Florida/Georgia Personal Injury & Workers Compensation

...Specifically, the Legislature has directed that the [f]ailure of the tenant to pay ... rent into the court registry pursuant to court order shall be deemed an absolute waiver of the tenant's defenses. In such case, the landlord is entitled to an immediate default for possession without further notice or hearing thereon. § 83.232(5), Fla....

...Nicholas A. Manzini, Miami, for respondent, Manzini & Associates, P.A. Before SCHWARTZ, C.J., and GODERICH and GREEN, JJ. PER CURIAM. Treating these petitions for certiorari as an application for mandamus, we find that the trial judge is required by section 83.232(5), Florida Statutes (1995) to issue an immediate writ of possession for the subject premises....

...Also, Premici alleged that the landlord agreed to allow him to continue operating his business without paying rent until his right to damages was decided. United next filed a "Motion for Determination of Rent Due and Payment of Rent Into Registry of Court." In that motion, United requested that, pursuant to section 83.232, Florida Statutes (1993), the court should determine the amount of rent due and order Premici to pay the rent due into the registry of the court pending disposition of the case....

...7.18, plus interest. Premici contends that the lower court erred in entering judgment based on his "default" in failing to deposit rent into the registry of the court. We agree and reverse. The key issue in this appeal concerns the interpretation of section 83.232, Florida Statutes, a new procedure governing commercial tenancies, enacted in 1993; 83.232....

...He urges he is entitled to a trial of his defenses to payment of rent. Although United cannot be blamed for attempting to take advantage of the unfortunate drafting of this statute, we cannot accept its interpretation of this provision. Reading the language of section 83.232 in context, especially in light of its legislative history, it becomes clear that Premici's interpretation of the statute is the correct one....

...In this commercial landlord/tenant dispute, a landlord petitions for mandamus, seeking an immediate default and writ of possession based on the tenant's failure to timely pay rent into the court registry in accordance with the trial court's order entered under section 83.232, Florida Statutes....

...We grant the petition. The tenant fell more than $50,000 behind in rent under two lease agreements for two office suites. The landlord filed suit in Broward County Circuit Court. In accordance with landlord's motion for deposit of rents pursuant to section 83.232, Florida Statutes, the trial court held a hearing in February and ordered the tenant to pay the February rent into the court registry and "to continue to do so until further Court Order on a monthly basis." The court did not order the defendant to deposit the rent on any particular day....

...nterest of 12%. The tenant posted the rent on or about the 7th of the month for three months: March, April, and May 2010. On June 2, 2010, when rent was not yet deposited, the landlord filed a motion for default and immediate writ of possession. See § 83.232(5), Fla. Stat. (2009). On June 3, 2010, the tenant deposited rent. The trial court deferred ruling on the landlord's motion for default pending an evidentiary hearing. The landlord then filed this petition for writ of mandamus. Section 83.232 requires the tenant to pay into the court registry its rent to forestall possession of the premises by the landlord during a pending eviction proceeding....

...The tenant is required, even without court order, to make payments into the registry of the court when due. Where the court enters an order requiring payment, those payments are also to be made as they accrue, "the time of accrual being as set forth in the lease." § 83.232(1), Fla....

...We withhold the issuance of the writ, as we are assured that the trial court will act in accordance with this opinion and issue the writ of possession to the landlord. We note that the landlord is entitled to a default for possession in accordance with section 83.232(5), not disbursement of the deposited funds....

...mber 3, 2009. On November 4, 2009, the tenant attempted to deposit the ordered rent into the court registry, but the court clerk rejected the deposit as untimely. Subsequently, the landlord moved for an immediate default and writ of possession under section 83.232(5), Florida Statutes (2009)....

...the offices of tenant's attorneys, Rothstein Rosenfeldt Adler, P.A. The trial court denied the landlord's motion for default and immediate possession. This appeal followed. On appeal, the landlord asserts that the trial court had no discretion under section 83.232(5) to deny an immediate default and writ of possession when the tenant failed to deposit rent timely into the court registry. The tenant contends that the trial court properly exercised its discretion in light of the unusual circumstances in this case. We agree with the landlord and reverse. Section 83.232(5) provides: "Failure of the tenant to pay the rent into the court registry pursuant to court order shall be deemed an absolute waiver of the tenant's defenses....

...On Thursday October 29, 2009, the court entered an agreed order directing the tenant to deposit the rent for September and October 2009 in the court registry within three days. This meant that the due date for the deposit was Tuesday November 3, 2009. See § 83.232(1), Fla....

..."Failure of the tenant to pay the rent into the court registry pursuant to court order shall be deemed an absolute waiver of the tenant's defenses. In such case, the landlord is entitled to an immediate default for possession without further notice or hearing thereon." Id. § 83.232(5)....

...Commercial landlord Palm Beach Marketplace, LLC, asks this court to compel the trial court to enter a default and writ of possession in its favor. We grant the petition because the tenant, Aleyda’s Mexican Restaurante, Inc., failed to comply with the statutory requirements of section 83.232, Florida Statutes. We recognize the tenant’s dispute about when the rental payment was due; however, the landlord pointed to the terms of the lease which provide for payment to be made on the first of the month despite any course of conduct to the contrary. See §§ 83.232(1) & (5), Fla....

...e writ, as we are assured that the trial court will act in accordance with this opinion and issue the writ of possession to the landlord. Also as this court pointed out in Pool, the landlord is entitled to a default for possession in accordance with section 83.232(5), not disbursement of the deposited funds....

...osit rent into the court registry as ordered by the court pursuant to section 88.232, Florida Statutes (2012). We grant the petition. The commercial landlord sued the tenant in county court for eviction and for damages. The county court, pursuant to section 83.232, Florida Statutes, entered an order determining the amount of rent to be paid into the court registry....

...ng. Further, given the purpose of the statute at issue, we hold that rule 9.130(f) does not prohibit entry of a default judgment for possession where the commercial tenant fails to abide by an order requiring deposit of rent into the court registry. Section 83.232 is designed to protect a commercial landlord from irreparable harm where a tenant holds over during eviction proceedings without paying rent....

...t to pay the rent into the court registry pursuant to court order shall be deemed an absolute waiver of the tenant’s defenses. In such case, the landlord is entitled to an immediate default for possession without further notice or hearing thereon. § 83.232(5), Fla....

...ises to the level of a departure from the essential requirements of law and results in a miscarriage of justice. The court’s holding, which sets precedent controlling county court cases, would permit commercial tenants to frustrate the purposes of section 83.232....

....The statute provides: “If the landlord is in actual danger of loss of the premises or other hardship resulting from the loss of rental income from the premises, the landlord may apply to the court for disbursement of all or part of the funds so held in the court registry.” § 83.232(1), Fla....

...ented rent for September and October 2005. After Tanksley failed to pay the November rent into the court registry by the first of November, the Landlords filed on November 3, 2005, their "Ex-Parte Motion for Default and Immediate Possession," citing section 83.232(5), Florida Statutes (2005)....

...Therefore, the notice issue does not determine the outcome here, and we decline to issue an advisory opinion on this issue. The Landlords next argue that Tanksley's failure to pay rent as previously ordered by the court entitled them to possession of the property. We agree. Section 83.232 governs rent payments into the court registry in an action by a landlord of a nonresidential tenancy which includes a claim for possession....

