. Fla.Stat. § 98.161. Each Supervisor is empowered to enforce the provisions of the Florida Election Code, including the statute at issue here, section 102.031....

...eet of the polling place, without regard to whether the conduct is disruptive, and without concern as to whether the prohibition encompasses public streets, public sidewalks, public parks or other traditionally public forums. Indisputably, Fla.Stat. § 102.031(3) prohibits the Plaintiffs' ability to speak freely and to gather opinion about the electoral process from those who have voted in this State....

...2646, 2656, 33 L.Ed.2d 626 (1972); In re The Express-News Corp., 695 F.2d 807, 808 (5th Cir.1982). And, indeed, without the ability to collect information, viewpoints, and opinions from voters, the right to report and publish political news would be left with little means of fulfillment. Fla. Stat. § 102.031 constricts not only the ability to gather important news about voters' preferences and opinions, but perhaps even more basic, the right to speak freely about matters of undisputed public importance....

...214, 218, 86 S.Ct. 1434, 1437, 16 L.Ed.2d 484 (1966). The ability to speak on matters of public importance is fundamental to self-government. 5. The Plaintiffs have a substantial likelihood of prevailing on the merits in this case precisely because section 102.031 strikes so broadly at protected expressive activities. The statute forbids "soliciting or attempting to solicit any ... opinion ... for any purpose ..." Fla.Stat. § 102.031(3)(b)....

...We add that there has been no showing that exit polls or other voter interviews by journalists in any way have disrupted any polling place in this state. Nor has any evidence been presented, no less convincing proof, that the presence of reporters near a polling place tends to discourage anyone from voting. Moreover, while section 102.031 restricts a journalist's ability to solicit or gather opinions from voters within 150 feet of the polling place, the statute does not, by its terms, prohibit a journalist or anyone else from entering that zone to observe and report on voter turnout. Nor does this statute appear to bar reporters from questioning non-voters about their opinions within 150 feet; nor, finally, does it literally proscribe the gathering of "facts" as opposed to "opinion." Thus, to the extent that section 102.031(3) was codified essentially to restrict the number of people who may enter the zone and thereby maintain the sanctity and decorum of the polling place, it does not go far enough to accomplish that task....

...Under Florida law, no person may approach a voter within the zone and ask the voter his or her opinion. It does not matter that the voter wants to speak or that the reporter wishes to listen, or that the discussion is wholly non-disruptive. 6. Fla.Stat. § 102.031 is overbroad in another sense: the 150-foot zone as measured from the building entrance housing a polling place does not exempt public streets, sidewalks, and parks....

...The record evidence has established that a 150-foot zone created by statute would encompass within its geographic ambit in Dade County public sidewalks, streets and parks, along with at least nine seats of local government. We add that in this respect, section 102.031(3) is similar to section 104.36, which was held to be an unconstitutional infringement of the freedom of speech in Clean-Up '84 v....

...t restrictive means in achieving its goal. To the extent that the statute is designed to prevent disruption at the polling place, the statute cuts too deep because it proscribes all exit polling and interviewing, whether disruptive or not. Moreover, section 102.031(2) empowers the deputy sheriff to maintain "good order" at the polls, and section 104.0515 prohibits the deprivation of voting rights by anyone....

...ohibition against solicitation of all opinion within 150 feet would be impractical. 9. Defendants also contend that insofar as this statute is overbroad in the sense that it prohibits protected speech in traditionally public areas, we should redraft section 102.031 so as to strike the statute's application where the 150-foot zone includes traditional public areas....

...On its face, the statute cannot be read to exclude traditionally public areas, or, for that matter, to prohibit only disruptive solicitation of voter opinion. It unequivocally bars all solicitation of opinion within 150 feet. For us to rehabilitate section 102.031 as the Defendants urge, would involve major restructuring and rewording of the statute, a task properly reposed in the legislature, not the courts....

...This Circuit has held that the loss of First Amendment rights, even for a brief period, causes irreparable harm. Cate v. Oldham, 707 F.2d 1176, 1188 (11th Cir.1983); see also Florida Committee for Liability Reform v. McMillan, 682 F.Supp. 1536, 1542, supra. Here, the enforcement of section 102.031(3) against the solicitation of all opinion within 150 feet of the polling place would destroy the ability effectively to conduct exit polls and reporters' interviews throughout Florida on March 8, 1988....

...Because of the very nature of exit polls, there are no alternative days or different methods to collect the data they gather. 12. On the other hand, based on the evidence presented at the hearing of February 26, 1988, an order enjoining the enforcement of section 102.031(3) would not cause substantial harm to the Defendants....

