Florida/Georgia Personal Injury & Workers Compensation

...neither the discharge of a debt [which releases only a debtor's personal liability] nor the exempt status of property will preclude the enforcement of valid liens. 3 Collier (15th Ed.) § 506.07; 3 Collier (15th Ed.) § 522.27; 1A Collier (14th Ed.) § 17.29; 4B Collier (14th Ed.) § 70.70....

pre-judgment interest in an action brought under section 17, 29 U.S.C. § 217. Hope Garcia Lancarte, 632 F.2d

...NOTES [1] The record before us is unclear as to whether the judgment also was filed in any other counties. [2] Ch. 70-12, Laws of Florida. [3] 1A Collier on Bankruptcy § 17.05 (14th ed. rev. 1976). [4] Jaubert Bros. Inc. v. Landry, 15 So.2d 158 (La. App. 1943); Collier, note 3, at § 17.29....

...Rule 691-40.103 prohibits expenditures from state funds, unless expressly provided by law, for enumerated items, including “(6) Decorative items (globes, statues, potted plants, picture frames, etc.).” According to the rule, it was adopted in 1975, amended in 1995, and was created under the authority of section 17.29, Florida Statutes, which provides: 17.29....

...The Chief Financial Officer may make payments by state warrant if deemed administratively necessary. The ALJ concluded that rule 691-40.103 was an invalid exercise of the Chief Financial Officer’s (the “CFO”) rulemaking authority because it was not specifically authorized by its enabling statute, section 17.29, Florida Statutes (2012). The ALJ reasoned that while section 17.29 conferred broad powers and duties on the CFO to process day-to-day payments, it did not explicitly authorize the CFO to restrict expenditures. With respect to each of the subsections in section 17.29, the ALJ stated that section 17.29(1) specifically authorizes the CFO only to process expenditures, not to prohibit them. Section 17.29(2) only relates to procedures for processing interagency and interagency [sic] payments, which is not related to the challenged rule. Additionally, subsections 17.29(3) and (4), deal with electronic means for payments, which are not issues relating to what is reimbursable as an expenditure. The ALJ concluded that “there is simply no language within the text of section 17.29 which suggests that the CFO is authorized to adopt rules restricting expenditures. Therefore, rule 691^10.103 does not implement or interpret any specific power or duty granted by section 17.29.” We agree with the ALJ’s interpretation of section 17.29 and her conclusion on this point. In addition to listing section 17.29 as its specific authority, rule 691-40.103 also lists sections 17.001,17.03, and 215.42, Florida Statutes, as “law implemented.” Section 120.52(2), Florida Statutes (2012), defines “law implemented,” as “the language of the enabling statute being carried out or interpreted by an agency through rulemaking.” As it did below, Appellant also contends that section 17.29(1) and 17.03(1) together provide sufficient authority for the rule. The ALJ rejected Appellant’s argument that she should look to both section 17.29 and section 17.03 to find authority for the rule....

...The CFO has no authority to supervise the operation of other state officers or state agencies in the exercise of the discretion vested in them by law. Fla. Dev. Comm’n v. Dickinson, 229 So.2d 6, 8 (Fla. 1st DCA 1969). We accordingly conclude that section 17.03(1), whether separately considered or in combination with *728 section 17.29, does not provide a specific grant of legislative authority for rule 691-40.103....

...If the property was not exempt, so that the judgment became a lien against it, then even though the bankruptcy discharge released John Harris from personal liability on the judgment, the lien itself was not discharged, but survived the bankruptcy. 1A Collier on Bankruptcy, § 17.29 (14th ed....