...Subsection (5) provides: "Failure of the tenant to pay the rent into the court registry pursuant to court order shall be deemed an absolute waiver of the tenant's defenses. In such case, the landlord is entitled to an immediate default for possession without further notice or hearing thereon." § 83.232(5)....

...Cases addressing this statute support the view that the Landlords here are entitled to a writ of possession. See City of Miami v. Smith, 698 So.2d 320 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997) (stating that county judge was required to issue an immediate writ of possession pursuant the mandatory terms of section 83.232(5)); Chartier v. Sherman, 672 So.2d 604 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996) (denying certiorari relief to tenant and upholding default under section 83.232(5) where tenant failed to abide by terms of stipulated agreement that rent be paid directly to landlord during pendency of litigation); Courthouse Tower, Ltd. v. Manzini & Assocs., 683 So.2d 215 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996) (granting mandamus relief and requiring trial court to issue immediate writ of possession as required by section 83.232(5)); Premici v. United Growth Props., L.P., 648 So.2d 1241 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995) (interpreting section 83.232(5) as resulting in waiver of defenses for possession claim only, not rent claim)....

...These cases do not provide a clear answer to the specific question presented here, however, which is whether the trial court retains the discretion to excuse the late payment of rent into the court registry based on a finding of excusable neglect. To answer this question we rely on the plain meaning of section 83.232(5), which indicates that the legislature intended that a landlord's right to possession be absolute....

...Smiley, Miami, for respondent, Los Latinos Restaurant, Inc. Before SHEPHERD and SUAREZ, JJ., and SCHWARTZ, Senior Judge. SCHWARTZ, Senior Judge. Upon the lessee's failure to timely deposit a monthly rental payment into the registry as required by court order [1] under section 83.232, Florida Statute, the petitioner—landlord was absolutely entitled to an ex parte, immediate default for a writ of possession of the premises by section 83.232(5), Florida Statute....

...Coe, 587 So.2d 474 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991). Mandamus granted. [3] NOTES [1] The payment was due February 1, 2009, the landlord sought, filed an ex parte motion for possession on February 2, 2009. The tenant did not tender a payment until February 5, 2009. [2] § 83.232(5), Fla....

..., Aldo Glussich Revocable Living Trust & Lena Glussich Revocable Living Trust, Marion Hasterok, Kenneth Offenther, Todd Adams Butler and Gale M. Butler. GERBER, JONATHAN D., Associate Judge. These consolidated appeals present the question of whether section 83.232, Florida Statutes, allows a trial court the discretion to excuse a tenant's failure to pay rent timely pursuant to court order....

...When the unit owners still failed to pay, Blandin filed a complaint for breach of the land lease, seeking possession and damages. The unit owners moved to have the trial court determine the amount of the accrued rent that should be placed in the court registry pursuant to section 83.232....

...as a whole in order to ascertain the general purpose and meaning of each part; each subsection, sentence, and clause must be read in light of the others to form a congruous whole." Bush v. Holmes, 919 So.2d 392, 406-07 (Fla.2006) (citation omitted). Section 83.232, Florida Statutes, provides, in pertinent part: (1) In an action by the landlord which includes a claim for possession of real property, the tenant shall pay into the court registry the amount alleged in the complaint as unpaid, or if...

...2d DCA 2006), the Second District also was presented with the question of whether the trial court retains the discretion to excuse the late payment of rent into the court registry based on a finding of excusable neglect. The Second District responded: To answer this question we rely on the plain meaning of section 83.232(5), which indicates that the legislature intended that a landlord's right to possession be absolute. The statute does not allow for a procedure whereby a trial court may excuse the tenant's noncompliance with its prior order. 947 So.2d at 492. See also City of Miami v. Smith, 698 So.2d 320 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997) ("Pursuant to the mandatory terms of section 83.232(5), ......

...uitable in a particular case. Courthouse Tower, Ltd. v. Manzini & Assocs., 683 So.2d 215 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996) (citation omitted). Though not necessary to have prevailed on his appeal, Blandin asks this court to go one step further and find that, under section 83.232, a trial court has the discretion to allow a pre-deadline extension only for the first court-ordered payment, but not for further court-ordered payments....

...session is REVERSED, and the trial court's order granting Blandin's second motion for immediate final default judgment of possession is AFFIRMED. This court remands for the issuance of immediate writs of possession pursuant to the mandatory terms of section 83.232(5)....

...om an order denying it immediate possession of commercial space in the hotel leased to A.K. Gift Shop, Inc., entered upon the failure of A.K. Gift Shop to comply with an “Agreed Order Directing Tenant to Pay Rent Into Registry of Court Pursuant to § 83.232, Florida Statutes.” The order, signed by the trial court on April 5, 2011, and filed with the clerk on April 7, 2011, required A.K....

...finality). 1 Moreover, the record reflects A.K. Gift Shop did not deposit the specified rent into the court registry until April 19, 2011, more than five days after the date by which even A.K. Gift Shop’s counsel contends he received the order. 2 Section 83.232(5), Florida Statutes (2011), provides, “Failure of the tenant to pay the rent into the court registry pursuant to court order shall be deemed an absolute waiver of the tenant’s defenses....

...The trial court may not consider the reasons why the deposit was not timely made.” We further stated, “[T]he law is the law. It is not our job to carve exceptions into an otherwise clear and imperative statute.” Id. at 812 n. 1. Under the plain language of section 83.232(5), DTRS Intercontinental is entitled to an immediate writ of possession....

...ch it alleged were “determinative of Fiddler’s rights in and to the property.” The court denied Fiddler’s motion for rehearing but granted its motion to stay the final judgment, stating that “[gjood cause has been shown.” This was error. Section 83.232, Florida Statutes (2008), governs rent payments into the court registry in an action by a landlord of a nonresidential tenancy which includes a claim for possession of the property....

...nant’s defenses. In such case, the landlord is entitled to an immediate default for possession without further notice or hearing thereon.’ ” 214 Main Street Corp. v. Tanksley, 947 So.2d 490, 492 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006). Under the mandatory terms of section 83.232(5), the trial court had no discretion to stay the final judgment of possession; Reagan was entitled to immediate possession of the property upon Fiddler’s failure to timely deposit its rent payment. See id.; Blandin v. Bay Porte Condo. Ass’n, 988 So.2d 666 , 669-70 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008) (citing 214 Main Street and stating that under section 83.232(5), a trial court has no discretion to excuse a tenant’s failure to timely pay rent)....

...2 The court ruled that the Landlord was entitled to $10,000 out of the registry of the court, and the Subtenant was to pay to the Landlord $5,000 each month thereafter, with the balance of each month’s rent to be paid into the registry of the court. The Subtenant appeals. Section 83.232(1), Florida Statutes, requires a tenant to pay into the court registry the amount of unpaid rent together with rent accruing during the pendency of the suit. Failure to do so is deemed an “absolute waiver of the tenant’s defenses,” and the landlord is entitled to an immediate default. § 83.232(5), Fla....

...Quinn Jones, III, City Attorney, and Theresa L. Girten and Warren Bittner, Assistant City Attorneys, for petitioner. Kris E. Penzell, Miami Beach, for respondent. Before SCHWARTZ, C.J., SORONDO, J., and BARKDULL, Senior Judge. PER CURIAM. Pursuant to the mandatory terms of section 83.232(5), Florida Statutes (1995), the county court judge was required to issue an immediate writ of possession for the premises involved in this case....

