CopyCited 26 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 1970 Fla. LEXIS 2461
chooses to exercise such veto. "The provisions of Section 6, 8 and 12 of Article III, supra, must be construed
CopyCited 16 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 20 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 286, 1995 Fla. LEXIS 1043, 1995 WL 368411
...le access from another street even though the alternate route is longer.
538 So.2d at 849 (quoting Pinellas County v. Austin,
323 So.2d 6, 8-9 (Fla. 2d DCA 1975)) (citations omitted); see also 2A Julius L. Sackman, Nichols' The Law of Eminent Domain §
6.08[2] (rev....
CopyCited 16 times | Published | Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit | 2017 WL 117124, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 549
current and accrued liabilities. Loan Agreement § 6.8. A loan agreement with RUS, such as CAEC’s
CopyCited 3 times | Published | Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit | 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 4905
...stem to regulate its elected judicial officials.
The Alabama Constitution charges the state's highest court with the responsibility of developing and
implementing the ethical rules that govern state judges. Ala. Const. of 1901, amend. 328, § 6.08(c)....
CopyCited 2 times | Published | District Court, S.D. Florida | 1971 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11864
City of Belle Glade, which provide, in part: Section 6-8 Qualification of Candidates Each candidate for
CopyCited 1 times | Published | Florida 1st District Court of Appeal
...Although this rule restricting actions at law between partners may have been based in part on historical distinctions between actions at law and at equity, see White v. Ross,
35 Fla. 377,
17 So. 640, 641 (1895), and see also Bromberg & Ribstein on Partnership, §
6.08(c) (1988), the rule also furthers judicial economy by requiring the resolution of all disputes among the partners and partnership in one proceeding. Bromberg & Ribstein at §
6.08(c). Thus, an action for a partnership accounting encompasses all claims, counterclaims and set offs between and among the partners involving matters related to the partnership, including claims for breach of a partner's fiduciary duty. Id. at §
6.08(a)....
CopyCited 1 times | Published | Florida 4th District Court of Appeal | 2007 WL 2847951
...thereof to it. . . . After the Commission has considered the proposed initiative as required by section
6.07, the Commission is then required to either adopt the initiated ordinance as its own or submit the ordinance to the electors, as required by section
6.08 below: Sec.
6.08....
CopyCited 1 times | Published | District Court, M.D. Florida | 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9124, 2010 WL 455285
...icts. Section 2.03.26 of the LDC, entitled "Antenna Towers," provides, in pertinent part: Antenna Towers may be permitted as a Special Use within districts as defined in Section 2.03.01. Such Antenna Towers shall be subject to the requirements of... Section 6.08.12 of this Code and further subject to the following: A....
...OR) zoning district shall be reviewed as a Special Use. C. The applicant shall demonstrate that there are no other suitable existing Antenna Towers or Structures on which the applicant/provider can reasonable [sic] place its antennas, as provided in Section 6.08.12.R. Sec. 2.03.26, LDC. Section 6.08.12 of the LDC further provides, in pertinent part: *1285 V....
...within six hundred (600) feet of any designated Scenic Highway or Scenic Roadway as defined in Article XII of this Code unless the applicant establishes that disapproval of such tower would prohibit communications service to a particular area. Sec. 6.08.12V, LDC (emphasis added)....
...re set for a public hearing before the County's Planning and Zoning Agency ("PZA"). In most circumstances, the decision of the PZA following the hearing is the final action of the County. However, where an applicant requests a waiver of certain Sec. 6.08.12 requirements, such as placement of a tower within the 600' Scenic Highway setback, the application is subject to final approval of the Board of County Commissioners (the "Board")....
...the rear (east) of the Church Property and 288' from the residential lot line to the south of the Church Property, so as to comply with Sec. 2.03.26B. This placed the monocross 350' from the center line of SR 13, less than the 600' required by Sec. 6.08.12V....
