...nd that that portion of the rule prescribing a fourteen-day period after receipt of actual notice exceeded the permissible scope of DER’s rule-making authority. The City’s argument is that the validity of rule 17-103.155 must be measured against section
403.815, Florida Statutes (1989), and that publication pursuant to section
403.815 is the exclusive means of providing notice of a pending application. 1 *209 We do not agree with the City’s contention. Section
403.815 refers to, and must be read in conjunction with, section 120.-60(1) which, in turn, incorporates section
120.57(1)(b)2. Section
120.57(1)(b)2 calls for “reasonable notice.” We conclude that the purpose of section
403.815 is merely to amplify the notice provisions of section
120.57(1)(b)2 by providing that reasonable notice under section
120.57(1)(b)2 may, and in some cases must, include notice by publication. We do not agree with the City that the rule exceeds the scope of DER’s rule-making authority. We see no reason to conclude that the legislature in enacting section
403.815 intended to depart from the general rule that actual notice is not only an appropriate method of providing notice but is generally the primary method of accomplishing notice of impending action to an interested or affected person or entity....
...The parties do not identify, nor has our research revealed, a prior case deciding the issue the City raises; but City of St. Cloud v. Dep’t of Environmental Regulation,
490 So.2d 1356 (Fla. 5th DCA 1986), seems to have assumed the validity of rule 17-103.155. Affirmed. FRANK and ALTENBERND, JJ., concur. . Section
403.815 reads as follows: Public notice; waiver of hearings....