...Alhambra subsequently counterclaimed, seeking eviction and damages for Charbonier’s refusal to pay the additional rent as required under the lease. Alhambra also filed a motion to require Charbonier to deposit all of the disputed rent into the court registry pursuant to section 83.232, Florida Statutes (2015)....

...en in the case). That address was specified as the address for further notices to Piwko in the order granting Piwko’s attorney’s motion to withdraw. Thereafter, Piwko failed to make a payment of rent into the registry of the court as required by section 83.232, Florida Statutes (2010)....

...*376 The motion to amend and third amended complaint were served by mail on Piwko before the entry of default against him. Piwko responds that the summary eviction order, based on his failure to pay rent into the court registry, must be considered a “default” for purposes of Rule 1.080(a). We disagree. Section 83.232(5), Florida Statutes (2010), states: “Failure of the tenant to pay the rent into the court registry pursuant to court order shall be deemed an absolute waiver of the tenant’s defenses....

...The mortgage lender, tenants in common as owners, and Midgard have an obvious and unitary interest in collecting defaulted rent. Addressing the trial court’s release to counsel for Park Centre of the rent payments deposited into the court registry, those payments were mandatory under section 83.232, Florida Statutes (2011), if DNC wished to retain possession pending the final adjudication of the claims and counterclaims....

...otherwise payable every month by DNC in excess of the rent payable by Park Centre under its prime lease. . Hayes v. Guardianship of Thompson, 952 So.2d 498 , 509 n. 14 (Fla.2006); Zabrani v. Riveron, 495 So.2d 1195 , 1197 n. 2 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986). . § 83.232, Fla....

...lution fraught with obvious drawbacks and delays when the mortgage loan on the property is already in default and a lessee is withholding rent. . Although we do not reach the merits of the remaining and untried issues among the parties, we note that section 83.232 will require Park Centre's counsel to restore all rent (including “Transfer Premium”) to the court registry if a summary writ of possession against Park Centre is to be avoided....

...nt on the pleadings; 3) awarding unpaid rent as damages. “An appellate court considers a trial court’s granting of a judgment on the pleadings by a de novo standard of review.” Newsome v. GEO Group, Inc., 72 So.3d 168, 170 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011). Section 83.232, Florida Statutes (2011), sets forth the requirements for payment of rent into the court registry once a landlord in a non-residential lease files an action for possession....

...the defense of payment or satisfaction has been asserted, the court, in its discretion, may order the tenant to pay into the court registry the rent that accrues during the pendency of the action, the time of accrual being as set forth in the lease. § 83.232(1), Fla....

...Under subsection (5), “Failure of the tenant to pay the rent into the court registry pursuant to court order shall be deemed an absolute waiver of the tenant’s defenses. In such case, the landlord is entitled to an immediate default for possession without further notice or hearing thereon.” § 83.232(5), Fla....

...Here, the trial court entered an order requiring Misha to pay rent into the court registry as it came due each month if it was not paid directly to GAR’s counsel. Based on the language italicized above, the trial court had authority to do so even if Misha raised payment of past rent as a defense. Under section 83.232(5), Misha’s failure to comply with the trial court’s order entitled GAR to an immediate default for possession and judgment on the pleadings regarding the action for possession....

...to a court registry in any type of case involving a claim of possession, in order to insure against a tenant occupying property rent-free during the pendency of a lawsuit. See Famsun Invest, LLC v. Therault, 95 So.3d 961, 962 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012) (“Section 83.232 is designed to protect a commercial landlord from irreparable harm where a tenant holds over during eviction proceedings without paying rent.”); Premici v....

...United Growth Properties, L.P., 648 So.2d 1241, 1243 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995) (“The statute is designed to remedy the problem of commercial tenants remaining on the premises for the duration of litigation without paying the landlord rent.”). “A default under this statute [section 83.232] determines only the possesso-ry interest and does not resolve a dispute for damages.” Famsun Invest, 95 So.3d at 963-64 (emphasis added)....

...ry by March 25, 2013. 13 The order also obligated the Debtor to continue paying $17,130.40 in monthly rent into the court registry on the fifth day of each month while the eviction action was pending. 14 The order expressly provided, consistent with section 83.232, Florida Statutes, that any failure to timely pay the past-due rent or future rent into the court registry would constitute an absolute waiver of the Debtor’s defenses to the Landlord’s claim for possession....

...But Rule 1.500 only comes into play when a defendant fails to file or serve any paper in an action. 36 Here, the Debtor timely responded to the Landlord’s complaint for possession and damages. The default in the state court case was entered because the Debtor failed to deposit its monthly rent into the court registry under section 83.232. Under section 83.232, the failure to deposit rent into the registry of the court is deemed an absolute waiver of all of the tenant’s defenses to the landlord’s claim for possession. 37 Section 83.232 says nothing about the well-pled allegations of the complaint being deemed true....

...dgment for possession. See, e.g., Nevins Drug Co. v. Bunch, 63 So.2d 329, 332-33 (Fla. 1953); Smith v. Winn Dixie Stores, Inc., 448 So.2d 62, 64 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984). . Abrams v. Paul, 453 So.2d 826, 831 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984). . Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.500. . § 83.232(5), Fla. Stat. . Id. The Landlord principally relied on one case for the proposition that a default under section 83.232 results in the well-pled allegations of the complaint being deemed true: Wenboy Ltd....

...ry, asserting that Vance Realty failed to satisfy the statutory prerequisites of section 83.201, Florida Statutes (2004), 2 to negate the duty of payment. At the hearing, Park Place also argued that, in the context of an action by the landlord under section 83.232, 3 the court may disburse registry funds if the landlord demonstrates that it is in actual danger of loss of the premises or other hardship resulting from the loss of income. We disagree with this premise. Park Place had not asserted a landlord-tenant claim for the possession of the property. Vance Realty’s counsel admitted that neither section 83.201 nor 83.232 applied and that the gist of the lawsuit was the fear they would lose the security deposit due to the appellees’ insolvency....

...The landlord asserted no claim respecting the funds, and there was no litigation pending alleging a claim for possession of real property. Had there been, the court could have ordered Vance Realty to pay rent into the registry of the court pursuant to section 83.232(1)....

...Townsend. . Section 83.201 sets forth the procedure the tenant must follow to withhold rent after prescribed written notice to the landlord that the premises are untenantable and the landlord fails to make the specific repairs within twenty days. . Section 83.232 provides for rent to be paid into the registry of the court in "an action by the landlord which includes a claim for possession of real property.” The statute, among other things, also allows the landlord to apply to the court for di...

...n reversed on appeal. The record disclosed that the reversal of the judgment of eviction was based on the trial court’s failure to allow tenant to pay into the registry an amount determined by the court for the disputed amount of rents pursuant to section 83.232(1), Florida Statutes (2010)....

...The landlord followed all legal requirements of the Court. Absent the court order, the landlord could lawfully not evict the tenant. A careful reading of the appellate opinion reveals the county court judgment was reversed because the trial judge did not comply with F.S. 83.232(1)....

...e, for appellees. KUNTZ, J. Custom Marine Sales, Inc. (“Custom Marine”) appeals a non-final order requiring it to deposit rent payments into the court registry. It argues that the trial court erred in ordering it to deposit rent pursuant to section 83.232, Florida Statutes (2017), because there is no rent due under the applicable lease....

