RULE 9.020. DEFINITIONS

The following terms have the meanings shown as used in
these rules:

(a) Administrative Action. Administrative action includes:

(1) final agency action as defined in the Administrative
Procedure Act, chapter 120, Florida Statutes;

(2) nonfinal action by an agency or administrative law
judge reviewable under the Administrative Procedure Act;

(3) quasi-judicial decisions by any administrative body,
agency, board, or commission not subject to the Administrative
Procedure Act; and
(4) administrative action for which judicial review is
provided by general law.

(b) Clerk. The person or official specifically designated as
such for the court or lower tribunal; if no person or official has been
specifically so designated, the official or agent who most closely
resembles a clerk in the functions performed.

(c) Court. The supreme court, the district courts of appeal,
and the circuit courts in the exercise of the jurisdiction described
by rule 9.030(c), including the chief justice of the supreme court
and the chief judge of a district court of appeal in the exercise of
constitutional, administrative, or supervisory powers on behalf of
such courts.

(d) Family Law Matter. A matter governed by the Florida
Family Law Rules of Procedure.

(e) Lower Tribunal. The court, agency, officer, board,
commission, judge of compensation claims, or body whose order is
to be reviewed.

(f) Order. A decision, order, judgment, decree, or rule of a
lower tribunal, excluding minutes and minute book entries.

(g) Parties.

(1) Appellant. A party who seeks to invoke the appeal
jurisdiction of a court.

(2) Appellee. Every party in the proceeding in the lower
tribunal other than an appellant.

(3) Petitioner. A party who seeks an order under rule
9.100 or rule 9.120.

(4) Respondent. Every other party in a proceeding
brought by a petitioner.
(h) Rendition of an Order. An order is rendered when a
signed, written order is filed with the clerk of the lower tribunal.

(1) Motions Tolling Rendition. The following motions, if
authorized and timely filed, toll rendition unless another applicable
rule of procedure specifically provides to the contrary:

(A) motion for new trial, remittitur, or additur;

(B) motion for rehearing;

(C) motion for certification;

(D) motion to alter or amend;

(E) motion for judgment in accordance with prior
motion for directed verdict;

(F) motion for arrest of judgment;

(G) motion to challenge the verdict;

(H) motion to correct a sentence or order of
probation under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(b)(1);

(I) motion to withdraw a plea after sentencing
under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.170(l);

(J) motion to correct a disposition or commitment
order under Florida Rule of Juvenile Procedure 8.135(b);

(K) motion to claim ineffective assistance of
counsel following an order terminating parental rights under
Florida Rule of Juvenile Procedure 8.530(f);

(L) motion to vacate an order under Florida
Family Law Rules of Procedure 12.490(e)(3) or 12.491(f); or

(M) motion to withdraw a plea after disposition
under Florida Rule of Juvenile Procedure 8.075(f).
(2) Effect of Motions Tolling Rendition. If any timely and
authorized motion listed in subdivision (h)(1) of this rule has been
filed in the lower tribunal directed to a final order, the following
apply:

(A) the final order will not be deemed rendered as
to any existing party until all of the motions are either withdrawn
by written notice filed in the lower tribunal or resolved by the
rendition of an order disposing of the last of such motions;

(B) if an order granting a new trial is rendered,
tolling concludes, notwithstanding that other such motions may
remain pending at the time; or

(C) if a notice of appeal is filed before the rendition
of an order disposing of all such motions, the appeal must be held
in abeyance until the motions are either withdrawn or resolved by
the rendition of an order disposing of the last such motion.

(i) Rendition of an Appellate Order or Opinion. An
appellate order or opinion is rendered when docketed by the clerk of
the court. If any timely and authorized motion under rules 9.330 or
9.331 is filed, the order or opinion will not be deemed rendered as
to any party until all of the motions are either withdrawn or
resolved by the rendition of an order or opinion on the motion.

(j) Conformed Copy. A true and accurate copy.

(k) Signed. A signed document is one containing a signature
as provided by Florida Rule of General Practice and Judicial
Administration 2.515(c).

(l) E-filing System Docket. The docket where attorneys
and those parties who are registered users of the court’s electronic
filing (e-filing) system can view the electronic documents filed in
their case(s).

Committee Notes
1977 Amendment. This rule supersedes former rule 1.3.
Throughout these rules the defined terms have been used in their
technical sense only, and are not intended to alter substantive law.
Instances may arise in which the context of the rule requires a
different meaning for a defined term, but these should be rare.

