...y the donor.” Id. at 897 (citations omitted and emphasis in original). Finally, Appellants argue that the assets in the trusts are part of the decedent’s estate and should pass to Ms. Cessac because the terms of the will meet the requirements of section
732.607, Florida Statutes, and indicate the decedent’s intent that Ms. Cessac receive the assets. Section
732.607 provides: A general residuary clause in a will, or a will making general disposition of all the testator’s property, does not exercise a power of appointment held by the testator unless specific reference is made to the power or there is some other indication of intent to include the property subject to the power. The Talcott court rejected an identical argument as to the applicability of section
732.607 when, citing the statute, the court stated, “[i]f the trust contains no specific limitation on the manner of executing the power, other evidence that the power had been executed may be considered to determine intent [but][w]hen the trust defines the manner in which the power must be exercised, noncompliance with the donor’s requirements defeats the appointment.”
423 So.2d at 955-56 (citations omitted). We agree; nothing in section
732.607 limits the power of an individual to place specific requirements on the disposition of his or her property and where, as here, a settlor of a trust places specific restrictions on the exercise of a power of appointment, section
732.607 is inapplicable....
