Florida/Georgia Personal Injury & Workers Compensation

...rest arose after Orix filed UCC-1 financing statements concerning the same collateral, contending that the financing statements filed by Orix are misleading and insufficiently describe all of the encumbered collateral in violation of Florida Statute Section 679.1081....

...nonmoving party's case and for which the nonmoving party will bear the burden of proof at trial. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, All U.S. 317, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986) (cert, denied, 484 U.S. 1066, 108 S.Ct. 1028, 98 L.Ed.2d 992 (1988)). Section 679.1081 of the Florida Statutes sets forth the test to determine the sufficiency of the description of collateral in both a security agreement and a financing statement. Section 679.1081(1) provides, in relevant part, that a description of collateral is sufficient if it reasonably identifies what is described....

...Dickason v. Marine National Bank of Naples, 898 So.2d 1170, 1173 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.2005). Florida law therefore requires that the security agreement contain a description of the collateral sufficient to “reasonably identify] what is described.” Fla. Stat. § 679.1081 (1)....

...One of the requirements of creating a security interest enforceable against a debtor and third parties with respect to given collateral is that "[t]he debtor has authenticated a security agreement that provides a description of the collateral." § 679.2031(2)(c)1., Fla. Stat. (2008). Section 679.1081, Florida Statutes (2008), controls the sufficiency of description of collateral and provides in pertinent part: (1) Except as otherwise provided herein and in subsections (3), (4), and (5), a description of personal ......

...o perfect. Under section 679.203 1, Florida Statutes, a security interest in collateral is not enforceable against the debtor until, among other things, the debtor has authenticated a security agreement that describes the collateral. 14 According to section 679.1081, Florida Statutes, a description of personal property in a security agreement is sufficient if “it reasonably identifies what is described.” 15 As the comment to that section puts it, a description of collateral is sufficient if “the description does the job assigned to it: it makes possible the identification of the thing described.” 16 Section 679.1081 then goes on to provide six methods of reasonably identifying collateral: (i) specifically listing the collateral; (ii) listing the collateral by category; (iii) listing the collateral by a type defined in the UCC; (iv) listing the c...

...r signs “a security agreement that provides a description of the col- lateral.” Fla. Stat. § 679.2031(2)(c). A general description of the type of collateral is sufficient in most cases. See id. §§ 679.1021(pp), 679.1081(1). But for commercial tort claims, a creditor’s security interest will not attach unless the security agreement explicitly de- scribes the commercial tort claim. See id. § 679.1081(5)(a)....

...Stat. § 679.1021(m). Second, Sunz did not have a security interest in Pay- roll’s commercial tort claims because its security agreement did not describe commercial tort claims as collateral, much less specifically describe them. See id. § 679.1081(5)(a)....

...Because Sunz and Payroll’s security agreement did not describe commercial tort claims as col- lateral, Sunz’s security interest had not attached to Payroll’s BP claim when the Service’s tax lien perfected. See Fla. Stat. § 679.1081(5)(a)....

...all assets" are insufficient as a matter of law. See Davis v. Kisko (In re McKeon), 7 B.R. 10 (Bankr.N.D.Fla.1980). Such generalized descriptions remain insufficient as a matter of law under the version of the UCC currently in effect. See Fla. Stat. § 679.1081(3) ("A description of collateral as `all the debtor's assets' or `all of the debtor's personal property' or using words of similar import does not reasonably identify the collateral for purposes of the security agreement.")....

...nd is enforce *785 able against the debtor and third parties if 1) the secured party has given value; 2) the debtor has rights in the collateral; and '3) there is an authenticated security agreement that describes the collateral. 24 Florida Statutes § 679.1081 governs sufficiency of descriptions of collateral for creation of a security interest; its requirement is clear: “a description of personal or real property is sufficient, whether or not it is specific, if it reasonably identifies what...

...he collateral if it contains the UCC’s defined categories, quantity, computational or alloca-tional formulas or procedures, or any other method “if the identity of the collateral is objectively determinable.” 26 The combination of Fla. Stat. §§ 679.1081 (3) and 679.2031 makes it clear that because the Defendant and Debtors described the collateral as “all of Maker’s assets,” the promissory note was insufficient to create a security interest in favor of the Defendant that attached and is enforceable against the Debtor or the Plaintiff. Fla. Stat. §§ 679.1081 (3) provides: A description of collateral as “all the debtor’s assets” or “all the debtor’s personal property” or using words of similar import does not reasonably identify the collateral for purposes of the security agreement. 27 The Defendant argues that language in one sentence of Official Comment 2 to Fla. Stat. § 679.1081 should alter this outcome: “The purpose of requiring a description of collateral in a security agreement under Section 9-203 is evidentiary.” 28 Focusing on the word “evidentiary,” the Defendant asserts that a super-generic description like the one here does not, by itself, render a security agreement invalid or unenforceable. The fallacy of this argument is apparent upon a reading of all of Comment 2, rather than the single sentence selected by the Defendant. Comment 2 to § 679.1081, in its entirety, states: The purpose of requiring’ a description of collateral in a security agreement under Section [679.2031] is evidentiary....

...ral possible. Under § 679.2031, an enforceable security interest is created only if all elements are present, including an authenticated security agreement with a description of the collateral. 30 If the description is explicitly insufficient under § 679.1081, it is axiomat *786 ic that the description cannot meet the requirements of § 679.2031....

...is enforceable under Florida’s UCC, the third-requirement for creation of a security interest is missing. Because no security interest was created, the Defendant has no security interest to enforce. Parol Evidence Despite the clarity of Fla. Stat. § 679.1081 (3), the Defendant maintains that the first sentence of Official Comment 2 requires this Court to permit him to introduce parol evidence to prove that he and the Debtors intended for him to have a security interest in the Debtors’ personal property, including TZ I....

...s. It is designed to document the intent of the parties concerning the creation of the security interest and to eliminate parol evidence to prove the intent, 45 The First Circuit Court of Appeals, analyzing the Massachusetts equivalent of Fla. Stat. § 679.1081 , ruled similarly: The draftsmen of the UCC ascribed two purposes to [the] requirement [for a formal security agreement]....

...hedules filed by the Debtors in their Chapter 7 case. . At the hearing, the Defendant asserted that this Court cannot grant the relief the Plaintiff seeks — a summary judgment that renders his security interest unenforceable — because Fla. Stat. § 679.1081 does not contain a consequence for non-compliance. This assertion is partially correct: the consequence is not built into Fla. Stat. § 679.1081 , it is contained in § 679.2031....

...Summers, Uniform Commercial Code §§ 23-2 to 23-3 (6th ed.2010). The only record proof that the Defendant gave value for the security interest is in the Defendant’s affidavit. Doc. 42-1, at 1. The Plaintiff has not contested the Defendant's testimony on this point. . Id. § 679.1081(1) (emphasis added). . Id. § 679.1081(2) (emphasis added). Section 679.1081 sets forth exceptions to this general rule not applicable here. . Id. § 679.1081(3). . Id. § 679.1081 cmt....

...Because creation of a security interest requires an adequate description of collateral, the best interpretation of the quoted language from Crews and Ford v. Feldman, then, would require a statutorily-approved description before a third party could not challenge the specificity of that description. Fla. Stat. §§ 679.1081 , 679.2031 (2014)....

...Under the section titled “Sufficiency of description” currently in effect, a description of collateral such as “all the debtor’s assets” or “all the debtor’s personal property” or words of similar import “does not reasonably identify the collateral for purposes of the security agreement.” § 679.1081(3), Fla....