CopyCited 2 times | Published | Florida 5th District Court of Appeal | 84 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (West) 333, 2014 Fla. App. LEXIS 12143, 2014 WL 3871264
...These authorities hold that the U.C.C. reference to “disposition” connotes a transfer for value of the creditor’s rights to the collateral and does not contemplate a creditor’s transfer of title to itself. 4 See, e.g., Fletcher, 499 *508 F.Supp. at 698-99 . In fact, section 679.619(3), Florida Statutes (2009), specifically provides that “[a] transfer of the record or legal title to collateral to a secured party ......
...y in a position to pass legal or record title to a transferee at foreclosure; a secured, party who has obtained record or legal title retains its duties with respect to enforcement of its security interest, and the debtor retains its rights as well. § 679.619(3), Fla....
CopyCited 1 times | Published | United States Bankruptcy Court, S.D. Florida. | 22 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. B 165, 70 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (West) 85, 2009 Bankr. LEXIS 3332
...The issue before the Court is whether a 2001 amendment to Article 9 of the Florida Commercial Code renders Kalter inapplicable and entitles a debtor to regain possession of a vehicle repossessed prepetition. For the following reasons, the Court concludes that Kalter is still applicable notwithstanding the change to Fla.Stat. § 679.619(3)....
...abama law provides the same result). Citing Kalter, Creditor argues that turnover must be denied since the Vehicle is not property of the estate. The Debtor argues that Kalter and its progeny no longer apply because of a 2001 amendment to Fla. Stat. § 679.619(3)....
...Furthermore, the 11th Circuit repeatedly rejected the argument that a debtor's right of redemption is sufficient to pull the property back into the estate. Id. at 1355. [1] In this case, Debtor argues that a 2001 amendment to Article 9 of the Florida UCC, in particular Fla. Stat. § 679.619(3), renders Kalter's analysis inapplicable....
...As amended the subsection provides as follows: "A transfer of the record or legal title to collateral to a secured party under subsection (2) or otherwise is not of itself a disposition of collateral under this chapter and does not of itself relieve the secured party of its duties under this chapter." Fla.Stat. § 679.619(3) (2001) (emphasis added.) Debtor relies on Nolan to support his argument that the addition of the language "or otherwise" to this subsection of Article 9 governing transfers of title "likely overrides any effect title-clearing statutes w...
...592 (Bankr.D.Kan.2004)). The Nolan court's interpretation is misguided and the statute's Official Comment debunks any such argument: "The mechanism provided by this section is in addition to any title-clearing provision under law other than this Article." Fla. Stat. § 679.619, cmt....
...The comment explicitly states the legislature's intent to supplement, not replace, existing non-UCC law, such as Florida's title-clearing statute. In addition, neither the statute, nor its official comment, addresses the issues of ownership discussed in Kalter and Lewis. Clearly, in enacting the change to § 679.619(3), the legislature did not intend to override the effect of Florida's Certificate of Title statute....
...its explicit recognition in §
319.28(2)(b) that ownership of collateral transfers to secured *905 creditor upon repossession. In re Kalter,
292 F.3d at 1359. In sum, to the extent Nolan found Kalter inapplicable based on the amendment to Fla. Stat. §
679.619(3), the Court rejects its conclusion....
