Florida/Georgia Personal Injury & Workers Compensation

...titute negligence per se. DeJesus, 281 So.2d at 201. Violations of all other statutes, i.e., statutes designed to protect the public in general, are only considered prima facie evidence of negligence. Id. Section 384.34(1) provides that violation of section 384.24 constitutes a first-degree misdemeanor. Section 384.24 makes it unlawful to knowingly transmit a sexually transmissible disease....

...significant social, health, and economic costs, including infant and maternal mortality, temporary and lifelong disability, and premature death. § 384.22, Fla. Stat. (1989). Thus, we find that if a plaintiff is able to file a complaint that tracks section 384.24, that plaintiff will have presented prima facie evidence of negligence, not absolute proof of negligence....

...In other words, in order to state a cognizable cause of action for negligent transmission of a sexually transmissible disease, a plaintiff must allege that the defendant knew he or she was infected with one of the sexually transmissible diseases enumerated in section 384.24, that the defendant had been informed that said disease could be communicated through sexual intercourse, and that the defendant had sexual intercourse with the plaintiff without informing the plaintiff of the presence of the disease a...

...ances. Of course, if the defendant establishes that the plaintiff was engaged in an illegal act at the time he or she contracted the disease, this will bar any recovery. Since Gabriel's complaint fails to set forth the allegations necessary to track section 384.24, Florida Statutes (1989), it does not state a cognizable cause of action....

...Yarnell of Gilbert|Yarnell, Palm Beach Gardens, for appellee. GROSS, J. The circuit court dismissed appellant Yulia Forest Kohl’s claim of negligent transmission of a sexually transmissible disease with prejudice for her failure to track the language of section 384.24, Florida Statutes (2013)....

...Gabriel v. Tripp, 576 So. 2d 404 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991), that a civil cause of action for negligent -2- transmission of a sexually transmissible disease is cognizable only where the plaintiff tracks the language of section 384.24, Florida Statutes (2013). To satisfy the statute, the former husband contended that the former wife was required to allege (1) that he had actual knowledge he “was infected with one of the sexually transmissible diseases enumerated in section 384.24” and (2) that he “had been informed that said disease could be communicated through sexual intercourse.” The former husband argued the complaint alleged “no basis for asserting [he] ‘knew’ he had HPV.” The circuit court dismissed the negligence count with prejudice, due primarily to the former wife’s failure to “track the allegations required for a civil action predicated upon § 384.24 Florida Statutes.” Classifying the matter as an “attempt to create a new cause of action,” the trial court explained that “Florida courts have required plaintiffs to strictly track th[e] statute.” Thus, the former wife failed to s...

...1999); Long v. Adams, 333 S.E.2d 852, 854-55 (Ga. Ct. App. 1985); Doe v. Johnson, 817 F. Supp. 1382, 1393 (W.D. Mich. 1993). -4-  This limitation on a common law cause of action derives from the application of section 384.24, Florida Statutes (2013), a criminal statute that makes it a first-degree misdemeanor to knowingly transmit certain sexually transmissible diseases....

...another person through sexual intercourse, to have sexual intercourse with any other person, unless such other person has been informed of the presence of the sexually transmissible disease and has consented to the sexual intercourse. § 384.24(1), Fla. Stat. (2013). In Gabriel, the Second District ostensibly made tracking section 384.24 a necessary component to a claim for negligent transmission of a sexually transmissible disease. There, the trial court dismissed a negligence suit in which the plaintiff attempted to track the language of section 384.24 and alleged she contracted genital herpes after engaging in sexual intercourse with the defendant. 576 So. 2d at 404. The Second District agreed with the plaintiff that “such a negligence cause of action is cognizable in Florida.” Id. However, the court disagreed that a violation of section 384.24 constitutes negligence per se, holding that the statute is “not designed to protect a particular class of persons, but rather the public in general.” Id. at 405. With that ruling, we do not disagree. From this determination, the Second District explained “that if a plaintiff is able to file a complaint that tracks section 384.24, that plaintiff will have presented prima facie evidence of negligence, not absolute proof of negligence.” Id....

