CopyPublished | Florida 4th District Court of Appeal
...Milton N. Whynes (“Whynes”) appeals the dismissal of his complaint
against American Security Insurance Company (“ASIC”) and Wells Fargo
Bank, N.A. (“Wells Fargo”). The complaint alleged a violation of a
consumer protection statute, section 626.9551(1)(d), Florida Statutes
(2015), and sought a declaratory judgment....
...allegations contained in the complaint, we affirm.
Whynes, a borrower, challenges the exchange of information between
his mortgagee bank, Wells Fargo, and the servicer that monitors required
levels of insurance on its mortgaged properties, ASIC, pursuant to section
626.9551(1)(d)....
...Whynes alleges that, in exchange for this mortgage
monitoring service, ASIC has the exclusive right to impose “force-placed
insurance” 1 on the Wells Fargo properties if the properties become
uninsured through lapses or otherwise under-insured.
Underlying this action is section 626.9551(1)(d)’s provision that no
person may use or provide to others insurance information required to be
disclosed by a borrower to a lending institution in connection with a loan
“for the purpose of soliciting the sale of insurance” without the borrower’s
consent. (Emphasis added). Whynes alleged that, despite his
maintenance of insurance, ASIC force-placed insurance on Whynes’ home.
Further, he essentially alleged a specific violation of section 626.9551(1)(d)
in that ASIC used Whynes’ information to solicit the sale of a force-placed
insurance policy to Wells Fargo....
...Fargo may not provide any more protected information to ASIC.
ASIC and Wells Fargo separately moved to dismiss, alleging, among
other things, that Whynes failed to state a cause of action: He did not
allege a “solicitation” within the meaning of section 626.9551(1)(d) since
his insurance was force-placed and Whynes, the borrower, was not directly
solicited. The trial court agreed and dismissed the complaint.
Accordingly, the issue before this court is whether section
626.9551(1)(d) requires the prohibited solicitation to be directed to a
borrower. We agree with the trial court that it does and, because there is
no binding authority interpreting section 626.9551(1)(d), we offer our
interpretation.
It is a fundamental principle of statutory interpretation that
legislative intent is the “polestar” that guides this Court’s
interpretation....
...intent.” State v. Webb,
398 So.
2d 820, 824-25 (Fla. 1981). Further, “[a] phrase must be viewed in the
context of the entire statutory section.” WFTV, Inc. v. Wilken,
675 So. 2d
674, 678 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996).
Turning to the subject statute, section
626.9551 is part of Florida’s
Unfair Insurance Trade Practices Act, see section
626.951(2), Florida
Statutes (2015), and is entitled “Favored agent or insurer; coercion of
debtors.” The statute provides in relevant part:
(1) No p...
...conditions of
insurance coverage, insurance claims, and insurance history
provided by the customer. The opportunity to object to the
use of insurance information must be in writing and must be
clearly and conspicuously made.
§ 626.9551, Fla. Stat. (emphasis added).
The trial court did not err because the plain language of section
626.9551 indicates its prohibition of solicitations made directly to
borrowers....
...with an unsophisticated party such as an individual borrower, not a
situation in which two sophisticated financial entities are dealing with one
another, such as when a bank purchases a force-placed insurance policy
from an insurer. The other subsections within section 626.9551 also
support this conclusion, as they largely contemplate direct dealings with
borrowers and/or customers. See, e.g., § 626.9551(1)(a)-(b) (prohibiting a
3
lender from conditioning a loan on a borrower obtaining an insurance
policy through a particular insurer and prohibiting the rejection of a
requisite insurance policy beca...
...Affirmed.
LEVINE and KLINGENSMITH, JJ., concur.
LEVINE, J., concurs specially with opinion, in which KLINGENSMITH, J.,
concurs.
LEVINE, J., concurring specially.
I concur with the majority opinion that the trial court correctly found
that the text of section 626.9551(1)(d), Florida Statutes, was inapplicable
to the facts of this case....
CopyPublished | District Court, M.D. Florida | 2012 WL 2585188, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 91831
...(“Pratt Aff.”), Doc. 78-Ex. 6, ¶ 7. Defendant maintains that pursuant to the Anti-Coercion Statute, Eastern Financial was required to allow the SFP borrowers to designate the closing agent, and they selected Marrero. Doc. 65, p. 12; Fla. Stat. § 626.9551 ....
...ts were properly executed” is an overreach of the terms in the actual Retainer Letter. Doc. 76, pp. 17-18. . Again, Plaintiff has not made this allegation in the SAC, but rather raises it in response to Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment. . Section 626.9551 provides in pertinent part: (1) No person may: (a) Require, as a condition precedent or condition subsequent to the lending of money or extension of credit or any renewal thereof, that the person to whom such money or credit is exten...