...ons in active concert or participation with them who receive actual notice of this order by personal service or otherwise, are hereby prohibited and restrained until further order of this Court from: (a) enforcing or threatening to enforce Fla.Stat. § 102.031(3) against exit polling, the conducting of voter interviews and any other journalistic activity by broadcasters, newspapers and journalists during the March 8, 1988 presidential primary; or (b) otherwise preventing (except as provided in s...

...Defendant Robert Butterworth, as the Attorney General of the State of Florida, has been granted leave to intervene on behalf of defendants in this action. 5. The present motion asks the Court to declare illegal and preliminarily enjoin enforcement of § 102.031(3) of the Florida Statutes (1987) by the two defendant classes during the primary election scheduled for Super Tuesday....

...nces. Clean-Up '84 v. Heinrich, 582 F.Supp. 125 (M.D.Fla.1984), aff'd, 759 F.2d 1511 (11th Cir.1985). Shortly after the affirmation of the preliminary injunction in Clean-Up '84, the Florida Legislature reformed its electoral regulations by amending § 102.031 to provide a procedure by which organizations such as the Committee could give advance notice of their intention to solicit near polling places and thereby give election officials an opportunity to make arrangements to ensure order....

...The reform additionally excepted commercial businesses, privately owned homes, and privately owned property from the effect of the new 50-foot exclusionary zone. See id. The current statute, enacted in 1987, finally repealed § 104.36 and replaced the notice-and-solicit procedure of § 102.031 with the presently challenged 150-foot radius in which solicitation of votes, opinions, contributions, and signatures is prohibited....

...Hersey ("Hersey"), Supervisor of Elections for Putnam County and President of The Florida State Association of Supervisors, and Lee Jarrell ("Jarrell"), Assistant Supervisor of Elections for Duval County, concerning the events which prompted the 1987 changes in § 102.031 and the interests allegedly advanced by the statute in its current form....

...This testimony is not legislative history and was not represented as such. However, it sheds light on the factual basis which might support whatever legislative purposes are otherwise proved. 8. Hersey testified that "one of the biggest problems" prompting § 102.031(3) was the objection by churches, some of which withdrew as polling places following the 1986 election, to the content of specific solicitations for signatures on petitions seeking a constitutional amendment legalizing casino gambling and to the general practice of solicitations for signatures....

...e on Ethics and Elections and a letter of transmittal from Committee Staff Director Wayne R. Malaney to State Representative Dorothy Sample. Intervenor's Exh. No. 3. Plaintiff Committee submitted tapes from hearings concerning H.B. 549, which became § 102.031(3), held before a subcommittee and the Florida House Committee on Ethics and Elections....

...The tapes corroborate the significance of the loss of polling places at churches as a motivation for the 1987 amendments. 10. Hersey and Jarrell both testified that they were not aware of a single polling place that would be lost if enforcement *1540 of § 102.031(3) on Super Tuesday were enjoined....

...In various other counties in Florida, polling places also include condominiums, as well as schools, fire departments, churches and public buildings. Tr. at 26, 46. Private property is within the 150-foot distance of many polling places. Id. at 50. 12. Hersey testified he would not attempt to enforce § 102.031 against activity taking place within 150 feet of a polling place but occurring on private property....

...He also testified, however, that this was his personal interpretation of his authority and that the statute on its face applied to activities on private property which might be subjected to enforcement by a different elections supervisor or sheriff. Id. at 57-58. 13. If § 102.031(3) is enforced during the Committee's solicitation of voters near the polls on Super Tuesday, the Committee may be unable to obtain the signatures necessary to place its proposed amendment on the general election ballot in November....

...e the public interest. Johnson v. United States Dep't of Agric., 734 F.2d 774, 781 (11th Cir.1984). 4. The Court finds that the Committee has a substantial likelihood of prevailing on the merits. The Court perceives several constitutional defects in § 102.031(3): (a) Subject-matter overbreadth....

...The plain language of the statute forbids "soliciting or attempting to solicit any ... opinion ... for any purpose." This provision prohibits virtually every form of expression between persons who are within 150 feet of the polling place. The broad scope of this prohibition directed at expressive activity renders § 102.031(3) facially invalid....