...TMs case comes before tMs court on a petition for common law certiorari to review a decision of the circuit court acting in its appellate capacity. The underlying action involves a commercial lease. During the pendency of a suit for possession brought by Sherman, the landlord, he moved for payment of rent pursuant to § 83.232 Fla.Stat....

...However, pursuant to a stipulation between the attorneys, the parties agreed that payments would be paid directly to the landlord. The tenant, Chartier, faded to abide by the terms of the stipulated agreement and, after notice, the trial court entered a default as permitted by § 83.232(5)....

PLEUS, J. Cascella appeals a non-final order of eviction 1 issued pursuant to section 83.232(1), Florida Statutes (2000). He argues that the trial court erred in evicting him under section 83.232(1) for failure to pay ad valorem taxes into the court registry because this obligation was not part of his rent....

...Further, the CPA argued this debt constituted a part of Caseellas’ rent obligation. The trial court agreed that the lease made the payment of the ad valorem taxes a part of the rent and that the CPA was entitled to the summary eviction remedy of section 83.232....

...to proceed. On February 18, 2002, the lower court conducted a new hearing and again concluded that eviction was proper because Cascella failed to pay the portion of his rent consisting of ad valorem property taxes. On appeal, Cascella contends that section 83.232 is limited to rental payments and does not apply to a default in a lease covenant....

...“That which we call a rose, by any other name would smell as sweet.” William Shakespeare, Romeo and Juliet, act 2, sc. 1, (1599). Because these taxes had not been paid or deposited into the court registry, the entry of the order of eviction pursuant to section 83.232 was proper....

...Pamela Stinnette Vergara, Judge. Mahra Sarofsky, of Ward Damon, PL, West Palm Beach, for Appellant. George L. Sigalos and Damon E. Gasser, of Simon & Sigalos, LLP Boca Raton, for Appellee. September 22, 2023 PRATT, J. Section 83.232(5), Florida Statutes (2022), provides that during the pendency of a nonresidential eviction action, “[f]ailure of the tenant to pay the rent into the court registry pursuant to court order shall be deemed an absolute waiver of the t...

...ents . . . are timely received by [Landlord]. This may be accomplished through the trust account of counsel for the Defendants or via direct payments to [Landlord].” On April 6, 2022, Landlord moved for immediate default for possession under section 83.232(5), noting that the April 2022 rent payment did not arrive by April 1 and therefore was not timely received under the court’s December 3, 2021 order. Tenant and Guarantor opposed the motion. On the law, they argued that the immediate default procedure of section 83.232(5) applies only when a court order directs a tenant to pay rent into “the court registry,” and here, the court had instead ordered Tenant to make payments either to its lawyer’s trust account or to Landlord directly....

...of default and final judgment of eviction after default. 1 They also unsuccessfully sought stays of the writs of possession. We have jurisdiction. 2 II. On appeal, Tenant raises arguments regarding the interpretation of both section 83.232(5) and the trial court’s December 3, 2021 order....

...that Tenant urges us to adopt. We thus discern no error in the trial court’s conclusion that Tenant breached its order. IV. Because Tenant breached the trial court’s December 3, 2021 order, we must decide whether that breach triggered section 83.232(5)’s immediate default for possession. The plain language of the statute compels us to conclude that it did not. A. Section 83.232 establishes a procedure for payment of rent during the pendency of a commercial landlord’s claim for possession....

...If the landlord is in actual danger of loss of the premises or other hardship resulting from the loss of rental income from the premises, the landlord may apply to the court for disbursement of all or part of the funds so held in the court registry. § 83.232(1)....

...which shall be issued immediately upon filing of the tenant’s initial pleading, motion, or other paper,” and “[t]he filing of a counterclaim for money damages does not relieve the tenant from depositing rent due into the registry of the court.” § 83.232(3)–(4). Finally, in subsection (5), the statute specifies a remedy for the tenant’s noncompliance: immediate default for possession. Under that subsection, “[f]ailure of the tenant to pay the rent into the court registry pursuant to court order shall be deemed an absolute waiver of the tenant’s defenses,” and “the landlord is entitled to an immediate default for possession without further notice or hearing thereon.” § 83.232(5). B. “[T]he text and structure of the relevant statute[ ]—and no other considerations—control our resolution of this appeal.” Burton v....

...This “supremacy-of-the-text principle,” which we are bound to apply, Ham v. Portfolio Recovery Associates, LLC, 308 So. 3d 942, 946 (Fla. 2020), leads us to conclude that breach of an order requiring payment of rent through a lawyer’s trust account or directly to the landlord does not trigger section 83.232(5)’s immediate default for possession. Section 83.232(5) unequivocally makes its immediate default hinge on “[f]ailure of the tenant to pay the rent into the court registry pursuant to court order.” (emphasis added). To state the obvious, a private attorney’s trust account is not “the court registry.” Neither is a landlord’s account. While the terms “court registry” and “registry of the court” are not defined anywhere in section 83.232, they carry a clear, ordinary meaning: the depository held and controlled by the court and its staff....

...Taylor, 2023 WL 4670253, at *7 n.3. It stretches all credulity to assert that members of the public ever have understood the term “court registry” to encompass attorneys’ and landlords’ own accounts. This is especially evident when contrasting section 83.232 with other statutes in which the Legislature has chosen to allow for rent or other monies to be paid outside the court registry. For example, section 697.07(5), Florida Statutes (2023), governs assignment of rents during the pendency o...

...As another example, section 61.18, Florida Statutes (2023), directs that sureties on defaulted alimony and child-support bonds “shall be ordered to pay into the registry of court, or to any party the court may direct, the sum necessary to cure the default.” (emphasis added). Section 83.232 contains no similar allowance for payments outside the court registry, and we cannot add one by judicial gloss. See Burton, 362 So. 3d at 316 (declining to add language to a statute). In sum, section 83.232(5)’s immediate default is triggered only by a “[f]ailure of the tenant to pay the rent into the court registry pursuant to court order,” and because a landlord’s or private attorney’s account is not “the court registry,” Tenant’s breach of the trial court’s December 3, 2021 order did not trigger section 83.232(5)’s immediate default for possession. 7  C. Landlord offers various reasons why we should depart from the statute’s plain language....

...ayment to accounts other than the court registry. The problem with this argument is that each time the statute speaks of a tenant’s rent payments, it provides that those payments “shall” or “must” be made “into the court registry.” See § 83.232(1). This language is mandatory, not permissive. Moreover, as we explain above, unlike several other statutes, section 83.232 does not contain language authorizing the court to direct payments outside the court registry. This omission is particularly striking when we consider that the statute does allow the court to modify the statutory procedure in certain other ways—for example, by allowing the court to extend certain time periods for making payments. See § 83.232(1)....

...payments are sent, held, and disbursed from, it would have included language to that effect. Instead, the statute describes the tenant’s obligation to make payments into the court registry as a “requirement,” and it directs the court to “notify the tenant of the requirement.” § 83.232(3). Modifying the statutory procedure to provide for payments through an attorney’s trust account or directly to the landlord may or may not be sound policy....

...“[A] court ‘may not rewrite the statute or ignore the words chosen by the Legislature so as to expand its terms.’” Id. (quoting State v. Gabriel, 314 So. 3d 1243, 1248 (Fla. 2021)). Second, Landlord appeals to the evident purpose behind section 83.232(5): “to remedy the problem of commercial tenants remaining on the premises for the duration of litigation without paying the landlord rent.” Premici v....