...transmission of a sexually transmissible disease, a plaintiff must allege that the defendant knew he or she was infected with one of the sexually transmissible diseases enumerated in -5-  section 384.24, that the defendant had been informed that said disease could be communicated through sexual intercourse, and that the defendant had sexual intercourse with the plaintiff without informing the plaintiff of the presence of the disease and without securing the plaintiff's consent to sexual intercourse under such circumstances. Id. (emphasis added). Since the plaintiff in that case “fail[ed] to set forth the allegations necessary to track section 384.24, Florida Statutes (1989),” the court held she failed “state a cognizable cause of action.” Id. We disagree with Gabriel’s broad holding that section 384.24 exclusively controls the elements of the negligence cause of action to which it applies....

...or is so repugnant to the common law that the two cannot coexist.” Thornber v. City of Fort Walton Beach, 568 So. 2d 914, 918 (Fla. 1990). Therefore, in a case of common law negligence based on the transmission of a sexually transmissible disease, section 384.24 does not exclusively delineate the elements of the cause of action. Nor are the diseases specified in section 384.24 the only diseases that might form the basis of a negligence cause of action; even though HPV is not one of the diseases enumerated in the statute, its transmission could still form the basis of a common law negligence claim. A violation of section 384.24 is evidence of negligence, not a catalog of the required elements of the cause of action....

...body of law.” Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Cal. State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 533 n.28 (1983). The common law “‘must keep pace with changes in our society’ and ‘may [even] be altered when the 2 We note that, as a criminal statute, section 384.24 requires proof that a person “know[ ] he or she is infected with one or more” of the enumerated diseases and that “such person has been informed that he or she may communicate this disease to another person through sexual interco...

...Plaintiff argues that it has no duty to defend or indemnify under the policy because the allegations of the underlying counterclaim show that McGinnis' alleged injuries resulted from Welsh's intentional and/or criminal conduct. In support, plaintiff relies upon Fla.Stat. § 384.24 and a policy provision excluding coverage for intentional or criminal acts reasonably expected to result in the alleged injury. Defendants argue that the policy exclusion only applies where the sustained injury "may reasonably be expected to result" from the criminal act. Defendants argue that Welsh's violation of section 384.24 alone does not result in the exclusion of coverage as the counterclaim alleges negligent conduct by Welsh and not intentional acts....

...All doubts as to whether a duty to defend exists must be resolved against the insurer and in favor of the insured. Grissom v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 610 So.2d 1299, 1307 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992); rev. denied, 621 So.2d 1065 (Fla.1993). The counterclaim alleges the elements set forth in Florida Statute section 384.24....

...precautions to prevent transmitting HIV to McGinnis during their sexual relations; (d) he engaged in sexual relations with McGinnis during the years 1990 and 1991; and (e) as a proximate result of Welsh's negligence, McGinnis was infected with HIV. Section 384.24 provides in relevant part: It is unlawful for any person who has ......

...disease to another person through sexual intercourse, to have sexual intercourse with any other person, unless such person has been informed of the presence of the sexually transmissible disease and has consented to the sexual intercourse. Fla.Stat. § 384.24....

...However, the policy does not cover "any bodily injury or property damage which may reasonably be expected to result from the intentional or criminal acts of an insured person or which is in fact intended by an insured person." (Dkt. 1, Exh. A, p. 17). Plaintiff alleges that Welsh's actions violated Fla.Stat. § 384.24....

...through sexual intercourse, it was unlawful for Welsh to have sexual intercourse with McGinnis because he failed to inform McGinnis that he was HIV-positive and then receive his consent to sexual intercourse. The counterclaim tracks the language of section 384.24 and alleges a criminal act on the part of Welsh....

...T.F., 528 N.W.2d 869 (Minn.1995) (transmission of herpes through unprotected sexual intercourse substantially certain to occur and did in fact occur, thus, intentional as a matter of law). When evaluating the counterclaim in conjunction with the policy provisions, Welsh's criminal acts under section 384.24 were reasonably expected to result in the harm sustained by McGinnis....

...The fact that the counterclaim alleges negligent transmission of HIV as opposed to intentional acts does not defeat plaintiff's motion for summary judgment. Defendants' reliance on Gabriel v. Tripp, 576 So.2d 404 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991) where the court held that a properly pled section 384.24 constitutes a prima facie case of negligence is misplaced. Under the policy, there is no coverage when the harm "may reasonably be expected to result" from the criminal or intentional act. Because this court finds that specific intent is not required under the policy exclusion, the fact that section 384.24 is not a specific intent crime has no bearing on the analysis....