...27 at R-4, 192). The PZA's decision was based upon the following findings of fact: (1) The request is consistent with Section 2.03.01 allowing communication towers in an RS-E zoning district and 2.03.26; conditions for approval of special use permit pursuant to Section 6.08.12 except as waived herein; (2) The request is not in conflict with the Comprehensive Plan; (3) The construction of a 150-foot alternative tower structure with accessory equipment building(s) and antenna in this location is compatible with the surrounding area; (4) The location and placement of communication antenna tower providing compliance with Section 6.08.12 and conditions herein provided promotes the health, safety, and general welfare of the citizens of the area; (5) The antenna tower is necessary to provide telecommunication service to a particular area and there are no suitable existi...
...The Order contained the following findings of fact in support of the Board's denial: 1. The request is contrary to the public interest and is in conflict with the surrounding development; 2. The request does not meet the criteria set forth in the LDC, specifically including, but not limited to, Section 2.03.26 and 6.08.12V; 3....
...already taken contrary and final action; not limited to the narrow issue before the Board; or are inaccurate characterizations of the testimony on the record." (Doc. 28 at 16). With regard to the "narrow issue before the Board," Wireless interprets Section 6.08.12V of the LDC [10] to limit the Board's consideration of the Application to "whether Anchor demonstrated that `disapproval would prohibit communications service to a particular area.'" ( Id....
...oard's personal conclusion that the coverage maps do not provide evidence that denial would prohibit communications service in the area does not constitute substantial evidence." (Doc. 28 at 18). The County disputes Wireless's interpretation of Sec. 6.08.12V with respect to the Board's consideration of exceptions to the 600' Scenic Highway setback requirement....
...City of Wichita Falls, TX,
364 F.3d 250, 259 (5th Cir.2004) (emphasis added). The Court's first inquiry is which substantive legal standard to apply in determining whether Wireless has "establishe[d] that disapproval [of the proposed monocross] would prohibit communications service" to the Fruit Cove area, as required by Section
6.08.12V of the LDC. The County assumed in its Motion for Summary Judgment that the Act's federal prohibition of service standard was overlaid upon Section
6.08.12V, and thus that the Board was required to deny the Application unless Wireless successfully demonstrated that denial would prevent MetroPCS from closing a "significant gap" in service coverage. [11] However, despite the similar language in Section
6.08.12V and § 332(c)(7)(B)(i)(II) regarding prohibition of service, Wireless expressly disclaims the applicability of the federal standard to the question of whether it has satisfied its burden under the LDC....
...the "industry standard" and is required by providers to succeed in the competitive personal wireless services environment. For its part, the County argues that if the federal standard is not applied, the Court should adhere to the plain language of Section 6.08.12V; using this plain language, the Board was required to deny the Application "unless [Wireless] establishe[d] that disapproval" of the tower "would prohibit communications service" in the affected area. As Wireless is disclaiming application of the Act's prohibition of service standard to Section 6.08.12V, the Court must be guided by the plain language of Sec. 6.08.12V....
...Tepper,
2 So.3d 209, 213 (Fla.2009) (Under Florida law, "[w]hen a statute's language is plain and unambiguous, there can be no resort to statutory construction"). [13] While Wireless would like to read "indoor," "seamless coverage," and "industry standard" into Section
6.08.12V, such language simply does not exist....
...n the area, apart from acknowledging that their general objective was to "get rid of the red and the blue and go to green." (Doc. 27, R-7 at 656). Based on this evidence, the Board determined that the Application did not carry the burden required by Section 6.08.12V....
...The cross design was selected to blend in with the surrounding church property. [4] Part 12.01.00 of the LDC provides that "Scenic Highway or Scenic Roadway (As it applies to Antenna Towers): Means SR 13/CR 13 from Duval County line to SR 207 (William Bartram Scenic Highway)." [5] Sec. 6.08.12E.1., LDC....
...ge, nor that denial of the Application effects a prohibition of service under § 332(c)(7)(B)(i)(II) of the Act. Instead, Wireless contends that the Board's determination that Wireless failed to establish a prohibition of service as required by Sec. 6.08.12V of the LDC is unsupported by substantial evidence, in violation of § 332(c)(7)(B)(iii)....