The term “administrative action” is new and has been defined
to make clear the application of these rules to judicial review of
administrative agency action. This definition was not intended to
conflict with the Administrative Procedure Act, chapter 120, Florida
Statutes (1975), but was intended to include all administrative
agency action as defined in the Administrative Procedure Act. The
reference to municipalities is not intended to conflict with article
VIII, section 1(a), Florida Constitution, which makes counties the
only political subdivisions of the state.

The term “clerk” retains the substance of the term “clerk”
defined in the former rules. This term includes the person who in
fact maintains records of proceedings in the lower tribunal if no
person is specifically and officially given that duty.

The term “court” retains the substance of the term “court”
defined in the former rules, but has been modified to recognize the
authority delegated to the chief justice of the supreme court and the
chief judges of the district courts of appeal. This definition was not
intended to broaden the scope of these rules in regard to the
administrative responsibilities of the mentioned judicial officers.
The term is used in these rules to designate the court to which a
proceeding governed by these rules is taken. If supreme court
review of a district court of appeal decision is involved, the district
court of appeal is the “lower tribunal.”

The term “lower tribunal” includes courts and administrative
agencies. It replaces the terms “commission,” “board,” and “lower
court” defined in the former rules.

The term “order” has been broadly defined to include all final
and interlocutory rulings of a lower tribunal and rules adopted by
an administrative agency. Minute book entries are excluded from
the definition in recognition of the decision in Employers’ Fire Ins.
Co. v. Continental Ins. Co., 326 So. 2d 177 (Fla. 1976). It was
intended that this rule encourage the entry of written orders in
every case.

The terms “appellant,” “appellee,” “petitioner,” and
“respondent” have been defined according to the rule applicable to a
particular proceeding and generally not according to the legal
nature of the proceeding before the court. The term “appellee” has
been defined to include the parties against whom relief is sought
and all others necessary to the cause. This rule supersedes all
statutes concerning the same subject matter, such as section
924.03, Florida Statutes (1975). It should be noted that if a
certiorari proceeding is specifically governed by a rule that only
refers to “appellant” and “appellee,” a “petitioner” and “respondent”
should proceed as if they were “appellant” and “appellee,”
respectively. For example, certiorari proceedings in the supreme
court involving the Public Service Commission and Industrial
Relations Commission are specifically governed by rule 9.110 even
though that rule only refers to “appellant” and “appellee.” The
parties in such a certiorari proceeding remain designated as
“petitioner” and “respondent,” because as a matter of substantive
law the party invoking the court’s jurisdiction is seeking a writ of
certiorari. The same is true of rule 9.200 governing the record in
such certiorari proceedings.

The term “rendition” has been simplified and unnecessary
language deleted. The filing requirement of the definition was not
intended to conflict with the substantive right of review guaranteed
by the Administrative Procedure Act, section 120.68(1), Florida
Statutes (Supp. 1976), but to set a point from which certain
procedural times could be measured. Motions that postpone the
date of rendition have been narrowly limited to prevent deliberate
delaying tactics. To postpone rendition the motion must be timely,
authorized, and one of those listed. However, if the lower tribunal is
an administrative agency whose rules of practice denominate
motions identical to those listed by a different label, the substance
of the motion controls and rendition is postponed accordingly.
The definition of “legal holiday” has been eliminated but its
substance has been retained in rule 9.420(e).

The term “bond” is defined in rule 9.310(c)(1).

Terms defined in the former rules and not defined here are
intended to have their ordinary meanings in accordance with the
context of these rules.

1992 Amendment. Subdivision (a) has been amended to
reflect properly that deputy commissioners presently are designated
as judges of compensation claims.

Subdivision (g) has been rewritten extensively. The first change
in this rule was to ensure that an authorized motion for clarification
(such as under rule 9.330) was included in those types of motions
that delay rendition.

Subdivision (g) also has been revised in several respects to
clarify some problems presented by the generality of the prior
definition of “rendition.” Although rendition is postponed in most
types of cases by the filing of timely and authorized post-judgment
motions, some rules of procedure explicitly provide to the contrary.
The subdivision therefore has been qualified to provide that
conflicting rules shall control over the general rule stated in the
subdivision. See In Re Interest of E. P., 544 So. 2d 1000 (Fla. 1989).
The subdivision also has been revised to make explicit a
qualification of long standing in the decisional law, that rendition of
non-final orders cannot be postponed by motions directed to them.
Not all final orders are subject to postponement of rendition,
however. Rendition of a final order can be postponed only by an
“authorized” motion, and whether any of the listed motions is an
“authorized” motion depends on the rules of procedure governing
the proceeding in which the final order is entered. See Francisco v.
Victoria Marine Shipping, Inc., 486 So. 2d 1386 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986),
review denied 494 So. 2d 1153.