...Because we have decided the case based on the language of the policy, we do not reach the other grounds relied upon by the circuit court — the application of the pokey’s exclusions for intentional acts and for liability statutorily imposed on any insured. See § 384.24, Fla....

...Determining that the information sufficiently alleges unlawful *441 sexual intercourse by a person knowingly infected with the human immunodeficiency virus (HIV), we reverse. The defendant was charged with one count of unlawful sexual intercourse by a person knowingly infected with HIV, as prohibited by sections 384.24(2) and 384.34(5), Florida Statutes (2008). The defendant filed a motion to dismiss the information, contending that sexual intercourse, as that term is used in section 384.24(2), takes place only when the female sex organ is penetrated by the male sex organ and, therefore, the statute did not apply to the defendant’s alleged conduct, which involved homosexual oral and anal sex. After considering the argument of counsel, the trial court granted the motion and entered a dismissal order. The State contends that dismissal was not warranted in this case. We agree. The defendant was charged with violating section 384.24(2), which reads: 384.24....

...intercourse as including vaginal intercourse and sexual union between humans involving genital contact other then vaginal penetration by the penis). As such, we conclude that the plain and ordinary meaning of the term sexual intercourse, as used in section 384.24(2), includes vaginal, anal, and oral intercourse between persons, regardless of their gender....

...legislature regardless of whether such construction varies from the statute’s literal meaning. In other words, criminal statutes are not to be so strictly construed as to emasculate the statute and defeat the obvious intention of the legislature. Section 384.24(2) falls within chapter 384, which is entitled the Control of Sexually Transmissible Disease Act....

...ithin which State officials can address the rapidly changing medical knowledge about sexually transmissible diseases, in an effort to efficiently and effectively reduce the incidence of such diseases in Florida. The portion of the Act at issue here, section 384.24(2), addresses the transmission of HIV through sexual contact....

...intent to efficiently and effectively reduce the incidence of sexually transmitted diseases in Florida. In dismissing the information, the trial court cited L.A.P. v. State, 62 So.3d 693 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011). In that case, the defendant contended that section 384.24(2) requires proof of sexual intercourse between a man and a woman, and thus, the statute did not apply to the homosexual sex acts she was charged with committing....

...transmissible diseases encompasses conduct beyond penile-vaginal intercourse. We have for review State v. Debaun, 129 So. 3d 1089, 1095 (Fla. 3d DCA 2013), in which the Third District Court of Appeal held that the term “sexual intercourse” as used in section 384.24(2), Florida Statutes (2011), encompasses conduct beyond penile-vaginal intercourse, including oral and anal intercourse between two men. The Third District certified that its decision is in direct conflict with L.A.P. v. State, 62 So. 3d 693, 694-95 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011), in which the Second District held that the term “sexual intercourse” as used in section 384.24(2) applies only to “the penetration of the female sex organ by the male sex organ.” We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const. Because we conclude that the term “sexual intercourse” in section 384.24(2) encompasses conduct beyond penile- vaginal intercourse, we approve the decision of the Third District in Debaun and disapprove the decision of the Second District in L.A.P. I. BACKGROUND In 2011, Gary G. Debaun was charged with violating section 384.24(2), Florida Statutes (2011), which provides: It is unlawful for any person who has human immunodeficiency virus infection, when such person knows he or she is infected with this disease and when such person h...