...The Court, however, cannot conceive of a principled manner by which to narrow plainly overbroad language. See id. 107 S.Ct. at 2572-73 ("[T]he vagueness *1541 of this suggested construction itself presents serious constitutional difficulty."). Moreover, if § 102.031(3) is narrowed by carving exceptions for some messages but not for others, the statute becomes an invalid content-based regulation of speech. See Chicago Police Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 101, 92 S.Ct. 2286, 2293, 33 L.Ed.2d 212 (1972). (b) Overbroad Geographic Application. The terms of § 102.031(3) stretch its application to a distance of 150 feet from a polling place regardless of the private or public status of the property so affected....

...e. The state can prove no threat to the voting process at these sites, hence the statute once more is unconstitutionally overbroad. Clean-Up '84, 759 F.2d at 1514. It was proposed by counsel and witnesses that this effect could be mitigated by using § 102.031(3)(c) as a discretionary method to avoid unconstitutional applications. Two problems arise from this position. First, the language of § 102.031(3), when compared to § 101.121, does not fairly admit an exception for private property within 150 feet of polling places. Second, if § 102.031(3)(c) is given wide interpretation to permit discretion by each elections supervisor, the statute becomes imbued with the kind of standardless discretion which the Supreme Court condemned in Cox v....

...discretionary governmental powers would be delegated to or shared with religious institutions."). Another proffered interest, control of disruption within the corridors of the polling places, does not justify the additional 150-foot buffer zone that § 102.031(3) creates....

...Consequently, defendants must demonstrate the incremental contribution *1542 to the electoral process that is achieved by the 100 feet of public forum which is at issue. The Court perceives that defendants are unlikely to offer an adequate justification to counterbalance the free speech rights infringed by § 102.031(3)....

...Barry, 798 F.2d 1450, 1469 n. 15 (D.C.Cir.1986), cert. granted sub nom. Boos v. Barry, ___ U.S. ___, 107 S.Ct. 1282, 94 L.Ed.2d 141 (1987). If the analysis of Playtime Theatres could be applied to political expression, it would not be available to defend § 102.031(3)....

...Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293, 104 S.Ct. 3065, 3068-69, 82 L.Ed.2d 221 (1984). As previously noted, the Court believes that there is a substantial likelihood that defendants will not carry their burden. 7. An order enjoining defendants from enforcing § 102.031(3) would not substantially harm them in any manner. No evidence was presented that a single polling place would be lost if a preliminary injunction were issued. On the other hand, as the 1985 version of § 102.031 amply showed, a number of readily available means, short of an outright ban on solicitation, can be employed to protect the integrity of the election process....

...ons in active concert or participation with them who receive actual notice of this order by personal service or otherwise, are hereby prohibited and restrained until further order of this Court from: (a) enforcing or threatening to enforce Fla.Stat. § 102.031(3) against the peaceful, orderly and non-disruptive solicitation of signatures for plaintiff's initiative petitions during the March 8, 1988, presidential preference primary near any polling place; or (b) otherwise preventing plaintiff or...

...Chapter 102 contains procedures for conducting elections and ascertaining election results. Specifically, sections 102.012 to 102.014 confer upon local supervisors of elections certain powers to appoint election *644 boards, recruit poll workers, and conduct training. Section 102.031 sets forth whose presence is permitted in polling rooms and voting areas....

This appeal is about voting. Florida Statute § 102.031(4) says that no person may solicit voters “within

...of fact may be provided to the voters to ensure an informed electorate. We also determine that there is no statute that prohibits such limited explanatory material as long as it meets the impartiality requirements set out in sections 101.031(4) and 102.031(4)(a), Florida *640 Statutes (2006)....

...rning the substitution of one party's candidate constitutes a partisan action favoring that party and that any document that effectively stated a vote for Foley was a vote for Negron served the purpose of soliciting a vote for Negron in violation of section 102.031(4)(a), Florida Statutes, which prohibits solicitation of voters inside the polling place or within 100 feet of the entrance to any polling place or early voting site....

...not on the ballot, is essential to the voters' casting an effective vote. [4] We also find nothing in the statutes that would preclude the giving of notice as long as the notice complies with the impartiality requirements of sections 101.031(4) and 102.031(4)(a), Florida Statutes....

...We share the trial court's concern and its unspoken fear of bias or partisanship entering into the polling place. It is, thus, important for the courts to balance the desire for an informed electorate with strict enforcement of impartiality mandated by the Legislature in sections 101.031(4) and 102.031(4)(a), Florida Statutes....