...ry essence of legislative choice—and it frustrates rather than effectuates legislative intent simplistically to assume that whatever furthers the statute’s primary objective must be the law.” Id. Regardless, we do not think that honoring section 83.232(5)’s plain meaning frustrates the purpose that we attributed to the statute in Premici....

...the court’s authority to enter an immediate default for possession. 9 And indeed, Tenant did not sit on its rights when it became clear that it faced default. In opposing Landlord’s motion for default, Tenant argued that section 83.232(5)’s automatic default for possession is triggered only by a failure to pay court-ordered rent into the court registry....

...payments and then enter an immediate default for possession when he breaches that order. Fifth, Landlord calls to our attention several decisions of our sister courts. Upon close inspection, we do not believe that those decisions conflict with our reading of section 83.232(5). In Chartier v....

...rse rent, and Tenant thus has not invited—or otherwise waived its right to challenge—the order’s noncompliance with the statute. In Blandin v. Bay Porte Condominium Ass’n, Inc., the Fourth District confronted “the question of whether section 83.232, Florida Statutes, allows a trial court the discretion to excuse a tenant’s failure to pay rent timely pursuant to court order.” 988 So. 2d 666, 667 (Fla....

...The trial court had granted the landlord a final judgment for possession, but it nonetheless stayed the judgment, finding “[g]ood cause” to do so. Id. at 718. The Second District held that there is no “good cause” exception to the immediate nature of section 83.232(5)’s default for possession. See id. (“Under the mandatory terms of section 83.232(5), the trial court had no discretion to stay the final judgment of possession; [the landlord] was entitled to immediate possession of the property upon [the tenant’s] failure to timely deposit its rent payment.”). That holding does not conflict with our holding here....

...that Landlord cites decided the precise question that Tenant raises here. At most, the cases show that some trial courts have a practice of allowing parties to stipulate that tenants will pay rent to accounts other than “the court registry” that section 83.232 describes....

...rent payments “shall” be made “into the court registry,” and only a “[f]ailure of the tenant to pay the rent into the court registry pursuant to court order” may trigger section 82.232’s immediate 12 default for possession. § 83.232(1), (5)....

or dismissed. Further, “[a] default under [section 83.232, Florida Statutes,] determines only the possessory

...(“Landlord”) against Exclusive Motoring Worldwide, Inc. and Rolando Ramirez (collectively, “Tenant”). Following service of the complaint, both parties sought a determination of the rent due to be deposited into the court registry pursuant to section 83.232, Florida Statutes....

...trial court did not abuse its discretion in requiring payment of the deferred rent into the court registry. We do, however, agree with Tenant that the trial court erred in ordering disbursement of the full rent amount paid into the court registry for June-September 2021. Section 83.232(1) provides that the trial court may disburse all or part of the funds held in the court registry “[i]f the 2 landlord is in actual danger of loss of the premises or other hardship resultin...

...refused to pay rent on the theory that the Tenant failed to provide marketing services as required by the lease. The Tenant sued the Subtenant for eviction and money damages and the Subtenant counterclaimed for unjust enrichment. As required by section 83.232, Florida Statutes (2010), the Subtenant paid the monthly rent into the court registry for the duration of the term of the lease....

...In Tribeca I, this court held that the Landlord’s right to the registry funds was subordinate to the main action. Tribeca I, 82 So. 3d at 901. However, because the Subtenant was still in possession of a portion of the premises, this court held that the Landlord may be entitled to disbursement under section 83.232(1), Florida Statutes (allowing disbursement where a landlord is in danger of losing the premises or suffering other hardship resulting from loss of rental income from the premises). Id. On remand, the Landlord returned some of the disbursed funds to the registry and began to receive hardship payments under section 83.232(1). The Tenant and the Subtenant proceeded to the non-jury trial which resulted in the Tribeca II appeal....

...In fact, the funds consisted of disputed rental payments to be allocated between the Tenant and the Subtenant. Tribeca II, 162 So. 3d at 250. During the pendency of this case, the Landlord’s only independent claim to the funds was the hardship claim under section 83.232(1). We again remand for the trial court to conduct an evidentiary hearing to determine the apportionment of rent paid by the Subtenant between the value of the property and the value of the marketing services....

...uirement to deposit rent into the court registry on or before the deadline imposed by the court.” The landlord argues that this Court has held that if the tenant fails to deposit the rent into the registry by the deadline, the controlling statute, section 83.232(5), Florida Statutes (2020), provides no discretion to the circuit court and requires the entry of a default. In response, the tenant argues the landlord waived strict compliance with the statute when it allowed the tenant more time to pay an earlier monthly rent payment to the clerk....

...Further, the circuit court did not rely on waiver. Instead, the issue is whether the mailing of the rent payment to the clerk of court before the due date and the clerk’s deposit of the rent payment one day after the due date is enough to comply with section 83.232(5). We note two facts....

...Regardless of the tenant’s reason for failing to make the deposit, the trial court was statutorily required to enter an immediate default and writ of possession.”). Finally, we note that “the landlord is entitled to a default for possession in accordance with section 83.232(5), not disbursement of the deposited funds.” Palm Beach Marketplace, LLC v....

...Appellant, Denise Ann Cross d/b/a Onyx Nails, appeals the county court’s entry of default and its final judgment for possession after default. Because there was no court order requiring Appellant to pay rent into the court registry pursuant to section 83.232(5), Florida Statutes (2023), we reverse and remand for further proceedings.  Edgewood Grande, LLC (“Edgewood”) (landlord) and Appellant (tenant) entered into a ten-year commercial lease agreement beginning March 1, 2022....

...Edgewood moved the court to order Appellant to deposit $20,540, the current amount owed, into the court registry. It alternatively requested the court to set a hearing to determine the appropriate amount of rent to be deposited in accordance with section 83.232(2), Florida Statutes....

...other than payment. In its order, the court cited to section 83.60(2), Florida Statutes, a section which is applicable to residential tenancies. The following day, Appellant moved to set aside the default, arguing that she filed an answer in accordance with section 83.232(1) and that the court failed to comply with section 83.232(3) by failing to notify her of the requirement that rent be paid into the court registry by order....

...default judgment based on her failure to pay the claimed amount of unpaid rent into the court registry. We agree. When Appellant filed her answer, the court should have entered an order instructing her to pay rent into the court registry. See § 83.232(3), Fla....

...the court registry by order, which shall be issued immediately upon filing of the tenant’s initial pleading, motion, or other paper.”). In the absence of this order, immediate default was improper pursuant to the statutes regarding non-residential leases. See § 83.232(5), Fla....

...also 34th St., LLC v. Pro-Karting Experience, Inc., 385 So. 3d 167, 168 (Fla. 2d DCA 2024) (“[B]ecause Tenant was not previously ordered to deposit monies into the court registry, no [duty to issue immediate default] arose here under the plain language of section 83.232(5), Florida Statutes (2022).”). Because there was no court order directing Appellant to pay rent into the registry, we find that immediate default was improper....

...appeals an Order of Default for Immediate Possession entered in favor of landlord, Whitehurst Family Partnership. We agree with the Second District’s analysis in 214 Main Street Corp. v. Tanksley, 947 So.2d 490 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006) rev. denied No. SC07-272, 956 So.2d 457 (Fla. Apr. 17, 2007), and conclude that section 83.232(5) of the Florida Statutes governs the instant circumstances and mandates affirmance....