...learned that Debaun had forged his doctor’s signature on the lab -2- report and was in fact HIV positive. Id. C.M. reported the crime and assisted law enforcement in obtaining admissions from Debaun during a controlled phone call. Debaun was subsequently charged with violating section 384.24(2), a third-degree felony.1 Debaun moved to dismiss the charge under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.190(c)(4), arguing that the term “sexual intercourse,” which is not defined in chapter 384, applies only to penetration of the female sex organ by the male sex organ. Id. at 1091. The trial court granted Debaun’s motion to dismiss based on the decision of the Second District in L.A.P., 62 So. 3d at 694-95, which held that the term “sexual intercourse” in section 384.24(2) applies only to penile- vaginal intercourse between a male and a female. Id. The State appealed. Id. On appeal, the Third District rejected the holding of L.A.P. and concluded that the “meaning of the term ‘sexual intercourse’ as used in section 384.24(2) includes more than an act where a male’s penis is placed inside a female’s vagina, and encompasses the oral and anal sexual activity” in which Debaun engaged with the victim. Id. at 1095. The court reversed the order dismissing the charge against Debaun and certified conflict with L.A.P. Id. 1. See § 384.34(5), Fla. Stat. (2011) (“Any person who violates s. 384.24(2) commits a felony of the third degree . . . . Any person who commits multiple violations of s. 384.24(2) commits a felony of the first degree . . . .”). -3-  In reaching its conclusion that section 384.24(2) applied to conduct beyond penile-vaginal intercourse, the Third District ascertained the plain and ordinary meaning of “sexual intercourse” from an edition of Webster’s Third New International Dictionary that was published the same year that section 384.24(2) was enacted, defining “sexual intercourse” as either “heterosexual intercourse involving penetration of the vagina by the penis” or “intercourse involving genital contact between individuals other than penetration of the vagina by the penis.” Id. at 1091 (citing Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 2082 (1986)). Having determined that “the plain and ordinary meaning of the term ‘sexual intercourse’ as used in section 384.24(2) includes more than an act where a male’s penis is placed inside a female’s vagina” and recognizing that it would thwart legislative intent to interpret the statute as prohibiting only penetration of the vagina by the penis, the court concluded that Debaun “engaged in acts which fall within the plain and ordinary meaning of the term ‘sexual intercourse’ as used in section 384.24(2).” Id....

...th any female.” § 384.02, Fla. Stat. (1985), repealed by ch. 86-220, § 91, Laws of Fla. In 1986, when the Venereal Diseases Act was repealed and replaced by the Control of Sexually Transmissible Disease Act, and section 384.02 was replaced by section 384.24, the application of the Act was expanded from only sexual intercourse between “any female . . . with any male person” and “any male person . . . with any female” to sexual intercourse between “any person . . . with any other person.” Compare § 384.02, Fla. Stat. (1985), with § 384.24, Fla....

....” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting § 826.04, Fla. Stat. (2008)). Based on this definition, the Second -5- District concluded that the Legislature’s use of the term “sexual intercourse within section 384.24(2) is clear[ly] and unambiguous[ly]” limited to heterosexual penile- vaginal intercourse, and therefore “the statute d[id] not apply to [L.A.P.’s] actions”—“engaging in oral sex and digital penetration of the vagina without informing her partner of her HIV positive status.” Id. at 694-95. During the pendency of Debaun’s appeal, the Fifth District also considered the scope of the term “sexual intercourse” in section 384.24(2). See State v. D.C., 114 So. 3d 440 (Fla. 5th DCA), review dismissed, 123 So. 3d 557 (Fla. 2013) (table). Like Debaun, the defendant in D.C. was charged with violating section 384.24(2) after engaging in oral and anal intercourse with another man without first disclosing that he was HIV positive. Id. at 441. D.C. moved to dismiss the charge, “contending that sexual intercourse, as that term is used in section 384.24(2), takes place only when the female sex organ is penetrated by the male sex organ and, therefore, the statute did not apply to [his] alleged conduct, which involved homosexual oral and anal sex” between two men....

...of the definitions uncovered by the court or cited by D.C. limited “sexual intercourse” to “heterosexual vaginal intercourse.” Id. The Fifth District therefore concluded that “the plain and ordinary meaning of the term sexual intercourse, as used in section 384.24(2), includes vaginal, anal, and oral intercourse between persons, regardless of their gender.” Id....

...ANALYSIS In the analysis that follows, we first consider the plain and ordinary meaning of the term “sexual intercourse” and conclude that it is not limited to only penile- vaginal intercourse. We then conclude that the plain and ordinary meaning of “sexual intercourse” controls in section 384.24(2) because it effectuates the legislative intent of the statute....

...s Court’s jurisdiction, the case was dismissed. D.C. v. State, 123 So. 3d 557 (Fla. 2013) (table). -7- provided in the incest statute and referenced in the case law cited in L.A.P. are not applicable to section 384.24(2). The narrow issue before the Court is whether the term “sexual intercourse” as used in section 384.24(2) is limited to conduct involving the penetration of the female sex organ by the male sex organ or whether it encompasses conduct beyond penile-vaginal intercourse....

...effectively with reducing the incidence of sexually transmissible diseases, and provides patients with a secure knowledge that information they provide will remain private and confidential. § 384.22, Fla. Stat. (2011) (emphasis added). Within the Act, section 384.24(2) seeks to further the Legislature’s intent to reduce the incidence of sexually transmissible diseases by making it unlawful for any person with HIV to knowingly expose another person to HIV through sexual intercourse without...