...any particular ticket, candidate, amendment, question, or proposition. After giving the elector instructions and before the elector has voted, the officers or persons assisting the elector shall retire, and such elector shall vote in secret. . . . . 102.031 Maintenance of good order at polls; authorities; persons allowed in polling rooms and early voting areas; unlawful solicitation of voters.— ....

...Plaintiffs, various media organizations involved in newsgathering activities, seek to enjoin Defendants, Secretary of State Sue Cobb ("Cobb") and Lester Sola ("Sola"), Supervisor of Elections of Miami— Dade County, Florida, from enforcing Fla. Stat. § 102.031(4)(a), (b) (2005). That statute prohibits the solicitation of voters inside a polling place or within 100 feet of the entrance to any polling place. Fla. Stat. § 102.031(4)(a). The term "solicit" is defined to include "seeking or attempting to seek any vote, fact, opinion, or contribution" and "conducting a poll." § 102.031(4)(b)....

...nt injunction. The Court held a hearing on the matter on October 20, 2006. Because the statute's restrictions violate the First and Fourteenth Amendments, the Court grants Plaintiffs request that the Defendants be permanently enjoined from enforcing Section 102.031(4)(a) as to their exit-polling activities. The statute impermissibly proscribes constitutionally protected exit polling. Moreover, the statute is not narrowly tailored to address the significant interests of the State. I. Background of Florida Statute § 102.031. Section 102.031(4)(a) has undergone several amendments in its history, all of which have been invalidated under the First Amendment....

...ation to prevent it from exit polling within 300 feet of the polling place in the November 1985 election. Spanish Int'l Commc'ns Corp. v. Firestone, No. 85-3453-CIV-Hastings (S.D.Fla. Nov. 1, 1985). Most recently, this Court struck down a version of Section 102.031 which prohibited solicitation of all opinion from the voters of Florida, within 150 feet of the polling place....

...Smith, 681 F.Supp. 794, 802 (S.D.Fla. 1988); see also Florida Comm. for Liability Reform v. McMillan, 682 F.Supp. 1536, 1543 (M.D.Fla.1988) (entering a preliminary injunction barring enforcement of the same statute). The Florida legislature then amended Section 102.031 in 1989, reducing the "restricted zone" from 150 feet to 50 feet....

...so as not to disturb, hinder, impede, obstruct, or interfere with voter access to the polling place or polling room entrance' and was clearly identified as an activity in which voters may participate voluntarily." Compl. ¶ 33. Plaintiffs concede that the 1989 version of Section 102.031 was constitutional. In 2005, the Florida legislature again amended Section 102.031, imposing the present restrictions on solicitation. The issue before the Court is whether the 2005 amendments to Section 102.031(4)(a) comport with the requirements of the First Amendment....

...In a review of 5,090 complaints submitted to the Election Incident Reporting System by Florida voters, "[n]ot one of those citizen complaints referenced exit-polling behavior." Workman Decl. ¶ 9. Likewise, the official Florida House of Representatives Staff Analysis report describing the 2005 amendments to Section 102.031 "does not indicate that exit-polling activities have caused any polling place disturbances." Id....

...1013, 103 L.Ed.2d 271 (1989)) (internal quotation omitted). Moreover, this Court has recognized that "the conduct of exit polling and journalistic interviews are protected by the First Amendment guarantees of free speech and free press." CBS, 681 F.Supp. at 802. B. Level of Scrutiny Section 102.031(4)(a) bars speech in quintessential public forums, which include those places "which by long tradition or by government fiat have been devoted to assembly and debate." Perry Educ....

...overnmental interest, and leave open ample alternatives for communication." Burson, 504 U.S. at 197, 112 S.Ct. 1846 (citing United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 177, 103 S.Ct. 1702, 75 L.Ed.2d 736 (1983)). Therefore, we first must determine whether Section 102.031(4)(a) is a content-neutral or a content-based restriction....

