CopyCited 8 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 1956 Fla. LEXIS 3635
...ment against the person bound by the undertaking for the amount of the penalty of said undertaking, and execution shall be issued to collect the amount of said undertaking." Also pertinent to the problem here presented are the provisions of Sections 903.29 and 903.30, ibid., authorizing the court to set aside the judgment of forfeiture within thirty days "for a reasonable cause shown" and "upon such terms as are just * *" *157 and prescribing the procedure for remission of the forfeiture....
...ut notice and an opportunity to present its defenses was a denial of the due process of law guaranteed by Section 12 of the Declaration of Rights of our Constitution, F.S.A., and that the provisions for a remission of the forfeiture made by Sections 903.29 and 903.30 are inadequate protection, since the 30-day period during which it can apply for a remission of the forfeiture may expire without its having had notice of the judgment entry....
...use the default and when, by the express terms of its undertaking, it is "bound" to pay the penal sum specified therein upon such failure particularly where, as here, provision for the remission of the forfeiture is expressly made by the statute, Section 903.29, supra....
CopyCited 5 times | Published | Florida 1st District Court of Appeal
...The circuit court denied the applications. We hold that the imprisonment and detention of the principal under the circumstances related does not operate to relieve the surety from its obligation on the bail bonds in suit. Appellant contends that its rights are governed by Section 903.29(1), Florida Statutes 1959, F.S.A., which provides: "After the entry of judgment on the undertaking, the court entering the judgment may for a reasonable cause shown within thirty days set aside the judgment in whole or in part upon suc...
...on or trial in the federal court in South Carolina, which occurred in May 1960, until he received a letter from the Chief Deputy United States Marshal in Charleston, South Carolina, addressed February 27, 1961. The state contends, and we agree, that Section 903.29(1), Florida Statutes 1959, F.S.A., has no application to the situation with which we are confronted....
CopyAgo (Fla. Att'y Gen. 1977).
Published | Florida Attorney General Reports
...When a bondsman writes a bond for one company and the bond is estreated, and after the estreature the surety company for whom the bondsman wrote the bond cancels the bonsman's license with that company, may the bondsman still legally arrest the principal pursuant to s. 903.29 , F....
...S., if the bondsman had an indemnity agreement with the surety company, at the time of the streature, to save it harmless from the estreature? 2. If the answer to question 1 is `no,' would it make any difference if, at the time of the arrest of the principal, the bondsman was licensed by another company? SUMMARY: Section 903.29 , F. S., authorizes a surety to arrest the principal on a forfeited bond. If the license and power of attorney by which a bondsman acts as limited surety agent for a surety company are revoked, the bondsman cease to have any authority under s. 903.29 to arrest the principal of a bond given by the surety company by whom the bondsman was formerly licensed....
...This conclusion would not be affected by an indemnity agreement between the bondsman and the surety company, or by the fact that the bondsman, after such revocation by the surety company in question, might still be licensed by some other surety company. Section 903.29 , F....
...n paid, the surety may arrest the principal for the purpose of surrendering him to the official in whose custody he was at the time bail was taken or in whose custody he would have been placed had he been committed. It should be carefully noted that s. 903.29 , F....
...ars that the type of bondsman contemplated is one who acts as a `limited surety agent' (as defined in s.
648.25 (4), F. S.) of a surety company. Under these circumstances, the surety company is the actual `surety' for purposes of the arrest power of s.
903.29 . Thus, if the bondsman establishes suretyship (pursuant to s.
903.29 [2]) by attaching to the bond a power of attorney to act for and as the agent of a surety company by which he is licensed, then that bondsman, as agent for the surety, would have only those powers granted to the surety by s.
903.29 in regard to arrest of the principal. If the bondsman's license and power of attorney to act as agent of the surety are revoked, then the bondsman, upon such revocation, would cease to have any arrest authority under s.
903.29 (which speaks only to the surety )....
...Any other contractual agreement between the surety company and the bondsman (such as the indemnity agreement to which you referred) would not of itself provided sufficient authority for the power to arrest and could not be substituted for the statutory arrest authority granted to the surety by s. 903.29 . The fact that the bondsman in question, after revocation, might still be licensed by another surety company (other than the surety company which has given the bond in question) would be of no effect as to the surety's statutory authority under s. 903.29 to arrest the principal....
CopyPublished | District Court of Appeal of Florida | 11 Fla. L. Weekly 1869, 1986 Fla. App. LEXIS 9532
...ender of the defendants did not thwart proper prosecution. No reason is given by the trial court for the denial of the discharge other than the adoption of the rationale in a county court *1066 opinion from Alachua County. That opinion suggests that section 903.29, Florida Statutes (Supp.1984), denies to the surety the right to arrest the principal until after the surety had paid the forfeiture....
...arning of the failure to appear of his principal must first hurry to the court house to pay the forfeiture before effecting the apprehension of the principal, even though that delay may allow the principal to escape forever. The only construction of section 903.29, Florida Statutes (Supp.1984) that comports with the rationale of the rest of the chapter is that the section provides a limitation on the arrest power for a term not to exceed two years after payment of the forfeiture....