...ctions, as well as the majority of all people (55%) living with HIV in the United States as of 2013. Id. When the plain meaning of the term “sexual intercourse”—which includes oral and anal intercourse between two men—is applied to section 384.24(2), the statute acts to prohibit HIV-positive individuals from engaging in the sexual acts that are most likely to transmit the infection to a sexual partner without informing the partner of the presence of the infection and obtaini...

...the intercourse despite the presence of the infection. This is a reasonable result, - 11 - which gives full effect to the Legislature’s intent to reduce the incidence of HIV. Thus, the plain meaning of the term controls in section 384.24(2). Lastly, we explain why although “[i]n the absence of a statutory definition, it is permissible to look to case law or related statutory provisions that define the term,” L.A.P., 62 So....

...3d at 694 (alteration in original) (quoting State v. Brake, 796 So. 2d 522, 528 (Fla. 2001)), the definitions of “sexual intercourse” provided in the incest statute and referenced in the cases cited by the Second District in L.A.P. are not applicable to section 384.24(2). First, when a court looks to other statutory provisions to define a term that lacks its own statutory definition, the provision to which a court looks must be related to the provision lacking a definition....

...1st DCA 1989)); see also Carnes v. State, 725 So. 2d 417, 418 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999) (“The obvious purpose of the incest statute is to address the evil of sexual intercourse between persons who are related to each other within specific degrees.”). Section 384.24(2), which is located in a different chapter and under a - 12 - different title than the incest statute, addresses a separate evil and is not related to the incest statute. Second, application of the definition of “sexual intercourse” provided in the incest statute (“penetration of the female sex organ by the male sex organ”) to section 384.24(2) would fail to give full effect to the statute and the legislative intent of chapter 384 by excluding from the statute’s ambit both the type of sexual intercourse with the highest risk of communicating HIV and the category of in...

...vaginal, anal, and oral intercourse, and is in fact most likely to be spread through anal intercourse—it would be absurd for the term “sexual intercourse” to apply only to the act of heterosexual penile-vaginal intercourse. If the Legislature intended to exclude from section 384.24(2) knowing and unconsented exposure to HIV through oral or anal sexual intercourse, it could have provided a specific and limited definition of “sexual intercourse,” just as it did in the incest statute. In addition to the incest statute, the Second District in L.A.P. relied on four cases in support of its conclusion that the definition of “sexual intercourse” provided in the incest statute limits the use of the term in section 384.24(2) to penile-vaginal intercourse....

...2d 178 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983), decision quashed, 464 So. 2d 1192 (Fla. 1985), merely relied on the - 14 - definition in Williams. None of those cases compel us to impose a limitation on the application of section 384.24(2) to only penile-vaginal intercourse....

...The term “sexual intercourse” is commonly understood to broadly refer to various sexual acts—including the sexual act at issue here. In certain contexts, the term refers specifically—that is, more narrowly—to penile-vaginal intercourse. But in the context of section 384.24(2), “sexual intercourse” unambiguously denotes sexual conduct that includes acts of oral and anal intercourse. III. CONCLUSION - 15 -  The term “sexual intercourse” in section 384.24(2) encompasses conduct beyond heterosexual penile-vaginal intercourse....

BLACK, Judge. L.A.P. challenges her judgment and sentence for violating section 384.24(2), Florida Statutes (2008), which makes it a third-degree felony for any person with knowledge that she is infected with HIV to have sexual intercourse with another person without informing the other person of her status as HIV positive....

...We must determine whether the trial court erred in denying L.A.P.’s motion to dismiss the charge on the basis that L.A.P.’s actions — engaging in oral sex and digital penetration of the vagina without informing her partner of her HIV positive status — violated section 384.24(2). 1 Because section 384.24(2) requires sexual intercourse, we agree with L.A.P....

...3d DCA 1983) (defining sexual intercourse as “ ‘actual contact of the sexual organs’ of two persons and penetration of the body of another” (quoting Williams v. State, 109 So. at 306 )), overruled on other grounds by State v. Lanier, 464 So.2d 1192 (Fla.1985). The meaning of sexual intercourse within section 384.24(2) is clear and unambiguous....