...red to accomplish the significant state interest in protecting the orderly functioning of the electoral process, nor [was] it the least restrictive means available for accomplishing that legitimate goal." 681 F.Supp. at 796. Next, Cobb contends that Section 102.031(4)(a) is distinguishable from the content-based Tennessee statute that was upheld in Burson because the former covers all kinds of speech, while the latter only restricted speech related to a political campaign. Indeed, Section 102.031(4)(a) does proscribe a broader swath of speech ,than did the Tennessee statute at issue in Burson. That broader reach, however, does not mean that Section 102.031(4)(a) is content-neutral. For one, it only prohibits the solicitation of voters. Opinions and facts may be solicited from non-voters within the restricted area. Like the Tennessee statute in Burson, Section 102.031(4)(a) does not reach some other categories of speech. 504 U.S. at 197, 112 S.Ct. 1846. As stated in the Plaintiffs' reply, "[i]t is not illegal under Section 102.031(4)(a) for someone to make a speech about any subject, to ask questions of non-voters, or to sing the Florida Gators' fight song within 100 feet of polling places, but it is against the law to ask a voter about the ballot they cast." Pl.'s Reply at 4. In Burson, the Court stated that "the First Amendment's hostility to content-based regulation extends not only to a restriction on a particular viewpoint, *1369 but also to a prohibition of public discussion of an entire topic." Id. Section 102.031(4)(a) does not prohibit myriad other forms of speech, simply solicitation of voters, making it a content-based restriction on speech. As a facially content-based restriction on political speech in a public forum, Section 102.031 "must be subjected to exacting scrutiny: the State must show that the `regulation is necessary to serve a compelling state interest and that it is narrowly drawn to achieve that end.'" Id....

...Ultimately, the question of which level of scrutiny applies is academic here because the statute is not narrowly tailored to accomplish a significant state interest. Therefore, under either strict or intermediate scrutiny, the statute fails to pass constitutional muster. C. Analysis Although this Court found Section 102.031 unconstitutional in CBS, Cobb argues that the 2005 amendments to the statute are constitutionally permissible because (1) the Supreme Court's decision in Burson compels a different result, and (2) the reduction of the "no solicitation" zone from 150 feet to 100 feet makes it constitutionally compliant. 1. Burson v, Freeman First, Cobb relies upon the notion that Burson has changed the landscape on the constitutionality of Section 102.031(4)(a) since it was struck down in CBS....

...Given the conflict between these two rights, we hold that requiring solicitors to stand 100 feet from the entrances to polling *1370 places does not constitute an unconstitutional compromise. Id. at 211, 112 S.Ct. 1846. Contrary to Cobb's suggestion, however, Burson does not save Section 102.031(4)(a) from, its constitutionally impermissible status....

...While there is no evidence of widespread voter harassment or intimidation by exit-pollers, there is evidence that poll workers do create these problems"). In sum, the Supreme Court's decision in Burson has not made the restrictions on exit polling in Section 102.031(4)(a) constitutionally *1371 acceptable....

...at 34 ("The presence of the press at polling places would likely serve as a deterrent to fraud and intimidation"). Because exit polling is significantly distinguishable from the electioneering and campaigning, the Burson decision does not support a finding of Section 102.031(4)(a)'s constitutionality. 2. Reduction to 100 Feet Because Burson alone does not save Section 102.031(4)(a), we must determine whether the reduction of the "no solicitation" zone from 150 feet to 100 feet makes the statute constitutionally permissible....

...The State's interest in the voting process, to be sure, is also substantial. The State has an interest in protecting the orderly administration of elections and the election process, in increasing voter participation, and in providing easy access to the polls. Section 102.031(4)(a) does not properly address those concerns, however....

...s constitutionally legitimate interests in this case. Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, it is hereby ORDERED that Plaintiffs' Request for Declaratory Relief and a Permanent Injunction is GRANTED. Defendants are barred from enforcing Fla. Stat. § 102.031(4)(a) as applied to Plaintiffs' exit-polling activities....

...NOTES [1] Soles takes no position on the merits of Plaintiffs' Complaint. Def. Lester Sola's Mem. In Resp. To Pl.'s Compl. at 1. [2] Of course, it would stand to reason that the State could prevent a rogue exit-poller from interfering with a voter's access to the polling station. [3] In fact, the version of Section 102.031 that existed after the 1989 amendments represented such a valid, narrowly constructed law that limited activity at and around `polling stations.

...that correspond with early-voting hours. FLA. STAT. § 101.69(2)(a). Another provision prohibits the solicitation of voters within 150 feet of a polling place or drop box and proscribes “any activity with the intent to influence or effect of influencing a voter.” Id. § 102.031(4)(a)-(b)....

...drop-boxes by restricting the hours that the boxes may be available and by requiring that they be monitored in-person when available. Fla. Stat. § 101.69(2)(a). Second, in Florida, you may not “solicit” voters within 150 feet of a polling place. Id. § 102.031(4)(a). The solicitation provision broadens the statutory definition of the word “solicit” to mean “engaging in any activity with the intent to influ- ence or effect of influencing a voter.” Id. § 102.031(4)(b)....