...We have jurisdiction. Fla. R. App. P. 9.130(a)(3)(C)(ii). 3 We find no error in the trial court’s entry of the writ of possession where the Tenant indisputably failed to deposit the rent into the court registry on the date ordered by the trial court. See § 83.232(5), Fla....

...entered the written order on Thursday, May 4. Tenant paid the full amount due on Thursday, May 11, 2023. Despite Tenant’s undisputedly untimely payment, the trial court denied Landlord’s motion. On appeal, Landlord contends the trial court lacked discretion, under section 83.232, Florida Statutes (2023), to deny the motion for immediate default for possession....

...20, 2024) (“[S]tatutory interpretation is a question of law subject to de novo review.”) (quoting GTC, Inc. v. Edgar, 967 So. 2d 781, 785 (Fla. 2007)). ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION The parties disagree over the construction and application of section 83.232, Florida Statutes (2023), which provides in pertinent part: (1) In an action by the landlord which includes a claim for possession of real property, the tenant shall pay into the court registry the am...

...notice or a hearing,” citing Bank of N.Y. Mellon Corp. v. Hernandez, 299 So. 3d 461, 463 (Fla. 3d DCA 2020). The Landlord also argues that the motion to determine rent was not intended to serve as a vehicle for final adjudication of eviction actions. Section 83.232, Florida Statutes (2020), concerns “Rent paid into registry of court,” and provides: (1) In an action by the landlord which includes a claim for possession of real property, the tenant shall pay into the court re...

...limited to only the factual or legal issues concerning: (a) Whether the tenant has been properly credited by the landlord with any and all rental payments made; and (b) What properly constitutes rent under the provisions of the lease. § 83.232(1)-(2), Fla. Stat. (2020) (emphasis added). The statute also provides that a tenant’s failure to pay rent due into the court registry as ordered operates as a waiver of a tenant’s defenses and entitles the landlord to immediate default for possession. § 83.232(5), Fla. Stat. (2020). The purpose of section 83.232 is “to protect a commercial landlord from irreparable harm where a tenant holds over during eviction proceedings without paying rent.” Lenmar Realty, LLC v....

...4th DCA 2012)). At the hearing on the motion, the parties agreed the Tenant was current on base rent payments, which the record reflects were being paid into the court registry. The dispute was how much additional rent was due, if any. Pursuant to section 83.232(2)(b), the trial court was to conduct an evidentiary hearing limited to the factual and legal issues concerning “[w]hat properly constitutes rent under the provisions of the lease.” § 83.232(2)(b), Fla....

...There, the lease described a credit to which the tenant was entitled for partial destruction of the premises as a reduction to “fixed rent.” Id. at 1179. Where the parties disputed the amount of rent due after considering the credit, we held that the trial court erred by failing to hold an evidentiary hearing under section 83.232(2). Id. at 1180. We reasoned: This case fell under section 83.232(2)(b), which contemplates a hearing on “[w]hat properly constitutes rent” under a lease. The trial court was required to make at least a preliminary determination of the reduction, if any, to which the tenant was entitled regarding the deposit into the court registry required by section 83.232. Like the findings in a temporary relief hearing in a chapter 61 case, a finding at a section 83.232 hearing can be modified after discovery and a final hearing on the merits. Id....

...been entered in its favor against Tenant Pro-Karting Experience, Inc. On appeal, Landlord frames one narrow issue:  [A] trial court has a ministerial duty to issue an immediate default against a tenant pursuant to Florida Statue [sic] 83.232 when a tenant has failed to deposit rents in the Court Registry after being ordered to, and a failure by the tenant to deposit rents not only acts as a waiver of the tenant's defenses, but affords the landlord the absolute right...

..., with no valid exceptions, equitable or statutory available to the tenant. (Emphasis added.) However, because Tenant was not previously ordered to deposit monies into the court registry, no such duty arose here under the plain language of section 83.232(5), Florida Statutes (2022)....

...Landlord filed a motion for contempt, eviction, and entry of judgment for failure to pay pursuant to the summary judgment order. Landlord's motion expressly 2 sought "an immediate writ of eviction" pursuant to section 83.232. Tenant responded opposing the motion and, later, filed an emergency motion to stay issuance of any writ of possession. Shortly thereafter, the trial court entered a writ of possession in favor of Landlord....

...issued, Tenant had now deposited an appropriate amount into the court registry. The court accordingly invalidated the writ of possession on the basis that Tenant's payment of the disputed monies into the court registry "effectively complies with Florida Statute 83.232 and saves the day." Landlord timely appealed this nonfinal order. Analysis Landlord's appellate argument is extremely narrow. Specifically, Landlord asserts (1) that the trial court ordered Tenant in the summary judgment order to pay monies into the court registry and (2) that Tenant's failure to timely comply waived all of Tenant's defenses under section 83.232(5), thereby entitling Landlord to an immediate writ of possession. The subsection Landlord relies upon provides in full: (5) Failure of the tenant to pay the rent into the court registry pursuant to court order shall be deemed an absolute waiver of the tenant's defenses....

...direct Tenant to pay any monies into the court registry. Rather, it expressly orders Tenant to pay the disputed monies directly to Landlord. And the parties have not identified any other order directing payment into the court registry. Thus, under the plain language of section 83.232(5), the absolute waiver of defenses was never triggered, precluding Landlord's resulting entitlement to immediate possession. To dispense here with this express legislative precondition would effectively render the statutory language "into the court registry" a nullity....

...2d at 604 ("However, pursuant to a stipulation between the attorneys, the parties agreed that payments would be paid directly to the landlord. The tenant, Chartier, failed to abide by the terms of the stipulated agreement and, after notice, the trial court entered a default as permitted by §83.232(5).")....

court entered the final judgment pursuant to section 83.232(5), Florida Statutes (2019), based on the tenant’s

...The tenant made partial payments of rent. The landlord filed a complaint for eviction and damages for nonpayment of rent. Multiple times, the tenant asked for a hearing to determine the amount of money he would be required to post in the court registry pursuant to section 83.232(2), Florida Statutes (2017), which provides: (2) If the tenant contests the amount of money to be placed into the court registry, any hearing regarding such dispute shall be limited to only the factual or legal issue...

...by the tenant and other credits to which the parties agreed. The tenant -2- failed to make the required payment and the court entered a default final judgment for possession. The circuit court erred in failing to hold a section 83.232(2) hearing. Under the statute, a hearing is appropriate to determine “[w]hat properly constitutes rent under the provisions of the lease.” The lease in this case defined “fixed rent” in section 3; concerning a “partial destru...

...air operations interfere with the business conducted on the Premises by Lessee.” The lease thus describes the credit to which a tenant is entitled for partial destruction of the premises as a reduction to “Fixed Rent.” This case fell under section 83.232(2)(b), which contemplates a hearing on “[w]hat properly constitutes rent” under a lease. The trial court was required to make at least a preliminary determination of the reduction, if any, to which the tenant was entitled regarding the deposit into the court registry required by section 83.232. Like the findings in a temporary relief hearing in a chapter 61 case, a finding at a section 83.232 hearing can be modified after discovery and a final hearing on the merits. This case is similar to Double Park, LLC v....

...“Annual Rent” defined in the lease became additional “Annual Rent” to which the landlord was entitled. Id. at 280. As in this case, the trial court denied an evidentiary hearing on the issue of what amount the tenant was required to post into the court registry under section 83.232 as a result of its sublease....

