CopyCited 2 times | Published | Florida 3rd District Court of Appeal | 2002 Fla. App. LEXIS 7396, 2002 WL 1058509
...Before GREEN, SHEVIN, and RAMIREZ, JJ. RAMIREZ, J. Andres F. Tejada appeals a final order in a civil forfeiture action dismissing his claim to $406,626.11 in U.S. currency seized from his Florida bank account. The trial court based its dismissal of Tejada's claim upon section 896.106, Florida Statutes (2000), which codified what is commonly referred to as the "fugitive disentitlement doctrine." We affirm because the statute was not impermissibly applied retroactively....
...The Court specifically stated, however, that it was not "intimat[ing] a view on whether enforcement of a disentitlement rule under proper authority would violate due process." Id. at 828,
116 S.Ct. 1777. [Emphasis added]. In 2000, the Florida legislature enacted section
896.106, effective July 1, 2000....
...excessive response to those concerns, particularly where such action was predicated only on the court's inherent power. Id. at 828-29,
116 S.Ct. 1777. The import of the decision was that Congress could grant district courts such a power. By enacting section
896.106, that is precisely what the Florida legislature has done. III. Tejada also argues that section
896.106 is incorrectly being applied retroactively....
...Professor Hochman also wrote that "[t]he most obvious kind of retroactive statute is one which reaches back to attach new legal rights and duties to already completed transactions." Hochman, 73 Harv. "L.Rev. at 692. The only completed transaction prior to the enactment of section 896.106 was the alleged money laundering which took place through Tejada's bank account....
...Board of Public Instruction of Okaloosa County,
203 So.2d 497, 498 (Fla.1967). As Degen's underpinnings centered on the lack of inherent authority on the part of the federal district court to dismiss a civil forfeiture action under the fugitive disentitlement doctrine, the enactment of section
896.106 can be viewed as remedial....
...The majority, here nevertheless, finds that Tejada's claims should be dismissed. Clearly, the majority opinion is at odds with the United States Supreme Court's reasoning in Degen. [5] Now that the holding of Degen is clear, the question at issue remains whether section 896.106 can be constitutionally applied to Tejada's case....
...The right to contest the forfeiture of one's property, is secured by the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution; see Degen v. United States,
517 U.S. at 822-23,
116 S.Ct. 1777, and Article 1, Section 9 of the Florida Constitution. See Department of Law Enforcement v. Real Property,
588 So.2d at 966. Section
896.106 is a statutory waiver of a fugitive's due process rights in a civil forfeiture proceeding....
...Eng,
951 F.2d 461, 466 (2nd Cir.1991). Such a waiver can only be substantive in nature. Serna v. Milanese, Inc.,
643 So.2d at 38 (statute which takes away an existing right is substantive in nature). Thus, pursuant to established laws of statutory construction, section
896.106 simply cannot be applied retroactively....
...[7] At that time, the circuit court did not have the authority to strike Tejada's claim and enter judgment against him (or any fugitive claimant in a civil forfeiture case) by virtue of his fugitive status. [8] Degen,
517 U.S. at 824,
116 S.Ct. 1777. This case then proceeded onward for nearly two-years before the passage of section
896.106. It was only after that statute was enacted that the City renewed its motion to dismiss, which the trial court ultimately granted. Nothing had changed in this case, including Tejada's status as a fugitive, other than the legislature's enactment of section
896.106. The majority, however, asserts that it is Tejada's continued status as a fugitive, rather than the trial court's application of section
896.106, that caused Tejada's claim to fail....
...2d DCA 1978) (it would be unconstitutional for court to give retroactive effect to a shortened statute of limitations when to do so would bar a cause of action existing on the effective date of the statute). It was the impermissible retroactive application of section 896.106 that disenfranchised him of his previously vested right to participate in this forfeiture proceeding....
...692 (1960) ("A retroactive statute is one which gives to pre-enactment conduct a different legal effect from that which it would have had without the passage of the statute."). The majority also asserts retroactive application of the statute is appropriate here because section 896.106 is merely remedial in nature....
...ainst retrospective operation). As stated above, I believe that this statute affects a substantive fundamental right, i.e. the right to defend one's property. That right is clearly protected by both the Florida and United States Constitutions. Thus, section 896.106 is far more than a remedial or procedural statute, and simply cannot be retroactively applied. Finally, given the unlawful retroactive application of section 896.106 in this case, it is not necessary for us to reach Tejada's constitutional challenge to this statute....
...has refused to apply a statute retroactively if the statute imparis vested rights, creates new obligations, or imposes new penalties." State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Laforet,
658 So.2d at 61. Here, there is no legislative statement directing that section
896.106 be applied retroactively....