...provide to would-be registrants (the “Registration-Disclaimer Pro- vision”), Fla. Stat. § 97.0575(3)(a); and (3) a provision prohibiting the solicitation of voters within 150 feet of a drop box or polling place (the “Solicitation Provision”), Fla. Stat. § 102.031(4)(a)–(b)....

...finding, the state has met its burden to obtain a stay. The Solicitation Provision precludes any “person, political committee, or other group or organization” from “solicit[ing] vot- ers inside the polling place” or within 150 feet thereof. Fla. Stat. § 102.031(4)(a)....

...fied in this paragraph; seeking or attempting to seek a signature on any petition; selling or attempting to sell any item; and engaging in any activity with the intent to influ- ence or effect of influencing a voter. Id. § 102.031(4)(b). The district court held that the language “engaging in any activity with the intent to influence or effect of influencing a voter” was impermissibly vague because it “fails to put Floridians of ordi- nary intelligence...

A. Butterworth Attorney General RAB/tjw 1 Section 102.031(2), F.S. Cf., Joughin v. Parks, 147 So. 273

election and the canvass of the votes.” Id. § 102.031(1). That in- cludes verifying the identify

...104.051 , F.S. (willful refusal or neglect of duty by election officials); s. 104.185 , F.S. (knowingly signing petition more than one time); s. 104.19 , F.S. (using stickers, rubber stamps, or any device to adversely affect normal election process). See also, ss. 102.031 , 104.11 , 104.23 , 104.41 , F.S....

...Mason, 167 So.2d 721 (Fla. 1964); 49 Fla.Jur.2d Statutes s. 95; AGO 83-97. It appears, then, pending any such judicial determination, that s. 101.121 operates to prohibit nonvoters from collecting signatures within 50 feet of a polling place. See also, s. 102.031 , F.S., which provides in subsection (1) that "[e]ach election board shall possess full authority to maintain order at the polls and enforce obedience to its lawful commands during an election and the canvass of the votes." Pursuant to subsection (3) of s. 102.031 : Any person, political committee, committee of continuous existence, or other group or organization that intends to solicit voters within 100 feet of any polling place on the day of any election shall notify the supervisor of elections at least 3 days prior to the day of the election of such intent....

...1983, merely prohibited nonvoters, excepting certain designated officials, to come within 15 feet of any polling place. Section 1, Ch. 85-205, Laws of Florida, amended s. 101.121 to its present form. Section 2, Ch. 85-205, inter alia, added subsection (3) to s. 102.031 ....

...ute for House Bills 541 and 866, enacted into law as Ch. 85-205, Laws of Florida. Thus, s. 101.121, F.S., operates to prevent nonvoters from coming within 50 feet of a polling place from the opening to the closing of the polls. Moreover, pursuant to s. 102.031 , F.S., any of the entities listed must give the supervisor of elections appropriate notice at least 3 days prior to the election if such entity intends to solicit voters within 100 feet of any polling place on the day of an election. The supervisor of elections is accorded the authority to "take any action necessary to ensure order at the polling places affected by such soliciting." Section 102.031 (3), F.S....

...August 22, 2008. OPINION AND ORDER JOHN E. STEELE, District Judge. This matter comes before the Court on Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Injunction (Doc. #2) filed on August 11, 2008. Plaintiffs seek to enjoin the enforcement of Florida Statute § 102.031(4)(a)-(b) (2008) on the basis that it is facially unconstitutional and unconstitutional as applied to plaintiffs' petition circulation activities....

...d association, and the right to petition for grievances. ( Id. at ¶¶ 47, 50, 52.) Count Three seeks preliminary and permanent injunctive relief banning the enforcement of the Florida statute against plaintiffs. ( Id. at ¶ 58.) II. Florida Statute § 102.031 addresses, among other things, the maintenance of good order at polling places and the unlawful solicitation of voters. The statute first gives each election board the "full authority to maintain order at the polls and enforce obedience to its lawful commands during an election and the canvass of the votes." FLA. STAT. § 102.031(1) (2008)....

...e deputy sheriff to be present from the time the polls or early voting sites open until the election is completed, and requires the deputy sheriff to be subject to the lawful commands of the clerk or inspectors and to maintain good order. FLA. STAT. § 102.031(2). The statute identifies the persons who may enter the polling room or polling place and early voting areas. FLA. STAT. § 102.031(3)....

...ng a poll except as specified in this paragraph; seeking or attempting to seek a signature on any petition; and selling or attempting to sell any item. The terms "solicit" or "solicitation" shall not be construed to prohibit exit polling. FLA. STAT. § 102.031(4)(a)-(b)....