...not invade the province of the legislature and add words which change the plain meaning of the statute.’ ” Lanier, 443 So.2d at 183 (quoting Metro. Dade Cnty. v. Bridges, 402 So.2d 411, 414 (Fla.1981)). The legislature limited the application of section 384.24(2) to specific conduct....

...The legislature may, of course, amend the statute to broaden its application. See, e.g., § 796.08(4), Fla. Stat. (2008); § 827.071(l)(g). Accordingly, we reverse L.A.P.’s conviction and remand with directions that the trial court discharge her. CASANUEVA, C.J., and LaROSE, J., Concur. . Section 384.24(2) provides: It is unlawful for any person who has human immunodeficiency virus infection, when such person knows he or she is infected with this disease and when such person has been informed that he or she may communicate this diseas...

...Sanders, Assistant Public Defender, Bartow, for Appellant. Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Cerese Crawford Taylor, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, for Appellee. BLACK, Judge. L.A.P. challenges her judgment and sentence for violating section 384.24(2), Florida Statutes (2008), which makes it a third-degree felony for any person with knowledge that she is infected with HIV to have sexual intercourse with another person without informing the other person of her status as HIV positive....

...We must determine whether the trial court erred in denying L.A.P.'s motion to dismiss the charge on the basis that L.A.P.'s actions—engaging in oral sex and digital penetration of the vagina without informing her partner of her HIV positive status—violated section 384.24(2). [1] Because section 384.24(2) requires sexual intercourse, we agree with L.A.P....

...3d DCA 1983) (defining sexual intercourse as "`actual contact of the sexual organs' of two persons and penetration of the body of another" (quoting Williams v. State, 109 So. at 306)), overruled on other grounds by State v. Lanier, 464 So.2d 1192 (Fla.1985). The meaning of sexual intercourse within section 384.24(2) is clear and unambiguous....

...., the courts `may not invade the province of the legislature and add words which change the plain meaning of the statute.'" Lanier, 443 So.2d at 183 (quoting Metro. Dade Cnty. v. Bridges, 402 So.2d 411, 414 (Fla.1981)). The legislature limited the application of section 384.24(2) to specific conduct....

...The legislature may, of course, amend the statute to broaden its application. See, e.g., § 796.08(4), Fla. Stat. (2008); § 827.071(1)(g). Accordingly, we reverse L.A.P.'s conviction and remand with directions that the trial court discharge her. CASANUEVA, C.J., and LaROSE, J., Concur. NOTES [1] Section 384.24(2) provides: It is unlawful for any person who has human immunodeficiency virus infection, when such person knows he or she is infected with this disease and when such person has been informed that he or she may communicate this diseas...

WELLS, Judge. The State of Florida appeals from an order interpreting the term “sexual intercourse” as used in section 384.24(2) of the Florida Statutes (2011) as meaning only contact between the genitals of a man and a woman and dismissing the charges against the appellee, Gary G....

...Although the laboratory report Debaun provided showed that he was HIV negative, C.M. learned, after having engaged in mutual fellatio and penile-anal penetration by'Debaun, that Debaun was in fact HIV positive. Debaun subsequently was charged with violating section 384.24(2), which makes it a crime for anyone who knows that he or she is infected with HIV to engage in “sexual intercourse” with anyone unless that person *1091 has been informed of the infection and consents to such intercourse: It is u...

...cate this disease to another person through sexual intercourse, to have sexual intercourse with any other person, unless that person has been informed of the presence of the sexually transmissible disease and has consented to the sexual intercourse. § 384.24(2), Fla. Stat. (2011). Claiming that the term “sexual intercourse” as used in section 384.24(2) applies only to penetration of the female sex organ by the male sex organ, Debaun moved to dismiss the charges against him....

...ded to apply to “any form of sexual activity,” nonetheless dismissed the charges against Debaun because of our sister court’s decision in L.A.P. v. State, 62 So.3d 693 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011). Therein, the Second District held that, for purposes of section 384.24(2), “sexual intercourse” is an act where a male’s penis is placed inside a female’s vagina and therefore section 384.24(2) did not apply to the activities (oral sex and digital penetration between two women) involved there....

...The issue before us is one of statutory construction and is subject to de novo review. See Fla. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot. v. ContractPoint Fla. Parks, LLC, 986 So.2d 1260, 1264 (Fla.2008). While we need not determine whether the term “sexual intercourse” as used in section 384.24(2) encompasses any and all forms of sexual activity, including all of the activities (i.e., digital penetration) at issue in L.A.P., we do find that the term encompasses more than just penetration of the female sex organ by the male se...