...tenant may owe to the landlord “as a consequence of the [tenant’s] sublease.” Id. at 282. Both this case and Double Park involve post-lease adjustments to “rent” set forth in a lease. Where there is a dispute as to the amount of such adjustments, section 83.232(2) requires an evidentiary hearing prior to an order requiring the posting of the adjustments in the court registry. We distinguish this case from more common situations in which a tenant, facing eviction, claims as a defense to th...

...Those situations are not controlled -3- by today’s decision, which is limited to a lease provision describing an event which expressly alters the amount of rent set forth in the lease. We reverse the default final judgment and remand to the circuit court for a section 83.232(2) evidentiary hearing. GERBER, C.J., and CONNER, J., concur. * * * Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing. -4- 

...Before WELLS, EMAS and LOGUE, JJ. WELLS, Judge. In this action arising out of a landlord-tenant dispute, Double Park, LLC, the plaintiff/counter-defendant below, appeals from a non-final order directing it to place disputed excess rent money in escrow pursuant to section 83.232 of the Florida Statutes (2014)....

...ce, maintenance, taxes, utilities and capital improvements, far exceeded the rent Double Park collected from the sublessee, and requested an evidentiary hearing to determine the proper amount of excess rent to be paid into the court registry. See § 83.232(2)(b), Fla....

...ute shall be limited to only the factual or legal issues concerning . . . [w]hat properly constitutes rent under the provisions of the lease”); Muvico Entm’t, L.L.C. v. Pointe Orlando Dev. Co., 755 So. 2d 194, 194 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000) (“[S]ubsection 83.232(2), Florida Statutes (1999), specifically provides that if the tenant contests the amount of money to be paid into the court registry, the court is limited to factual and legal issues concerning what constitutes rent under the lease...

...An Appeal from the County Court for Miami-Dade County, Milena Abreu, Judge. Bridgé Golde, in proper person. Nexterra Law, and Steven M. Liberty and Eric A. Jacobs, for appellee. Before EMAS, C.J., and LOGUE and SCALES, JJ. PER CURIAM.  Affirmed. See § 83.232(5), Fla....

....12. LRM sought double rents, pursuant to section 83.06. The county court denied Good To Go’s motion to dismiss, granted LRM’s motion to determine rents, and ordered Good To Go to deposit past due rents of $11,682.12 into the court registry. See § 83.232....

...After conducting a hearing, the trial court entered an order directing the tenant to pay $10,700 into the court registry. When the tenant undisputedly did not do so by the date required by the trial court’s order, the trial court entered a default final judgment and a writ of possession. See § 83.232(1),(5), Fla. Stat....

...4th DCA 1983))). In case number 3D21-2426, the landlord appeals the order staying the writ of possession. 1 Upon a tenant’s failure to pay into the court registry the amount of rent determined by the trial court, the landlord is entitled to the remedy of an immediate default for possession. § 83.232(5), Fla....

...its absolute statutory remedy of immediate possession of the property, see Stetson Mgmt. Co., 18 So. 3d at 718 (reversing stay of final judgment of possession based on “good cause” shown by sublessee because “[u]nder the mandatory terms of section 83.232(5), the trial court had no discretion to stay the final judgment of possession”)....

GERBER, JONATHAN D., Associate Judge. These consolidated appeals present the question of whether section 83.232, Florida Statutes, allows a trial court the discretion to excuse a tenant’s failure to pay rent timely pursuant to court order....

...When the unit owners still failed to pay, Blandin filed a complaint for breach of the land lease, seeking possession and damages. The unit owners moved to have the trial court determine the amount of the accrued rent that should be placed in the court registry pursuant to section 83.232....

...a whole in order to ascertain the general purpose and meaning of each part; each subsection, sentence, and clause must be read in light of the others to form a congruous whole.” Bush v. Holmes, 919 So.2d 392, 406-07 (Fla.2006) (citation omitted). Section 83.232, Florida Statutes, provides, in pertinent part: (1) In an action by the landlord which includes a claim for possession of real property, the tenant shall pay into the court registry the amount alleged in the complaint as unpaid, or if...

...2d DCA 2006), the Second District also was presented with the question of whether the trial court retains the discretion to excuse the late payment of rent into the court registry based on a finding of excusable neglect. The Second District responded: To answer this question we rely on the plain meaning of section" 83.232(5), which indicates that the legislature intended that a landlord’s right to possession be absolute....

...The statute does not allow for" a procedure whereby a trial court may excuse the tenant’s noncompliance with its prior order. 947 So.2d at 492 . See also City of Miami v. Smith, 698 So.2d 320 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997) (“Pursuant to the mandatory terms of section 83.232(5), ......

...ble in a particular case. Courthouse Tower, Ltd. v. Manzini & Assocs., 683 So.2d 215 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996) (citation omitted). Though not necessary to have prevailed on his appeal, Blandin asks this court to go one step further and find that, under section 83.232, a trial court has the discretion to allow a pre-deadline extension only for the first court-ordered payment, but not for further court-ordered payments....

...sion is REVERSED, and the trial court’s order granting Blandin’s second motion for immediate final default judgment of possession is AFFIRMED. TMs court remands for the issuance of immediate writs of possession pursuant to the mandatory terms of section 83.232(5)....

...We have jurisdiction. Fla. R. App. P 9.130(a)(3)(C)(ii). We affirm. On appeal, the Tenant argues the trial court should have first ruled on his motion to dismiss before requiring a deposit into the court registry. The plain language of section 83.232, Florida Statutes, mandates a rent deposit absent a “defense of payment or satisfaction of the rent.” § 83.232(1), Fla. Stat. “The court, on its own motion, shall notify the tenant of the requirement that rent be paid into the court registry by order, which shall be issued immediately upon filing of the tenant’s initial pleading, motion, or other paper.” § 83.232(3), Fla. Stat. Because the plain language of section 83.232 makes a rent deposit mandatory absent a defense of payment or satisfaction of the rent, we find no abuse of discretion in requiring such a deposit before ruling on the motion to dismiss. See T.G. United, Inc. v. AADD Props., LLC, 371 So. 3d 396, 400 (Fla. 5th DCA 2023) (“Section 83.232 establishes a procedure for payment of rent during the pendency of a commercial landlord’s claim for possession.”); § 83.232(1), Fla....

...ing the pendency of the action, when due, unless the tenant has interposed the defense of payment or satisfaction of the rent in the amount the complaint alleges as unpaid.”); Fabre v. 4647 Block, LLC, 401 So. 3d 523, 528 (Fla. 3d DCA 2024) (“Section 83.232 is designed to protect a commercial landlord from irreparable harm where a tenant holds over during eviction proceedings without paying rent.” (quoting Famsun Inv., LLC v....

...past due rent should be reduced because Landlord failed to provide air conditioning to the premises. Tenants’ failure to pay rent into the registry of the court, as ordered, resulted in the county court entering a Default Final Judgment for Possession, based upon section 83.232(5), Florida Statutes (2019), in favor of Landlord....

...2014). Landlord’s suggestion that it obtained the equivalent of a default final judgment against Tenants, which entitled it to attorney’s fees without the need for a hearing, goes too far. The default judgment was just as to possession. The provision in section 83.232(5), that failure to pay rent into the court’s registry results in “an absolute waiver of the tenant’s defenses,” refers only to a landlord’s demand for and its right to possession; it is not a default as to all issues pending in the case....