...The statute does not define "exit polling." The statute further requires that each supervisor of elections inform the clerk of the designated area within which soliciting is deemed to be unlawful, based on the particular characteristics of that polling place. FLA. STAT. § 102.031(4)(c)....

...E.g., Johnston v. Tampa Sports Auth., 530 F.3d 1320, 1325 (11th Cir.2008). The burden of persuasion for each of the four, requirements is upon the movant. Siegel v. Le-Pore, 234 F.3d 1163, 1176 (11th Cir.2000) (en banc). IV. Plaintiffs argue that FLA. STAT. § 102.031(4)(a)-(b) is unconstitutional both on its face and as applied to plaintiffs' exit petitioning....

...Plaintiffs assert that they are likely to prevail on both their facial and as-applied challenges, while defendants assert that plaintiffs will not prevail on either. A. Facial Challenge to Statute: In Count One of their Complaint, plaintiffs argue that Florida Statute § 102.031(4)(a)-(b) (2008) violates the First Amendment on its face....

...at 1190 (citation omitted.) In short, "[f]acial challenges are disfavored . . ." Id. at 1191. Plaintiffs do not seem to pursue an argument under this standard. (Doc. # 2, pp. 18-21.) It is clear in light of Burson and Wash. State Grange (discussed below) that Florida Statute § 102.031(4)(a)-(b) (2008) is not categorically unconstitutional in each of its potential applications....

...verbreadth grounds." Members of City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 800-801, 104 S.Ct. 2118, 80 L.Ed.2d 772 (1984). The Court finds that plaintiffs have not shown a substantial likelihood that they can establish that Florida Statute § 102.031(4)(a)-(b) (2008) prohibits a substantial amount of protected speech either in an absolute sense or relative to the statute's plainly legitimate sweep....

...te sense or relative to the statute's plainly legitimate scope. The statute requires that the supervisor of elections inform the clerk of the designated no-solicitation area "based on the particular characteristics of that polling place," FLA. STAT. § 102.031(4)(c), and requires the clerk or supervisor to designate the no-solicitation zone and mark its boundaries before the polling place or early voting site is opened. FLA. STAT. § 102.031(4)(a)....

...s important regulatory interests are generally sufficient to justify reasonable, nondiscriminatory restrictions on election procedures. Wash. State Grange, 128 S.Ct. at 1191-92 (quotations and citations omitted). As relevant to this case, FLA. STAT. § 102.031(4)(a)-(b) provides that "[n]o person......

...Thus, under Burson, the State must show that the statute is (1) necessary (2) to serve a compelling state interest and (3) that it is narrowly drawn or sufficiently tailored to achieve that end. As discussed previously, there is no dispute that Florida Statute § 102.031(4)(a)-(b) (2008) serves compelling state interests....

OPINION AND ORDER JOHN E. STEELE, District Judge. This matter comes before the Court on Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary Injunction (Doc. #2) filed on August 11, 2008. Plaintiffs seek to enjoin the enforcement of Florida Statute § 102.031(4)(a)-(b) (2008) on the basis that it is facially unconstitutional and unconstitutional as applied to plaintiffs’ petition circulation activities....

...ociation, and the right to petition for grievances. (Id. at ¶¶ 47, 50, 52.) Count Three seeks preliminary and permanent injunctive relief ban *1168 ning the enforcement of the Florida statute against plaintiffs. (Id. at ¶ 58.) II. Florida Statute § 102.031 addresses, among other things, the maintenance of good order at polling places and the unlawful solicitation of voters. The statute first gives each election board the “full authority to maintain order at the polls and enforce obedience to its lawful commands during an election and the canvass of the votes.” Fla. Stat. § 102.031 (1) (2008)....

...e deputy sheriff to be present from the time the polls or early voting sites open until the election is completed, and requires the deputy sheriff to be subject to the lawful commands of the clerk or inspectors and to maintain good order. Fla. Stat. § 102.031 (2). The statute identifies the persons who may enter the polling room or polling place and early voting areas. Fla. Stat. § 102.031 (3)....

...l except as specified in this paragraph; seeking or attempting to seek a signature on any petition; and selling or attempting to sell any item. The terms “solicit” or “solicitation” shall not be construed to prohibit exit polling. Fla. Stat. § 102.031 (4)(a)-(b)....