Subdivision (g)(1) has been added to clarify the date of
rendition when post-judgment motions have been filed. If there is
only 1 plaintiff and 1 defendant in the case, the filing of a post-
judgment motion or motions by either party (or both parties) will
postpone rendition of the entire final order as to all claims between
the parties. If there are multiple parties on either or both sides of
the case and less than all parties file post-judgment motions,
rendition of the final order will be postponed as to all claims
between moving parties and parties moved against, but rendition
will not be postponed with respect to claims disposed of in the final
order between parties who have no post-judgment motions pending
between them with respect to any of those claims. See, e.g., Phillips
v. Ostrer, 442 So. 2d 1084 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983).

Ideally, all post-judgment motions should be disposed of at the
same time. See Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc. v. Robinson, 472 So. 2d 722
(Fla. 1985). If that occurs, the final order is deemed rendered as to
all claims when the order disposing of the motions is filed with the
clerk. If all motions are not disposed of at the same time, the final
order is deemed rendered as to all claims between a moving party
and a party moved against when the written order disposing of the
last remaining motion addressed to those claims is filed with the
clerk, notwithstanding that other motions filed by co-parties may
remain pending. If such motions remain, the date of rendition with
respect to the claims between the parties involved in those motions
shall be determined in the same way.

Subdivision (g)(2) has been added to govern the special
circumstance that arises when rendition of a final order has been
postponed initially by post-judgment motions, and a motion for new
trial then is granted. If the new trial has been granted simply as an
alternative to a new final order, the appeal will be from the new final
order. However, if a new trial alone has been ordered, the appeal
will be from the new trial order. See rule 9.110. According to the
decisional law, rendition of such an order is not postponed by the
pendency of any additional, previously filed post-judgment motions,
nor can rendition of such an order be postponed by the filing of any
further motion. See Frazier v. Seaboard System Railroad, Inc., 508
So. 2d 345 (Fla. 1987). To ensure that subdivision (g)(1) is not read
as a modification of this special rule, subdivision (g)(2) has been
added to make it clear that a separately appealable new trial order
is deemed rendered when filed, notwithstanding that other post-
judgment motions directed to the initial final order may remain
pending at the time.

Subdivision (g)(3) has been added to clarify the confusion
generated by a dictum in Williams v. State, 324 So. 2d 74 (Fla.
1975), which appeared contrary to the settled rule that post-
judgment motions were considered abandoned by a party who filed
a notice of appeal before their disposition. See In Re: Forfeiture of
$104,591 in U.S. Currency, 578 So. 2d 727 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991). The
new subdivision confirms that rule, and provides that the final
order is rendered as to the appealing party when the notice of
appeal is filed. Although the final order is rendered as to the
appealing party, it is not rendered as to any other party whose post-
judgment motions are pending when the notice of appeal is filed.

1996 Amendment. Subdivision (a) was amended to reflect the
current state of the law. When the term “administrative action” is
used in the Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure, it encompasses
proceedings under the Administrative Procedure Act, quasi-judicial
proceedings before local government agencies, boards, and
commissions, and administrative action for which judicial review is
provided by general law.

Addition of language in subdivision (i) is intended to toll the
time for the filing of a notice of appeal until the resolution of a
timely filed motion to vacate when an order has been entered based
on the recommendation of a hearing officer in a family law matter.
Under the prior rules, a motion to vacate was not an authorized
motion to toll the time for the filing of an appeal, and too often the
motion to vacate could not be heard within 30 days of the rendition
of the order. This rule change permits the lower tribunal to
complete its review prior to the time an appeal must be filed.

2000 Amendment. The text of subdivision (i) was moved into
the main body of subdivision (h) to retain consistency in the
definitional portions of the rule.

2020 Amendment. For purposes of determining the date of
rendition, it is important that electronically and paper-filed orders
and judgments include accurate date stamps. Thus, absent
extraordinary circumstances, documents should be date stamped
for the day on which they are filed with the clerk. Backdating to the
date on which the order or judgment was signed is not permitted.
See, e.g., Guy v. Plaza Home Mortg., Inc., 260 So. 3d 280, 280–81
(Fla. 4th DCA 2018) (“[Backdating the date of rendition] can cause,
at best, confusion, and at worst, a loss of appellate rights. . . . By
backdating the electronic filing stamp, the clerk changes the
rendition date, possibly to the prejudice of an appellant.”).

Court Commentary

1996 Amendment. Subdivision (h) was amended to ensure
that a motion to correct sentence or order of probation and a
motion to withdraw the plea after sentencing would postpone
rendition. Subdivision (h)(3) was amended to explain that such a
motion is not waived by an appeal from a judgment of guilt.