...der § 332(c)(7) (B)(i)(II), the Court will not reach this issue. [12] Noting that the LDC does not expressly reference the prohibition standard of § 332(c)(7)(B)(i)(II), Wireless argues that the federal interpretation should not be applied to Sec. 6.08.12V: The County . . . argues that [Wireless] failed to establish a prohibition of service. Although the County identifies the appropriate standard, that is the provision in its own code, Section 6.08.12V, the County cites to federal case law interpreting another provision of the TCA not raised by [Wireless'] complaint....
CopyPublished | District Court of Appeal of Florida | 1998 Fla. App. LEXIS 11510
and see also Bromberg & Ribstein on Partnership, §
6.08(c) (1988), the rule also farthers judicial economy
CopyPublished | Florida 1st District Court of Appeal | 2007 Fla. App. LEXIS 16481, 2007 WL 3033503
...t." It also stated: "This contract shall at all times be subject to any and all laws, and all lawful rules, regulations, or policies now existing or hereafter enacted. " (Emphasis supplied.) The School Board of Levy County had a policy, contained in section 6.08(2)(c-d) of its rules, providing that a teacher under a professional service contract who later became a supervisor or principal would be entitled to reassignment to a teaching position if his or her contract as a supervisor *396 or principal was not renewed....
...ed after its expiration date. The trial court issued a writ of mandamus commanding the school board to reinstate Ms. Terrell to a position as a classroom teacher with full benefits and back pay. In its order, the court found that "the change to Rule 6.08 to delete Rule 6.08(2)(c) and Rule 6.08(2)(d) ....
...Because the basis for the trial court's ruling could not be supported by law, the appellee, through counsel, abandoned these reasons on appeal. Instead, the appellee argues that we should affirm on the theory argued at trial, to wit, that the school board repealed rules 6.08(2)(c) and (d) such that they applied retroactively to Ms....
...Terrell contends that she had every right to, and in fact relied upon, the right created by these rules to be reinstated as a classroom teacher. However, the plain language of her contract belies any legal reason to rely on the continuation of rules 6.08(2)(c) and (d) as part of her contract where the contract expressly provides that it is subject to laws and rules "now existing or hereafter enacted." Therefore, in the absence of a clear legal right to reinstatement as a classroom teacher, mandamus will not lie....
CopyAgo (Fla. Att'y Gen. 2009).
Published | Florida Attorney General Reports
the potential portability amount allowed under section 6(8), Article VII of the Florida Constitution. A
CopyPublished | Supreme Court of Florida | 1980 Fla. LEXIS 4464
Proposed Article IV, Section 8 as it would appear: Section 6 8. (a) Applications for admission to The Florida
CopyPublished | Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
defense as a statutory setoff defense under Ala. Code § 6- 8-80 was unjustifiably narrow. After review of Wadley’s
CopyPublished | United States Bankruptcy Court, M.D. Florida | 23 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. B 337, 2012 WL 1889792, 2012 Bankr. LEXIS 2378
Declaration when fees are assessed, but according to Section 6.8, a claim of lien does not occur automatically
CopyPublished | District Court of Appeal of Florida
v. Kaplan,
514 U.S. 938, 944 (1995). Section 6.8, step 4, of the Agreement explicitly states that
CopyPublished | District Court of Appeal of Florida
follows: (Emphasis added). Further, section 6.8 of the personal guaranty provided:
CopyPublished | Florida 3rd District Court of Appeal | 2004 Fla. App. LEXIS 5218, 2004 WL 784473
...ption of the LDRs in 1998, and subsequent Zoning Code amendments. See Key West *661 Code §§ 122-26, 122-27, 122-32. See generally 7 Fla. Jur.2d Building, Zoning and Land Controls § 197 (2004); 1 Kenneth H. Young, Anderson's American Law of Zoning § 6.08 (4th ed.1996); 4 Edward H....
...Code. The interpretation given to the Rollisons by the city attorney was consistent with the position given to realtors and other owners by the responsible members of the city administration. See 1 Kenneth H. Young, Anderson's American Law of Zoning § 6.08; see also Key West Code § 122-1371(a)....
...It was instead an interpretation of the existing Key West ordinances. Interpretation was necessary for licensing, code enforcement, and in order to inform citizens regarding what uses may be made of their property. See 1 Kenneth H. Young, Anderson's American Law of Zoning §§ 6.08, 6.11, 6.13; Paloumbis v....