...Frank of Frank Law Firm, P.A., Fort Lauderdale, for appellant. Douglas D. Stratton of Law Office of Douglas D. Stratton, PA, Miami Beach, for appellee. PER CURIAM. Appellant Ninter Group USA, Inc. appeals the trial court’s final judgment of eviction and a writ of possession, entered pursuant to section 83.232(5), Florida Statutes (2019)....

...per month; (2) rent from August 14, 2019, to August 13, 2020, was $6,895.85 per month; and (3) rent for August 2019 was $6,808.84. In September 2019, the landlord moved for entry of default, a final judgment of possession, and a writ of possession under section 83.232(5), Florida Statutes (2019)....

...entered the rent order, the tenant paid rent for August 2019 in the amount of only $6,695 and failed to pay the remaining balance of $113.84. The landlord also asserted the tenant paid only $6,695 of the $6,895.85 due for September. The landlord argued that under section 83.232(5), it was entitled to an immediate ex parte final judgment of possession. The tenant responded and moved to strike the motion for default. Regarding the August 2019 rent, the tenant asserted that before the court entered the rent order, it had already deposited $6,695 into the court registry....

...And, although the tenant timely paid the $6,695 into the court registry on September 4th, that amount was less than the total amount due. “In essence, [the tenant] failed to pay all of the rent due on the due date,” which entitled the landlord to possession under section 83.232(5)....

...The court noted there was no equitable exception to the statute, and it had no 3 discretion to excuse the tenant’s non-compliance. The court entered a final judgment of eviction and a writ of possession. 1 Section 83.232 governs a nonresidential tenant’s rent payments when a landlord sues for possession: In an action by the landlord which includes a claim for possession of real property, the tenant shall pay into the court registry...

...If the tenant contests the amount of accrued rent, the tenant must pay the amount determined by the court into the court registry on the day that the court makes its determination. The court may, however, extend these time periods to allow for later payment, upon good cause shown. Id. § 83.232(1) (emphasis added)....

...“Failure of the tenant to pay the rent into the court registry pursuant to court order shall be deemed an absolute waiver of the tenant’s defenses. In such case, the landlord is entitled to an immediate default for possession without further notice or hearing thereon.” Id. § 83.232(5). We have explained that “[s]ection 83.232 is designed to protect a commercial landlord from irreparable harm where a tenant holds over during eviction proceedings without paying rent....

...The trial court’s duty under the statute is simply ministerial. Palm Beach Marketplace, LLC v. Aleyda’s Mexican Restaurante, Inc., 103 So. 3d 911, 912 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012). And yet, the statute’s language allows the court to extend time to allow for later payment upon good cause shown. § 83.232(1), Fla....

...nt. In the eviction action, Lincoln Enterprise filed an answer and affirmative defenses, in which it raises many of the same issues that form the basis of its declaratory judgment action. In the eviction case, Bookstein filed a motion pursuant to section 83.232 of the Florida Statutes to have the court set an evidentiary hearing to determine the amount of rent Lincoln Enterprise should pay into the registry of the court while the dispute is pending. The trial court set a December 8, 2017 hearing date for Bookstein’s section 83.232 motion. Based on the parties’ stipulation, the trial court, in October of 2017, consolidated the two cases under the earlier filed declaratory judgment action’s case number (2017-017875-CA-09)....

...proceedings for thirty days and cancelled the December 8, 2017 hearing. A week later, on November 29, 2017, the trial court entered the order on appeal that lifted the previously entered stay and re-set the December 8th hearing on Bookstein’s section 83.232 motion.1 Bookstein has moved to dismiss Lincoln Enterprise’s appeal on both jurisdictional and mootness grounds. In Lincoln Enterprise’s response to Bookstein’s motion to dismiss the appeal, Lincoln Enterprise states, �...

...ni. After disputes arose between the parties, Omni stopped making rent payments. Subsequently, Parrish filed a three count complaint against Omni—for eviction, breach of lease agreement and breach of guaranty agreement. Thereafter, pursuant to section 83.232, Florida Statutes (2021), Omni filed a motion to determine the amount of rent that it was to deposit into the court registry during the pendency of the litigation. After an evidentiary hearing, the trial court entered an order...

...Cooke Carbonell LLP, and Jorge L. Carbonell and Robert F. Cooke and Arianna M. Mendez, for appellant. Rodolfo Nuñez, P.A., and Rodolfo Nuñez, for appellee. Before SCALES, GORDO and BOKOR, JJ. PER CURIAM. Affirmed. Fla. Stat. § 83.232(5) (“Failure of the tenant to pay the rent into the court registry pursuant to court order shall be deemed an absolute waiver of the tenant’s defenses....

...DiBello, Coral Gables, and Carlos B. Castillo, for appellee. Before GERSTEN, C.J., and CORTIÑAS, J., and SCHWARTZ, Senior Judge. PER CURIAM. We find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in requiring payments of rent into the registry under section 83.232(1), Florida Statutes (2007)....

...r); Hughes v. First Federal Savings and Loan Ass’n, 621 So.2d 557 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993); CMR Distributors, Inc. v. The Resolution Trust Corp., 593 So.2d 593 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992). .The respondents have not filed a claim for double rent. See §§ 83.06; 83.232, Fla.Stat. (1993). In any event, section 83.232 applies only to causes of action arising on or after October 1, 1993....

...excuse the tenant's noncompliance with its prior order. Therefore, we conclude that the trial court erred in setting aside the default and writ of possession based upon the finding that the late November payment was the result of excusable neglect”) (citing § 83.232(5), Fla....

...not be binding unless in writing, signed and delivered by the party to be bound.’ Thus, this language prevents an oral waiver or modification . . . .); DTRS Intercontinental Miami, LLC v. A.K. Gift Shop, Inc., 77 So. 3d 785, 786-87 (Fla. 3d DCA 2011) (“Section 83.232(5), Florida Statutes ....

...Nine days later, the trial court rendered a default final judgment of eviction authorizing the immediate issuance of a writ of possession. The instant appeal ensued. ANALYSIS 2  Section 83.232(1), Florida Statutes (2020), governing monetary default in nonresidential tenancies, provides, in relevant part, In an action by the landlord which includes a claim for possession of real property, the tenant shall pay in...

...into the court registry pursuant to court order shall be deemed an absolute waiver of the tenant's defenses. In such case, the landlord is entitled to an immediate default for possession without further notice or hearing thereon.” § 83.232(5), Fla....

...final judgment. Accordingly, Simpson had ample opportunity to deposit the required funds. Under these circumstances, and given that Simpson did not raise the issue of registry access prior to the entry of default, we conclude the plain language of section 83.232(5), Florida Statutes, compelled entry of the default final judgment....

...C v. Therault, 95 So. 3d 961, 963 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012) (“The default judgment entitled the landlord to immediate possession of the property based on the tenant's failure to deposit rent into the court registry as ordered by the court pursuant to section 83.232, Florida Statutes.”); Park Adult Residential Facility, Inc., 36 So....

the same time refusing to pay rent. See, e.g., § 83.232(1), Fla. Stat. (2014). Using chapter 83 as a template

for possession into the registry of the court. § 83.232, Fla. Stat. (2018) (commercial tenancies); § 83

resolved at trial and not in proceedings under section 83.232. AFFIRMED. PETERSON and THOMPSON, JJ„ concur