...tions to ascertain the plain and ordinary meaning of a word. Id.; see also Sch. Bd. of Palm Beach Cnty. v. Survivors Charter Sch., Inc., 3 So.3d 1220, 1233 (Fla.2009). In this case, the dictionary definition of the term “sexual intercourse” when section 384.24 was enacted in 1986 is broader than just penetration of a vagina by a penis....

...r than penetration of the vagina by the penis Merriam Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 2082 (1986). Thus, De-baun and C.M. engaged in acts which fall within the plain and ordinary meaning of the term “sexual intercourse” as used in section 384.24(2)....

...To discern this intent, the Court looks ‘primarily 5 to the plain text of the relevant statute, and when the text is *1092 unambiguous, our inquiry is at an end.”) (citation omitted). Because we find that the plain and ordinary meaning of the term “sexual intercourse” as used in section 384.24(2) includes more than an act where a male’s penis is placed inside a female’s vagina, we need not, as did our sister court in L.A.P., look to case law defining this term as used in other statutes....

...Phillipe, 769 So.2d 961, 967 (Fla.2000)), and in such manner that it does not “render part of [the] statute meaningless.” Id. (quoting Forsythe v. Longboat Key Beach Erosion Control Dist., 604 So.2d 452, 456 (Fla.1992)). To this end, “sexual intercourse” must be read in the context of not only section 384.24, but also in the context of Chapter 384 as a whole....

...ion according to the general terms and intentions of the entire ... Act,” and that “it is axiomatic that we construe the statute as a whole entity ... in order to arrive at a construction which avoids illogical results”). Chapter 384, of which section 384.24(2) is a part, is titled the “Control of Sexually Transmissible Disease Act” and addresses the threat to the public posed by sexually transmitted diseases....

...efficiently and effectively with reducing the incidence of sexually transmissible diseases, and provides patients with a secure knowledge that information they provide will remain private and confidential. § 384.22, Fla. Stat. (2011). To this end, section 384.24(l)-(2) makes it unlawful for “any person” who has any of these diseases to have “sexual intercourse” with any “other person” without informing that person of the sexually transmissible disease....

...It also expanded its application from only sexual intercourse between “any female ... with any male person” and “any male person ... with any female,” to sexual intercourse between “any person ... with any other person.” Compare § 884.02, Fla. Stat. (1985) with § 384.24, Fla....

...le penetration — encompasses conduct beyond vaginal/penile penetration to include the conduct at issue here. We find that it does. Accordingly, because we conclude that the plain and ordinary meaning of the term “sexual intercourse” as used in section 384.24(2) includes more than an act where a male’s penis is placed inside a female’s vagina, and encompasses the oral and anal sexual activity involved here, we reverse the order on review and remand for reinstatement of the charges against Debaun....

...nce the Control of Sexually Transmissible Disease Act was enacted in 1986. When enacted, the Act referred to "human T-lymphotropic virus type III (HTLV-III) infection.” See Ch. 86-220, § 90, at 1677, Laws of Fla.; § 384.23(3), Fla. Stat. (1986); § 384.24, Fla....

...The Florida legislature amended the Act in 1988 to replace HTLV-III with "human immune deficiency virus infection [HIV],” and also added the element of consent by the uninfected person. See Ch. 88-380, § 26, at 2016, Laws of Fla.; § 384.23(3), Fla. Stat. (1988); § 384.24, Fla. Stat (1988). In 1997, the Florida legislature added subsections to section 384.24 that had not been there at its inception-placing HIV in subsection (2) and leaving all other sexually transmissible diseases in subsection (1). See Ch. 97-37, § 1, at 221-22, Laws of Fla. Beyond this change, the language in subsections (1) and (2) is identical. Id. At the same time, the legislature amended the penalties for violating section 384.24, upping the uniformed, unconsented transmission of HIV to a third degree felony and leaving the penalty for said transmission of the other diseases as a first degree misdemeanor....

...While this appeal was pending in this court, the Fifth District Court of Appeal issued its decision in State v. D.C., 114 So.3d 440 (Fla. 5th DCA 2013). That court employed a similar analysis to that set forth herein in finding that the term "sexual intercourse" as used in section 384.24(2) is not limited to heterosexual vaginal intercourse.