...The statute does not define “exit polling.” The statute further requires that each supervisor of elections inform the clerk of the designated area within which soliciting is deemed to be unlawful, based on the particular characteristics of that polling place. Fla. Stat. § 102.031 (4)(e)....

...E.g., Johnston v. Tampa Sports Auth., 530 F.3d 1320 , 1325 (11th Cir.2008). The burden of persuasion for each of the four, requirements is upon the movant. Siegel v. Le-Pore, 234 F.3d 1163, 1176 (11th Cir.2000) (en banc). IV. Plaintiffs argue that Fla. Stat. § 102.031 (4)(a)-(b) is unconstitutional both on its face and as applied to plaintiffs’ exit petitioning....

...Plaintiffs assert that they are likely to prevail on both their facial and as-applied challenges, while defendants assert that plaintiffs will not prevail on either. A. Facial Challenge to Statute: In Count One of their Complaint, plaintiffs argue that Florida Statute § 102.031(4)(a)-(b) (2008) violates the First Amendment on its face....

...at 1190 (citation omitted.) In short, “[fjacial challenges are disfavored ...” Id. at 1191 . Plaintiffs do not seem to pursue an argument under this standard. (Doc. # 2, pp. 18-21.) It is clear in light of Burson and Wash. State Grange (discussed below) that Florida Statute § 102.031(4)(a)-(b) (2008) is not categorically unconstitutional in each of its potential applications....

...readth grounds.” Members of City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 800-801 , 104 S.Ct. 2118 , 80 L.Ed.2d 772 (1984). The Court finds that plaintiffs have not shown a substantial likelihood that they can establish that Florida Statute § 102.031(4)(a)-(b) (2008) prohibits a substantial amount of protected speech either in an absolute sense or relative to the statute’s plainly legitimate sweep....

...se or relative to the statute’s plainly legitimate scope. The statute requires that the supervisor of elections inform the clerk of the designated no-solicitation area “based on the particular characteristics of that polling place,” Fla. Stat. § 102.031 (4)(c), and requires the clerk or supervisor to designate the no-solicitation zone and mark its boundaries before the polling place or early voting site is opened. Fla. Stat. § 102.031 (4)(a)....

...s important regulatory interests are generally sufficient to justify reasonable, nondiscriminatory restrictions on election procedures. Wash. State Grange, 128 S.Ct. at 1191-92 (quotations and citations omitted). As relevant to this case, Fla. Stat. § 102.031 (4)(a)-(b) provides that “[n]o person ......

...Thus, under Burson , the State must show that the statute is (1) necessary (2) to serve a compelling state interest and (3) that it is narrowly drawn or sufficiently tailored to achieve that end. As discussed previously, there is no dispute that Florida Statute § 102.031(4)(a)-(b) (2008) serves compelling state interests....

...“person, political committee, or other group or organization” from “solicit[ing] voters inside the polling place or within 150 feet of a secure ballot intake station or the entrance to any polling place” or other voting location. Id. § 102.031(4)(a). It defines “solicit” and “so- licitation” to include, among other things, “engaging in any activity with the intent to influence or effect of influencing a voter.” Id. § 102.031(4)(b)....

...ke station or the entrance to any USCA11 Case: 22-11143 Document: 193-1 Date Filed: 04/27/2023 Page: 62 of 79 62 Opinion of the Court 22-11143 polling place.” FLA. STAT. § 102.031(4)(a)....

...paragraph; seeking or attempting to seek a signature on any petition; selling or attempting to sell any item; and engaging in any activity with the intent to influ- ence or effect of influencing a voter. Id. § 102.031(4)(b)....

...ban on ‘engaging in any activity with the intent to influence or effect of influencing a voter’ [to be] unconstitutionally vague under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.” (Quoting FLA. STAT. § 102.031(4)(b)). The Supreme Court has held that a statute may be “imper- missibly vague” for two reasons....

...66 Opinion of the Court 22-11143 The challenged clause contains two operative phrases. One prohibits “engaging in any activity with the intent to influence . . . a voter.” FLA. STAT. § 102.031(4)(b)....

...2019). The statute does not prohibit “any activity [conducted] with the intent to influence . . . a voter”; instead, it prohibits any activity that qualifies as solicitation that is conducted “with the intent to influ- ence . . . a voter.” See FLA. STAT. § 102.031(4)(b)....

...tion that this phrase is unconstitutionally vague. The second half of the challenged clause—which prohibits “engaging in any activity with the . . . effect of influencing a voter”—presents a different question. See FLA. STAT. § 102.031(4)(b) (emphasis added)....